Nova Law Review Full Issue by unknown
Nova Law Review
Volume 15, Issue 3 1991 Article 18
Nova Law Review Full Issue
Copyright c©1991 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
1et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
NOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 15 SPRING 1991 NUMBER 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1990 SURVEY OF FLORIDA LAW
Arbitration ................................... Robert M . Jarvis 923
Bankruptcy ................................. Lawrence Kalevitch 933
Blue Sky Law ............................ Michael T. Murtaugh 953
Civil Procedure ........................... William VanDercreek 993
Criminal Law ............................... Pamela Cole Bell 1037
Constitutional Law ........................... David C. Hawkins 1049
Evidence ................................... Dale Alan Bruschi 1131
Juvenile Law .................................. M ichael'J. Dale 1169
Mediation .............................. Geraldine Lee Waxman 1211
and Sharon Press
Real Property ............................ Ronald Benton Brown 1227
Scientific Evidence ..................... Carol Henderson Garcia 1253
Torts .................................... M ichael L. Richmond 1285
Florida's New Business Corporation Act
The Financial Provisions of Florida's New
Business Corporation Act-The Model Act
with Anti-Takeover Twists ...................... David S. Felman 1319
Indemnification of Corporate Officers
and Directors ............................... Robert L. Jennings 1357
and Kenneth A. Horky
Notes and Comments
Note: The Personal Liability of Directors in
Florida: Whose Corporation is it Anyway?
.................................... Riah Ramlogan Seuradge 1389
Exceptions to Discharge: The Supreme Court
Adopts a Preponderance of the Evidence Standard
of Proof in Section 523 Proceedings ............... Andrew Kessler 1411
Florida v. Bostick: Voluntary Encounter or the
Power of Police Intimidation? . . . . . . . . . . Margaret Fanjul Montalvo 1435
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/18
Arbitration
Robert M. Jarvis*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of the Florida Arbitration Code ("FAC")' in
1957, the use of arbitration to resolve disputes has grown at a steady, if
not breathtaking, pace in Florida.' As may be expected, many of the
more perplexing issues concerning arbitration in the state have been
long since resolved by the courts. Nevertheless, case law continues to
develop as both the state and federal courts address new issues and
reanalyze old problems. This survey discusses such developments dur-
ing the period from October 1, 89 to September 30, 1990.For the most part, the opinions generated during the year under
review were a predictable reprise of previous decisions. Thus, while the
courts once again made it clear that they favor arbitration as a method
of resolving disputes,3"they were not adverse to adopting positions that
* Associate Professor of Law, Nova University, Shepard Broad Law Center
B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., University of Pennsylvania; LL.M., New York
University. Member of the Advisory Board of the World Arbitration and Mediation
Report and member of the respective panels of arbitrators of the American Arbitration
Association and the Maritime Arbitration Board, Inc.
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 682.01-.22 (1989).
2. A useful history of the growth of arbitration in Florida is contained in Com-
ment, Seeking Its Place in the Sun: Florida's Emerging Role in International Com-
mercial Arbitration, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 363, 367-70 (1987-88).
3. See, e.g., Gibson v. The Florida Bar, 906 F.2d 624, reh'g denied, 917 F.2d 570
(1 1th Cir. 1990) (bar association's decision to refer to arbitration all disputes involving
the use of compulsory membership dues held proper); United Paperworkers Int'l, Local
#395 v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 833 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (although federal law
contained six month statute of limitation, Florida's one year statute of limitation was
held applicable where it would serve important policy of promoting arbitration to re-
solve labor disputes); Feather Sound Country Club v. Barber, 567 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (courts must yield their jurisdiction when confronted with a valid
arbitration agreement); Mitchell v. School Bd. of Dade County, 566 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct.'App. 1990) (plaintiffs' tort claims were cognizable, if at all, only in arbitra-
tion); Thomson, Bohrer, Werth & Razook v. Multi Restaurant Concepts, 561 So. 2d
1192 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (pleading mistake by counsel did not affect party's
right to immediate review of trial court's decision denying motion to compel arbitra-
tion); Air Conditioning Equip. v. Rogers, 551 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (trial court had no authority to remove dispute from arbitration and submit it to
3
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weakened arbitration when they felt that larger principles were at
stake.' They insisted that valid arbitration agreements be enforced
fully,5 yet were adamant that parties not be referred to arbitration un-
less solid evidence existed that they had signed an arbitration agree-
ment.6 They demanded that the agreement clearly cover the specific
controversy, 7 and refused to order arbitration when they onsidered the
mediation).
4. See, e.g., Harbuck v. Marsh Block & Co., 896 F.2d 1327 (11th Cir. 1990)
(state court's decision as to appropriate forum for arbitration was not reviewable in
federal court); JDC (America) Corp. v. Amerifirst Florida Trust Co., 736 F. Supp.
1121 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (Federal Arbitration Act does not in itself confer subject matter
jurisdiction on the federal courts); Robert M. Swedroe, P.A. v. First Am. Inv. Corp.,
565 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (expert who testified at arbitration hear-
ing was not entitled to a mechanic's lien for his services); Allen v. Interstate See., 554
So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (once a party elects a forum for arbitration it
may not switch to a different forum without the consent of the opposing party); Anstis
Ornstein Assocs. v. Palm Beach County, 554 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App. 1989)
(although party had waited for months to raise statute of limitations defense, once the
defense was made arbitration had to be stayed until court could rule on the issue).
5. See, e.g., Prudential-Bache Sec. v. Goldin, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 95,397
(S.D. Fla. June 22, 1990) (arbitration clause in securities contract that used the term
"transactions" was meant to cover investors' total relationship with brokerage house
and would not be read to cover only matters affecting trading in investors' account);
Fernandez v. Smith Commercial Group, 560 So. 2d 1389 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(justice required president of company to be permitted to invoke arbitration agreement
even though agreement was actually between his company and another company);
deWindt v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 40 Fla. Supp. 2d 125 (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct.
1990) (fact that arbitration agreement was entered into by predecessor company did
not bar successor company from asserting its right to arbitrate dispute with employee).
6. See, e.g., Birchtree Fin. Servs. v. Lance, 561 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1990) (question of whether parties had entered into a valid arbitration agreement could
only be decided by trial court after full evidentiary hearing); Prudential-Bache Sec. v.
Greenspoon & Marder, P.A., 551 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (trial
court may enjoin arbitration proceeding if it finds that the parties did not agree to
arbitrate); Spitz v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 549 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (investors who claimed that they had been fraudulently induced to sign an arbi-
tration agreement were entitled to a new trial when jury's verdict on the question was
inconsistent and, as a result, incomprehensible).
7. " See, e.g., Kincaid Constr. Co. v. Worsham Underground Util. Constr., 566 So.
2d 600 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (arbitration agreement in construction contract
covered only disputes over price and did not include disputes arising from who was to
furnish equipment); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Banaszak, 561 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (arbitration agreement in insurance policy did not extend to question of
whether tortfeasor, who was not a party to the policy, had been negligent); McClure v.
Painewebber, Inc., 549 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (arbitration agree-
[Vol. 15
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dispute premature.' Although the 'courts continued to insist on a high
level of proof before finding that a party had waived its right to arbi-
tration,9 they again made it clear that a bankruptcy filing trumps an
arbitration agreement.' 0 And while they continued to defer to arbitra-
tors on matters involving hearing procedure," they refused to expand
the types of relief arbitrators may afford disputants.'" Finally, even as
the courts again showed great willingness to confirm arbitration
awards,' 3 they continued to be extremely cautious in enforcing the re-
ment in employment contract did not reach dispute involving separately negotiated
promissory note).
8. See Graham v. Friendly Ford, Inc., 552 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (indemnity claim involving landlord and tenant could not be sent to arbitration
until after court had determined whether underlying lease was valid).
9. See, e.g., Stone v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 898 F.2d 1542 (11th Cir. 1990) (party
that engaged in discovery for almost two years before seeking arbitration waived its
right to arbitration); Hardy Contractors v. Homeland Property Owners Ass'n, 558 So.
2d 543 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (party's decision to seek discovery after expressly
requesting that dispute be referred to arbitration warranted trial court's conclusion that
party had waived its right to arbitration).
10. See, e.g., In re Murray Indus., 114 Bankr. 749 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)
(automatic bankruptcy stay would not be lifted to permit arbitration to go forward
where claimant failed to demonstrate that exceptional circumstance justified such ac-
tion); In re Bicoastal Corp., 111 Bankr. 999 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (automatic bank-
ruptcy stay would be lifted so that contract price adjustment dispute could be submit-
ted to arbitration because matter required special expertise possessed by the arbitrator
and would not unduly interfere with the handling of the estate).
11. See Boudreau v. L.F. Rothschild & Co., No. 89-250-CIV-ORL-18 (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 23, 1990) (WESTLAW, 1990 WL 81861) (whether arbitration was to be
held in New York City or Orlando was question for the arbitrator). But see Latin Am.
Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Pastor, 561 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(trial court was justified in instructing arbitrators to specify nature of insured's dam-
ages because of insurer's previous actions).
12. See Complete Interiors, Inc. v. Behan, 558 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App.), rev. denied, 570 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 1990) (arbitrator exceeded his power by
awarding punitive damages where arbitration agreement did not expressly provide for
such damages).
13. See Carpet Concepts v. Architectural Concepts, 559 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (arbitration award must be confirmed except where statutory
grounds for vacating or modifying the award are shown to exist). But see Ainsworth v.
Skurnick, 909 F.2d 456 (11th Cir. 1990) (trial court may award damages denied by
arbitrator where party is entitled to such damages as a matter of law); Cone Corp. v.
State, 556 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (decision by State Arbitration
Board in dispute arising from the building of a state road was not consistent with the
plain meaning of the relevant regulation).
Jarvis
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sulting judgments. 4
The year, however, did not represent merely a retread of previ-
ously travelled terrain. Rather, at least one case, Fewox v. McMerit
Construction Co., 5 involving the often visited issue of attorneys' fees,
proved that sometimes the trip is more interesting than the destination.
To fully appreciate the decision, a brief review of the landscape is in
order.
II. BACKGROUND
Although arbitrators in Florida enjoy substantial discretion when
it comes to making awards, they are prohibited from granting attor-
neys' fees. Instead, the prevailing party in an arbitration may recover
its attorneys' fees only by making a post-award motion in circuit court.
This state of affairs is the result of section 682.11 of the FAC, which
reads as follows: "Unless otherwise provided in the agreement or provi-
sion for arbitration, the arbitrators' and umpire's expenses and fees,
together with other expenses, not including counsel fees, incurred in
the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as provided in the
award."16
Over the years, the bifurcation mandated by the FAC, while un-
wieldy, provoked little comment - that is, until 1988, when the Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal dropped an unexpected bombshell in Glen
Johnson, Inc. v. L.M. Howdeshell, Inc.'7
The facts of the case were simple. Glen Johnson, Inc. ("Johnson"),
a contractor on a construction project, had entered into a subcontract
with L.M. Howdeshell, Inc. ("Howdeshell"). When a dispute arose be-
tween the parties, Howdeshell filed a complaint against Johnson and
The American Insurance Company ("American"), the surety on John-
son's contractor's bond. The complaint sought damages as well as at-
torneys' fees, as provided in the surety agreement. Upon being served
with the complaint, Johnson and American moved to have the dispute
14. See, e.g., Ocala Breeders' Sales Co. v. Brunetti, 567 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1990) (arbitration award would not be deemed res judicata where party seek-
ing to invoke the award was dropped "from the style of the case"); Perez v. Great
Republic Ins. Co., 559 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (insured who re-
ceived arbitration award against its insurer would not be permitted to collect on the
award until after suit against the third party tortfeasor was concluded).
15. 556 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
16. FLA. STAT. § 682.11 (1989) (emphasis added).
17. 520 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
[Vol. 15
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submitted to arbitration.
The arbitrator to whom the case was referred dismissed
Howdeshell's claim without prejudice on the ground that it could not
be decided until after Johnson was paid by the construction project's
owner. In response, Howdeshell filed a motion with the circuit court in
which-it asked the court to either modify or vacate the award.
The motion was heard by Judge Crockett Farnell, who agreed
with Howdeshell. Finding that all of the conditions precedent to pay-
ment had been satisfied,18 he entered a final judgment for Howdeshell
in the amount of $20,762.60. Of this sum, $9,717.50 represented attor-
neys' fees incurred by Howdeshell in conducting its case before the
arbitrator.
Johnson and American appealed Judge Farnell's decision to the
Second District Court of Appeal. There, in a terse opinion authored by
Judge Edward F. Threadgill, Jr., with whom joined Chief Judge Paul
W. Danahy, Jr., and Judge Jack R. Schoonover, Sr., the court agreed
with Judge Farnell that Howdeshell was entitled to damages, but ruled
that it could not recover its attorneys' fees. 9 The panel explained its
decision by saying: "Attorney's fees for arbitration proceedings are ex-
pressly excluded by section 682.11, Florida Statutes (1985)."10 Despite
the remarkable nature of its conclusion, no authority was offered to
support this view, nor was any explanation provided as to why the court
was reversing summarily thirty years of precedent.
Ten months later, another panel of the Second District Court of
Appeal was faced with the same issue in St. Paul Fire & Marine In-
surance Co. v. Sample.2 Judith and Robert H. Sample had taken out
an automobile insurance policy with the St. Paul Fire and Marine In-
surance Company ("St. Paul"). Subsequently, Mrs. Sample was in-
volved in a car accident with an uninsured motorist and filed a claim
with St. Paul. When St. Paul informed the Samples that their policy
did not include uninsured motorist coverage, the Samples sought and
received an order directing St. Paul to submit the issue of coverage to
arbitration.
The arbitrators agreed with the Samples and awarded them
$19,230.77. The Samples then proceeded to court to recover their at-
torneys' fees and were awarded an additional $30,000 by Judge Wil-
18, Id. at 298.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 533 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
1991)
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liam L. Walker. St. Paul appealed.
On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal, in an opinion au-
thored by Judge Vincent T. Hall and joined in by Acting Chief Judge
James E. Lehan and Judge Jerry R. Parker, reversed Judge Walker.
Citing Glen Johnson, the panel issued an opinion as c:ryptic as its
predecessor's:
St. Paul's first contention in this appeal is that the trial judge erred
in including the hours the Samples' attorney spent on the arbitra-
tion proceeding in calculating the attorney's fee award because at-
torney's fees are not normally awarded for time spent in connection
with arbitration proceedings. This contention is correct.2"
III. Fewox v. McMerit Construction Co.
Although the Second District took it as self-evident in both Glen
Johnson and Sample that section 682.11 prohibited the recovery of at-
torneys' fees, in the months that followed no other appellate court in
Florida adopted Glen Johnson. 3 Thus, parties in the 'irst, Third,
Fourth, and Fifth Districts continued to be able to recover their attor-
neys' fees, while parties in the Second District found themselves left
out in the cold. And so matters stood in December 1989 when the Sec-
ond District decided Fewox.
Robert D. Fewox and the Adalia Condominium Partnership of
Florida ("Adalia") were the owners of a condominium built by the
McMerit Construction Company ("McMerit"), the predecessor of the
McCarthy Construction Company ("McCarthy"). After a controversy
22. Id. at 1197.
23. Indeed, in Zac Smith & Co. v. Moonspinner Condominium Ass'n, 534 So.
2d 739 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988), the First District Court of Appeal explicitly
rejected Glen Johnson by writing:
Appellants interpret this provision [FLA. STAT. § 682.11] to exclude the
award of attorneys fees in arbitration proceedings, relying on . . . Glen
Johnson, Inc. v. L.M. Howdeshell, Inc., 520 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA
1988).
We accept appellee's interpretation of section 682.11 as the more logi-
cal [position]. The statute does not proscribe attorney fees in arbitration
proceedings, but merely states that the arbitration panel is authorized to
award all fees and costs except attorney fees.
Id. at 742 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 15
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arose between the parties, Fewox and Adalia sued McMerit, McCar-
thy, and the Federal Insurance Company ("FIC"), which had issued a
performance bond. The defendants successfully moved for an order re-
ferring the case to arbitration.
The dispute was heard by the American Arbitration Association
and an award ultimately was issued against McCarthy for $185,888,35.
Upon receiving the award, the claimants filed a confirmation motion
and moved for attorneys' fees from FIC as provided in the performance
bond.
While the motions were pending, McCarthy voluntarily satisfied
the award.24 Judge Morton J. Hanlon subsequently denied the motion
for attorneys' fees on the basis of Glen Johnson. Fewox and Adalia
appealed to the Second District Court of Appeal.
In a lengthy en banc opinion, the Second District, speaking
through Judge Herboth S. Ryder, reversed the trial court and admitted
the obvious: Glen Johnson and Sample had gotten the law wrong.
Judge Ryder began the court's mea culpa by writing:
Upon a close examination of section 682.11 and the relevant case
law, we conclude that Glen Johnson and Sample were wrongly de-
cided insofar as they hold that the statute prohibits an award of
attorney's fees for services rendered by the attorney during arbitra-
tion proceedings. The "not including counsel fees" clause in section
682.11 merely indicates that an arbitrator may not include attor-
ney's fees in his award of expenses and fees incurred during arbi-
tration proceedings. . . . The legislature apparently eliminated at-
torney's fees from the subject matter jurisdiction of arbitration
because arbitrators are generally businessmen chosen for their ex-
pertise in the particular subject matter of the suit and have no ex-
pertise in determining what is a reasonable attorney's fee. ...
Thus, the intent of the statute is merely to prohibit arbitrators
24. Although McCarthy issued a check for the full amount of the arbitrator's
award, Fewox and Adalia did not receive the money:
McCarthy['s] . . . check. .. [was made] payable to both appellants and
the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), which had
claimed an interest in the proceeds of the award. McCarthy and FIC then
filed a motion to interplead the funds into the registry of the court. The
trial court, pursuant to a written stipulation between appellants and
FSLIC, ordered that the funds be deposited into an interest-bearing ac-
count pending a determination of the claims of appellants and FSLIC
thereto.
Fewox, 556 So. 2d at 420.
1991]
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from awarding attorney's fees.25
Judge Ryder sought to put the best face possible on Glen Johnson
and Sample:
Upon examining Glen Johnson and Sample, we are of the opinion
that our erroneous conclusion in those cases regarding the effect of
section 682.11 may very well have stemmed from our misinterpre-
tation of our previous decision in Beach Resorts International [v.
Clarmac Marine Construction, 339 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1976)], although Glen Johnson did not cite Beach Resorts
International. Other courts have also misconstrued Beach Resorts
International to hold that section 682.11 prohibits an award of at-
torney's fees for services rendered during arbitration . . . .Beach
Resorts International, however, merely holds that section 682.11
prohibits an arbitrator from awarding attorney's fees associated
with arbitration and that such fees are awardable by the trial court
if there is statutory authorization or contractual agreement be-
tween the parties therefor. In Beach Resorts International, there
was neither a contractual agreement nor an applicable statute au-
thorizing an award of attorney's fees.2 6
Seemingly aware that even with the discussion of Beach Resorts
International the mistake made in Glen Johnson and 'Sample was inex-
plicable, Judge Ryder made one final attempt to exonerate himself and
his colleagues. Claiming that a conflict existed among the circuits as to
the holding in Beach Resorts International, he certified the following
question to the Florida Supreme Court as one involving inter-district
conflict and being of great public importance: "Does section 682.11,
Florida Statutes (1987), prohibit an award of attorney's fees incurred
during arbitration proceedings, or does it merely prohibit the arbitrator
from making such an award?"2 7
IV. POST MORTEM
In January 1990, Judge John M. Scheb, another member of the
Second District Court of Appeal, certified the same question in Park
Shore Development Co. v. Higley South, Inc."s One month later, how-
25. Id. at 421-22.
26. Id. at 422.
27. Id. at 423.
28. 556 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
[Vol. 15
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ever, Judge Ryder threw in the towel.
In Raymond James & Assocs., Inc. v. Wieneke,29 Judge Ryder,
now elevated to Acting Chief Judge, admitted that there was no inter-
district conflict, the certified question was not of great public impor-
tance, and no guidance was required from the Supreme Court. As his
final word on the subject, he wrote: "The Florida Arbitration Code spe-
cifically takes attorney's fees out of the broad grant of authority it gives
to arbitrators . . . .Consequently, arbitrators cannot award attorney
fees. When the case is taken to the trial judge for confirmation, how-
ever, the judge may then assess fees. Fewox."30
V. CONCLUSION
Although Fewox is likely to be remembered chiefly as a study in
judicial embarrassment, it contains an important message that should
not be lost: the Florida Legislature's decision to bar arbitrators from
including attorneys' fees in their awards is fundamentally unsound. Not
only does it undermine confidence in the arbitral process by suggesting
that arbitrators cannot be trusted to know the difference between what
is reasonable and what is unreasonable, it creates needless work for the
courts. Moreover, it prohibits parties from receiving the full benefit of
their decision to arbitrate because they still must go to court to recover
their attorneys' fees.
Perhaps the best reason to scrap the ban, however, is the need for
intellectual honesty. In 1986, the Legislature enacted the Florida Inter-
national Arbitration Act ("FIAA")31 to govern international, as op-
posed to domestic, arbitrations.3 2 Unlike the FAC, the FIAA specifi-
cally authorizes arbitrators to decide whether any party is entitled to
attorneys' fees.33 Obviously, there is no basis for distinguishing between
those who arbitrate domestic disputes from those who arbitrate dis-
29. 556 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
30. Id. at 801.
31. FLA. STAT. §§ 684.01-.35 (1989).
32. For a detailed examination of the FIAA, see Jarvis, International Arbitra-
tion, ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FLA. §§ 7.1-.57, at 7-1 to 7-26 (1989).
33. The FIAA states: "The arbitral tribunal may award reasonable fees and ex-
penses actually incurred, including, without limitation, fees and expenses of legal coun-
sel, to any party to the arbitration and shall allocate the costs of the arbitration among
the parties as it determines appropriate." FLA. STAT. § 684.19(4) (emphasis added).
1991]
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putes of an international character; if international arbitrators can be
trusted to determine what is a reasonable fee, so can domestic
arbitrators.
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Bankruptcy: Eleventh Circuit Review
Lawrence Kalevitch*
I. SECURED CLAIMS IN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
In the last two years, the Eleventh Circuit decided several cases
which have raised controversial questions about the treatment of liens'
or secured claims2 in consumer bankruptcy. In In re Folendore,3 the
court accepted an interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code unsupported
in either pre-Code or legislative history: that a debtor in chapter 74
may avoid wholly undersecured claims under section 506(d).6 Secured
claims have received a chilly reception in bankruptcy throughout the
years, and Folendore is frostier than most.
Related to Folendore is the development of home mortgage lien-
stripping6 in chapter 13": that a chapter 13 debtor may limit the mort-
gage lien during and after the chapter 13 case to the value of the
home.8 Although the Eleventh Circuit has yet to rule on the controver-
* Professor of Law, Nova University, Shepard Broad Law Center. LL.M., New
York University; J.D., St. Louis University. This author thanks Andrew Kessler for
assisting with this article.
1. The Bankruptcy Code, Title 11 of the U.S.C. [hereinafter Code], states that a
"'lien' means charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or
performance of an obligation." 11 U.S.C. § 101(33) (1988).
2. The Code defines a secured claim broadly in section 506(a): "An allowed
claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest
. . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the
estate's interest in such property . . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
3. In re Folendore, 862 F.2d 1537 (1lth Cir. 1989).
4. Chapter 7 of the Code provides for the liquidation of the debtor's nonexempt
assets from which creditors will receive payment. The remaining chapters of the Code
deal with reorganization of debtors.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
6. Lien-stripping is the invalidation of a lien on property to the extent that the
property has a value less than the debt secured by the lien.
7. Chapter 13 of the Code is a reorganization chapter. Debtor commits to a three
(sometimes five) year payment plan. When, or if, the plan is completed, the debtor is
discharged from any remaining debt other than domestic obligations and long-term
debt. 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1988).
8. Although this issue has not appeared in a reported Eleventh Circuit opinion, a
discussion of the Third Circuit opinion in Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortg. Co., 895
F.2d 123 (3rd Cir. 1990), is included because Folendore may foreordain that result.
13
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sial question of home mortgage lien-stripping in chapter 13, the
Folendore decision and the recent validation of serial bankruptcy filings
in Saylors9 suggest that a "chapter 20"10 may permit a debtor to lien-
strip a home mortgage." In general under chapter 7, lien..stripping is
controversial as is lien-stripping a home mortgage under chapter 13.
Bankruptcy is complex because the interpretation of the 1978
Code breeds three recurrent controversies. First, the functions of the
several different chapters of the Code, as well as the different avenues
of relief, are both alike, yet different. Second, a large number of key
provisions of the Code, especially Chapter 5, apply to all chapters
under which a debtor, and sometimes a creditor, may file for relief.
Unless the Code drafters strove for controversy, it is a grave error to
assume the usefulness, or appropriateness, of such a significanit number
of provisions for different forms of debtor relief. Surely, the drafters'
expectation of how all the provisions would fit together exceeded their
draftsmanship. Core conceptions in bankruptcy often fit a paradigm of
liquidation and discharge; others fit a paradigm of reorganization,
Rarely do the core conceptions fill the same function in both liquidation
and reorganization. Because a number of core matters receive prescrip-
tion in Chapter 5, the courts have had some difficulty finding how these
fit both liquidation cases under Chapter 7 and reorganization cases
under Chapters 11 and 13. The third essential creating more than tech-
nical controversy under the Code is public policy. Lien.stripping in
bankruptcy generates controversy not only for its novelty, but because
it significantly differs from lien avoidance under the classical,' 2 strong-
arm,'" preference' 4 and fraudulent transfer1 5 ideas. The classical theo-
ries of lien avoidance rest on a perceived inter-creditor unfairness. The
strong-arm power invalidates pre-bankruptcy liens because failure to
See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
9. In re Saylors, 869 F.2d 1434 (11th Cir. 1989).
10. See infra note 92.
11. The use of a chapter 20 to lien-strip a home mortgage should be impermissi-
ble, and Folendore itself does not permit such a strategy. See infra notes 75-99.
12. The classical lien avoidance provisions of bankruptcy law antedate the Bank-
ruptcy Code of 1978 and were firm fixtures of bankruptcy jurisprudence at that time.
See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended by the Chandler Act of June 22, 1938, ch.
575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1979). These classical lien avoidance provisions continue in
present law. See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (a) (1988).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (b).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 548.
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notice the lien presumably misleads other creditors. Preferences upset
traditional bankruptcy norms concerning what creditors should receive.
Similarly, fraudulent transfers to creditors and donees, prior to bank-
ruptcy, affect bankruptcy's distributional norms. For the most part,
creditors and other third parties can engage in transactions with proper
planning and immunize their interests from classical lien avoidance.
That is, what one might regard as legitimate secured transactions en-
tered into with a debtor prior to bankruptcy, properly executed and
perfected, rarely result in avoidable liens under the classical lien avoid-
ance powers.
However, the new phenomena of lien-stripping arises from either
market value fluctuation or mistaken collateral valuation. Planning can
generally control only the latter. Even if planning could control market
value fluctuation, lien-stripping under the Code would remain contro-
versial to the extent it exceeds the proper balance of debtor and credi-
tor benefits. The ideal balance, if any, is controversial. Thus, lien-strip-
ping as a debtor's tool will remain controversial.
A. In re Folendore
In Folendore, the Eleventh Circuit permitted the use of a contro-
versial lien-stripping 16 power by a chapter 7 debtor. Prior to Folendore,
courts outside of this circuit disagreed about whether section 506(d)
not only determines valid secured claims against the bankruptcy estate,
but also invalidates liens outside of the bankruptcy case. 17 The question
16. See supra note 6 (defining lien-stripping). Folendore approves a controversial
interpretation of section 506(d) permitting the foregoing form of lien-stripping in a
chapter 7 case, discussed infra notes 29-41. Other forms of lien-stripping are less con-
troversial. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988).
17. Compare In re Gaglia, 889 F.2d 1304 (3rd Cir. 1989); In re Lindsey, 823
F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Moses, 110 Bankr, 962 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990); In
re Brouse, 110 Bankr. 539 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re Zlogar, 101 Bankr. 1 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1989); In re Garnett, 99 Bankr. 757 (D.W.D. Ky. 1989); In re Hougland, 83
Bankr. 648 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988); In re O'Leary, 75 Bankr. 881 (Bankr. D. Or.
1987); In re Worrell, 67 Bankr. 16 (C.D. II1. 1986); In re Cleveringa, 52 Bankr. 56
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985); In re Lyons, 46 Bankr. 604 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1985); In re
Gibbs, 44 Bankr. 475 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984); Brace v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 33 Bankr. 91 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); In re Tanner, 14 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1981); In re Walker, 11 Bankr. 43 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1981); with In re Dewsnup,
908 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1990) cert. granted, 111 S.Ct. 949 (1991); In re Israel, 112
Bankr. 481 (D. Conn. 1990); In re D'Angona, 107 Bankr. 448 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989);
In re Shrum, 98 Bankr. 995 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989); In re McLaughlin, 92 Bankr.
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of extra-bankruptcy lien enforcement would not generally arise, but for
a longstanding principle in bankruptcy: that discharge of debt does not
per se invalidate a lien securing debt after bankruptcy.18 Congress un-
doubtedly reaffirmed the latter principle, 19 and further provided debtors
express provisions for avoiding certain liens in bankruptcy, so that after
bankruptcy, debtors' fresh starts are unimpaired by lien survival.20
Lien-stripping was part of the package of new rights individual
debtors received under the 1978 Code. In chapter 7, individual2 debt-
ors may strip particular liens which impair their enjoyment of exempt
property.2 2 In chapter 13, individuals 23 may confirm a plan which limits
payments on the secured claim to the value of the collateral. 24 Yet, the
use of section 506(d) to strip-down a lien received no mention in the
legislative history.2 5 Other sections provide classical avoidance of what
913 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1988); In re Verma, 91 Bankr. 17 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987); In re
Maitland, 61 Bankr. 130 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986); In re Wolf, 58 Bankr. 354 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1986); In re Cordes, 37 Bankr. 582 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984); In re
Mahaner, 34 Bankr. 308 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1983); In re Nefferdorf, 26 Bankr. 962
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983); see also In re Simmons, 765 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1985); In re
Schneider, 37 Bankr. 115 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1984); In re Spadel, 28 Bankr. 537
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983); In re Harvey, 3 Bankr. 608 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980).
A decision in Dewsnup, now before the Supreme Court, should resolve this
conflict.
18. Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617, 620 (1886); In re Tarnow, 749 F.2d 464, 465
(7th Cir. 1984).
19. Section 524 (a)(2) as originally enacted included the phrase, "or property of
the debtor," which some courts understandably assumed overruled Long, 117 U.S. at
617; e.g., In re Willie Williams, 9 Bankr. 228 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981). Congress subse-
quently deleted the phrase.
20. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(f), 722 (1988).
21. "Person" is defined in the Code as an "individual, partnership, and corpora-
tion .... " 11 U.S.C. § 101(35) (1988). Only individuals receive exemptions under
the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).
22. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (f). Courts have disagreed about whether section 522(f)
applies in Chapter 13 cases. Compare In re Hall, 752 F.2d 582 (11th Cir. 1985) (hold-
ing that it does apply) with In re Berry, 30 Bankr. 36 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
23. Only individuals may file under chapter 13. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(5)(B)(ii).
25. The House concluded that:
Subsection [506](d) permits liens to pass through the bankruptcy case
unaffected. However, if a party in interest requests the court to determine
and allow or disallow the claim secured by the lien under section 502 and
the claim is not allowed, then the lien is void to the extent that the claim is
not allowed.
H.R. REP. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 357 (1977), reprinted in 1973 U.S. CONG. &
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section 506(d) recognizes as secured claims in appropriate cases. 26
What is striking about the balance Congress apparently made in
the Code for chapter 7 cases is the specific limitation of the debtor's
lien-stripping power to certain kinds of liens27 on certain exempt or ex-
emptible property under section 522.28 In contrast, section 506 applies
to all claims of liens, whether they are statutory, consensual, judicial or
common law liens. Additionally, section 506 speaks about secured
claims on any kind of property, real or personal, exempt, exemptible or
non-exempt. In Folendore, a chapter 7 debtor sought to avoid a third
mortgage 29 held by the Small Business Administration (SBA) on real
ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6313.
It also noted that:
Subsection [506](d) provides that to the extent a secured claim is not
allowed, its lien is void unless the holder had neither actual notice nor
knowledge of the case, the lien was not listed by the debtor in a chapter 9
or 11 case or such claim was disallowed only under section 502(e).
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5854.
Each of these reports on the Bankruptcy Code limits the voidability of a secured
claim under section 506(d) to claims which are not allowable claims in bankruptcy.
These reports show that section 506(a) determines whether an allowed claim is a se-
cured claim. Further, they show that section 506(d) defines what is an allowed claim
for purposes of section 506(a). With exceptions stated in section 506(d), claims which
are not allowed under section 502(b), the general allowance of claims provision of the
Code, cannot become secured claims in a bankruptcy proceeding. Liens secure claims;
if a claim is invalid, the lien is also invalid in a bankruptcy proceeding. The legislative
history thus shows that section 506(d) deals with the problem of liens securing claims
which are not allowable in the bankruptcy. However, the recent cases such as
Folendore have construed the function of section 506(d) as also regarding the problem
of the undersecured lien.
26. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. These other sections operate
when section 506 recognizes a secured claim. For example, one, who prior to bank-
ruptcy, had obtained a first mortgage on land owned by the debtor will have a secured
claim in the debtor's bankruptcy. If the creditor obtained that mortgage as a gift from
the debtor, the mortgage will first be identified by section 506 as a secured claim and in
all likelihood, the secured claim will be avoided as a fraudulent transfer under section
548.
27. Debtor's lien-stripping power is limited to judicial liens on exempt property
and nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interests in particular personal prop-
erty subject to exemption. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (f)(1)(2).
28. See § 522(0(2).
29. The opinions in the case do not mention whether the realty in issue was ex-
empt property. Even if it were, the lien-stripping rules for exempt property were inap-
plicable since only judicial liens may be stripped from exempt realty. § 522(f)(1). That
the realty was not exemptible is implicit in the trustee's decision to abandon the prop-
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property abandoned by the trustee.30 The combined liens of these first
two mortgages exceeded the value of the collateral."1 Section 506(d)3 2
provides: "(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the
debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void .... .,3
The issue in Folendore is whether a lien securing an allowable
claim is voidable under section 506(d) in a chapter 7 case. The court
stated the issue as the following: "[W]hether an unsecured lien sup-
ported by an allowable claim is voidable under 11 U.S.C.A. §
506(d)." 4 The court held that such a lien was voidable and reversed.
erty for lack of equity in the estate's interest. Abandonment under section 554 of prop-
erty in which the estate's interest is merely nominal is routine and enables the trustee
to avoid fruitless estate expenses, such as participating in a motion by secured claim-
ants for relief from stay.
30. 862 F.2d at 1538.
31. The parties had stipulated in the bankruptcy court that the senior liens ex-
ceeded the value of the property subject to the mortgages. Both courts below denied the
avoidance the debtors sought under section 506(d) because the debtors had not previ-
ously requested disallowance of the claim under section 502. In re Folendore, 85 Bankr.
180 (M.D. Ga. 1988).
However, it should be noted that the district court clearly stated that it did not
consider the lack of a request for disallowance to have been a formal or procedural
defect. The district court ruled on the basis of "cases holding that a debtor in a chapter
7 case may not use § 506(d) to void the consensual lien of a creditor because the lien is
undersecured." Id. at 182.
32. Section 506(d) was amended in 1984 to eliminate the exception to its avoid-
ance rule that stated, "unless a party in interest has not requested that the court deter-
mine and allow or disallow such claim under section 502 of this title." 11 U.S.C. §
506(d) (1978)(amended 1984). However, the revised exceptions to the avoidance rule
expressly exempt certain disallowed claims from the operation of the rule: "(1) such
claim was disallowed only under section 502(b)(5) or 502(e) of this title; or (2) such
claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure of any entity to file a
proof of such claim under section 501 of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988).
Thus, one may well find unpersuasive the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that the
avoidance rule does not presume a disallowed claim. See Folendore, 862 F.2d at 1539.
If the exceptions contemplate particularly grounded disallowances, the rule must con-
template disallowable claims. Otherwise, the rule would not need the exceptions origi-
nally or presently stated. The Folendore court describes the now repealed request ex-
ception, the 1979 version of section 506(d)(1), as serving a vital function. 862 F.2d at
1539 n.3.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). The exceptions which followed the quoted body of sec-
tion 506(d) when the case arose stated: "(1) a party in interest has not requested that
the court determine and allow or disallow such claim under section 502 of this title; or
(2) such claim was disallowed only under section 502(e) of this title." 11 U.S.C. §
506(d) (1978)(amended 1984).
34. 862 F.2d at 1538.
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"The plain language of the statute, supported by a majority of the
bankruptcy courts, inferences drawn from the 1984 amendments, and
common sense, [sic] requires the SBA's lien be voidable whether or not
its claim has been disallowed under section 502."1
Is the statute plain? The statute states that a lien is void to the
extent it secures a claim against the debtor that is "not an allowed
secured claim."3 In Folendore the parties agreed that the SBA did not
have an "allowed secured claim."' 37 The SBA unsuccessfully pointed
out that it held an allowed claim. Its position was that section 506(d)
only voids liens securing disallowed claims. Since its claim was allowa-
ble, the lower courts properly rejected the debtors' attempted
avoidance.
Undoubtedly, the expression "not an allowed secured claim" is
ambiguous. There are two reasons why a claim may not be allowed and
secured. First, the claim may be wholly invalid and thus not allowed in
bankruptcy. Second, though a claim may be valid and allowed, it may
have nothing securing it, and thus not be a secured claim under section
506(a). The issue is whether the expression "not an allowed secured
claim" in section 506(d) refers only to situations in which a secured
claim (determined by section 506(a)) is not allowed under section 502.
The legislative history speaks only to this function of section 506(d).8
Or does the expression also embrace allowable claims which are not
secured claims under section 506(a). The language is not plain.
The exceptions presume the text speaks to claims that are not al-
lowable under other sections of the Code.39 The inferences the court
drew from the 1984 amendments may be countered by equally plausi-
ble inferences.4 °
The court erred in relying on common sense in justification of its
conclusion.
35. Id. at 1539.
36. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d).
37. What is an "allowed secured claim" is nowhere defined in the code. The
court and the parties appear to have presumed that section 506(a) defines what is an
allowed secured claim. But, section 506(a) only says that an allowed claim, in reference
to section 502, secured by a lien on property is a "secured claim." I 1 U.S.C. § 506(a).
The phrase "allowed secured claim" does not appear in section 506(a) at all but ap-
pears in sections 506(b)-(d).
38. See supra notes 25 & 32.
39. See supra note 32.
40. See supra note 32.
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The whole point of bankruptcy is to provide a debtor with a
fresh start. Section 506 allows the debtor the option to begin anew
on its former property, Section 506 does not give a debtor it prop-
erty back as some sort of windfall. It simply permits a debtor to
eventually repurchase an equity interest in it, something the SBA
admits it [the debtor] has the right to do on any other piece of
land.4 1
Bankruptcy is intended to provide relief to both debtors and credi-
tors. The court's function is to determine the meaning of an often diffi-
cult bankruptcy text. Reliance on plain meaning characterizations of
undefined, ambiguous statutory language is unfair to both debtors and
creditors.12
The potential impact of Folendore may be addressed by consider-
ing why a debtor like Folendore would want to avoid a lien when prop-
erty is worth no more than the debts secured by senior liens. Valuation
of estate property is speculative. A debtor may think the collateral is
worth more than the amount determined by the bankruptcy court. As
well, property values may be temporarily distressed. At some future
time, a debtor might be able to make a deal with senior lienors or bor-
row the money to buy them out. However, a trustee in a chapter 7 case
is unlikely to await for these developments. Once the property is aban-
41. Folendore, 862 F.2d at 1540.
42. A further point against Folendore is that pre-Code law stated none of this.
The Supreme Court has found pre-Code treatment of liens in bankruptcy critical when
the Code is unclear. See United Savings Assoc. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.
Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1989). Pre- and post-Code case law clearly state that such a lien,
along with the senior liens, survive bankruptcy whether or not the debtor gets a dis-
charge of the underlying debt. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
Perhaps the majority of courts have confused the invalidation of a secured claim,
per section 506(d) as a claim against property of the estate, with invalidity in general.
The function of section 506 is merely administrative: to define what and who has a
secured claim in bankruptcy for a ban kruptcy case administration. One who has a fully
secured claim could not participate, for example, in distribution from the unencum-
bered assets' liquidation. Nevertheless, one can appreciate the ease with which invalid-
ity of a secured claim in a bankruptcy proceeding may be broadened to invalidity for
all purposes - when a junior lien is not a secured claim in bankruptcy because the
senior liens secure debt greater than the value of collateral. The Code seems to say this
since by the term "void," one might understand the paramount federal law of the Code
as superseding contrary state law. Unless one understands the characterization of an
invalid secured claim under section 506(d) as implicitly limited to questions arising in
the bankruptcy case, one may read the subsection universally.
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doned by the trustee,43 the debtor's relatively inexpensive request 44 for
avoidance under section 506(d) might encourage optimism on the
debtor's part of eventually finding equity in the property.
In substance, lien cramdown 45 in reorganization cases proceeds
under section 506 in the same initial manner as Folendore. The amount
of a secured claim is obtained by determining the value of the collat-
eral. When the collateral is worth less than the debt it secures, the
amount of the secured claim is the value of the collateral. A debtor in
reorganization must pay a secured claim at least the value of collateral
under the plan, unless the claimant agrees to a lesser payment. This
general structure of lien cramdown permeates the Code. Chapter 13
clearly limits all secured claims except for home mortgages to the value
of the collateral.46 Likewise, Chapter 12 states the same secured claim
cramdown rule,47 and chapter 11 differs only in the right of an under-
secured creditor's opportunity to elect treatment of the claim as fully
secured. 48 So, under the Code, the effect of lien-stripping as per section
506 will occur routinely in rehabilitation cases under the Code. Lien-
stripping is a reorganization concept because it has traditionally been
provided as a reorganization cramdown device.
What is strange about Folendore is not the substance but the locus
of the lien-stripping in a chapter 7 liquidation case. An argument for
lien-stripping under section 506(d) may point to other Code sections
providing for lien-stripping within Chapter 7, such as sections 72241
and 522(f). 50 However, the redemption opportunity of section 722 is
narrow. This right of redemption applies only to exempt personal prop-
erty intended for personal, family or household use, and only if such
property secures a dischargeable consumer debt.51 Likewise, lien-strip-
ping under section 522 extends only to exempt property.
43. The trustee may abandon property of the estate when the property has "in-
consequential value or benefit to the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).
44. Or, is the request seemingly inexpensive? Potential appeals to the district or
circuit courts of appeal surely bear on the utility of requesting and opposing avoidance
under section 506(d).
45. The term cramdown describes the process in which a secured claim is re-
duced to the value of the collateral.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(5)(B)(ii).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5)(B) (1988).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (1988).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 722.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0.
51. 11 U.S.C. § 722.
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The implications of the Folendore treatment of section 506(d) in a
distressed market are serious. Whether Folendore will lead to the re-
sults suggested in the following hypotheticals is speculative, since the
courts may confine their analyses to only the most junior liens. For
example, suppose I borrow money to add a pool or some other improve-
ment to my house. Subsequently, I incur financial difficulty and file
chapter 7 or 13 .52 The current market value of my house is 50 % below
$200,000, the amount I paid. I financed at 90% on my first mortgage
and another 10% on a second mortgage for the pool. The house today
at filing is worth $100,000.
Having filed chapter 7, I use section 506(d) to avoid the junior lien
per Folendore, because the junior lien is worthless: the senior mortgage
exceeds the value of the collateral. Next, I also avoid so much of the
first lien that exceeds $100,000, the present value of the collateral, and
I discharge both debts. Because I have kept the first mortgage debt
current and continue to keep it current through bankruptcy, the first
mortgagee cannot get relief from stay during the bankruptcy nor may
it foreclose thereafter. Sometime after bankruptcy when the market
rises, I refinance or sell the property. The payoff to the first mortgagee
is $100,000, the amount of its lien, less any principal paydowns made
since its lien was reduced to that amount pursuant to the section
506(d) determination. Any contractual attempt to stop me from so do-
ing falls under the supremacy clause. Any attempt to collect the debt
on that mortgage is stayed. 53
52. Section 1111 (b) of chapter 11 inhibits this form of lien-stripptng. Under sec-
tion 111 (b), an undersecured creditor may elect to have its secured claim allowed in
the amount of the debt secured. That is, section 506 is displaced by section 1111 (b). As
a result of the election, a secured creditor must receive payments under the plan
amounting to the debt. However, the secured claim may be paid over time and the time
value of the payments must amount to no less than the value of the collateral. In terms
of the present value of future payments, even an electing undersecured creditor receives
in a chapter 11 plan only the value of its collateral. However, an electing undersecured
creditor retains its lien on its collateral during the performance of a plan in the full
amount of the debt. As a result, such a creditor may enforce that lien pcst-confirmation
should the debtor default under the plan. The post-bankruptcy effectiveness of its lien
differentiates chapter 11 lien-stripping from the chapter 7 lien-stripping accepted by
Folendore. Should the collateral later appreciate in value due only to market forces,
the electing undersecured creditor, who elected to have the entire claim treated as se-
cured, may reap the appreciation if the debtor defaults. Under Folendore, the lien-
stripped creditor in chapter 7 presumably cannot reinvigorate its lien after bankruptcy.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2).
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B. Chapter 13 Home Mortgage Strip-down
In the same scenario, I may file chapter 13 rather than chapter 7,
so long as I meet the jurisdictional limitations of chapter 13. 5 Whether
I may use the section 506(d) strip-down in my scenario depends not
only on the controversy about section 506(d), but also on a controver-
sial passage which appears only in chapter 13. Under section
1322(b)(2), a chapter 13 plan may "modify the rights of holders of
secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in
real property that is the debtor's principal residence . . . ."5 Recently,
the third86 and the ninth57 circuits have created a controversy by
broadly interpreting a chapter 13 debtor's right to modify a secured
claim against the debtor's principal residence. 58 These cases depend on
section 506 and especially the Folendore interpretation. Cramdown in
chapter 13 is precisely what section 506(d) accomplished in my previ-
ous example: all a chapter 13 debtor need pay a secured claim is the
value of the collateral (any deficiency participates as an unsecured
claim). Chapter 13 debtors have been cramming down secured claims
on cars and nonresidential property for 12 years.5 But, such debtors
were thought unable to affect their home mortgage because of section
1322(b), which states a chapter 13 plan "may modify the rights of
holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security
interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence
54. Code section 109(e) permits only individuals to use chapter 13. Individuals
may have aggregate secured debts no greater than $350,000 and aggregate unsecured
debts no greater than $100,000. Additionally, to file under chapter 13 one must have a
regular source of income. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
56. Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortg. Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990).
57. In re Hougland, 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
59. Indeed, the courts have also permitted cramdown on the principal residence
of a debtor when the debt is secured by more than only the principal residence of the
debtor. This occurs because section 1322(b)(2) limits the chapter 13 debtor's general
right to modify secured claims to claims secured "only by a security interest in real
property that is the debtor's principal residence." § 1322(b)(2); see Wilson v. Com-
monwealth Mortg. Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 128 (3d Cir. 1990) (alternate holding); In re
Selman, 120 Bankr. 576 (Bankr. D. N.M. (1990); In re Stiles, 74 Bankr. 708 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1987); In re Lapp, 66 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986); In re Ramirez, 62
Bankr. 668 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986); In re Baksa, 5 Bankr. 184 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1980).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b).
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The third and ninth circuits held that the "rights o1' holders of
secured claims" means only their rights as a secured claimant deter-
mined by section 506(a).6 ' Because section 506(a) includes as a se-
cured claim only that portion of a claim for which the value of the
collateral provides security, an undersecured claim gives rise to a se-
cured claim only in the amount of the value of the security or collat--
eral. As to the excess of the debt above the value of the collateral, an
unsecured claim is created. Wilson and Hougland interpret the non-
modification rule of section 1322(b)(2) for principal residence mort-
gages to refer only to the secured claim as determined by section
506(a). However, the unsecured claim is modifiable. In effect, this ap-
pears to mean that the amount of the promised monthly mortgage in-
stallment cannot be modified, but the amount of the outstanding mort-
gage balance can be modified and stripped-down to the value of the
collateral as determined under section 506(a). Thus, a debtor's monthly
payment on the home mortgage, cannot be reduced, but a debtor may
have the court adjudicate the outstanding balance of the mortgage lien
as invalid to the extent the debt exceeds the property value.
Under this approach, the same result may be reached in my hypo-
thetical through a chapter 13 case as well as in a chapter 7. As noted
earlier, the ordinary cramdown of secured. claims to the value of the
collateral holds in chapter 13, but the specific limitation of section
1322(b)(2) bars home mortgage strip-down.62 Whether the decisions in
Wilson and Hougland will prevail in the Eleventh Circuit remains to
be seen. Much may be said against the cited rulings, however, I shall
discuss only two points.
A secured claim in a chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding cannot
have a value larger than that of the collateral. Section 1322(b)(2) per-
61. Wilson, 895 F.2d at 128; Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1183.
62. Compare In re Woodall, 123 Bankr. 95 (W.D. Okla. 1990). In re Moran,
121 Bankr. 879 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1990); In re Chavez, 117 Bankr. 733 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1990); In re Sauber, 115 Bankr. 197 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990); In re Schum, 112
Bankr. 159 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990); In re Diquinzio, 110 Bankr. 628 (Bankr. D. R.I.
1990); In re Russell, 93 Bankr. 703 (D.N.D. 1988); In re Brown, 91 Bankr. 19 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1988) with In re Bellamy, 122 Bankr. 856 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991); Goins v.
Diamond Mortg. Corp., 119 Bankr. 156 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); In re McNair, 115
Bankr. 520 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990); In re Gadson, 114 Bankr. 453 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1990); In re Brouse, 110 Bankr. 539 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re Demoff, 109 Bankr.
902 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989); In re Ross,, 107 Bankr. 759 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989);
In re Kessler, 99 Bankr. 635 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Hill, 96 Banlcr. 809 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1989); In re Harris, 94 Bankr. 832 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1989).
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mits modification of the rights of any claimant, secured or unsecured.63
Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) entitles any secured claimant to payments
under the plan amounting to no less than its "allowed secured claim." 4
That amount is the value of the collateral determined by either section
506 or by stipulation. When section 1322(b)(2) permits modification of
secured claims, it cannot be addressing the issue of what the secured
claimant's entitlement under the plan is, since section 1325(a)(5) di-
rectly provides for entitlement once the section 506 determination of
the amount of the secured claim is made. Thus, the function of section
1322(b)(2) regarding strip-down is mere reiteration of the lien strip-
down that the other cited sections accomplish.
The exception of the home mortgage from this strip-down reitera-
tion can have only one meaning: that a chapter 13 debtor has all the
modification rights, including strip-down per section 506, that debtors
in other chapters have, 65 except when the home mortgage is used as the
sole security for a debt. There are no other substantial modification
rights which would not otherwise be available to the chapter 13
debtor. 66 However, Hougland and Wilson suggest that substantial
meaning remains in section 1322(b)(2) because these decisions bar the
debtor from payment under the plan of less than the contractually
agreed-upon monthly installment.
Thus, under this view the non-modifiability of the monthly pay-
ment is what section 1322(b)(2) accomplishes. The courts could have
understood section 1322(b)(5) to provide as much.6 7 However, the
63. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
65. Section 506 applies in all chapters of the Code unless displaced by a particu-
lar provision in a chapter. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988).
66. For example, there is the right of cure of default which presumably includes
the right to decelerate, reverse a mortgagee's acceleration of the debt. 11 U.S.C. §
1322(b)(5).
67. Section 1322(b)(5) requires the "maintenance of payments while the case is
pending on any ... secured claim on which the last payment is due after the date on
which the final payment under the plan is due." 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5). The "pay-
ments" to which this subsection refers must be the amounts promised prior to the
bankruptcy because the sentence begins with the idea of curing default, which is con-
nected to the quoted text with "and." Id. It is unimaginable that a debtor would have
been thought by Congress to have either desire or need to cure a pre-bankruptcy de-
fault and then maintain any payments other than those which would not create another
default. As well, this subsection applies while a case is pending, which typically refers
to both pre- and post-confirmation periods. Presumably, no modifications could precede
confirmation of the chapter 13 plan. So, what payment the debtor would maintain
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grammatical argument within section 1322(b)(2) accepted by the
Hougland and Wilson courts, is far less convincing once one recognizes
maintenance of monthly payments to fall under section 1:322(b)(5).
Secondly, these recent cases overlook the confirmation rule for an
"allowed secured claim" applicable when the secured claimant has
neither accepted the plan,6 8 nor has the debtor surrendered the collat-
eral to the creditor.6 9 The confirmation rule provides that the secured
creditor retain its lien 0 and mandates that "the value, as of the effec-
tive date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on
account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such
claim." 71 Modification of the home mortgage, through strip-down to
current value of the lien and payment merely of the monthly install-
ment, cannot satisfy this controlling confirmation rule, unless payments
under the plan will fully pay-off the newly determined mortgage bal-
ance.2 Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) requires payments not less than the
allowed amount of the secured claim.1 Few debtors in chapter 13 will
be able to satisfy the rule since even a bankruptcy-reduced outstanding
balance of the mortgage will far exceed the sum of 3 or 5 years of
regular payments. 7" Also, refinancing is not easily available to such
would have to be the contractual amount. Finally, this subsection applies "notwith-
standing [1322(b)(2)]." Id.
68. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A). "Acceptance" of a chapter 13 plan is not defined
in chapter 13. Traditionally, plan acceptance in reorganization means voting favorably
on the plan. See e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (1988). As well under chapter 11, an
unimpaired class as defined in section 1124(1) is deemed to have accepted a plan. See
§ 1126(0. A class of claims is unimpaired when the plan does not alter its pre-bank-
ruptcy rights. § 1124(1). The pro-modification cases seem to assume that a home mort-
gagee which will receive its regular installment payments under a plan has not been
impaired and is thus deemed to have accepted the plan. Not only ha; chapter 13 no
such impairment/non-impairment provision, it also lacks any rule presuming an
unimpaired creditor to have accepted a plan.
69. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C).
70. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5(B)(i).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
72. In re Cobb, 122 Bankr. 22 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990).
73. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
74. A debtor may not confirm a chapter 13 plan which exceeds 3 years unless the
court, for cause, approves a longer period, not to exceed 5 years. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(c),
1329(c) (1988). Chapter 13 may not require that a debtor include a home mortgage
debt in the plan. Chapter 13 only governs the plan and the debt provided for in the
plan. However, in order to modify or cure a claim, under section 1322(b), the debtor
must do so in the plan. The right to cure arrearages on a mortgage, for example, under
section 1322(b)(5) is a right exercisable "under the plan." To cure arrearages, the
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debtors on normal credit considerations or on a refinancing agency's
discovery of the debtor's proposal.
C. Serial Bankruptcy Filings: Saylors75
If Folendore may truly be used in a chapter 7 to accomplish strip-
down of the home mortgage, debtors should continue to favor chapter 7
for the traditional reasons.76 Debtors for whom chapter 13 relief is im-
portant"7 and who also desire home mortgage strip-down, may be able
to pursue a serial bankruptcy strategy. Under this strategy, debtors
first file chapter 7 to obtain lien strip-down and later file, or convert, to
chapter 13. Although no less controversial than the other recent devel-
opments discussed in this article, serial bankruptcy filings were ap-
proved by the Eleventh Circuit recently in Saylors.7 8
Quite apart from lien-stripping, a debtor in a chapter 7 may incur
difficulty with the home mortgage or other property on which a creditor
holds a lien. Although a chapter 7 debtor has some protections against
an aggressive secured creditor in a chapter 7, including the automatic
stay of creditor action79 and personal property redemption under sec-
tion 722,80 the former may be lifted on behalf of a creditor who has
"cause for relief from stay." '
In Saylors, the mortgagee on the debtor's home obtained relief
from stay, in order to foreclose, shortly before the debtor's chapter 7
case was closed."2 The debtor filed chapter 13 the next day, even while
debtor must include payments on the arrearages during the 3-5 years of the plan. §
1322(b)(5).
75. In re Saylors, 869 F.2d 1434 (11th Cir. 1989).
76. Chapter 7 does not require post-petition payment from post-petition income,
nor does it subject a debtor to continuing supervision for up to five years.
77. These debtors would generally include those who need to cure or modify
claims including secured claims. See § 1322(b)(2)(5). It also includes those who are
without an opportunity for discharge of debt. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988). Also
included are debtors who have nondischargeable chapter 7 debt dischargeable under
the broader chapter 13 discharge. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a), 1328(a) (1988). And,
debtors with substantial properties not exempt in a chapter 7.
78. 869 F.2d at 1437.
79. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
80. 11 U.S.C. § 722.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).
82. Presumably, the debtor was in default on the debt which justified the relief
from stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).
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the chapter 7 case remained open.83 The debtor filed8" chapter 13 for
two related reasons: first, to obtain another"9 automatic stay to pre-
clude the mortgagee from foreclosing, and secondly, to obtain confir-
mation of a chapter 13 plan which would permit cure of mortgage ar-
rearages and retention by debtor of his home.
Saylors' chapter 7 discharge eliminated his personal liability on
the note secured by his home mortgage. Nevertheless, the mortgage
lien remained on his home, and the mortgagee retained his rights
against the home without personal recourse against debtor, Saylors.
Nonrecourse claims86 do not expressly fall under the definition of
"claim" in section 101(4). Nor does chapter 13 further elaborate the
meaning of claim. But, the court ruled that Saylors could cure 7 this
nonrecourse claim because of the rule of construction provided by sec-
tion 102(2): "'[C]laim against the debtor' includes claim against the
property of the debtor." ' So long as a mortgagor, like Saylors, retains
a property interest in the land, such as provided by local law in this
case,' the court ruled that even a nonrecourse claim may be treated in
83. The court ruled that the previous filing under chapter 7 did not preclude a
second filing under chapter 13 during the period after the chapter 'I discharge and
before the chapter 7 case was closed. Saylors, 869 F.2d at 1437.
84. The debtor chose to file under chapter 13, rather than convert the case from
chapter 7 to chapter 13, because the debtor sought to stay the foreclosure. Conversion
may have produced merely the same stay of creditor action which the debtor had in his
chapter 7. If so, the relief from that stay which the creditor had obtained may have
been unaffected by the conversion. See In re States Airlines, Inc., 873 F.2d 264 (1 ith
Cir. 1989) (holding conversion from chapter 11 to chapter 7 does not reimpose stay
against parties previously granted relief from stay). "The filing of EL petition under
section 301, 302, or 303 operates as a stay under section 362. A conversion under
section 348 does not." Id. at 268.
If a conversion by Saylors would not have affected the automatic stay, then his
creditor who had previously received relief from stay, would not have its rights affected
by conversion. Thus, the need to file a new case under chapter 13 arose and carried the
cost of a new filing fee.
85. Whether a debtor with an open bankruptcy case can obtain another stay by
filing under another chapter, or by filing a new petition under the same chapter, is
unclear under the Code. Saylors rules on the former.
86. A nonrecourse claim in this context means a claim against particular prop-
erty of the debtor but without recourse against the debtor personally or his other assets
for any deficiency.
87. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5).
88. Saylors, 869 F.2d at 1436.
89. Saylors had an equitable right of redemption under Alabama law.
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a chapter 13 plan.90 Further, Saylors' continuing property interest in
the home gave the chapter 13 bankruptcy court jurisdiction over this
property.91
Had Saylors simply filed chapter 13 to deal with a nonrecourse
claim against his home, the foregoing would hold some technical signif-
icance. The greater interest in Saylors is the serial bankruptcy or the
"chapter 20" 11 that the court approved. The court held the fact that
the chapter 13 was filed while the chapter 7 was still pending, did not
betray the debtor's necessary good faith. 3 "A per se rule . . . [would]
conflict with the purpose of Congress in adopting and designing chapter
13 plans."94 More broadly, the court held: "A bankruptcy court's de-
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. "Chapter 20" does not exist in the Code. But, a debtor who files chapter 7
and takes what relief that offers, and then files chapter 13, and takes the relief there
offered, has perhaps created a new Code chapter. Other numerical combinations have
appeared, such as a "chapter 26". E.g., In re Jones, 105 Bankr. 1007, 1011 (N.D. Ala.
W.D. 1989) (2 chapter 13 filings). The Code does not specifically impose any limita-
tions on the use of chapter 13 when a debtor has had previous bankruptcy relief. Under
chapter 7, however, the Code limits the availability of discharge where a debtor has
had previous bankruptcy relief. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(7)-(9). Courts have disagreed
about "chapter 20" and other serial filings. Compare In re Fulks, 93 Bankr. 274
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) with In re Samarripas, 107 Bankr. 366 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1989) (Judge Baynes soundly concludes that a chapter 13 plan should not be confirmed
if the previous chapter 7 case should have been dismissed as a "substantial abuse"
under section 707(b)).
Prior to the Code, the Supreme Court in Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S.
392 (1966), permitted a debtor to file a chapter XIII extension plan, although within
the prior six years he had received a discharge in the predecessor to chapter 7. Saylors
relied on Perry. But, the latter uttered a clear dictum that the decision would not apply
to a chapter XIII composition (debt-reduction) plan. Perry, 383 U.S. at 397-98. As
chapter 13 does not permit composition of a secured claim such as Saylors' mortga-
gee's, unless the secured claimant assents, the Eleventh Circuit was perhaps correct in
Saylors in relying on the Perry precedent. However, where the creditor holds an under-
secured claim, the unsecured portion is subject to composition in chapter 13. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1325(a)(4), 1325(b). To that extent Perry would disapprove a chapter 20. As well,
a serial chapter 13 may not be effective under Perry in another foreseeable context:
where a debtor does not discharge an unsecured debt in chapter 7 because the debt is
nondischargeable under section 523(a), the debtor may wish to file chapter 13 and pay
the appropriate percentage of the debt under the plan. Perry would find this composi-
tion impermissible.
93. 869 F.2d at 1437. A chapter 13 plan must be "proposed in good faith." I1
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).
94. Saylors, 869 F.2d at 1437.
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termination whether a chapter 13 plan has been proposed in good faith
is a finding of fact reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard. 95
Since the bankruptcy court was in the best position to judge the credi-
bility of the debtor, and it found one of the factors suggesting good
faith under controlling case law,96 the finding of good faith was not
clearly erroneous. Clearly then, chapter 13 filings following chapter 7
cases will receive serious scrutiny in the bankruptcy court. That deter-
mination will almost certainly stand on appeal, given the high standard
of clearly erroneous. As a device to accomplish lien-stripping of a home
mortgage, 97 a "chapter 20" will have formidable hurdles. :First, a court
may as a matter of law deny the combined effect of the two chapters as
doing indirectly what cannot be done directly under chapter 13 because
of section 1322(b)(2). Second, a court should factually find that a
chapter 13 plan has not been proposed in good faith if the prior or
pending chapter 7 case might have been dismissed as a substantial
abuse under section 707(b).98 Third, debtors will usually pay more
under the chapter 13 plan on the stripped-down mortgage than their
regular monthly payments to meet the secured claim cramdown
standard.9
II. CONCLUSION
All the implications of Folendore and the other recent cases need
not come to pass. The courts can, and should, limit Folendore and the
others so far as possible. Congress did not intend to imperil under-
secured claims for the benefit of an individual chapter 7 debtor. Nor
did Congress intend to jeopardize the home mortgage as have Wilson
95. Id. at 1438.
96. See In re Kitchens, 702 F.2d 885, 888-89 (11th Cir. 1983). The bankruptcy
court had found good faith in that Saylors income had increased by $283 between the
time of his two filings. Saylors, 869 F.2d at 1438.
97. This assumes the local courts will not follow Wilson and Hougland. See
supra notes 54-74 and accompanying text.
98. See Samarripas, 107 Bankr. at 366. A substantial abuse under section
707(b) consists of a debtor's filing chapter 7 when the debtor has the ability to pay
creditors. See, e.g., In re Rushing, 93 Bankr. 750 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1988) (chapter 7
dismissed where debtors could have paid all unsecured claims within three years but
debtors sought to retain ski boat by reaffirmation).
99. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii); see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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and Hougland. Finally, the courts should follow Saylors and permit
serial bankruptcy filings, but only upon a careful scrutiny of a debtor's
good faith.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 7, 1990, the Florida Securities and Investor Protection
Act, chapter 517 of the Florida Statutes,' was revised and re-enacted,2
* Professor of Legal Research and Writing, Nova University, Shepard Broad
Law Center. J.D., Catholic University of America, 1984; A.B., College of the Holy
Cross, 1981. Professor Murtaugh practiced securities law in Houston, Texas and New
York, New York, prior to joining the Law Center faculty.
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 517.011 - .32 (1987) (the "Act"), amended by 1990 Fla. Laws
362 ("Chapter 517").
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effective October 1, 1990, to include developments in securities regula-
tion that have occurred since the last major revision of the Florida Blue
Sky Law' in 1986.' The broadly based revisions include: definitional
changes;5 limitations on and expansions of the registration require-
ments and exemptions therefrom for certain securities and individuals
selling securities;6 supplementary requirements for the registration of
securities industry professionals (broker-dealers and investment advi-
sors);" and additional grounds for the revocation, denial or suspension
of the registration of securities and of securities industry professionals.,
The most controversial alteration to the Act was the conversion of
a simple three-letter word "may," to a not-so-simple five letter word
"shall." Section 517.122, the Act's provision regarding the arbitration
of disputes between securities professionals and their customers,9 origi-
nally provided that Florida registered broker-dealers "may provide to
an aggrieved party the option of having arbitration before . .. the
American Arbitration Association."'" The 1990 amendments changed
2. The Act was scheduled for repeal on October 1, 1990 by 1981 Fla. Laws 318
and was scheduled for review prior to repeal pursuant to the Florida Regulatory Sunset
Act, FLA. STAT. § 11.61 (1989).
3. The term "Blue Sky Law" refers to state laws that regulate, inter alia, the
sale and registration of securities. The term originated in 1911 in connection with the
enactment by the State of Kansas of the first law governing the sale of securities.
Kansas had been a stronghold of the Populist philosophy [in an] era
when an 'Agrarian West' was bled by a 'Moneyed East.' Indeed, it was in
Kansas, apparently, that the term 'blue sky law' first came into general use
to describe legislation aimed at promoters who 'would sell building lots in
the blue sky in fee simple'.
L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 8 (1983) (citing Mulvey, Blue
Sky Law, 36 CAN. L. T. 37 (1916)).
4. On October 1, 1986, Florida enacted the Securities Industries Standards Act,
1986 Fla. Laws 85, that amended sections of and created provisions for the Act. See
infra note 37 and accompanying text.
5. H.B. 3429, 11th Leg., § 1 (1990) (the "Bill").
6. Id. at §§ 2-4.
7. Id. at §§ 6, 7.
8. Id. at §§ 5, 12.
9. Id. at § 8.
10. The full text of section 517.122 of the Act prior to its amendment by 1990
Fla. Laws 362 read:
Arbitration. Any agreement to provide services that are covere=d by this
chapter, entered into after January 1, 1987, by a person required to regis-
ter under this chapter, for arbitration of disputes arising under the agree-
ment may provide to an aggrieved party the option of having arbitration
before and pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association.
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the permissive to the mandatory: Florida registered broker-dealers
"shall provide . .. the option of having arbitration before .. . the
American Arbitration Association or other independent nonindustry ar-
bitration forum .... "I'
On October 3, 1990, three days after the amended Act became
effective, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida ruled that section 517.122 was unconstitutional. In Securities
Industry Association v. Lewis, 2 the Southern District found that the
Florida legislature's imposition of a required term in arbitration agree-
ments between broker-dealers and their customers "violates the protec-
tions embodied in [the Federal Arbitration Act], and therefore [was
preempted, pursuant to] the Supremacy Clause [of the United States
Constitution] ."1
This article will provide a brief historical analysis of the evolution
of the Florida Blue Sky Law and discuss the 1990 legislative changes
to that law. The article will then focus on the development of the juris-
prudence governing the arbitration of securities disputes; the issue of
state laws controlling arbitration -agreements under the potential he-
gemony of the Federal Arbitration Act; the Supremacy Clause and the
preemption doctrine; and the Lewis decision. It will conclude that al-
though the Lewis court's decision was not capricious, it was not
compelled.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FLORIDA'S BLUE SKY
LAW
"In Florida, securities regulation has developed dramatically over
the years with the philosophy of regulation shifting from registration of
FLA. STAT. § 517.122 (1987), amended by 1986 Fla. Laws 85.
11. The full text of section 517.122 of the Act after its amendment by 1990 Fla.
Laws 362 read:
Arbitration. Any agreement to provide services that are covered by this
chapter, entered into after October 1, 1990, by a person required to regis-
ter under this chapter, for arbitration of disputes arising under the agree-
ment shall provide to an aggrieved party the option of having arbitration
before and pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association
or other independent nonindustry arbitration forum as well as any industry
forum.
FLA. STAT. § 517.122 (1987), amended by 1990 Fla. Laws 362.
12. 751 F. Supp. 205 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
13. Id. at 208.
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the securities to protecting investors from fraudulent practices."1 In
1913, Florida passed its first Blue Sky Law and embarked upon regu-
lating the "merit" of an offering of securities.' 5 Merit regulation re-
quires that the state make a substantive review of an offering and inde-
pendently determine its fairness. In order to obtain registration of its
offering, the issuer must show that the issue is "fair, just and equita-
ble" to potential investors.1 6
This form of regulation contrasts with the "full and fair disclo-
sure" philosophy on which the federal securities laws are premised.17
Under the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"),18 issues of finan-
cial soundness, insufficient earnings, offering price, inequitable voting
rights and excessive commissions or underwriting and selling expenses
will not prevent an offering from going forward, so long as the issuer
makes full disclosure of any such condition. The Securities and Ex-
change Commission 19 has stated:
In contrast to some of the State officials and commissions, operat-
ing under state "Blue-Sky" laws that authorize them to pass upon
the merits of securities registered with them, it is not this Commis-
sion's function under the Securities Act to approve or disapprove
securities and the statute specifically makes it unlawful to represent
that the Commission has passed upon the merits of any security, or
14. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, H.B. 3429, 11 th
Leg. § 1 (1990) (FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS).
15. COMPTROLLER'S TASK FORCE ON SECURITIES REGULATION REPORT, H.B.
644, 9th Leg., lst.Sess., at 67 (1986) (TASK FORCE REPORT).
16. See Ex Parte Taylor, 68 Fla. 61, 71, 66 So. 292, 295 (1914) (quoting Chap-
ter 6422, acts of 1913). For commentaries on merit regulation by both proponents and
opponents, see Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of
Securities Committee, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41
Bus. LAW 785 (1986); Campbell, An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky Regu-
lation, 10 J. CORP. L. 553 (1985); Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in the
Merit Requirements, 1976 WIs. L. REV. 79 (1976); Hueni, Application of Merit Re-
quirements in State Securities Regulation, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1417 (1969); Mofsky &
Tollison, Demerit in Merit Regulation, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 367 (19"7); Tyler, More
About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 899 (1982); Warren, Reflections on Dual
Regulation of Securities: A Case Against Preemption, 25 B.C.L. REv.1 495 (1984).
17. L. Loss, supra note 3, at 36.
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a - 77aa (1990).
19. The Securities and Exchange Commission is the federal agency charged with
the responsibility of administering the federal securities laws. See Securities and Ex-
change Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1990).
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given approval to it.2"
One authority on the regulation of securities has noted colorfully:
"Congress did not take away from the citizen 'his inalienable right to
make a fool of himself.' It simply attempted to prevent others from
making a fool of him." 21
Partially in response to the stock market crash of 1929, the Flor-
ida legislature enacted the Florida Sale of Securities Act in 193 1.22
Modeled on the Uniform Sale of Securities Act23 adopted by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Bar Association, this Act created the Florida Securities
Commission consisting of the Comptroller, the Treasurer and the At-
torney General. 4 The state's regulatory scheme was broadened with
the requirement of registration of secondary sales of securities and the
expansion of requirements for registering primary offerings.
2 5
The next major revision of Florida's Blue Sky Law took place
forty-seven years later with the adoption of the Florida Sale of Securi-
ties Act in 1978.21 "The Act was characterized by a retreat from the
merit review philosophy and an increased emphasis on anti-fraud en-
forcement. The most significant change in the law was the exemption
from merit review of any security registered with the federal govern-
20. In re Universal Camera Corp., 19 S.E.C. 648, 656 (1945) (citations
omitted).
21. L. Loss, supra note 3, at 36. The "Dean of American securities law"
continues:
As the Supreme Court has ... put it, the SEC statutes embrace a "fun-
damental purpose. . . to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of busi-
ness ethics in the securities industry . . . ." It must not be thought, how-
ever, that Disclosure and Merit are two gods that sit on separate but equal
thrones. On the one hand [a state blue sky law, in particular, the Uniform
Securities Act] has a disclosure component, and most states today require
the delivery of a prospectus. On the other hand, the indirect regulatory
effect of a policed system of full and fair disclosure should not be underes-
timated: people who are forced to undress in public will presumably pay
attention to their figures.
Id. (citations omitted.)
22. 1931 Fla. Laws 261.
23. Uniform Sale of Securities Act (1929).
24. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 2.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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ment."2  This change in philosophy apparently resulted from the Flor-
ida Law Revision Council's 1975 finding that merit review had "arbi-
trarily inhibited growth of new enterprise and created undesirable
competitive advantages for large corporations at the cost of small
firms" and could not, therefore, survive a cost-benefit analysis.2"
In 1984, the legislature revisited the Blue Sky Law, enacting the
Investor Protection Act of 1984.29 This Act expanded the Department
of Banking and Finance's 3° anti-fraud enforcement authority to offers
and sales of investments as well as securities. 3' The addition of this
unique remedial provision was a response to the increasing practice of
unscrupulous promoters situating their fraudulent investment schemes
in Florida, where they could claim that their promotions did not involve
the offering or sale of "securities. '3 2
One year later, the Florida legislature attempted once again to fine
tune its Blue Sky Law by promulgating the Securities and Investor
Protection Act, 3 the grandfather of Chapter 517. Having determined
that it had lacked necessary prescience in 197834 when it exempted
from registration all securities registered under the United States Se-
curities Act of 1933,35 the legislature substituted the requirement of
27. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 69.
28. Id.
29. FLA. STAT. §§ 517.011 - .32 (1985).
30. The Division of Securities of the Department of Banking and Finance (the
Department) was created in 1969 to succeed the Securities Commission and was placed
under the administration of the Comptroller. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at
2.
31. Id.
32. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 70. An example of the expansion of
the Department's enforcement authority by the Investor Protection Act of 1984 is the
addition of a definition of "boiler rooms" and the concurrent prohibition of their opera-
tion for the commission of investment fraud. FLA. STAT. §§ 517.021 and 517.312
(1987). Prior to the 1984 Act, the term "security" in the Florida Blue Sky Law was
often accorded a restrictive interpretation by the Florida courts. In Yeomans v. State,
452 So. 2d 1011, 1012 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984), the court reversed the Comptrol-
ler's orders, closing thirty-two "boiler room" operations selling "filing service" con-
tracts in connection with the United States Department of Interior's oil and gas lease
lottery. The Third District held that the contracts were not securities (specifically, not
"investment contracts") as defined by the Florida Blue Sky Law.
33. The Securities and Investor Protection Act, FLA. STAT. §j; 517.011 - .32
(1985), amended by 1990 Fla. Laws 362.
34. 1978 Fla. Laws 435.
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a - 77aa (1990).
[Vol. 15
37
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Murtaugh
"registration by notification" for that exemption. 6
Continuing its annual foray into revising its laws governing the
offering and sale of securities and the people and practices associated
therewith, the legislature, in 1986, amended Florida's Blue Sky Law
again with the adoption of the Securities Industry Standards Act.37
The new law was premised on recommendations of the Comptroller's
Task Force on Securities Regulation, established in 1985 to "conduct a
comprehensive review of Florida's regulation of securities and other in-
vestment transactions."' 8 The primary objective of that legislation was
to enhance anti-fraud enforcement of securities and investment
transactions. 9
This Act sought to accomplish its 'purpose through, inter alia, in-
creasing the number of types of securities offerings that can be regis-
tered in Florida only through merit registration (as opposed to notifica-
tion registration), clarifying by redefinition the term "investment,"
imposing stricter requirements on individuals registering in the state as'
broker-dealers, and strengthening the Department's enforcement
powers.40
The Florida legislature in 1986 also opted to add the simple three-
letter word "may," rather than the not-so-simple five-letter word
"shall" to the Act's provision regarding the arbitration of disputes be-
tween a broker-dealer and its customer and the option of using the
American Arbitration Association.41 Thus, the controversy between the
State and the securities industry would be avoided for four years, dur-
ing which time the industry would be allowed to bolster its arsenal of
federal court jurisprudence and dicta with which to challenge such a
36. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 70. The proliferation of offerings
of federally registered penny stocks "had not been envisioned seven years earlier when
the Florida Securities Act was passed". Id. The 1985 legislation also enhanced the
investigative authority of the Department "by providing confidentiality for examination
of books and records and strict penalties for non-compliance with investigative subpoe-
nas." Id. at 71.
37. H.B. 644, 9th Leg., Ist Sess. (1986).
38. HousE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, H.B. 644, 9th
Leg., 1st Sess. (1986).
39. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15.
40. Id. For a thorough and thoughtful analysis of the Securities Industry Stan-
dards Act of 1986, its background and related issues, see Cane, The Securities Indus-
try Standards Act of 1986: Significant Changes In Florida's Blue Sky Laws, 11 NOvA
L. REV. 1179 (1987).
41. FLA. STAT. § 517.122 (Supp. 1986). See supra note 10 and infra notes 146-
54 and accompanying text.
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mandate.
III. HOUSE BILL 3429: THE 1990 LEGISLATIVE CHANGES TO
FLORIDA'S BLUE SKY LAW
A. Purpose and Scope
In addition to inspiring litigation over one of its more palpable sec-
tions, the Bill reenacted the Florida Blue Sky Law, Chapter 517 of the
Florida Statutes.42 In arguing the necessity of the Act's reinstatement,
the House Commerce Committee (the Committee) recognized that
"Florida residents are frequently the target of investment scams due to
the large pool of retirement money and the population growth rate" of
the state.43 The Committee asserted:
Without the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act, and
the rules promulgated thereunder, citizens of the State of Florida
would be vulnerable to a vast array of fraudulent schemes and the
State would be a haven for unscrupulous conduct within the securi-
-ties and investment advisory industry. The Act protects the eco-
nomic health, safety, and welfare of the investing public by estab-
lishing a method of regulating the sale of securities and
investments.4 1
Chapter 517 attempts to achieve its goals in three ways. First, it
requires the registration of securities, the purpose of which is to prevent
the offer or sale of issues that could result in fraud upon the purchaser,
unreasonable underwriting or selling expenses, or windfall profits to the
promoter or issuer at the expense of the public.45 Second, it requires
registration of persons engaged in the offer or sale of securities, thereby
attempting to assure the public that such people have at least a mini-
mal knowledge and ability to act in a fiduciary capacity, that they have
met minimal standards of financial responsibility and that unqualified
or unscrupulous persons are excluded from the business.4 6 Third, it pro-
vides penalties for persons engaging in fraudulent activity in connection
with the sale or purchase of securities or investments and gives the De-
42. See supra note 2.
43. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 3.
44. Id. at 2-3.
45. Id. at 3.
46. Id.
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partment the necessary authority to enforce those punitive provisions. 47
Additionally, the Committee recognized that in the absence of a
Florida law regulating securities, only the federal securities laws would
apply, if at all, to transactions in the State. The Committee posited
that:
[F]ederal protection would be limited in both scope and availability
[to Florida residents] for three reasons: (1) federal law would only
apply to interstate commerce and not to those transactions occur-
ring strictly within Florida; (2) federal law would not be as com-
prehensive as the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act;
and (3) the resources to pursue individual investment schemes
would not be available . . . . [A]ny degree of deregulation could
result in a lessening of protection and remedies available to the
public as well as to the industry.48
Finally, the Committee argued that Chapter 517 protects persons
engaged in the securities and investment advisory business as well as
the investing public.
[Chapter 517] protect[s] the business climate in which legitimate
dealers operate by ensuring that they are all held to the following:
the same minimum level of competence; the same books and
records, and net capital requirements; and the same standards in
the way they conduct business and deal with the investing public.
These standards serve to ensure fairness in competition among per-
sons in the industry, and further protect the industry from arbi-
trary or capricious conduct by the Department. 49
The Florida Legislature agreed with the Committee's assessment
of the need for reinstating the State's Blue Sky Law, as amended by
House Bill 3249, and voted, almost unanimously, for its passage.50 The
47. Id.
48. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 3-4. The Committee continued:
"Failure to re-enact the Act would most certainly adversely affect the public [by lead-
ing] to more improper or fraudulent securities transactions. In the absence of regula-
tory authority, the Department [of Banking and Finance] would be powerless to sanc-
tion such conduct." Id.
49. Id. at 4.
50. The Senate passed the Bill by a vote of 38 to 0; the House passed it by a vote
of 110-3. Id. at 10. The legislative history of the Bill was curious:
On 4/04/90 House Bill 3429 was filed by the Commerce Committee and
Representative Ron Johnson. The bill was referred to the Appropriations
1991]
40
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/18
Nova Law Review
amendments to the Act that the legislature so overwhelmingly endorsed
include changes affecting the registration of securities and exemptions
from securities registration,51 changes in the registration requirements
and exemptions from registration for securities industry personnel5" and
definitional and clarification changes. 3
B. Changes in the Registration and Exemption Therefrom of
Securities and Securities Professionals
1. Securities: Registration and Exemption
The Bill contains four significant changes regarding -the registra-
tion and exemption from registration of securities offerings under the
Florida Blue Sky Law.
First, the Act enumerates certain transactions that are exempt
from registration because of the nature of the issuer and the investors
involved in the issuer's offering. These exemptions are available in situ-
ations in which the potential for fraud and deceit are minimal, usually
because the purchaser is experienced in the investment field and has
Committee on 4/09/90 (HJ 00164), withdrawn from the Appropriations
Committee on 4/17/90 (HJ 00207) and placed on the Calendar. On 5/
02/90, the bill was placed on the Special Order Calendar and passed as
amended on 5/03/90 by a vote of 114-2 (HJ 00437). On 5/10/90 the
Senate received the bill in Messages and referred it to the Commerce
Committee (SJ 00319). On 5/23/90 the bill was withdrawn from the
Commerce Committee, substituted for CS/SB 1442 (SJ 00427) and was
passed as amended by a vote of 38-0 (SJ 00429). On 5/31/90 the House
refused to concur and requested the Senate to recede (HJ 1519). On 6/
01/90 the Senate refused to recede and requested the House to concur (SJ
01247). On 6/02/90 the House concurred and passed the bill as amended
by a vote of 110-3 (HJ 01901), and the bill was ordered enrolled.
Id. It is interesting to note that the Bill presented to Governor Martinez on June 6,
1990, became law on July 7, 1990 without his signature. Id.
51. See infra notes 54-90 and accompanying text. The FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS
advanced a different scheme organizing the Bill's changes to the Act. The Bill contains:
changes that codify the Department of Banking and Finances historical
interpretations of certain provisions of the Act, changes that update vari-
ous provisions of the law to reflect changes in corresponding federal law
and technical changes that clarify the requirements for compliance with
the Act and the meaning of certain terms.
FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 2.
52. See infra notes 91-109 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
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information available on which to base an informed investment deci-
sion.5 4 One such provision exempts from securities registration second-
ary market transactions in a security by a registered dealer.55
The Bill prohibits the use of this exemption for securities of an
issuer that previously have been denied registration by the Department
for cause. 6 This change puts the secondary market 7 on par with the
primary market 58 in Florida, and precludes an offering that would have
been denied registration from infiltrating the State'sborders in a sec-
ondary market transaction through a Florida registered dealer.
Second, the Bill grants the. Department the rulemaking authority
to exclude persons who sell securities in one type of exempt transaction,
the non-public ("private placement") or limited offering that the De-
partment has made exempt by rule,59 from the registration require-
54. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 5.
55. FLA. STAT. § 517.061(17)(a) (1987).
56. H.B. 3429, supra note 5, § 3. "Cause" exists when:
(a) The issuer is insolvent;
(b) The issuer or any controlling person has violated any provision of
[Chapter 517] or any rule made hereunder or any order of the Department
of which such issuer has notice;
(c) The issuer or any controlling person has been or is engaged or is
about to engage in fraudulent transactions;
(d) The issuer or any controlling person is in any other way dishonest
or has made any fraudulent representations or failed to disclose any mate-
rial information in any prospectus or in any circular or other literature
that has been distributed concerning the issuer or its securities; or
(e) The terms of the offer or sale of such securities under [the merit
registration provision] would not be fair, just, or equitable.
FLA. STAT. § 517.111 (1990).
57. The sale of a security by the buyer from the issuer in the primary market (in
the primary distribution of that security) to another purchaser at a mutually agreed
upon price is a sale in the secondary market (a secondary market transaction). The
proceeds of this transaction accrue to the first buyer, not to the issuer. This sale may
take place privately, through a broker-dealer or over a national securities exchabge. R.
TEWELES & E. BRADLEY, THE STOCK MARKET 3 (5th ed. 1987).
58. The initial sale of securities is from the issuing entity to the investor in a
primary transaction in the "primary market," with the sale proceeds flowing to the
issuer. Id.
59. FLA. STAT. § 517.061(18)(c) gives the Department the authority to exempt,
by rule, transactions from the Act's registration requirements. In relevant part, that
section states:
[T]ransactions defined by rules as transactions exempted from the re-
gistration provisions of [the Act], which rules the department may . . .
adopt . . . after a finding . . . that the application of the [Act's registra-
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ments for "dealers." 60 Regulation D, the federal regulation containing
the rules under which such offerings are exempt from federal securities
registration, allows the issuer (and its representatives) to offer and sell
its securities (in a regulated manner) without registering as a dealer."
The adoption of such a rule by the Department would coordinate fur-
ther the Florida exemption with the federal exemption, thereby simpli-
fying the process and decreasing the expense to an issuer desiring to
make a private placement or limited offering in Florida.62
Third, the Department also was provided authority to exempt from
the Act's "laborious merit review process"6 3 securities that, although
marketed at five dollars or less per share, are nevertheless of high in-
vestment quality. 4 Section 517.082 of the Act exempts from merit re-
tion] provisions ... to a particular transaction is not necessary in the pub-
lic interest and for the protection of investors because of the small dollar
amount of securities involved or the limited character of the offering [are
so exempted].
FLA. STAr. § 517.061(18)(c) (1987), amended by 1990 Fla. Laws 362.
60. "Dealer" includes any of the following:
1. Any person, other than an associated person registered under this chap-
ter, who engages, either for all or part of his time, directly or indirectly, as
broker or principal in the business of offering, buying, selling, or otherwise
dealing or trading in securities issued by another person.
2. Any issuer who through persons directly compensated or controlled by
the issuer engages, either for all or part of his time, directly or indirectly,
in the business of offering or selling securities which are issued or are pro-
posed to be issued by the issuer.
FLA. STAT. § 517.021(6)(a) (1990).
61. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 501 - 508 (1990).
62. An applicant for registration as a dealer must pay an assessment fee of $200.
See FLA. STAT. § 517.12(10) (1990).
Adopting such a rule would also bring the Department's small-off-.ring exemption
into parallel with the statutory limited offering exemption. Persons associated with an
issuer that makes an offering pursuant to section 517.061(11) (the statutory "private
placement") are excluded from the statutory definition of "dealer." See FLA. STAT. §
517.021(6)(b)(6) (1990).
It must be noted that the Department has not acted under its grant of authority to
adopt rules creating transaction exemptions for small or limited offerings in addition to
those provided in Chapter 517.
63. See FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 5.
64. H.B. 3429, supra note 5, § 4. The legislature did not impose any standard
with which the Department must abide in promulgating such a rule. The FINAL STAFF
ANALYSIS explains that because
this is an area where there is a potential for fraud, such as with stock
priced at less than $5 (or 'penny stock'), no substantive statutory standard
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gistration all securities "offered and sold pursuant to a registration
statement filed under the Securities Act of 1933, ' '65 but requires the
issuers of those offerings to register them for sale in the State of Flor-
ida pursuant to "notification." Notification registration, "a cursory pro-
cess, ' 66 requires the issuer to notify the Department of its intention to
make the offering, of its name and address of the title of the securities
that will be offered and sold, and to file with the Department a consent
to service and copies of documents filed with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission.6
The 1986 amendments to the Act 8 limited the use of notification
registration to issuers whose securities at the time of effectiveness with
the Securities and Exchange Commission are offered at a price of more
than five dollars per share or unit, unless the securities have been listed
or approved for listing on a national securities exchange or NAS-
DAQ.6" This limitation was added because of the Task Force's7" con-
is set for the Department to issue such rules as a standard may only en-
courage fraudulent obtainment of any exemption which may be set by
rule.
FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 5-6.
65. See supra note 1.
66. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 5.
67. Section 517.082 also requires the payment of a $1,000 nonrefundable fee. A
registration by notification becomes effective upon effectiveness of the registration
statement under the Securities Act of 1933. See supra note 1.
68. See supra note 4; see also Cane, supra note 40, for a detailed analysis and
explanation of this "limited return to merit regulation."
69. FLA. STAT. § 517.082(3) (1987). The full text of the then-new subsection 3
provided:
Except for securities offered or sold pursuant to a registration statement
filed under the Investment Company Act of 1940, the provisions of this
section may not be used to register securities if the offering price at the
time of effectiveness with the Securities and Exchange Commission is $5
or less per share or per unit, unless such securities are listed or designated,
or approved for listing or designation upon notice of issuance, on a stock
exchange registered pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or on
the National Association of Securities Dealers' Automated Quotation
(NASDAQ) System, or unless such securities are of the same issuer and
of senior or substantially equal rank to securities so listed or designated.
Id. The stock exchanges referred to include the New York Stock Exchange, the Ameri-
can Stock Exchange and the regional exchanges, such as the Philadelphia and Pacific
Stock Exchanges.
NASDAQ is the computerized price quotation system established by the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) in 1971.
The system displays price quotations that are continuously updated on a
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cern over the proliferation of offerings of "penny stocks," shares of
stock that are sold for nominal amounts.71 The Task Force Report
stated: "These are often highly speculative, undercapitalized offerings
and usually sold in states where the registration standards provide for
no merit review. Florida has a significant number of these questionable
investment opportunities due to the current absence of review for all
federally-registered offerings. '"72
But the Task Force was hesitant in re-imposing 73 a .nerit review
provision for securities registration. As former Florida Governor Rubin
Askew, the Chairman of the Task Force, stated: "[W]e are looking for
a balance . . . something that is workable and something that will al-
low the market to operate fairly and at the same time reduce the inci-
dence of people being taken on outright fraudulent schemes." 74 The
balance that was struck in 1986 was tilted in 1990. In addition to au-
thorizing the Department to exempt from merit review securities of
high investment quality, the Bill added to the Act's listing of exclusions
from the required merit review of securities marketed at five dollars or
less units of limited partnership interest.7 5
A unit of limited partnership interest, in its attributes as a secur-
ity7" and in the way it is regulated as a security,77 is different from the
real-time basis on computer terminals located in a subscriber's office. The
minimum qualification standards for initial inclusion of an issuer's securi-
ties in the NASDAQ system include (i) total assets of $2 million; (ii) capi-
tal and surplus of $1 million; (iii) 100,000 publicly held shares; (iv) 300
shareholders of record; and (v) two NASDAQ market makers.
NASD Manual, Sched. D 1138-41 (March 1987).
70. See supra note 15.
71. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 56. Penny stock, also known as
"cheap stock," has been the subject of heated debate between state regulators and
practitioners. See, e.g., NASAA Statement of Policy on Cheap Stock, 1 Blue Sky L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 5311 - 5314 (1984); Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Merit Regulation of
the State Regulation of Securities Committee, Report on State Merit Regulation, 10
J. CORP. L. 553 (1985).
72. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 56.
73. See supra notes 15 and 16, and accompanying text.
74. Testimony of Royce Griffin before the Task Force in Miami, Florida (Janu-
ary 13-14, 1986).
75. H.B. 3429, supra note 5, § 4.
76. A limited partnership interest is an "investment contract." An investment
contract involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with an expectation
of profit coming from the managerial efforts of others. S.E.C. v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293
(1946); S.E.C. v. Glen W. Turner Enter., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 821 (1973).
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common stock issued by a corporation. The primary distinction (for the
purposes of this discussion) is the illiquidity of the partnership inter-
est. 8 Units of limited partnership interest are purchased as long-term
investments because usually no active secondary market for them
exists.79
The issuing entity also is significantly different.80 The limited part-
Investment contracts are included in the definitions of a security in both Florida
law (see FLA. STAT. § 517.021 (1990)) and the federal Securities Act of 1933 (see 15
U.S.C. § 77b (1990)).
Note that, as a security, a unit of limited partnership interest shares a number of
similarities with a share of stock: they are both investment vehicles; unless an exemp-
tion exists they must be registered before being offered and sold, and the anti-fraud
rules apply to transactions in both.
For a discussion of whether every unit of limited partnership interest involves a
security, see Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 406-08 (7th Cir. 1978). For a discus-
sion of situations in which general partnership interests are securities, see Rivanna
Trawlers v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988); see also Chang, Meaning, Refer-
ence, and Reification in the Definition of a Security, 19 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 403
(1986); Arnold, "When is a Car a Bicycle?" And Other Riddles: The Definition of a
Security Under the Federal Securities Laws, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449 (1984-85);
Levinson, General Partnership Interests and the Securities Act of 1933: Recent Judi-
cial Developments, 10 OHto N.U.L. REV. 463 (1983); Long, Partnership, Limited
Partnership and Joint Venture Interests as Securities, 37 Mo. L. REv. 581 (1972).
77. Numerous states require that partnership offerings satisfy specific standards,
including standards of investor suitability. See, e.g., NASAA Statement of Policy, I
Blue Sky L.Rep. (CCH) Real Estate Programs, 5363, pt. III (1984). The NASD also
requires that limited partnerships satisfy certain criteria not applicable to corporate
offerings. See art. III, § 34, NASD Rules of Fair Practice, NASD Manual (CCH) 1
2191.
78. Hensley & Rothwell, Regulation T and Public Offerings of Limited Partner-
ships: Time for a Change, 39 Bus. LAW. 543, 544 (1984).
79. Id. Note that this is not true of "publicly traded limited partnerships" (some-
times referred to as master limited partnerships) that are exchange or NASDAQ
listed. Id.
The lack of an active secondary market is the result of restrictions imposed by
partnerships on free transferability of partnership units in order to protect the status of
the partnership as a non-taxable entity. The partnership agreement usually will pro-
hibit assignment or transfer of a unit without consent of the general partner to avoid
automatic termination of the partnership status under the Internal Revenue Code. Sec-
tion 708(b)(1) of the Code provides for automatic termination if fifty percent or more
of the capital and profit interests in a partnership are sold within a twelve-month pe-
riod. Id.
80. The traditional attributes of the partnership and corporate forms of business
organization differ in the formalities of organization, capital and credit requirements,
management and control, profits and losses, extent of liability, transferability of inter-
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nership is usually formed with a single, temporary business objective.8'
Unlike the corporation, it does not have perpetual life and its focus is
peculiarly specific.
These differences between the partnership and the corporation and
their respective securities typically result in a lower price 1.o the public
of partnership units than of new issues of corporate stock.!2 In remov-
ing partnership interests from the category of securities that must un-
dergo a merit review for registration in Florida, the legislature recog-
nized that those interests frequently are marketed at or below five
dollars without necessarily being of poor investment quality. In this im-
portant area, the regulatory balance has shifted in favor of
"[s]omething that is workable."' 3
Fourth, the Bill expands the grounds for denial, suspension or rev-
ocation of securities to include instances in which the issuer or any con-
trolling person of the issuer has failed to disclose any material informa-
tion in any prospectus, any offering circular or any other literature
concerning the issuer or its securities.8 4 Section 517.111 of the Act sets
forth the grounds for which the Department may revoke or suspend the
registration of any security registered with it, or deny any application
to register securities with it.8 5
est, continuity of existence and taxation considerations. See generally H. HENN & J.
ALEXANDER. LAWS OF CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1983).
81. A limited partnership is a contractual arrangement among one or more gen-
eral partners and limited partners who aggregate their financial resources and business
expertise to accomplish a business objective. Hensley & Rothwell, supra note 78, at
557.
82. The offering price of a new issue is determined after negotiations occur be-
tween the issuer and the underwriter. The factors generally considered in those negotia-
tions in determining the offering price at which to market a new issue are: prices of
similar companies; price/earnings ratio; capitalization; projected growth; acceptability
of certain maximum prices by customers; acceptability of certain minimum prices by
the proposed syndicate; book value; percentage of the shares to be publicly offered in
relation to the shares that will be outstanding after the offering; type of security being
offered; type of company; and public confidence in the market. Kowaloff & Flood, Pric-
ing, Effectiveness, and Closing, in SECURITIES UNDERWRITING, A PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE 325 (1985).
83. See supra note 74 and accompanying text..
84. H.B. 3429, supra note 5, § 5.
85. Section 517.111, of the Florida Statutes read, prior to amendment, inter alia:
Revocation or denial of registration of securities. (1) The department may
revoke or suspend the registration of any security, or may deny any appli-
cation to register securities, if upon examination into the affairs of the
issuer of such security it shall appear that:
[Vol. 15
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Prior to the Bill's amendment to this section, an issuer's registra-
tion of its securities could be denied or revoked pursuant to sub-section
(d) of section 517.111, if the issuer (or any controlling person of the
issuer) had made any fraudulent representation; 6 no provision existed
for patent non-disclosure. While arguably an issuer's non-disclosure
could have given rise to revocation or denial under another sub-section
of section 517.111, the amendment explicitly creates a separate ground
for material non-disclosure.87
Furthermore, the Bill amends section 517.111 to authorize the De-
partment to deny any request to terminate any securities registration or
withdraw any application for securities registration if the issuer has
committed any act that would be the ground for denial, suspension or
revocation of securities registration.88 The significance of this addition
lies in the extent of the examination the Department may make into
the affairs of an issuer that it believes has committed any such act.
Section 517.111(1) states, in part, that:
In making such examination, the department shall have access to
(a) The issuer is insolvent;
(b) The issuer or any controlling person has violated any provision of
this chapter or any rule made hereunder or any order of the department of
which such issuer has notice;
(c) The issuer or any controlling person has been or is engaged or is
about to engage in fraudulent transactions;
(d) The issuer or any controlling person is in any other way dishonest
or has made any fraudulent representations in any prospectus or in any
circular or other literature that has been distributed concerning the issuer
or its securities; or ....
FLA. STAT. § 517.111 (1987) (amended 1990).
The Bill inserted "or failed to disclose any material information" in sub-section
(d) after the word representations. H.B. 3429, supra note 5, § 5.
86. Id.
87. See supra note 85. Arguably, sub-section (c) of Section 517.111 could pro-
vide the grounds for denial or revocation of securities registration because failing to
disclose material information has been held to be engaging in a fraudulent transaction.
See, e.g, S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969) (ruling that the failure to disclose material information in the sale
of securities is actionable under the antifraud provisions of section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, thereunder).
88. The Bill added sub-section 5 to section 517.111: "(5) The department may
deny any request to terminate any registration or to withdraw any application for regis-
tration if the department believes that an act which would be grounds for denial, sus-
pension, or revocation under this chapter has been committed." H.B. 3429, supra note
5, § 5.
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and may compel the production of all the books and papers of such
issuer and may administer oaths to and examine the officers of such
issuer or any other person connected therewith as to its business
and affairs and may also require a balance sheet exhibiting the as-
sets and liabilities of any such issuer or his income statement, or
both, to be certified to by a public accountant ... 89
This addition allows the Department to retain jurisdiction over is-
suers or registrants that it believes have committed a fraudulent act,
with the power to require production of documents and sworn testi-
mony. It also conforms the standard for denial or requests to terminate
or withdraw registration of securities to the standard that exists for
associated persons.90
2. Securities Professionals: Registration and Exemption
The Bill contains six significant changes regarding the registration
and exemption of securities professionals under the Florida Blue Sky
Law.
First, section 517.12 of the Act requires that all persons, dealers,
investment advisers and others that transact a securities or investment
advisory business to or from the state be registered with the Depart-
89. FLA. STAT. § 517.111(1) (1990).
90. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 6. "Associated person" means any
of the following:
(a) Any partner, officer, director, or branch manager of a dealer or invest-
ment adviser or any person occupying a similar status or performing simi-
lar functions;
(b) Any natural person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by
such dealer or investment adviser, other than an employee whose function
is only clerical or ministerial; or
(c) Any natural person, other than a dealer, employed, appointed, or au-
thorized by a dealer, or issuer to sell securities in any manner or act as an
investment adviser as defined in this section.
The partners of a partnership and the executive officers of a corporation or
other association registered as a dealer are not "associated persons" within
the meaning of this definition.
FLA. STAT. § 517.021(4) (1990).
Section 517.161(5) contains the following with respect to the revocation, denial or
suspension of registration of an associated person: "The department may deny any re-
quest to terminate or withdraw any application or registration if the department be-
lieves that an act which would be a ground for denial, suspension, restriction, or revoca-
tion under this chapter has been committed." FLA. STAT. § 517.161(5) (1990).
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ment unless otherwise exempt.91 It also contains the application proce-
dure and requirements for registration. 2
The Bill adds to subsection (1) of section 517.1293 the requirement
that the securities firm, for which any applicant for registration as an
associated person seeks to register, be a Florida registered dealer or
investment advisor.9 4 This provision ensures that an individual will not
be registered as an associated person of an unlicensed securities firm.95
Second, the Bill clarifies that associated persons must successfully
pass oral or written examinations to register under the Act, and codifies
the Department's "long held position" that principals, managers, super-
visors or persons exercising similar functions may be held to higher ex-
amination standards because of their responsibilities over the acts of
their associated persons.9" The Bill also clarifies that if the applicant
has passed certain tests prescribed by the Securities Exchange Act, the
Department shall waive its own requirements only if the federal exami-
nation is for a position that relates to the position to be filled by the
applicant. 7
91. FLA. STAT. § 517.12 (1990).
92. Id.
93. Subsection (1) of section 517.12 requires that persons selling securities in
Florida register under the Act. Prior to amendment by the Bill, it read:
(1) No dealer, associated person, or issuer of securities shall sell or offer
for sale any securities in or from offices in this state, or sell securities to
persons in this state from offices outside this state, by mail or otherwise,
unless the person has been registered with the department pursuant to the
provisions of this section.
FLA. STAT. § 517.12 (1987)(amended 1990).
94. The text of the language added to section 517.12(1) states: "The department
shall not register any person as an associated person of a dealer or investment adviser
unless the dealer or investment adviser with which the applicant seeks registration is
lawfully registered with the department pursuant to this chapter."
H.B. 3429, supra note 5, § 6.
It is interesting to note that although in common parlance an investor's representa-
tive at the investor's brokerage firm is referred to as a "broker-dealer," actually (more
often than not) it is the corporate or partnership entity that employs those representa-
tives that is registered under the federal and state securities laws as a broker-dealer.
The human, individual representative employed by the broker-dealer firm is registered
under the securities laws as an "associated person" of that registered broker-dealer
firm.
95. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 6.
96. Id.
97. Id. As amended, section 517.12(8) states (with the Bill's amending language
in italics):
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Third, the Bill requires that every entity registered as a securities
dealer in the State of Florida also be registered as a broker or dealer
with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and be
insured by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation.98 As written
prior to amendment, section 517.12(16) allowed a Florida registered
broker-dealer's federal registration to lapse for a period of time prior to
the time at which the broker-dealer was required to renew its license in
Florida.
Fourth, to clarify its position that even though a broker-dealer
may effect transactions in securities that are exempt from registration
under the Act that broker-dealer is not always exempt from registra-
tion with the state. The legislature revised appropriate statutory cross
references in section 517.12(3). 9 Section 517.12(3) lists the instances
in which an, entity or individual may sell securities in an "exempt trans-
action"' 0 in Florida without registering as a securities professional.' 0'
The most well recognized "exempt transaction" is the private offering
The department may require the applicant of one or more principals or
general partners, or natural persons exercising similar functions, or any
associated person applicant to successfully pass oral or written examina-
tion. Because any principal, manager, supervisor, or person exercising
similar functions shall be responsible for the acts of the associated per-
sons affiliated with a dealer or investment adviser, the examination stan-
dards may be higher for a dealer, office manager, principal, or person exer-
cising similar functions than for a nonsupervisory associated person. The
department may waive the examination process when it determines that
such examinations are not in the public interest. The department shall
waive the examination requirements for any person who has passed any
tests as prescribed in s. 15(b)(7) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
that relates to the position to be filled by the applicant.
FLA. STAT. § 517.12(8) (1990).
98. House Bill 3429 added the italicized language to section 517.12(16) of the
Act:
Except for securities dealers who are designated by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York as primary government securities dealers or securities
dealers registered as issuers of securities, every applicant for initial or re-
newal registration as a securities dealer and every person registered as a
securities dealer shall be registered as a broker or dealer with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission and shall be subject to insurance coverage
by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation.
H.B. 3429, supra note 5, § 6.
99. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 6.
100. Section 517.061 of the Act provides that the securities registration provi-
sions of the Act do not apply to sales or purchases of certain securitie:;.
101. FLA. STAT. § 517.12 (1990).
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exemption in which an issuer sells his own securities to no more than
35 non-accredited purchasers during a 12 month period." 2
Fifth, the Bill amends section 517.121 of the Act. Prior to the
amendment, subsection (1) of that section required any dealer, invest-
ment adviser, branch office or associated person registered with the De-
partment to maintain such books and records as required by rule. This
section further requires the Department to periodically examine these
books and records to determine if there is compliance.10 3
The Bill deleted the requirement that the dealer, investment ad-
viser, branch office or associated person be registered with the Depart-
ment. Thus, after amendment, a branch office that is not lawfully regis-
tered will not escape culpability for failure to maintain the required
books and records.0
The House of Representatives Committee on Commerce indicated
that this amendment served two purposes. First, it protects the public
by ensuring that securities professionals will keep proper records of
their transactions. And second, regulators will have additional evidence
of the transactions at unregistered branch offices to determine whether
violations have occurred at any such office. °5
Finally, section 517.161 of the Act was amended by the Bill. Sec-
tion 517.161 sets forth the grounds and procedures for revocation, de-
nial or suspension of registration of a dealer, investment advisor, associ-
ated person or branch office.' 06 Prior to amendment, subsection (4)
stated, inter alia:
It shall be sufficient cause for denial of an application or revocation
of registration in the case of a partnership, corporation, or unincor-
porated association, if any member of the partnership or any of-
ficer, director, or ultimate equitable owner . . . of the corporation
or association has been guilty of an act or omission which would be
cause for denying or revoking the registration of an individual
dealer, investment adviser, or associated person.107
102. Section 517.061(11) contains Florida's version of the "private placement"
exemption.
103. Prior to amendment, section 517.121(1) read: "A dealer, investment ad-
viser, branch office, or associated person registered under s. 517.12 shall maintain such
books and records as the department may prescribe by rule." FLA. STAT. § 517.121(1)
(1987)(amended 1990).
104. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 7.
105. Id.
106. FLA. STAT. § 517.161 (1990).
107. FLA. STAT. § 517.161(4) (1987) (amended 1990).
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The Bill provides that a securities firm's equitable. owner's mere
commission of, as opposed to a judgement or plea of guilty for, any act
or omission that would be cause for denying or revoking an individual's
registration is cause for the Department to deny or revoke the registra-
tion of the firm."0 8 This modification places the standard in agreement
with the other subsections of section 517.161.19
C: Definitional Changes and Clarifications
House Bill 3429 made a number of minor definitional changes and
108. As amended, section 517.161(4) reads, in part:
It shall be sufficient cause for denial of an application or revocation of
registration, in the case of a partnership, corporation, or unincorporated
association, if any member of the partnership or any officer, director, or
ultimate equitable owner of the corporation or association has committed
any act or omission which would be cause for denying, revoking, restrict-
ing, or suspending the registration of an individual dealer, investment ad-
viser, or associated person . ...
FLA. STAT. § 517.161(4) (1990).
The Bill also added a definition of "ultimate equitable owner" to section
517.161(4):
As used in this subsection, 'ultimate equitable owner' means a natural per-
son who directly or indirectly owns or controls an ownership interest in the
corporation, partnership, association, or other legal entity however organ-
ized, regardless of whether such natural person owns or controls such own-
ership interest through one or more proxies, powers of attorney, nominees,
corporations, associations, partnerships, trusts, joint stock companies, or
other entities or devices, or any combination thereof.
FLA. STAT. § 517.161(4) (1990).
109. Section 517.161 provides, in part:
(1) Registration [of any dealer, investment adviser, associated person or
branch office] may be revoked, restricted, or suspended by the department
if the department determines that such applicant or registrant:
(a) Has violated any provision of this chapter or any rule or order made
under this chapter; (b) Has made a material false statement in the appli-
cation for registration; (c) Has been guilty of a fraudulent act in connec-
tion with any sale of securities, has been or is engaged or is about to en-
gage in making fictitious or pretended sales or purchases of any such
securities, or has been or is engaged or is about to engage in any practice
or sale of securities which is fraudulent or in violation of the law; (d) Has
made a misrepresentation or false statement to, or concealed any essential
or material fact from, any person in the sale of a security to such person;
FLA. STAT. § 517.161(1) (1990).
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modifications to clarify portions of the Act." 0
Section one of the Bill amends the definition section of the Act,
section 517.021, by deleting the definition of "accredited investor.""'
Section three of the Bill provides that "accredited investor" will be de-
fined by the Department in a rule that is in accordance with the corre-
sponding federal definition of that term."12 The Department has pro-
posed an amendment to the Florida Blue Sky Regulations to include a
definition of accredited investor that tracks the federal definition under
the Securities Act of 1933."1
The Bill also deletes the terms "broker," "agent" and "person"
and their accompanying definitions from section 517.021 of the Act." 4
The House Committee on Commerce offers no explanation for this
change. However, because prior to being deleted the definition of "bro-
110. The other changes made to the Act by House Bill 3429 are:
a. Section 3 of the Bill amended section 517.061 of the Act to include a reference
to "share exchanges" to reflect a recent amendment to the Florida General Corporation
Act;
b. Section 9 of the Bill deleted an obsolete date in section 517.131;
c. Section 10 of the Bill provided a necessary cross reference to the Open Govern-
ment Sunset Review Act in section 517.201(6) of the Act;
d. Section 11 of the Bill amended section 517.211(1) of the Act to provide a cross
reference to the Florida Statute section providing the legal rate of interest;
e. Section 12 of the Bill deleted an obsolete date in section 517.302 of the Act;
f. Section 14 of the Bill re-enacted Chapter 517 of the Florida Statutes as of
October 1, 1990; and
g. Section 15 of the Bill provides that Chapter 517 of the Florida Statutes will be
repealed on October 1, 2000, and shall be reviewed by the legislature pursuant to Sec-
tion 11.61 of the Florida Statutes.
111. H.B. 3429, supra note 5, § 1.
112. Id.
113. The "Florida Blue Sky Regulations" are the Rules of the Department, Divi-
sion of Securities. The Department's proposed amendment is to Rule 3E-200.001, the
definition section of the Regulations. The language of the proposed amendment is that
found in the definition of "accredited investor" in Rule 501 of the Rules and Regula-
tions of the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Act of 1933
(found at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (1990)).
The scant legislative history of the Bill provides no indication of why the legisla-
ture chose to delete the statutory definition and substitute a regulatory definition. How-
ever, if the legislature's intention was to place and keep the state's definition in step
with the federal definition, it is logically more appropriate for the term to be defined in
the Regulations than in the Statute. If the federal definition is amended in the future,
it will be less costly and time consuming for the Department to issue a new Rule than
for the legislature to amend the Chapter 517.
114. H.B. 3429, supra note 5, § 1.
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ker" referred to the definition of "dealer" and the definition of "agent"
referred to the definition of "associated person" in the Act, the legisla-
ture may have determined that these terms were superfluous.' 15
It is more curious that the legislative history of the Bill provides no
rationale for the legislature's decision to delete the term "person" and
its corresponding definition from the Act. The Florida Blue Sky Regu-
lations do not contain a definition of that term and the Department was
not directed to propose one. The term "person" is used numerous times
within other definitions in the Act and throughout the Act's substantive
provisions. 116 Determining the effect, if any, this deletion will have in
the future, is left to the future.
Section 517.051 of the Act enumerates the securities not subject to
the Act's registration requirements.1 7 These securities are exempted
from registration because they ordinarily are not susceptible to fraudu-
lent practices because the nature and character of the issuer, govern-
mental regulation on the issuer and the concomitant disclosure of finan-
cial information regarding the issuer, or because information about the
issuer is readily available in the marketplace." 8
Prior to the Bill's amendment, section 517.051 included as "ex-
empt securities," securities "issued by a corporation organized exclu-
sively for religious, educational, benevolent, fraternal, charitable, or re-
formatory purposes and not for pecuniary profit.""19 The Bill amended
this language to provide that a corporation organized exclusively for
one of those enumerated purposes must also be operated for those pur-
poses in order for its issues to qualify for the exemption. 2
115. Furthermore, the Florida Blue Sky Regulations contain a number of situa-
tion-specific definitions of those terms. For example, Rule 3E-200.001(3) defines
"Agent of Issuer" and Rule 3E-200.001(10) defines "Broker/Dealer."
116. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 517.021(6) (1990) (definition of "dealer"); §
517.021(8) (definition of "guarantor"); § 517.021(10) (definition of "investment advi-
sor"); § 517.021(19) (definition of "promotor"). See also FLA. STAT. : 517.12 (1990)
(requiring "persons" to register as dealers, associated persons, investment advisors or
branch offices); FLA. STAT. § 517.211 (1990) (holding every "person" who violates cer-
tain provisions of the Act liable for damages).
117. FLA. STAT. § 517.051 (1990). Securities exempted by this section include
federal bonds, state bonds, insurance policies and annuity contracts. Id.
118. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 5.
119. FLA. STAT. § 517.051(9) (1987) (amended 1990).
120. The amended text reads "securities issued by a corporation organized and
operated exclusively for religious, educational, benevolent, fraternal, charitable, or re-
formatory purposes and not for pecuniary profit ..... FLA. STAT. § 517.051(9)
(1990).
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IV. Securities Industry Association v. Lewis: THE 1990
JUDICIAL CHANGES TO FLORIDA'S BLUE SKY LAW
A. Arbitration of Securities Law Disputes
The jurisprudence of arbitrating securities law disputes under fed-
eral law, prior to 1989, focused on the "anti-waiver" provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933121 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Ex-
change Act").122 These provisions nullify any condition or stipulation in
a securities transaction that binds any person to waive compliance with
any provision of the securities laws. 23 In 1953, in Wilko v. Swan,24
the United States Supreme Court considered the language, purposes
and legislative history of the Securities Act of 1933 and concluded that
a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate a claim under that act was void
pursuant to section 14 of the Securities Act. 125
The Wilko court understood its decision was a difficult one in view
of the competing legislative policies embodied in the Securities Act and
the United States Arbitration Act of 1925.126 The Court described the
Arbitration Act's policy, one that strongly favors the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate as a means of effecting a "prompt, economical
and adequate solution of controversies," as "not easily reconcilable"
with section 14 of the Securities Act.12 But the Wilko court reached
its holding based on its conviction that section 14 of the Securities Act
does not permit waiver of the right to select the judicial forum in favor
of arbitration because "arbitration lacks the certainty of a suit at law
under the [Securities] Act to enforce [the buyer's] rights.' 28 The
Court also was convinced that the Securities Act was intended to pro-
121. See supra note 18.
122. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a - 7811 (1990).
123. Section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933 states: "Any condition, stipulation,
or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any
provision of this title or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void."
15 U.S.C. § 77n (1990).
Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states: "Any condition, stip-
ulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this
title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required
thereby shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1990).
124. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
125. Id. at 438.
126. See infra notes 158-184 and accompanying text.
127. 346 U.S. at 438.
128. Id. at 432.
1991]
56
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/18
Nova Law Review
tect buyers of securities, who often do not deal at arm's length with
sellers, by offering them "a wider choice of courts and venue" than is
enjoyed by participants in other business transactions, making the
"right to select the judicial forum" a particularly valuable feature of
the Securities Act. 129
In 1985, the Supreme Court again wrestled with the competing
policies of the federal securities laws and the federal Arbitration Act.
In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, a unanimous Court held that
the Arbitration Act requires federal courts, when faced with claims
that involve questions of federal securities law, state securities law or
common law, to sever or bifurcate the federal claims and compel arbi-
tration of all pendent state arbitrable issues when the parties had
agreed to arbitrate their dispute.'
Byrd inspired a profusion of comment and considerable litigation
in the lower federal courts.' 3 ' The Byrd decision indicated the Court's
maturing receptiveness to effectuate the policies underlying the Arbi-
tration Act, but it did not overrule Wilko. And, the question of whether
Wilko should be extended to predispute agreements to arbitrate claims
under the Exchange Act remained.
Two years later, the Supreme Court accepted the opportunity to
answer that question. In Shearson/American Express In,. v. McMa-
hon, the Court held that anti-fraud claims arising under the Exchange
Act are arbitrable pursuant to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement be-
tween a broker and a customer.3 2 The McMahon court recognized that
the Arbitration Act establishes a "federal policy favoring arbitration,
and stressed the statute's strong language, which declares, as a matter
of federal law, that arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract."'' 3 The Court concluded: "Thus, the
mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko opinion in
1953 is difficult to square with the assessment of arbitration that has
129. Id. at 435.
130. 470 U.S. 213, 221-22 (1985).
13 1. See, e.g., Comment, Arbitrating Civil RICO and Implied Causes of Action
Arising Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 CATH. U.L.
REV. 455 (1987); see also Cane, supra note 40; notes 125-148 and accompanying text.
132. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). The Court also held that federal civil RICO claims
are arbitrable pursuant to pre-dispute arbitration agreements betwe.en brokers and
their customers. Id.
133. Id. at 226-27 (citations omitted).
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prevailed since that time."' 34 The Court did not, however, overrule
Wilko v. Swan. Although the McMahon decision established the valid-
ity of arbitrating claims arising under the Exchange Act, claims arising
under the Securities Act remained non-arbitrable.
Three Justices dissented from the Court's holding in McMahon
that federal securities claims are arbitrable.'3 5 Justices Blackmun,
Brennan and Marshall did not deny the federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion, but were concerned about protecting the investing public from ar-
bitrable forums controlled by the securities industry. Justice Blackmun
wrote:
Both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 were enacted to protect investors from predatory behavior
of securities industry personnel. [T]he arbitral process at best
places the investor on an equal footing with the securities industry
personnel against whom the claims are brought. Compelling an in-
vestor to arbitrate securities claims puts him in a forum controlled
by the securities industry. This result directly contradicts the goal
of both securities Acts to free the investor from the control of the
market professional. 36
In 1989, the dissenting Justices in McMahon were presented with
another occasion to dissent on the issue of arbitrating federal securities
law claims when the Supreme Court decided Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.' 31 In Rodriguez de Quijas, the
Court, through Justice Kennedy, expressly overruled Wilko v. Swan
and held that predispute arbitration agreements for claims arising
under the Securities Act are enforceable. 38
Justice Kennedy observed that the "Court's characterization of the
arbitration process in Wilko is pervaded by . . . 'the old judicial hostil-
ity to arbitration,' "39 and recognized the growing judicial deteriora-
tion of that view, culminating in the Court's decision in McMahon 40
134. Id. at 233.
135. Id. at 242.
136. Id. at 233, 260.
137. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall, joined this
time by Justice Stevens (the author of the dissenting opinion) dissented from the
Court's holding in Rodriguez de Quijas. Id. at 486.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 480 (citation omitted); see supra notes 124-129 and accompanying
text.
140. 490 U.S. at 480-81; see supra notes 122-126 and accompanying text.
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He asserted:
Once the outmoded presumption of disfavoring arbitration proceed-
ings is set to one side, it becomes clear that the right to select the
judicial forum and the wider choice of courts are not such essential
features of the Securities Act that § 14 is properly construed to bar
any waiver of these provisions. 4 '
The Court posited that there is no distinction between the "anti-
waiver" provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, 42 and
concluded that it "would be undesirable for the decisions in Wilko and
McMahon to continue to exist side by side."'143
The Court's decision in Rodriguez de Quijas was a logical exten-
sion of a previous disposition. In reversing Wilko, the Court again em-
phasized the compelling language of the Arbitration Act that declares,
as a matter of federal law, a policy favoring arbitration of disputes.14
The majority did not address, however, the concerns raised by the dis-
sent in McMahon, and the question of what arbitration forum (as op-
posed to any arbitration forum) was not before the Court.' 4
B. Section 8 of House Bill 3429
Section 8 of House Bill 3429146 modified the text of Florida Stat-
utes section 517.122, the Act's provision regarding the arbitration of
disputes between securities professionals and their customers, by, inter
alia, replacing the word "may" with the word "shall.' 141 As amended
by the Bill, section 517.122 stated:
Arbitration. Any agreement to provide services that are covered by
this chapter, entered into after October 1, 1990, by a person re-
quired to register under this chapter, for arbitration of disputes
arising under the agreement shall provide to an aggrieved party the
141. 490 U.S. at 481.
142. See supra note 123.
143. 490 U.S. at 484.
144. 490 U.S. at 477; see supra notes 133 and 134 and accompanying text.
145. The dissent in Rodriguez de Quijas did not raise the same concerns prof-
fered by the dissent in McMahon. The dissent in Rodriguez de Quijas argued that
stare decisis prohibited the Court from overruling Wilko. 490 U.S. at 487.
146. H.B. 3429, 11th Leg. (1990).
147. H.B. 3429, supra note 146, § 8. For the text of section 517.122 before and
after amendment by the Bill, see supra notes 10 and 11, respectively.
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option of having arbitration before and pursuant to the rules of the
American Arbitration Association or other independent nonindus-
try arbitration forum as well as any industry forum.1 48
The House Commerce Committee's Final Staff Analysis is silent
on why the legislature chose to change the permissive to the
mandatory. However, the Task Force Report had proposed making this
change when the Act was last amended in 1986.149 The Task Force
Report originally proposed the change to ameliorate the perception
among investors that their only redress through arbitration was in a
forum sponsored and controlled by the securities industry.150 These
were the same concerns voiced in the dissent in McMahon.15'
The Task Force Report indicated an apprehension on the part of
the investing public that customers who had entered into predispute
arbitration agreements with their brokers and who submitted to arbi-
tration thereunder had not been given fair hearings before the industry
panels. 152 The Task Force Report continues:
It was the finding of this Task Force that the current provisions
contained in brokerage agreements often limit the choice of arbi-
tration panels to groups that are associated with the securities in-
dustry. Although there was no evidence presented that would jus-
tify concern with the impartiality of these mediators, it was the
Task Force's determination that an expanded selection of arbitra-
tion groups would strengthen the arbitration process through diver-
sification. There is a need for at least one additional arbitration
source in brokerage contracts that is sponsored by other than an
industry self-regulatory organization [such as the NASD] .15
In 1990, the Florida Legislature amended section 517.122 of the
Act and sounded a death knell to those concerns. The legislature, how-
ever, should have sent to know for whom the bell tolls. Two days after
the October 1, 1990 effective date of Chapter 517, the death knell
sounded again. This time the bell tolled for section 517.122. On Octo-
ber 3, 1990, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida summarily quieted that nascent arbitration provision, hold-
148. FLA. STAT. § 517.122 (1990); see also supra notes 10 and 11.
149. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 55.
150. Id. at 54.
151. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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ing it unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, preempted by the United States Arbitration
Act.154
C. Supremacy; Preemption and the Federal Arbitration Act
The Supremacy Clause of article VI of the United States Consti-
tution prevents the states from trespassing on federal law and policy. 1' 55
Preemption is the vehicle by which the Supremacy Clause is en-
forced.' 56 State laws are preempted by federal laws when the state law
actually conflicts with a federal law and when the state law encroaches
upon an area in which Congress intended its enactment to occupy the
given area to the exclusion of state law.157
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)' mandates that courts en-
force arbitration agreements and recognizes arbitration as a valid form
of dispute resolution. It does not contain, however, an express preemp-
tive provision.159
The FAA was designed "to overrule the judiciary's long-standing
refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate"'I6 and to place such agree-
ments "upon the same footing as other contracts."'' The Supreme
Court has postulated that although Congress undoubtedly was aware
that the FAA would encourage the expeditious resolution of disputes,
its passage "was motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional de-
sire to enforce agreements into which parties had entered."'1 62
154. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Lewis, 751 F. Supp. 205 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
155. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1117 (Ist'Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990).
156. Id.
157. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988); see also Jen-
nings, Arizona Corporation Commission v. Media Products, Inc.: Clarification of
Competing Federal and State Securities Regulation, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 449 (1989)
(providing an interesting discussion, analysis and explanation of the coexistence of fed-
eral and state securities laws that offers an understanding of the unresolved and re-
solved constitutional issues of the dual system of regulation).
158. United States Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1989).
159. Id.; see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (upholding
application of state arbitration law to arbitration provision in contract not covered by
the FAA).
160. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985).
161. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924)).
162. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 220.
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The Court has recognized that the FAA does not require parties to
arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so,' 6' and it does not prevent
parties who do agree to arbitrate from excluding certain claims from
the scope of their arbitration agreement."" It merely requires courts to
enforce negotiated agreements to arbitrate according to their terms. 6 5
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that Congress did not
intend the FAA to occupy the entire field of arbitration law. 6 6 The
Court has held that the FAA did not preempt a California law that
permits courts to stay arbitration proceedings pending resolution of re-
lated litigation involving third parties not bound by the arbitration
agreement when the parties contracted to abide by the state rules of
arbitration. 67
In striking down a section of the California Labor Code in Perry v.
Thomas, the Supreme Court reasoned that in enacting the FAA, "Con-
gress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the
power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitra-
tion."' 68 It continued: "Congress intended to foreclose state legislative
attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements
... . We see nothing in the [FAA] indicating the broad principle of
enforceability is subject to any additional limitations under state
law., 6 9
Although the Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the inten-
tion of the FAA was to mandate the enforceability of contractually
valid arbitration agreements, thereby proscribing a state from legisla-
tively or judicially requiring a judicial forum after the parties to the
arbitration contract have agreed otherwise,170 some lower federal courts
have interpreted the FAA and the Supreme Court's interpretation of it
to be hegemonic, prohibiting all state action with respect to arbitration
contracts.
163. See id. at 219.
164. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985).
165. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
166. See supra note 159 and accompanying text; see also Volt Information Sci-
ences, Inc. v. Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
167. See Volt, 489 U.S. 468.
168. 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,
10 (1984)).
169. Id. at 489-90 (quoting Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 11, 16).
170. Id.
1991]
62
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/18
Nova Law Review
For example, in Securities Industry Association v. Connolly, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the FAA
preempts the enforceability of a Massachusetts securities regulation.171
The regulation at issue barred securities firms from requiring individu-
als to enter into predispute arbitration agreements as a nonnegotiable
condition to opening a brokerage account, ordered that the prohibition
be brought conspicuously to the attention of the prospective customers
and required the brokerage firm to make a written disclosure of the
legal effect of the agreement.'72
The Connolly court reviewed the language of the FAA and the
Supreme Court's interpretation of both the language and the legislative
history of the FAA. 173 It seemingly relied heavily on dicta from Mc-
Mahon that "courts must be on guard for artifices in which the ancient
suspicion of arbitration might reappear,' 1 74 in holding that "no state
may simply subject arbitration to individualized regulation in the same
manner as it might subject some other unprotected contractual
device."15
The First Circuit also placed great emphasis, out of context, on a
statement from Perry v. Thomas.76 The parties in Perry were a bro-
kerage firm and one of its former employees who had signed an agree-
ment to arbitrate any dispute arising out of the employment relation-
ship. 7 7 One issue in the case was whether the provision of the
California Labor Code that provided wage collection actions may be
maintained without regard to the existence of any private agreement to
arbitrate was valid in face of the FAA. 78
The Supreme Court noted that section 2 of the FAA governs situ-
ations, such as this one, in which determining the enforceability of an
executed arbitration agreement requires choosing between a state law
and the FAA. 179 The Court opined that an agreement to arbitrate is
valid, irrevocable and enforceable, as a matter of federal law, "save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
171. 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990).
172. Id. at 1117.
173. Id. at 1117-20.
174. Id. at 1119 (citing Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. at 226).
175. Id. at 1120.
176. 482 U.S. 483.
177. Id. at 485.
178. Id. at 486.
179. Id. at 492. The Court was not addressing the issue of contract formation.
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contract."' 0 The Supreme Court continued:
Thus state law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applica-
ble if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revo-
cability, and enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law prin-
ciple that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract
to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this requirement of §
2. A court may not, then, in assessing the rights of litigants to en-
force an arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a man-
ner different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitra-
tion agreements under state law.l 8'
The issue in Perry and the Supreme Court's broad statements re-
garding section 2 of the FAA dealt directly with the heart of the FAA
and the legislative intent underlying it: States cannot, legislatively or
judicially, deny persons the right to arbitrate disputes after those per-
sons voluntarily have entered into a contract to do so.'8 2 The court in
Perry was not faced with the issue of whether, for the welfare of the
investing public, a state securities regulatory body could prohibit bro-
kerage firms from requiring individuals to enter into predispute arbitra-
tion agreements as a condition precedent to opening an account or re-
quire the firm to disclose to potential investors the legal consequences
of such a clause in the brokerage agreement the prospective customer
was signing.183
The Connolly court lifted, out of context, the Supreme Court's
statement that a "state law principle that takes its meaning precisely
180. Id. at 492 n.9 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1989). Section 2 of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to per-
form the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, trans-
action, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1989).
181. Perry, 482 U.S. 492 n.9 (citation omitted).
182. See supra, notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
183. See supra, note 172 and accompanying text. Admittedly, the first proposed
regulation appears inhospitable to arbitration. However, it does not affect the "validity,
irrevocability, or enforceability" of an arbitration agreement. It merely prohibits a bro-
kerage firm from requiring its potential customers from involuntarily entering into a
contract. See McMahon, 482 U.S. 220.
1991]
64
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/18
Nova Law Review
from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport
with the [equality requirement] of § 2," applied it to a different issue
and found the proposed regulations unconstitutional."" Connolly's ap-
plication of Perry to its issue and facts was unfounded and
unnecessary.
D. Supposition: The Demise of Section 8
The Connolly court was not alone in making an unwarranted con-
clusion during its foray into Supremacy Clause jurisprudence. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in
Securities Industry Association v. Lewis,185 following Connolly's wan-
ton lead, made the same suppositions about the FAA and the judicial
gloss painted thereon, and summarily held that section 8 of the Bill was
unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause, preempted by the
FAA.186
Prior to section 8's amendment to section 517.122 of the Act, an
arbitration agreement between a securities brokerage firm and its cus-
tomer could contain a provision allowing the parties the option of arbi-
trating any dispute arising thereunder before and pursuant to the rules
of the American Arbitration Association."'1 The amending language of
184. See Connolly, 883 F.2d at 1123 (quoting Perry, 482 U.S at 493). Addition-
ally, the appeals court in Connolly found no merit to Connolly's argument that Massa-
chusetts treats arbitration agreements like other contracts between businesses and con-
sumers- it regulates them as extensively as necessary for the public welfare. It stated:
"In our view, that self-congratulatory casuistry will not wash. Indeed, we think that it
was precisely this sort of categorization error which Congress sought to cure when it
enacted the FAA." Id. at 1120.
185. 751 F. Supp. 205. Gerald Lewis was named the defendant tn this action in
his official capacity as the Comptroller of the State of Florida and head of the Depart-
ment. Mr. Lewis is empowered to act as the senior executive in charge of the Depart-
ment for the state, including the Division of Securities and Investor Protection. In that
capacity, he is responsible for administering and enforcing the securities laws of Flor-
ida. FLA. STAT. § 517.03 (1990).
186. Lewis, 751 F. Supp. 205. The issue was before the court on the plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment. In addition to the Securities Industry Association, the
plaintiffs in this action were Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Donaldson, Lufkin & Jen-
rette Securities Corporation, Raymond James & Associates, Inc., Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., PaineWebber Incorporated, Prudential-Bache Securities
Inc., Shearson Lehman Brothers Inc. and Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co.,
Incorporated.
187. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. The American Arbitration Asso-
ciation is an independent, non-securities industry controlled, arbitration association.
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section 8 required that such agreements contain that option.'88
The plaintiffs in Lewis regularly transact securities brokerage
businesses in the State of Florida and do not include in their arbitration
agreements with their customers a provision for arbitration before the
American Arbitration Association or other independent, nonindustry
arbitration forum. 18 9 Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of sec-
tion 517.122 of Chapter 517 alleging that it conflicted with the FAA
and, therefore, violated the Supremacy Clause. 90
Citing Perry v. Thomas,'9' the plaintiffs argued that "[s]tate laws
that stand as obstacles to the parties' freedom to privately negotiate
arbitration agreements are . . . preempted by the [FAA], and invalid
under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2."191 In addition,
the plaintiffs relied substantially on Connolly9 3 for the same assertion.
The North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc.
filed an amicus curiae brief in Lewis.' 94 NASAA argued that Connolly
was contrary to binding precedent from the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit. 95
In Eassa Properties v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, the Eleventh
Circuit stated that "[this court] has adhered to the FAA's distinction
between contract formation and contract enforcement even though the
188. See supra note I1 and accompanying text.
189. Lewis, 751 F. Supp. at 206.
190. Id.
191. 482 U.S. 483.
192. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 8, Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Lewis, 751 F. Supp. 205 (S.D. Fla.
1990)(No. 90 Civ. 1934). The plaintiffs also cited general propositions of law on the
validity of state arbitration laws from a number of equally inapposite cases to support
their conclusion: Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) ("The preeminent
concern of Congress in passing the [FAA] was to enforce private agreements into
which parties had entered. . . ."); Ruby-Collins, Inc. v. City of Huntsville, 748 F.2d
573 (11th Cir. 1984) (Alabama law that predispute arbitration agreements were void
ab initio preempted by the FAA); Oppenheimer & Co. v.-Young, 475 So. 2d 221 (Fla.
1985) (provision of Florida Blue Sky Law, FLA. STAT. § 517.241 (3), precluding en-
forcement of predispute arbitration agreements concerning securities transactions, pre-
empted by the Act).
193. 883 F.2d 1114.
194. The North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. (NASAA)
is an organization of securities administrators from the many states and Canadian
provinces. See Loss, supra note 3, at 8.
195. Brief for North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc., ami-
cus curiae at 6-8, Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Lewis, 751 F. Supp 205 (S.D. Fla.
1990)(No. 90 Civ. 1934) [hereinafter NASAA Brief].
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state rule of formation singled out arbitration clauses for somewhat less
favorable treatment."' 9 NASAA therefore argued that while federal
law may govern the interpretation and enforcement of a valid arbitra-
tion agreement, state law governs the question of whether such an
agreement exists at all.'97
The Lewis court dismissed NASSA's contention that Eassa
Properties was controlling'9 8 and adopted plaintiffs' arguments. The
court held that "a state law that singles out arbitration agreements, as
does the amended version of [section] 517.122, conflicts with section 2
of the FAA."' 99
The plaintiffs in Lewis also contested section 517.122 on the
ground that it was preempted by section 5 of the FAA.210 Section 5 of
the FAA states in part that "[i]f in the agreement provision be made
for a method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an
umpire, such method shall be followed." 0'
196. 851 F.2d 1301, 1304 n.7 (11th Cir. 1988). The position of the Eleventh
Circuit is consistent with language from the Supreme Court in Perry. See Perry, 482
U.S. at 491 n.8; see also Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1547 (1lth Cir. 1985) (appli-
cability of the general provisions of state contract law to the determination of the mak-
ing of an arbitration agreement does not contravene the FAA or its underlying policy).
197. NASAA Brief, supra note 195, at 7.
198. The court in Eassa Properties upheld a provision of the Florida Uniform
Partnership Act that required all partners to agree to submit a claim or liability to
arbitration for the arbitration agreement to be valid. See Eassa Propertes, 851 F.2d at
1304. The Lewis court maintained that Eassa was distinguishable because it involved
an issue of state law that was applicable not only to arbitration agreements. See Lewis,
751 F. Supp. at 208.
199. Id.
200. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment at 15, Lewis, 751 F. Supp. 205 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (No. 90 Civ.
1934) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Memo].
201. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1989). Section 5 states:
If in the agreement provision be made for a method of namirg or ap-
pointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be
followed; but if no method be provided therein, or if a method be provided
and any party thereto shall fail to avail himself of such method, or it for
any other reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator or
arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a vacancy, then upon the application of
either party to the controversy the court shall designate and appoint an
arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require, who shall act
under he said agreement with the same force and effect as if he or they
had been specifically named therein; and unless otherwise provided in the
agreement the arbitration shall be by a single arbitrator.
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The plaintiffs contended that section 5 of the FAA "reflects a de-
termination by Congress that contracting parties' voluntary choice of
an arbitrator, or their choice of an arbitral forum, should govern and
should not be displaced by state statutes or regulations. '02 The second
time the trial court heard McMahon v. Shearson/Express, Inc.,203 it
opined that the Supreme Court's mandate to rigorously enforce arbitra-
tion agreements:
demands respect for a forum selection method voluntarily adopted
by the parties, which should be given specific enforcement. . . The
method agreed upon by the parties for naming an arbitrator is ex-
plicit and unambiguous and therefore must be given controlling ef-
fect. We have no power to change any of the terms of the
agreement. 204
The plaintiffs in Lewis relied on this language and argued that
securities brokers and their customers are "expressly entitled under sec-
tion 5 of the [FAA] to select the . . . arbitrable forums before whom
they will resolve their disputes. The compulsory forum provision [of
section 517.122] seeks to interfere with these voluntary choices."205
Although the court in McMahon II obviously was speaking of ju-
dicial modification of existing arbitration agreements, Lewis did not
question or consider the potentially spurious logic of applying that
holding to an issue dealing with the formation, as opposed to the en-
forcement, of an agreement to arbitrate disputes. Furthermore, the
court failed to address the Eleventh Circuit's position, most recently
expressed in Eassa Properties, that it adheres to the FAA's distinction
between contract formation and contract enforcement even though the
state rule of formation singles out arbitration clauses for somewhat less
favorable treatment.20 6 Again, the Lewis court agreed with the plain-
tiffs' argument and held that section 517.122 was unconstitutional, pre-
202. Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 200, at 15-16.
203. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 369
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), rev'd in part on other grounds, 896 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1990) [herein-
after McMahon I]. In McMahon II, the district court was asked to compel arbitration
under the rules of the New York Stock Exchange. That request was made by the bro-
ker after the case was remanded to the district court following the Supreme Court's
decision upholding the enforceability of arbitration agreements under the Exchange
Act. See supra, note 132 and accompanying text.
204. McMahon II, 709 F. Supp. at 373.
205. Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 200, at 17-18.
206. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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empted under the Supremacy Clause by the FAA.207
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Flor-
ida attributed a hegemonic deference to the Federal Arbitration Act
that was unnecessary based on the FAA, the legislative intent support-
ing the FAA, and the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence of
that act and its legislative history. The Department chose not to send to
know for whom the bell tolls; it did not appeal the Lewis decision.
Whether the concerns of the dissenting Justices in McMahon2 08 are
valid and whether they ever can and ever will be resolved remain unan-
swered questions. 0 9
207. Lewis, 751 F. Supp. at 208.
208. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
209. The issue is not dead, however. On January 31, 1990, The Honorable John
D. Dingall, Chairman of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of
Representatives, posted a letter to The Honorable Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller
General of the United States, in which Representative Dingall asked the General Ac-
counting Office to prepare a comprehensive study of securities industry practices with
respect to predispute arbitration clauses in customer agreements and of the arbitration
process as sponsored by the securities industry self-regulatory organizations.
Interestingly, on March 5, 1991, the Wall Street Journal ran an article entitled
"Brokerage Firms Drop Opposition to Arbitration." The article not only is germane to
this article, it also may provide some insight into the reasons for the Securities Industry
Association's energetic attempt to gain the ruling it did in Lewis. The article reports:
[I]n.a major shift, several big brokerage firms have embraced the indepen-
dent American Arbitration Association as an alternative to industry-spon-
sored forums for settling some investor disputes. The firms . . . -agreed to
participate in a pilot program that would allow customers to bring disputes
before the [American Arbitration Association] even when their brokerage
agreements restrict them to industry-sponsored arbitration forums.
The pilot program is a response to pressure from the Securities and
Exchange Commission, which a year ago strongly urged the securities in-
dustry to adopt a rule allowing investors a choice in arbitration forums.
The SEC believes giving customers such flexibility would allay concerns
that arbitration stacks the deck against small investors, which tl'e securi-
ties industry has long denied.
The [American Arbitration Association] is a major independent fo-
rum that is privately funded and widely perceived to be more sympathetic
to investors. Investors win about 60% of the time at the [American Arbi-
tration Association], compared with about half of the time at industry-
sponsored forums.
But brokerage firms have long had problems with the [American Ar-
bitration Association]. For one thing, it is more expensive than industry-
sponsored forums.
Dean Witter and PaineWebber will be reluctant to allow investors to
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V. CONCLUSION
House Bill 3429, enacted as Chapter 517 of the Florida Statutes,
made broadly based revisions to the Florida Blue Sky Law. It rein-
forced the goal of its predecessors by adding a number of provisions
that deny issuers or securities professionals the benefits of exemption
from registration, the opportunity to register when required to do so to
offer or trade in securities, and the ability to withdraw from registra-
tion if those individuals have committed any fraudulent act in connec-
tion with a securities transaction. The addition of these prohibitions
should increase the Department's ability to effectuate the legislature's
enunciated purpose of protecting Florida residents from investment
scams and other fraudulent activity in connection with the purchase
and sale of securities.21°
The Bill reduced the number of securities that will be subject to
Chapter 517's laborious merit review process and it gave the Depart-
ment additional rule making authority. These modifications will pro-
mote economy in transactions involving securities in Florida and in reg-
ulating those transactions.
Finally, the Bill added the short-lived section 8 to the Act. The
Lewis court had at its disposal a plethora of binding precedent and
persuasive authority in deciding whether to uphold or strike down the
prescription that arbitration agreements between Florida-registered
broker-dealers and their customers grant the customer the option of
arbitrating before a non-securities industry controlled forum. Based on
the jurisprudence of the Federal Arbitration Act and its potential he-
gemony over state laws affecting arbitration, the court's decision was
not capricious, but it was not compelled. And the final bell has yet to
toll.211
use the [American Arbitration Association] in some jurisdictions, such as
Florida and California, where they perceive lessened chances of winning.
Siconolfi, Brokerage Firms Drop Opposition to Arbitration, Wall St. J., March 5,
1991, at Cl, col. 3 and C21, col. 3.
210. See supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 209.
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Civil Procedure: 1990 Survey of Florida Law
William VanDercreek*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the survey period there were some significant developments
in the area of Florida Civil Procedure. The first development occurred
in the area of subject matter jurisdiction. As of October 1, 1990, the
subject matter jurisdiction of the county court was increased, both as to
the jurisdictional amount in controversy and as to the county court's
power to hear "matters in equity."' Although the overall scope of the
changes to the subject matter jurisdiction of the county courts is not
totally clear, the changes do warrant discussion.
The Florida Supreme Court also decided a significant case con-
cerning jurisdiction over the person. In Venetian Salami Co. v.
Parethenais,2 the court clarified the procedure to be followed when
resolving disputed factual issues relating to jurisdiction over the person.
The court approved the use of brief evidentiary trial court hearings to
resolve disputed issues of fact concerning in personam jurisdiction.3
Florida's highest court also addressed the continuing problems of
general and specific jurisdiction over the person: specifically, whether
the Florida long-arm statutes require a relationship between a cause of
action and the activities of a defendant corporation in the state (con-
nexity) when the corporation has designated a residential agent for ser-
vice of process in conjunction with its license to do business within the
state.4 In White v. Pepsico,5 the court held that the Florida statutes did
not require "connexity" between the cause of action and activities of
the defendant corporation.
Developments in other areas of Florida Civil Practice were not as
* Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law; LL.M., Yale Uni-
versity, 1959; J.D., University of Iowa College of Law, 1955; B.S., Iowa State Univer-
sity, 1952. Special thanks to Robert Pinder and Sharon DiMuro for assisting with this
article.
1. See infra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
2. 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989).
3. See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 37-63 and accompanying text.
5. 568 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1990).
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conspicuous as those in the jurisdictional area. However, a survey of
recent appellate decisions in the areas of venue,6 disqualification of
judges,7 pleadings," discovery, 9 default, 10 dismissal," offer of judg-
ment, 2 summary judgment,'" directed verdict,' 4 prejudgment inter-
est, 15 costs and interest,'16 attorney's fees,' 7 and res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel 8 have been included for a review of the trends developing
in those areas. Among these topics, the Florida Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Aspen v. Bayless'9 (concerning the recovery of costs paid by a
third party) and the court's discussion of attorney's fees in Standard
Guarantee Insurance Co. v. Quanstrom2" are well worth considering.
II. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER: CHANGES IN
COUNTY COURT JURISDICTION
Effective October 1, 1990,21 the county court's jurisdictional
amount in controversy was increased from $5,000 to $10,000, exclusive
of interest, costs and attorney's fees.22 The amended statute also in-
6. See infra notes 88-111 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 112-130 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 131-57 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 158-205 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 206-25 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 226-55 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 265-76 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 277-85 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 286-95 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 296-301 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 302-15 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 316-25 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 326-39 and accompanying text.
19. 564 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1990).
20. 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990).
21. There was a textual ambiguity on the face of the new law. The new law
purported to take effect on both July 1, 1990 and October 1, 1990. The Florida
Supreme Court, by administrative order, resolved this conflict in favor of the later date.
Administrative Order, In Re County Court Jurisdiction (Fla. July 3, 1990)
(unpublished).
22. 1990 Fla. Laws 269, codified at FLA. STAT. § 34.01(I)(c)(3) (Supp. 1990).
Section 34.01 now reads:
Jurisdiction of county court
(1) County courts shall have original jurisdiction:
(a) In all misdemeanor cases not cognizable by the circuit courts;
(b) Of all violations of municipal and county ordinances; and
(c) As to causes of action accruing:
[Vol. 15
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creases the amount in controversy to $15,000 for causes of action ac-
cruing on or after July 1, 1992.23
The amendments to Florida Statute section 34.01 also expand the
county court's jurisdiction in equitable matters. The revised statute
states that "[j]udges of county courts may hear all matters in equity
involved in any case within the jurisdictional amount of the county
court, except as otherwise restricted by the State Constitution or Laws
I. Before July 1, 1980, of all actions at law in which the matter in contro-
versy does not exceed the sum of $2,500, exclusive of interest, costs, and
attorney's fees, except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit
courts.
2. On or after July 1, 1980, of all actions at law in which the matter in
controversy does not exceed the sum of $5,000, exclusive of interest, costs,
and attorney's fees, except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
circuit courts.
3. On or after July 1, 1990, of actions at law in which the matter in con-
troversy does not exceed the sum of $10,000, exclusive of interest, costs,
and attorney's fees, except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
circuit courts.
4. On or after July 1, 1992, of actions at law in which the matter in con-
troversy does not exceed the sum of $15,000, exclusive of interest, costs,
and attorney's fees, except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
circuit courts.
The party instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding pursuant to this
schedule where the amount in controversy is in excess of $5,000 shall pay
to the clerk of the county court the filing fees and service charges in the
same amounts and in the same manner as provided in § 28.241
(2) The county court shall have jurisdiction previously exercised by county
judges' courts other than that vested in the circuit court by § 26.012, ex-
cept that county court judges may hear matters involving dissolution of
marriage under the simplified dissolution procedure pursuant to Rule
1.611 (c), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure or may issue a final order for
dissolution in cases where the matter is uncontested, and the jurisdiction
previously exercised by county courts, the claims court, small claims
courts, small claims magistrates courts, pal courts, and courts of chartered
counties, including but not limited to the counties referred to in §§ 9, 10,
11, and 24 of Art. VIII of the State Constitution, 1885.
(3) Judges of county court shall be committing magistrates. Judges of
county courts shall be coroners unless otherwise provided by law or by rule
of the Supreme Court.
(4) Judges of county courts may hear all matters in equity involved in any
case within the jurisdictional amount of the county court, except as other-
wise restricted by the State Constitution or the laws of Florida.
FLA. STAT. § 34.01 (Supp. 1990).
23. Id. at § 34.01(I)(c)(4).
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of Florida. ' 24 These recent amendments have created some ambiguity
concerning the application of the revised statute. While the former
statute allowed the assertion of "equitable defenses," and the amend-
ment's language would allow counterclaims, it is unclear whether a
permissive equitable counterclaim is within the purview of the 1990
amendments to the statute. Although the statutory language has been
broadened by the amendments, there is not an expressed indication that
an equitable permissive counterclaim could now be considered by the
county court. Also, the revised statute does not make it clear whether
the transfer of an action to the circuit court is now precluded when an
equitable counterclaim is asserted.
Other questions flowing from the 1990 amendments include: first,
whether or not the county court may now hear a compulsory equitable
counterclaim that exceeds $10,000; and, second, what prccedure does
the county court use to determine whether or not a permissive equitable
counterclaim is greater, or less, than $10,000. The answer to the first
question appears to be "no" in light of the fact that the statute restricts
the county court to equitable matters "within the jurisdictional
amount" of the court. However, the statute does not expressly address
compulsory counterclaims, and a different construction of' the statute
may later emerge. As to the second question, under the prior statute,
Florida courts did not have to value equitable permissive counterclaims
because the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.
Assuming the amended statute is construed to require such valuation,
the discussion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit - determining the federal jurisdictional amount in an injunc-
tion case - in McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co, 25 provides an example
of the proper method for determining the value of an equitable counter-
claim. However, evaluating the monetary value of equitable claims is
often fraught with difficulties as it involves the complicated process of
evaluating intangible equitable rights.
Until there is a judicial construction of the new statute, it is this
author's opinion that the better course is to err on the side of caution
and construe the statute narrowly. Such a construction, in essence,
would view the amendments as a supplementary grant of jurisdiction to
24. Id. at § 34.01(4). Compare this new language with former section
34.01(1)(c)(2) which simply stated that "[a]ll equitable defenses in a case properly
before a county court may be tried in the same proceeding." FLA. STAT. §
34.01(1)(e)(2)(1989) (amended 1990).
25. 595 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1979).
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the county court to hear only limited equitable matters. This approach
would allow the county court to hear equitable claims arising out of the
same transaction of the case, but would not vest the county court with
exclusive jurisdiction over all equitable claims properly joined as addi-
tional counts to the plaintiff's claim or that could be asserted by way of
permissive counterclaims. Also, this construction would permit the
transfer of the action to the circuit court.
The recent amendments also addressed some other issues. County
courts are now empowered to hear, or decide, certain dissolution of
marriage proceedings.2 6 Further, Florida Statute section 86.011 was
amended to comply with the county court's increased equitable juris-
diction. The county court is now expressly granted "jurisdiction
within [its] respective jurisdictional amount[s] to declare rights, status,
and other equitable or legal relations whether or not further relief is or
could be claimed. 2
8
III. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
A. Procedures for Determination of Jurisdiction
In Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais,2 9 the Florida Supreme
Court clarified the procedure to be followed in resolving disputed fact
issues governing jurisdiction over the person. Florida requires the plain-
tiff to plead facts upholding jurisdiction over a non-resident served
outside the state. The pleading requirement, and the confusion as to
whether ultimate or evidentiary facts must be pled, 30 was greatly sim-
26. 1990 Fla. Laws 269, codified at FLA. STAT. § 34.01(2) (Supp. 1990).
27. 1990 Fla. Laws 269.
28. FLA. STAT. § 86.011 (Supp. 1990).
29. 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989).
30. The commentary to the 1980 Amendment to Rule 1.070 addresses this
confusion:
1980 Amendment. Subdivision (i) is added in 1980 to eliminate pleading
evidentiary facts for "long-arm" service of process. It is based on the long
standing principle in service by publication that pleading the basis for ser-
vice is sufficient if it is done in the language of the statute. See McDaniel
v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820 (1926). Confusion has been generated
in the decisions under the "long-arm" statute. See Wm. E. Strasser Con-
struction Corp. v. Linn 97 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1957); Hartman Agency, Inc.
v. Indiana Farmers Mutual Insurance Co., 353 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1978), and Drake v. Scharlau, 353 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1978). The amendment is not intended to change the distinction be-
1991]
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plified by the 1980 amendments adding Rule 1.070(i), allowing the
pleading to track the language of the long-arm statute.3 ' When the
plaintiff has pled the statutory language under which jurisdiction is
claimed, the defendant who desires to oppose jurisdiction must file evi-
dentiary affidavits contesting the factual basis for jurisdiction. Once the
plaintiff's pleadings are challenged by the defendant's affidavit, the
burden of proof to establish, by evidentiary facts, the existence of juris-
diction is upon the plaintiff. Traditionally this has been done in several
ways: attaching supporting affidavits to the complaint; filing separate
affidavits; and using discovery materials. This paper wa: often pro-
duced conflicting affidavits concerning an identical evidentiary fact. In
Venetian Salami, the court required the trial court to conduct a live
evidentiary hearing to resolve disputes. 2 This hearing enables the trial
court to judge credibility, weight of the evidence, and resolve the
conflict.
Discovery, including interrogatories and requests for admissions,
as well as depositions, can be an important tool for the plaintiff in gath-
ering information to satisfy the burden of proof at the jurisdictional
hearing. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court upheld, as a sanc-
tion for the defendant's failure to respond to interrogatories, the strik-
ing of the defense of lack of jurisdiction. 3 In view of the Venetian Sa-
lami decision, the use of discovery and brief but evidentiary trial court
hearings to determine jurisdiction over the person will be the rule
rather than the exception. Appellate courts should give deference to the
trial court's resolution of fact issues, although the question of law that
tween pleading and proof as enunciated in Elmex Corp. v. Atlantic Fed-
eral Savings & Loan Association of Fort Lauderdale, 325 So. 2d 58 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. .1976). It is intended to eliminate the necessity of plead-
ing evidentiary facts as well as those of pecuniary benefit that were used in
the Elmex case. The amendment is limited to pleading. If the statutory
allegations are attacked by motion, the pleader must then prove the evi-
dentiary facts to support the statutory requirements. If denied in a plead-
ing, the allegations must be proved at trial. Otherwise, the allegations will
be admitted under Rule 1.110(e).
31. Rule 1.070(i) states: "[W]hen service of process is to be made under statutes
authorizing service on non-residents of Florida, it is sufficient to plead the basis for
service in the language of the statute without pleading the facts supporting service."
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1070(i).
32. Venetian, 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989).
33. Insurance Corp. of Ireland Ltd. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 707 (1982).
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may be involved would be reviewed de' novo.34
In Devaney v. Solitron Devices, Inc.,35 the court reversed on due
process grounds, the trial court's determination of jurisdiction at a
hearing noticed for other purposes. The jurisdictional hearing in Deva-
ney had been scheduled for a later date and the court held that it was
error to determine the jurisdictional question at a hearing noticed only
for motions to compel discovery. 36
B. Connexity: The Problems of General and Specific
Jurisdiction
In White v. Pepsico Inc.,"7 the Florida Supreme Court answered a
jurisdictional question certified by the Eleventh Circuit 38 as to whether
Florida long-arm statutes required a relationship between the cause of
action and the defendant corporation's activities in Florida ("connex-
ity") where the corporation had designated a residential agent for ser-
vice of process in Florida in conjunction with its license to do business
in the state.39 The supreme court ruled that the Florida statute did not
require connexity.40 The Eleventh Circuit only certified the question as
to the construction and meaning of the Florida statute, not to question
whether federal due process would require connexity. In this respect, it
has long been held that a state, if it so chooses, could subject a foreign
corporation that has appointed a resident agent for service of process to
general in personam jurisdiction over causes of action that have no re-
34. Mercedes Lighting and Electrical Supply, Inc., v. Department of Gen. Serv.,
560 So. 2d 272, 277 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990); compare Alexander Proudfoot Co.
v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912 (lth Cir. 1989).
35. 564 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
36. Id. at 1229-30.
37. 568 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1990).
38. The Eleventh Circuit certified the following question:
WHETHER, IN ACTIONS THAT ACCRUED BEFORE 1984, SER-
VICE ON A REGISTERED AGENT PURSUANT TO FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 48.081(3) and 48.091(1) [1983] CONFERRED UPON A
COURT PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A FOREIGN CORPO-
RATION WITHOUT A SHOWING THAT A CONNECTION EX-
ISTED BETWEEN THE CAUSE OF ACTION AND THE CORPO-
RATION'S ACTIVITIES IN FLORIDA.
White v. Pepisco, Inc., 866 F.2d 1325, 1326 (lth Cir. 1989).
39. White, 568 So. 2d 886.
40. Id.
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lationship to the forum.41
Service upon a foreign corporation's resident agent in the state is
analogous, if not tantamount, to jurisdiction over a foreign citizen who
is personally served with process in the state. The United States Su-
preme Court in Burnham v. Superior Court of California,42 reaffirmed
a state's power over a transient non-resident, personally served within
the state, notwithstanding that the transient actions of the defendant
within the state were not the basis of the cause of action asserted.43
General versus specific concepts of jurisdiction have been the
source of confusion and debate. The Florida Supreme Court in White
quoted the definition offered by the United States Supreme Court in
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall:44
When a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a
suit not arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with
the forum, the State has been said to be exercising 'general juris-
diction' over the defendant.' General jurisdiction is to be distin-
guished from 'specific jurisdiction,' which occurs 'when a State ex-
ercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of
or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum. 45
In view of the Florida Supreme Court's citation to both
Helicopteros46 and Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,41
some additional comments are necessary. Unlike White v. Pepsico Inc.,
the corporations in Perkins and Helicopteros had not obtained a license
to do business in the forum state and consequently had not appointed a
resident agent for service of process. Thus, neither .Perkins nor
Helicopteros is apropos concerning the issue decided in White.
In Perkins, the foreign corporation was generally carrying on all of
its business activities in Ohio, and had, as a practical, matter ceased all
business operations in the Philippines. The United States Supreme
Court held that federal due process would not bar Ohio courts from
41. Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 441 (1952).
42. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
43. Id. at 2111.
44. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
45. 568 So. 2d at 888 n.3 (citations omitted).
46. 568 So. 2d at 888 n.3 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)).
47. 568 So. 2d at 888 (citing Perkins v. Benquet Consolidated Mining Co., 342
U.S. 487 (1951)).
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exercising jurisdiction over the foreign corporation that was generally
and systematically carrying on business activities in Ohio, even though
the cause of action was in relation to matters which had occurred in the
Philippines.48
In Helicopteros, the United States Supreme Court held that more
than a million dollars worth of business activities by the foreign entities
in Texas were not the equivalent of the general and systematic activi-
ties of Benguet Mining in Ohio, and refused to extend the Perkins doc-
trine of general jurisdiction.49 The plaintiffs in Helicopteros (wrongful
death actions for a helicopter crash in Peru) did not argue "specific"
jurisdiction (i.e. the purchase of the helicopter, obtaining parts, and
training of pilots, all in Texas, was related to the cause of action), and
instead relied upon the concept of general jurisdiction.
Helicopteros, by limiting the theory of general jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation (that does not have a resident agent) to the Perkins
quality and quantum of facts, has eliminated practical utilization of the
concept. Perhaps the problem is that the dichotomy of general and spe-
cific jurisdictional theories is so deceptively simple. Indeed, the United
States Supreme Court in wrestling with substantiality of minimum con-
tacts for specific jurisdiction has found two separate aspects: first, the
question of what constitutes power; and second, the question of what is
reasonable if such power exists.
The question of whether the activities of the foreign corporation
that took place in the forum state were the basis for the cause of ac-
tion, was clear in International Shoe Co. v. Washington."0 That case
spawned the recognition of the "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice" test, a wonderfully warm usage of constitutional
prose that promotes flexibility rather than certainty.5 In Hanson v.
Denckla,52 the question of the relationship between the trustees' con-
duct in Florida and the cause of action was more ambivalent with the
Court, more by judicial fiat than analysis. The Court determined that
there were no contacts in Florida because the claim concerned the va-
lidity of the power of appointment of a trust that had been created in
Delaware.53 That the power of appointment had been executed in Flor-
48. Id.
49. 466 U.S. at 416.
50. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
51. 326 U.S. at 316 (citations omitted).
52. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
53. Id. at 251.
1991] 1001
79
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
ida, and the will probated in Florida, were not consensual minimum
contacts because the legal question was whether the appointment
clause of the Delaware trust authorized it to be exercised by a will.5 4
Although Hanson took a narrow view of what activities may be
deemed related to the claim for relief, this question of the relationship
is not easily resolved. A case of substantial interest to Florida's cruise
line business is now pending before the United States Supreme Court.55
The Court is reviewing a Ninth Circuit decision upholding jurisdiction
over a passenger's Washington action for a slip and fall aboard ship in
international waters off the coast of Mexico.56 Unlike Helicopteros,
special jurisdiction is claimed upon the relationship of the business ac-
tivities (i.e. soliciting Washington residents for international cruises by
Florida agents) to the cause of action. 57 This author believes jurisdic-
tion should be upheld. But whatever the ruling, the case will be of
significance.
Conley v. Boyle Drug Co.,58 decided shortly after White, also in-
volved construction and application of the Florida long-arm statutes.
The Florida Supreme Court ruled that cross-petition motions to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction should have been granted because the
plaintiff failed to offer any counter-affidavits or other evidentiary proof
of their allegations in response to the defendants' affidavits opposing
jurisdiction.59 The court also held against retroactive use of amend-
ments to the long-arm statutes: "The prohibition against retroactive ap-
plication applies in connection with both aspects of the long-arm stat-
ute at issue." 60
A correct and clear illustration of the principle that obligations for
payment pursuant to a contract made outside the State of Florida, for
services to be performed outside the state, do not vest jurisdiction in
Florida simply because the payee subsequently moved to Florida, is
found in Cookbook Publishers Inc. v. American Dental Program.6 1
Cookbook Publishers recognized that jurisdiction over the payer of an
obligation is not carried on the back of the payer and simply does not
54. Id. at 253.
55. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S.Ct. 39 (1990).
56. Shute v. Carnival Cruse Lines, 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S.
Ct. 39 (1990).
57. Id.
58. 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990).
59. Id. at 288-89.
60. Id. at 288.
61. 559 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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exist in any new forum in which the payee chooses to relocate.12 How-
ever, a different situation arises when the parties have contracted for
payment within Florida. Such a situation would involve consideration
of the totality of the transaction with a due process analysis of
reasonableness .6 3
C. Waiver by Appearance of Plaintiff or Defendant / Collateral
Attack / Child Support and Custody
Ever since the decision by the United States Supreme Court in
Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 4 it has been established
that a party who has appeared is bound by that court's jurisdictional
ruling and may not collaterally attack the decree for lack of jurisdic-
tion. Moreover, if a party appears and does not raise the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person, it has been deemed to be waived. 5
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court in York v. Texas6 upheld a
state's right to make every appearance a general appearance and thus
bar the use of a special appearance to challenge jurisdiction. But where
a party has not appeared and final judgment based upon default is ob-
tained, it has been established since the days of Pennoyer v. Neffi7 that
a collateral attack may be made. These principles were recognized in
Riskin v. Miklos, 8 which held a "defensive jurisdictional motion filed
by an attorney who was not admitted to the Ohio bar and which, for
that reason, was - quite correctly - stricken by the Ohio court" did not
constitute an appearance.6 9 Subsequently, the court ordered the trial
court on remand to hear the jurisdictional attack.7
In Edwards v. Johnson,7 1 the question was whether an out-of-state
plaintiff, by voluntarily appearing and invoking the jurisdiction of a
Florida court, is submitted to the jurisdiction of such court over per-
missive counter-claims authorized by Rule 1.170. The court opined:
62. Id.
63. See id. at 1303.
64. 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
65. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140.
66. 137 U.S. 15 (1890).
67. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
68. 569 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
69. Id. at 941.
70. Id.
71. 569 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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The general rule with regard to personal jurisdiction is that a
plaintiff who initiates an action in Florida court subjects himself to
the jurisdiction of that court, and to such lawful orders which are
thereafter entered, only with respect to the subject matter of the
action. 72
The Third District Court of Appeal opinion in Burden v. Dickman,
although cited by the First District as authority, does not support the
Edwards opinion. In Burden, jurisdiction was upheld over the plaintiff
because "[b]y petitioning the probate court to be appointed joint
guardians of the property, the Burdens submitted themselves to the
court's jurisdiction. They cannot now be heard to allege lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction.""3
None of the cases cited held that a permissive counterclaim cre-
ates an exception to the general rule. In Frazier v. Frazier,"' which was
also cited in Edwards, Florida was simply not the proper forum to
modify the parties' foreign dissolution decree.
With due deference, this rule that a foreign plaintiff i; not subject
to a permissive counterclaim appears, at first glance, to have little
merit and substance. Upon further analysis, the rule makes even less
sense. If a Florida plaintiff files suit in Florida, that Florida plaintiff is
certainly subject to jurisdiction of any and all counterclaims, permis-
sive or compulsory. The Rules do not require, or even provide, for the
issuance of a summons for service of an answer (a counterclaim is not a
separate pleading, it is to be included in the answer) 75 upon the plain-
tiff. It is to be served (without a summons) on the plaintiff's attorney
(or plaintiff if pro se) as provided in Rule 1.080.76
Contrary to the First District's reasoning, there is no statutory
provision in Chapter 48 of the Florida Statutes, or elsewhere, that re-
quires the defendant to obtain service by summons over the plaintiff.
What possible rationale could exist for judicially creating an immunity
in favor of a foreign plaintiff who chooses to voluntarily invoke the
Florida's judicial system to assert a claim against a Florida citizen? Is
the quality of Florida justice so low and inferior that in good con-
science we should protect foreign plaintiffs from the evils o f the Florida
72. Id. at 474 (citing Burden v. Dickman, 547 So. 2d 170, 172 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1989)).
73. Burden, 547 So. 2d at 172.
74. 442 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
75. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170.
76. See generally FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.080.
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judicial system? Surely Florida's jurisprudence recognizes that the
achievements of its legal system are at least as good as, if not better
than, those of its sister states. Perhaps the reason for the Rule is that,
if the foreign plaintiff had not filed suit in Florida, the Florida defend-
ant would have had to invoke the aid of a foreign forum to obtain re-
lief. With deference, the refusal to exercise jurisdiction should not be
predicated on what the foreign party plaintiff did not do, but on what
the party did do - which was to file suit in Florida and invoke the oper-
ation of the Florida judicial system. There is neither a constitutional
prohibition - state or federal - nor any Florida Supreme Court case,
that would mandate that jurisdiction over a plaintiff be limited to the
claim contained in the complaint.
Florida specifically has provided for jurisdiction over a spouse re-
siding in Florida pursuing an action for alimony or child support.78
This provision does, however, continue to raise questions as to its
proper meaning.
In Durand v. Durand,9 the husband contended that the provisions
of the statute did not apply because he did not reside in Florida "im-
mediately" prior to filing of the action. The court recognized that the
residency should "'proximately proceed the commencement of the ac-
tion'" but upheld jurisdiction notwithstanding the passage of several
years, upon the "'totality of the circumstances.' "80 In Dunlop v.
Dunlop,"' the parties had been married in New York and divorced in
London some 14 years later. After the divorce, the wife moved to Flor-
ida and the husband made support payments. The court held jurisdic-
tion did not exist in reference to her suit to domesticate a foreign judg-
ment and to increase child support.82
In Alvarez v. Alvarez, 3 following a Florida divorce and the grant-
ing of custody to the mother, the father kidnapped the child from Flor-
ida and concealed the child in New York for six years. After the
mother regained custody in Florida, the father, nevertheless, was al-lowed limited visitation. 5 After the mother, now remarried, had moved
77. See generally White, 568 So. 2d 886.
78. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(e) (1989).
79. 569 So. 2d 838, 839 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
80. Id. at 839 (citations omitted).
81. 564 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
82. Id. at 619.
83. 566 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
84. Id. at 516.
85. Id.
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to New Jersey with her child, the husband brought the child to Florida
and, believe it or not, obtained an emergency change of custody at a
7:15 a.m. hearing based upon a telephonic notice to the mother in New
Jersey.86 The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed on the basis
that Florida should decline to exercise jurisdiction in favor of New
Jersey pursuant to section 61.1316(3) of Florida's Statutes.87
IV. VENUE
Unlike the significant statutory changes in the subject matter ju-
risdiction of the Florida circuit and county courts, and a number of
significant cases concerning jurisdiction over the person, the venue
cases were mainly representative of typical problems. Nevertheless,
there are several matters worth noting.
Among the recurring issues is the standard of review. In Hickman
v. Sacino,88 the court stated that the standard for review for granting
or refusing a change of venue under forum nonconveniens is "'palpa-
ble' abuse or a grossly 'improvident' exercise of discretion." 89 In Carter
v. Fleming,9" the complaint alleged that a promissory note was due and
payable (to the holder after default) in Escambia County. The appel-
late court found an abuse of discretion:
Because the promissory note designated Duval County as the place
of payment and the complaint contains no allegation of fact that
86. Id.
87. The statute provides in pertinent part:
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall consider if
it is in the interest of the child that another state assume jurisdiction. For
this purpose if may take into account the following factors, among others:
(a) If another state is or recently was the child's home state;
(b) If another state has a closer connection with the child and his family
or with the child and one or more of the contestants;
(c) If substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal relationships is more readily available in
another state;
(d) If the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less appropri-
ate; and
(e) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state would contravene
any of the purposes stated in s. 61.1304.
FLA. STAT. § 61.1316(3) (1989).
88. 566 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)(per curiam).
89. Id. at 903 (citation omitted).
90. 567 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
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prior to Carter's breach for nonpayment a holder in due course of
the note designated another place of payment, the cause of action
alleged in count two could only have accrued in Duval County.
Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that proper
venue for count two lies in Escambia County. 91
Several appeals involved related 'law suits pending in different
counties. In Independent Fire Insurance Co. v. Arvidson,92 an insurer
had previously filed a suit for a declaratory judgment against the in-
sured to void a policy allegedly procured by misrepresentation. The
present suit was brought by the insured against the tortfeasor and the
insurance company for PIP and uninsured/underinsured benefits. No
abuse of discretion was found in the trial court's refusal to transfer the
personal injury action; however, the district court ordered the trial ac-
tion stayed pending the declaratory judgment suit.93
Several cases accomplished a consolidation by transferring. In
Towers Construction Co. v. Key West Polo Club Apartments, Ltd.,
94
while a contractor's suit to foreclose on a mechanic's lien was pending
in Monroe County, a subsequent suit alleging fraud and other matters
was filed in Bay County and transferred by stipulation to Monroe
County. The defendant in those proceedings then filed an unjust enrich-
ment action in Orange County based upon a mistake in making pay-
ments. The court ordered the Orange County suit transferred:
[W]here there are two actions between the same parties pending in
different circuits, jurisdiction is in the circuit where service of pro-
cess was first perfected. Where the suits revolve around the same
set of facts, the claims are interrelated and one lawsuit can resolve
the issues, it is judicially prudent to permit both suits to be resolved
in the same forum. 5
Similarly, in Edward J. Gerritts Inc. v. Chambers Truss Inc.,9 6 the
court stated: "In the interest of justice, venue should be transferred
where it will avoid piecemeal litigation and the possibility of inconsis-
tent results. In addition, a change of venue is intended to prevent a
91. Id. at 536-37.
92. 564 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. i990).
93. Id. at 1255.
94. 569 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
95. Id. at 831 (citations omitted).
96. 564 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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miscarriage of justice in the correct venue or to afford a more conven-
ient venue." 97
The interpretation of "or other representative" contained in the
venue statute section 47.051 was at issue in Piper Aircraft Corp. v.
Schwendemann.98 The statute, which is of substantial importance be-
cause it governs venue over foreign corporations, states in full:
Actions against corporations. -Actions against domestic corpora-
tions shall be brought only in the county or district where such
corporation has, or usually keeps an office for transaction of its cus-
tomary business, where the cause of action accrued, or where the
property in litigation is located. Actions against foreign corpora-
tions doing business in this state shall be brought in a county where
such corporation has an agent or other representative, where the
cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is
located. 9
The Third District Court of Appeal held that Piper Aircraft had repre-
sentatives in Dade County on the basis of having two independent and
separate entities there that were "contractually authorized by Piper to
perform repair, warranty, and maintenance work."' 00
The rule that a specific venue statute governs an action when a
general venue provision is also available was cited in Bryant v. Bry-
ant.'' The court held, in a suit to enforce alimony and child support
resulting from a Dade County judgment, that venue properly lay in
Orange County, the location where the mother and child were now
residing. 102
Spector v. Old Town Key West Development Ltd.,' 3 recognized
the general rule that a "local action" construction requires transfer of
an action to the county where the land at issue is located. The court
held, however, that a claim for the appointment of a liquidating trustee
for the assets of a limited partnership - assets which included real
property - was a transitory rather than a local action.'
97. Id. at 625.
98. 564 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
99. FLA. STAT. § 47.051 (1989).
100. 564 So. 2d at 547.
101. 566 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
102. Id. at 68.
103. 567 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
104. Id. at 1018.
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Posey v. Sheldon05 involved the question of which party should
pay fees upon the transfer of an action. The Orange County Circuit
Court ordered plaintiff's suit on a note executed in Okaloosa County
transferred for improper venue, but nonetheless directed the defendant
to pay the transfer fees. The district court reversed the ruling on fees
under section 47.091 of the Florida Statutes which requires the party
initially filing the action to pay the fees where the action was filed ini-
tially in the improper forum. Apparently, the trial court had confused a
transfer under Rule 1.170(j), where a defendant's counterclaim or
cross-claim exceeds the jurisdiction of county court and where the de-
fendant pays the fees, with a transfer under Rule 1.060, which provides
for transfer when the court in which the plaintiff filed suit lacks subject
matter jurisdiction or venue. The Fifth District was clearly correct in
holding that the plaintiff who has filed in the wrong venue must pay the
transfer costs, not only because of section 47.09116 of the Florida Stat-
utes, but also because of Rule 1.060(c) which states:
Method. The service charge of the clerk of the court to which an
action is transferred under this rule shall be paid by the party who
commenced the action within 30 days from the date the order of
transfer is entered, subject to taxation as provided by law when the
action is determined. If the -service charge is not paid within the 30
days, the action shall be dismissed without prejudice by the court
that entered the order of transfer. 107
What is strange, is why would the defendant want the suit trans-
ferred instead of dismissed for improper venue? Ordinarily the defend-
ant moves to dismiss for lack of venue, and the plaintiff will request
transfer rather than refiling a new action in the proper county (which
should be done, of course, before the statute of limitations runs).
One final note concerning transfers under Rule 1.060 and 1.1700)
is that although Rule 1.060(a) and (b) specify that the transfer is to be
"by the same method as provided in Rule 1.170(j),"108 section (c) of
Rule 1.060 mandates a different method. Not only must the defendant
tender the transfer fee under Rule 1.170(j), the defendant must do so
at the time the counterclaim is filed (unless the court in its discretion
105. 560 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
106. FLA. STAT. § 47.091 (1989)
107. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.060(c).
108. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.060(a) and (b).
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extends the time). 109 Under Rule 1.1700), if the fee is paid, "the action
shall be transferred forthwith." 110 In contrast, under Rule 1.060(c) the
plaintiff is to pay the fee within 30 days after the case is o:-dered trans-
ferred, which transfer the court "may" order instead. of "shall"
order."'
V. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
Concepts of equity and justice are predicated on the policy of un-
biased judges making impartial judicial decisions. In the common
mind, judges are expected to be above reproach, totally objective, and
Solomon-like as they distribute justice to the masses.
Unfortunately, most judges are merely human, notwithstanding
our desires that they be otherwise. When the question of a "fair trial"
or "conflict of interest" arises, two mechanisms come into play: Article
V of the Florida Constitution, through the Judicial Qualifications Com-
mission, regulating the grounds for admonishment or continuance in
office; and recusal, either initiated by the judge himself, by suggestion,
or by motion by one of the parties involved who might be threatened by
the judge's potential for bias. Disqualification is a sensitive area for
judges regardless of what mechanism is utilized.
While the Judicial Administration Rule 2.060 requires a lawyer to
disregard the unfounded request of a client for disqualification of a
judge, a more difficult decision must be made when the client's fears
appear to be valid. Unfortunately, parties are able to abuse the system
and eliminate, under the guise of bias, a competent, intelligent, and
unbiased judge in the hope and expectation of obtaining a successor
judge who would be friendly to the movant. Undoubtedly, this has hap-
pened and will continue to happen, but there is no effective way of
precluding this possible evil because it appears essential that a chal-
lenged judge not conduct a hearing to refute ill-founded allegations.
The lawyer must weigh his professional and ethical responsibilities to
represent his client's best interests against personal concerns about of-
fending the judge and living with the possible ramifications in future
cases. Following an unsuccessful motion, a lawyer may find there is
some truth in the old adage that if one is going to shoot at the king, it
is better not to merely wound him. Additionally, the replacement may
109. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.060(c).
110. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(j).
111. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.060(c).
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cause the original judge to look more attractive in retrospect.
Proper procedures for disqualification of judges are discussed in
the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3-C, and are based on
Rule 1.432112 and chapter 38 of the Florida Statutes. If a legally suffi-
cient motion is filed, the judge must proceed to enter an order of dis-
qualification and may take no further actions on the case."' "[L]egal
sufficiency" is met by technical compliance with the statutory and Rule
requirements as well as a determination of whether the allegations
would cause "a reasonably prudent person" to fear an unfair or biased
hearing before the judge in question." 4 While technical noncompliance
has not barred valid claims in the past,115 not all courts are tolerant of
motions which do not meet section 38.10 guidelines requiring the inclu-
sion of an affidavit of prejudice." 6
Motions must be made within a "reasonable time" following the
discovery of valid grounds for disqualification. 11 Timely filing allevi-
ates unnecessary costs, delay, and adverse effects on the other
parties.""
"[A]n allegation in a motion that a litigant or counsel for a liti-
gant has made a legal campaign contribution to the political campaign
of the trial judge, or the trial judge's spouse, without more, is not a
legally sufficient ground [for disqualification]." ''  In MacKenzie v.
Super Kids Bargain Store,"z0 two suits were consolidated' 2' around a
112. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.432.
113. Mackenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1990);
Thunderbird Ltd., v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 566 So. 2d. 1296 (Fla 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
114. Thunderbird, 566 So. 2d. at 1304 (citation omitted).
115. Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (failure to
comply with statutory requirements by attaching a certificate of good faith to the mo-
tion to disqualify, did not require that movant's motion to disqualify be denied).
116. Lee v. Lee, 563 So. 2d 754, 755 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990)(per curiam).
117. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.432(c).
118. Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 1986).
119. MacKenzie, 565 So. 2d at 1335 (footnote omitted).
120. 565 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1990).
121. Breakstone v. MacKenzie, 561 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990),
was consolidated with Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc. v. MacKenzie for the purpose of
en banc consideration at the appellate level. In Breakstone, at the trial court level, the
defendant's motion was denied by MacKenzie. A renewed motion was also denied. In
Super Kids, after the defendant moved for disqualification on the basis of the same
$500 campaign contribution, plaintiff's counsel's ore tenus motion for substitution of
counsel was granted, but the motion for disqualification was denied.
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common allegation of bias due to a $500 campaign contribution given
by the plaintiff's counsel to the trial judge's husband. The Florida Su-
preme Court determined that, although there are valid concerns with
campaign contributions under the judicial election system,'22 such con-
tributions are an unavoidable part of the election process. The court
then found "that Florida's Code of Judicial Conduct together with..
statutory limitations[s] upon campaign contributions and the requisite
public disclosure of such contributions, provided adequate safeguards"
and a per se rule of disqualification because of campaign contributions
was not necessary.' 23 The court then held that when a campaign contri-
bution is the sole grounds for a judge's suggested recusal, it will be
considered legally insufficient for disqualification purposes. Addition-
ally, the court confirmed that judges are not to go "beyond a mere
determination of the legal sufficiency of the motion" and should not
attempt to defend or refute the allegations of impartiality. 24
When more than one disqualification is requested by any party to
a suit, "a subsequent disqualification under section 38.02 shall be
treated in the same manner as an initial disqualification under that
statute."'12 5 An important distinction exists between a disqualification
under section 38.02 and a disqualification under section 38.10. While
subsequent disqualifications by the same party under section 38.02 are
treated "in the same manner," a party, under section 38.10, has only
one unfettered right" for a judge's disqualification so that the same
party's subsequent motion for a disqualification under section 38.10 is
governed by the stricter standard stated in the second portion of that
statute.
26
122. MacKenzie, 565 So. 2d at 1335, 1340. Justice Kogan notes how easily the
Rules could be abused if the district court of appeal ruling had been affirmed, allowing
a $500 contribution to be legally sufficient for disqualification. "Attorney's who wished
to steer their cases away from a particular judge need do not more than contribute a
large sum to that judge's campaign .... [T]hese attorneys in actuality would be buy-
ing insurance that the judge could never hear their cases." Id. at 1.340 (Kogan J.,
concurring specially).
123. Id. at 1336.
124. Id. at 1339 (quoting Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440, 442 (Fla.
1978)("[W]hen a judge has looked beyond the mere legal sufficiency of a suggestion of
prejudice and attempted to refute the charges of partiality, he has then exceeded the
proper scope of his inquiry and on that basis alone established grounds for his disquali-
fication." (emphasis omitted)).
125. Brown v. St. George Island, Ltd., 561 So. 2d 253, 256 (Fla. 1990).
126. Id. at 256.
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In Brown v. St. George Island, Ltd., 27 the original trial judge was
recused under section 38.02 and the succeeding judge had been dis-
qualified under section 38.10. The Florida Supreme Court agreed that
a negative statement by a trial judge causes a party to feel that the
judge is biased against him, and it is reasonable for such a litigant to
fear they would not receive a fair trial under that judge.1 28 One month
later, the supreme court revisited Brown and held that when an oppos-
ing party to a suit moves under section 38.10 to disqualify a judge, the
motion is regarded as an initial motion for that party even if it is a
second or third disqualification within the same suit.1 29 The court noted
that a second request by a party who had previously sought a disquali-
fication is subjected to a stricter standard under section 38.10, but
when a second disqualification is sought by a party who has not previ-
ously filed such a motion, then "each side has the right to seek the
disqualification of one judge under the standard enumerated in the first
portion of section 38.10. ' '13o
VI. PLEADINGS
Florida has adopted liberal rules on pleading, and forms of action
and technical forms for pleas have been abolished.13' In Mayedo v. Co-
lite Industries, Inc.,132 the court reversed the trial court's ruling be-
cause the "judgment represents an aggravated and obviously unaccept-
able case of . . . reliance upon a meaningless technicality." Leave of
the court to amend pleadings "shall be given freely whern justice so
requires."'31 3 However, despite liberal rules for pleadings, problems
have arisen on appeal. Generally, recent cases reflect a trend to allow
amendment as required. In Salamon v. Munuswamy, M.D., P.A.,""
the court ruled that although an amended complaint had been filed
exclusively for declaratory relief, the court would allow supplementary
127. Id. at 254.
128. Id. at 257.
129. Brown v. St. George Island, Ltd., 562 So. 2d at 684, 685 (Fla. 1990).
130. Id. at 685. The court stated that "[i]t would be illogical to assume that the
legislature intended for the party that first disqualifies a judge under section 38.10 to
have that motion measured by a less stringent standard than a later motion filed by an
opposing party seeking to remove a successor judge." Id.
131. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110.
132. 566 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
133. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.90 (a).
134. 566 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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relief and an amendment that included injunctive relief as well. a35 In
Johnson Engineering, Inc. v. Pate,"6 the appellate court allowed
amendment after the trial court had denied a demand for jury trial as
untimely. 137 The appellate court ruled that although the case had al-
ready been noticed for a nonjury trial, raising of new issues which are
triable by a jury, embodied by an amended answer, warrant granting of
such a jury trial.'38 In Estate of Bobinger v. Deltona Corp.,3 9 the court
overturned a trial court's dismissal with prejudice of a class. action suit,
stating that the appellants should have been allowed an opportunity to
amend their complaint. 140 In this particular case, the trial court had
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.' 4 ' The appellate court
upheld the dismissal, and only took issue with the lower court's disal-
lowance of leave to amend the complaint. 4 '
However, blanket leave to amend is not guaranteed. At a mini-
mum, "[f]undamental concepts of due process require a party seeking
modification of a prior court order to file a written pleading and pro-
vide appropriate notice to all parties concerned."'143 Furthermore, ap-
pellate courts appear disinclined to review cases where the appellant
has not sought leave of the trial court to amend before pressing an
appeal. In Perruzzi v. Ferretti,4 4 the court held that an appellant who
did not seek leave of the trial court to amend his complaint cannot
complain that he should have been granted leave to amend. 45 The ap-
pellate court dismissed the appeal because "[t]o bring this claimed
right to amend to the appellate court before giving the trial court the
opportunity to consider such [an] assertion is untimely.' 46 Clearly,
there are some limits regarding the court's patience when it comes to
allowing amendments to complaints. In Feigin v. Hospital Staffing Ser-
135. Id. at 900.
136. 563 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
137. Id. at 1123.
138. Id.
139. 563 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
140. Id. at 740.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Herman v. Herman, 565 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (empha-
sis omitted).
144. 564 So. 2d 621, 622 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
145. Id. at 622.
146. Id.
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vices, Inc.,'147 the appellate court supported the trial court's refusal to
grant leave to amend, saying that "[r]efusal to grant leave to amend
was not an abuse of discretion since this was the seventh complaint
filed over a four-year period and the record clearly reflects the court's
warning that this was the plaintiff's 'last bite at the apple.' "1148
Courts have also focused on whether leave to amend, particularly
at the trial stage, would unfairly prejudice other parties. For example,
in Saunders v. Goulard,49 the court noted that the appellants were:
[D]eprived of any and all discovery as to the 'other extras' discov-
ered at the eleventh hour by the plaintiff, and, additionally, the
absence of information in regard to this additional claim prior to
trial impacted upon the formulation of the defendants' offer of
judgement and the subsequent post-trial determination by the trial
court as to the 'prevailing party' for the purposes of assessment of
costs and fees. 150
The appellate court then reversed and remanded for entry of judgment
exclusive of the additional items allowed by the trial court.' 5'
Similarly, within limits, courts have been liberal in determining
that improper pleadings should be recast properly without penalty. For
example, in In re Forfeiture,5 2 the court stated that "[w] e believe that
respondents' Motion to Determine Damages should be treated as a
counterclaim by supplemental pleading under Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.170(e)."' 53 Likewise, in Yost v. American Nat'l Bank, 54
the court determined that the trial court's severance of a counterclaim
was improper, since it should have been treated as a compulsory coun-
terclaim, even if it was not cast in that mold originally. 55 However, the
court in Turkey Creek, Inc. v. Londono, 56 noted that when there are
substantial differences in issues between the claim and counterclaim,
the fact that there is a logical relationship is not enough to allow re-
147. 569 So. 2d 941, 942 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 942.
149. 569 So. 2d 1305, 1307 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
150. Id. at 1306.
151. Id.
152. 569 So. 2d 1274, 1277 (Fla. 1990) (footnote omitted).
153. Id. at 1277.
154. 570 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
155. Id. at 352.
156. 567 So. 2d 943, 946 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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casting as a compulsory counterclaim.' Thus, as in amending plead-
ings, the record is mixed, but the trend appears to be in favor of liberal
application of the Rules.
VII. DISCOVERY
A. In General
Liberal "notice pleading" in Florida requires that some form of
discovery be used in almost every case. Florida's broad discovery provi-
sions reflect a policy of trial on the merits instead of trial by ambush.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280 provides the general framework
for discovery in Florida. Rule 1.280(b)(1) allows discovery of "any mat-
ter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter of the pending
action . ',158 Rule 1.280 also provides the various methods for com-
plying with discovery under the general rule. These methods of discov-
ery include: oral or written depositions (Rules 1.310, 1.320); interroga-
tories (Rule 1.340); production of documents and things and entry
upon land for inspection and other purposes (Rules 1.350, 1.351); phys-
ical and mental examinations (Rule 1.370); and requests for admissions
(Rule 1.370).
Information is discoverable if it is "reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery" of evidence admissible at trial." 9 The courts have
supported the broad use of discovery, even at the pre-suit stage. For
example, in Adventist Health System v. Hegwood,160 an en banc panel
of the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of
an equitable "pure bill of discovery" - allowing depositions of wit-
nesses - even though the applicable medical malpractice statute
granted only limited and informal presuit discovery and would have
prevented the depositions.' 6 '
There are, however, some limits on the use of discovery. While the
Rule provides broad authority to delve into "relevant" matters, discov-
ery may not be used for harassment purposes.' 62 Thus, in FDIC v.
Balkany, the appellate court invalidated an expansive discovery order
157. Id. at 945.
158. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1).
159. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1).
160. 569 So. 2d 1295, 1297 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)(en banc).
161. Id. at 1296.
162. See Caribbean Security Systems Inc. v. Security Control Systems Inc., 486
So. 2d 654 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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that allowed a party access to transactions contained in bank records
not even remotely related to the requestor's business.163 The court held
that the defendant's hope of finding some reference to misplaced docu-
ments did not justify an order that amounted to a "fishing expedi-
tion. '164 The principal discovery tool is the deposition. The discovery
rules have kept pace with technology concerning the manner in which
this discovery tool may be used so that oral depositions may now be
conducted via telephone" 5 or videotape, 6 provided that the proper
procedures, outlined in the Rule, 67 are followed.
In an oral deposition under Rule 1.310, section (d) provides the
proper manner for suspending or terminating the deposition and failure
to comply with the Rule may result in a waiver of any objections to
questions asked at the deposition. This point was illustrated in DeGen-
naro v. Janie Dean Chevrolet, Inc.,6 8 where the appellate court held
that, although counsel objected to a limited waiver of his client's attor-
ney-client privilege, proceeding with the deposition waived the privilege
and the court could not "unring the bell."' 69 When an objection has
been raised to a question asked during a deposition, the proper proce-
dure under Rule 1.310(d) is to suspend the deposition pending a ruling
on the objectionable question. It is improper for a lawyer to instruct a
witness not to answer a question and then continue with the deposition.
In Smith v. Grady, 70 the court stated that such an improper proce-
dure, through "selective adherence to the rules of civil procedure,"
amounts to "arrogance of the defense attorney" and "is without legal
justification.'' Similarly, where a request for a continuation is not
made at a summary judgment hearing, a party cannot later claim that
they did not have enough time to complete discovery.' 2
The 1988 Amendments to Florida's discovery rules clarified the
scope of discovery. The existence and content of insurance and indem-
nity agreements are now discoverable. 3 Additionally, expert witnesses
163. 564 So. 2d 580, 581 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
164. Id.
165. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b)(7).
166. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310 (b)(4).
167. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b)(7); FLA R. Civ. P. 1.30(b)(4).
168. 568 So. 2d 1008, 1009 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
169. Id. at 1009.
170. 569 So. 2d 504, 507 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
171. Id. at 507.
172. Light v. Weldarc Co., Inc., 569 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
173. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(2) (indemnity agreements are discoverable but not
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"expected to be called" at trial may now be deposed without leave of
the court.' 74 However, in Edwards v. Humana, Inc.,175 the court recog-
nized that "it is clear that the intent of rule 1.280 (b)(4)(B) is to afford
protection from the discovery of a consulting expert.' 7  The court's
holding in Edwards is consistent with the language of the Rule that
protects a consulting expert except under "exceptional circumstances."
Interrogatories were also addressed under the 1988 Amendments
to the Rule. A party may now serve up to 30 interrogatories on another
party without leave of the court. 77 Further, if the Florida Supreme
Court has approved a standard form 78 for initial interrogatories, then
that form must be used. 79 Examination of persons was also broadened
under the 1988 amendments to the Rules. An examination of a person,
as to matters in controversy, may now be performed by experts other
than physicians.'
B. Work Product/Attorney-Client Privilege
The work product privilege' 8 ' protects materials "prepared in an-
ticipation of litigation" by allowing discovery of materials only upon a
requestor's showing of "need" and inability, "without undue hardship
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means."' 82 The courts have limited the reach of this "privilege"
through the construction of the term "substantial equivalent." Illustra-
tive of this concept is Florida Mining and Materials Corp. v. Continen-
tal Casualty Co., 83 where the court protected a party's internal memo-
randa by finding that "admissions provide[d] the 'substantial
admissible at trial).
174. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(4)(A).
175. 569 So. 2d 1315, 1316 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
176. Id. at 1316.
177. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.340(a).
178. There are currently three standard interrogatory forms: Automobile Negli-
gence-Interrogatories to Plaintiff; Automobile Negligence-Interrogatories to Defendant;
and Marriage Dissolution-Interrogatories to Party. See FLA. R. Civ. P. Appendix.
179. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.340(a).
180. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.360(a).
181. Technically speaking, work product is not an evidentiary privilege, instead,
it is an exception to disclosure created by the Rules of Civil Procedure rather than the
Rules of Evidence.
182. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(3).
183. 556 So. 2d 518, 519 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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equivalent' of the internal memoranda.""" While materials, or fact
work product, are discoverable upon a showing of need and the lack of
a substantial equivalent, opinion work product is "absolutely, or nearly
absolutely, privileged." '185 In appropriate cases, the work product pro-
tection may apply to the investigative materials prepared on behalf of a
nonparty. For example, in Zaban v. McCombs,'86 corporate officers and
directors were named as defendants in a work-related wrongful death
action, but the corporation was not named as a party. The corporation
had, however, hired an investigator and had prepared investigative
materials concerning the accident and the plaintiff, claiming that the
materials were not protected because of the corporation's nonparty sta-
tus, requested discovery of the materials. The appellate court held that
the plaintiff, in such a situation, could not circumvent the work product
protection of Rule 1.280 (b)(3) merely because the producer of the
work product was not named as a party.187
Under the attorney-client privilege, a recognized evidentiary privi-
lege, undisclosed communications between an attorney and a client are
protected from involuntary disclosure even when the communications
"arise in the course of a transaction which itself later becomes the sub-
ject of litigation."188 An in-camera examination of requested material
is proper in order to determine if privileged information is protected by
the attorney-client privilege.'89 Waiver of the attorney-client privilege
may result from disclosure of the information. 90
The courts have not been receptive towards attempts at 'circum-
venting an evidentiary privilege. In Paper Corp. v. Schneider,' the
defendant, in a post-judgment execution proceeding, tried to shield fi-
nancial records from disclosure by turning them over to his accountant
and then seeking protection under the accountant-client privilege.'9 2
184. Id. at 519.
185. State v. Rabin, 495 So. 2d 257, 262 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986); see also
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(3) ("The court shall protect against disclosure of the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representa-
tive of a party concerning the litigation.").
186. 568 So. 2d 87, 89 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
187. Id. at 89.
188. Florida Mining and Materials Corp., 556 So. 2d at 519.
189. Blank v. Mukamal, 566 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (certiorari
granted and trial court's order demanding production of counsel's entire files quashed).
190. Id. at 55.
191. 563 So. 2d 1134, 1135 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
192. FLA. STAT. §§ 90.5055, 473.316 (1989).
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However, the court refused to accept the defendant's claim of eviden-
tiary privilege and held that the defendant could not shield otherwise
discoverable material by shifting that material into the possession of a
person granted a statutory privilege.'
C. Sanctions
Rule 1.380 provides sanctions for a party's failure to comply with
a discovery order. A trial court has the discretion to order dismissal' 94
or default9 5 for failure to comply with discovery requirements and a
dismissal or default entered by the trial court will be reviewed under an
"abuse of discretion" standard. 196 The Florida Supreme Court recently
addressed what factual findings are necessary before the trial court
may enter a default or dismissal under Rule 1.380. In Commonwealth
Federal Savings and Loan v. Tubero, 97 the Florida Supreme Court
considered the following certified question:
IS AN EXPRESS WRITTEN FINDING OF WILLFUL OR
DELIBERATE REFUSAL TO OBEY A COURT ORDER TO
COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY UNDER FLORIDA RULE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 1.380 NECESSARY TO SUSTAIN THE
SEVERE SANCTIONS OF DISMISSAL OR DEFAULT
AGAINST A NONCOMPLYING PLAINTIFF OR
DEFENDANT. 198
The court answered the question in the affirmative, and, though reaf-
firming the trial judge's discretionary power to enter a default or dis-
missal for noncompliance with discovery requirements, required that an
order of dismissal or default "contain an explicit finding of willful
noncompliance."199
An order of dismissal or default is the exception rather than the
general rule and thus, as the court noted in Yanks v. Amerifirst
193. Schneider, 563 So. 2d at 1135.
194. Delta Information Serv., Inc. v. Jannach, 569 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
195. Commonwealth Federal Saving and Loan v. Tubero, 569 So. 2d 1271 (Fla.
1990).
196. Id. at 1273.
197. Id. at 1271.
198. Tubero v. Chapnich, 552 So. 2d 932, 936 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
199. Tubero, 569 So. 2d at 1273.
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Bank,20 0 "the severity of the sanction [for noncompliance with a discov-
ery order] must be commensurate with the violation."' 20 1 The range of
appropriate sanctions include: prohibiting the introduction of evi-
dence;202 refusing to allow a party to present a claim or defense;203 or
the awarding of fees and costs.204 The court's contempt power may also
be used to remedy an individual's noncompliance with discovery re-
quirements. In Anderson Inv. Co. v. Lynch, the court noted that a de-
ponent may be found in contempt of court if he fails to be sworn or to
answer questions after being directed to do so by the court.20 5
VIII. DEFAULT
The terms "default" and "judgment" are not synonyms. "De-
fault," as used in the Rules, refers to an entry or order of default by
the clerk or judge. "Judgment," as used in the Rules, refers to the final
disposition of the proceeding, rendered by the judge, following the en-
try of a default. The term "default judgment," when it is used in court
opinions or legal literature, usually refers to a final judgment that was
rendered as a result of default. Occasionally the term "default judg-
ment" is used to incorrectly denote an entry of default, requiring that
the context in which the term is used be examined in order to ascertain
what the writer intended through the use of the term.
Rule 1.500 addresses the entry of default, the entry of judgments
upon the default, and the setting aside of defaults. 20 6 Rule 1.500 is
distinct from Rule 1.380(b); the later provision allows a judgment by
default for a party's failure to comply with discovery while Rule 1.500
addresses a party's failure to plead.207 In addition to a default for fail-
ure to plead, a default may also be entered for: filing a sham plead-
ing;208 failure to comply with a discovery order;20 9 failure of a party to
appear for his deposition or to answer properly propounded interrogato-
200. 569 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
201. Id.
202. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b)(2)(B).
203. Id.
204. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Hammock, 489 So. 2d 761 (Fla. lst.Dist. Ct.
App. 1986).
205. 540 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
206. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.500.
207. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.500.
208. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.150(a).
209. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b)(2)(C).
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ries; 210 or, failure to attend a pretrial conference."
The courts have liberally construed Rule 1.500, and are hesitant to
.uphold an entry of default that could deny a party the opportunity of a
decision on the merits of the case.212 In Apolaro v. Falcon,21 3 the court
held that a delay of 30-40 days in seeking relief from a default did not
justify denying the relief.2"4 The court stated that "[w]here there exists
any reasonable doubt in the matter, and where there has been no trial
on the merits, the trial court is to exercise its discretion in the direction
of vacating the default. 21 5
In Rapid Credit Corp. v. Sunset Park Centre,2 1 6 "Rapid" had er-
roneously filed a motion to transfer and consolidate in the wrong case.
Despite knowledge of these motions, opposing counsel sought, and was
granted, a clerk-entered default in the other case pending between the
parties. The appellate court remanded for vacation of the default and
held that opposing counsel, in this situation, was "on notice" that
Rapid intended to contest the action 217 and thus had an affirmative
duty to provide the court, and Rapid's counsel, with information re-
garding the procedural status of a case prior to default being
entered.18
Entry of an order of default can be avoided by filing a responsive
pleading prior to a motion for default. In Houswerth v. Sheriffs Dep't,
the court allowed dismissal for failure to prosecute, but held that a
default could not be entered in the action when a responsive pleading
was filed before the motion for default.219
If the trial court enters a default, until the entry has formed the
basis for a final judgment, the defaulted party can move to vacate or
set the order aside. A defendant is permitted, upon motion for relief
from a default judgment, to attack the "sufficiency -of the complaint
210. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(d).
211. FLA. R. Civ. P.. 1.200 (b).
212. Ole, Inc. v. Yariv, 566 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (default
judgment vacated and default set aside when defendant was unaware he was no longer
represented by counsel and plaintiff applied for ex parte default and obtained a default
judgment).
213. 566 So. 2d 815, 816 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
214. Id. at 816.
215. Id. at 816.
216. 566 So. 2d 810, 811 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
217. Id. at 811.
218. Id.
219. 567 So. 2d 476 (Fla 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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and its allegations to support the judgment."220 A default may also be
set aside when, on the face of the pleadings, there is confusion over the
amount of time allowed for a response. 22
Under Rule 1.500, only the court may enter an order of default
when "any paper" has been filed by the opposing party. 2  The term
"any paper" has been construed liberally to allow a default entered
without notice to be vacated when a motion to consolidate and transfer
was erroneously filed in the wrong lawsuit 223 or when a motion to quash
service of process was filed. 224 After entry of a default, a party in de-
fault may only file a pleading requesting relief from the default.2 25
IX. DISMISSAL
Rule 1.420 provides for both voluntary and involuntary dismis-
sals.226 A party's failure to attend a pretrial conference may also result
in a dismissal of the action but Rule 1.200(c) governs the court's action
in that situation.227 Rule 1.420 allows for dismissal of claims with or
without prejudice.228
Because dismissal is such a drastic remedy, the courts have re-
quired evidence of "wilful or flagrant or persistent disobedience" of a
court order prior to allowing dismissal of an action.229 As noted by the
court in Epps v. Hartley, dismissal of a plaintiff's complaint suspends
the plaintiff's right to proceed but does not serve as an adjudication on
the merits.230 However, an order granting a motion to dismiss should
plainly indicate that the action has in fact been dismissed, and should
220. Cabral v. Diversified Serv., Inc., 560 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1990)(citations omitted) (abuse of discretion to enter default when failure to respond
was due to confusion resulting from the pendency of a case with a related subject
matter).
221. Hader v. American Builders and Contractors Co., 564 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1990)(pleading that read "[t]he Defendants have __ number of
days" to respond was sufficient to demonstrate excusable neglect that justified setting
aside the default).
222. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.500(b).
223. Rapid Credit Corp., 566 So. 2d 810.
224. Carson v. Rossignol, 559 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
225. Hines v. Hines, 494 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
226. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420.
227. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.200(c).
228. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.420.
229. Anthony v. Schmitt, 557 So. 2d 656, 662 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
230. 495 So. 2d 921, 922 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
1991] 1023
101
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
contain the "requisite words of finality" in order to vest an appellate
court with jurisdiction to review the order."'
Much litigation arises regarding just what is meant by dismissal of
an action for "failure to prosecute." If "no record activity in further-
ance of the suit ' 2 32 has occurred for a period of one year, then dismis-
sal of the suit for failure to prosecute2 33 may be proper. In Anthony v.
Schmitt, the Second District Court of Appeal provided an in-depth
analysis of Rule 1.420(e).23 4 The court noted the conflict between the
First District 23 5 and the Fourth District23 and opted for an interpreta-
tion of Rule 1.420(e) that would allow the trial court more discretion
than the rule of the Fourth District, but less than that of the First
District. 37 The court stated that:
[A] trial court may dismiss an action if the only activity within the
relevant year is discovery activity by the plaintiff taken in bad faith
merely as a means to avoid the application of Rule 1.420(e) and
without any design 'to move the case forward toward a conclusion
on the merits or to hasten the suit to judgment.'238
The appellate court noted that its "bad faith activity" test was similar
to striking discovery that amounted to "sham or pretextual record ac-
tivity" when used by a plaintiff to circumvent Rule 1.420(e). s39
A motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute need not be filed by a
party to the action since the Rule itself grants standing to file the mo-
tion to "any interested person."240 Under the Rule, the one-year period
without record activity accrues from the date of filing the action, not
the date of service of notice in the proceeding.2 41 Rule 1.420(e) is not
231. Henrion v. New Era Realty IV, Inc. 567 So. 2d 562, 563 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
232. Rosa v. Hodges, 559 So. 2d 1289, 1290 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
233. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e).
234. 557 So. 2d 656.
235. Karcher v. F.W. Schinz & Assoc., 487 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (trial court may determine whether discovery was "genuine" when deciding
whether such discovery constituted record activity under Rule 1.420(e)).
236. Philips v. Marshall Berwick Chevrolet, Inc. 467 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) (dismissal is proper only when discovery is "repetitious").
237. Anthony, 557 So. 2d at 662.
238. Id. (quoting Barnett Bank v. Fleming, 508 So. 2d 718, 720 (Fla. 1987)).
239. Id.
240. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e); Rosa, 559 So. 2d at 1290.
241. Scharlin v. Broward County Property Appraisal Bd., 500 So. 2d 345 (Fla.
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self-executing, record activity prior to a party, or the court on its own
motion, moving for a dismissal for failure to prosecute will preclude
dismissal. 42
No consensus exists among the appellate courts regarding what
particular actions by the parties constitute record activity that is suffi-
cient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute: each case
turns on the specific facts before the court. Litigation concerning costs
and fees as to one defendant has been held to constitute record activity
precluding dismissal against co-defendants. 243 A notice of trial,244 a fil-
ing of summons, 245 service of process, 246 and paying a new filing fee in
order to transfer the case 241 have all been viewed as acts intended to
hasten a suit toward judgment and thus sufficient record activity to
preclude dismissal. Non-frivolous discovery activity may also constitute
record activity within the meaning of Rule 1.420(e). 48
On the other hand, the following actions have been viewed as non-
record activity, thus permitting dismissal for failure to prosecute: the
taking of depositions; 249 notices of withdrawal and substitution of coun-
sel;26 ° and responses to interrogatories filed after a motion to dismiss.251
In Caldwell v. Mantei, 52 the court held that status requests and re-
ports, even though technically record activity, did not further the case
toward disposition and were held insufficient to shield against a motion
to dismiss for failure to prosecute.
Upon a showing of "good cause", the court has the discretion to
allow an action to continue despite a party's failure to prosecute the
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
242. Barnes v. Escambia County Employees Credit Union, 488 So. 2d 879 (Fla.
Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
243. Freeman v. Schuele, 566 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
244. Mitchell v. Coker Fuel Inc., 511 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1987)(notice for trial controlled the action even though filed simultaneously with mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to prosecute).
245. Garland v. Southeastern Palm Beach County Hospital Taxing Dist., 526 So.
2d 725 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
246. Glassalum Eng'g Corp. v. 392208 Ontario Ltd., 487 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
247. Henkel v. Chua, 507 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
248. Anthony, 557 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
249. Smith v. DeLoach, 556 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
250. Nesbitt v. Community Health, Inc., 566 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
251. Caldwell v. Mantei, 544 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
252. Id. at 254.
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claim within one year.25 In A & W Electric, Inc. v. Abraira, the court
held that the plaintiffs heart surgery and subsequent rehabilitation pe-
riod were sufficient reasons to preclude dismissal, even though the
plaintiff did not seek a continuance prior to a one-year period of record
inactivity. 54 However, in Denson v.Meyer,255 the court refused to view
settlement negotiations between the parties as "good cause" for not dis-
missing an action that was without record activity for over one year.
X. OFFER OF JUDGMENT
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 seeks to encourage parties
to settle claims without litigation. 256 At any time, not later than 60
days before trial or less than 15 days after service of a counteroffer,
either party in an action may make an offer to settle "all pending
claims."25 7
The Florida Supreme Court's amended version of Rule: 1.442 (Of-
fer of Judgment) took effect as of January 1, 1990.258 When consider-
ing the amendment of the Rule, the court rejected the argument that
the court should declare sections 768.79 and 45.061, Florida Statutes,
unconstitutional based on possible conflicts between the statutes and
Rule 1.442, saying "[w]e agree with the Committee that sections
768.79 and 45.061 impinge upon this Court's duties in their procedural
details . . . [t]o the extent the procedural aspects of new rule 1.442 are
inconsistent . . . the rule shall supersede the statutes. 25 9
Applying only to money damages,260 offers of judgment must be
accepted within 30 days after service of the offer or the offer will be
deemed rejected.26 1 A rejection of an offer terminates the offer.26 2 A
counteroffer is also considered a rejection. 23 The court may impose
"sanctions equal to reasonable attorneys fees and all reasonable costs of
253. A & W Electric Inc. v. Abraira, 567 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
254. Id.
255. 565 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
256. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.441; Aspen v. Bayless, 564 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1990).
257. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442.
258. 550 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1989).
259. Id. at 443.
260. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.441(a).
261. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.441(f)(1).
262. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.441(f)(3).
263. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.441(f)(2).
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the litigation accruing from the date the relevant offer of judgment was
made" '64 when the rejection of the offer was unreasonable, resulting in
further litigation costs, 6 5 and when, either the damages awarded to the
offeree "are less than 75 percent of the offer" or, "more than 125 per-
cent of the offer."2 66
Offers of judgment may not contain extraneous conditions which
must be met in order to accept the monetary settlement offer. 67 In
Martin v. Brousseau,268 the appellate court ruled that a conditional of-
fer of judgment made by the appellee was invalid because of the condi-
tions attached to the offer. The court then reversed the trial court's
decision imposing costs and attorney's fees upon the prevailing litigant
who had been awarded damages of twenty-five percent less than the
conditional offer of judgment. 69 The conditions attached to the offer of
judgment were "to execute a full and complete release and satisfaction,
a hold harmless affidavit, and a stipulation for dismissal with
prejudice. "270
In Aspen v. Bayless s71 a landmark case, the Florida Supreme
Court held that "a party is not precluded from recovering costs under
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, or after judgment in its favor,
when someone other than the named party pays or advances those
costs. '272 The court reasoned that a nonprevailing plaintiff should not
reap windfall benefits simply because litigation costs were borne by an
insurance carrier.2 3 In keeping with the goal of settling disputes with-
out going to trial, the court further reasoned that "[i]f a named insured
is unable to obtain costs under rule 1.442, there would be less incentive
to accept an offer to settle and no penalty for failing to do so. ''274 Addi-
tionally, the insurer who expends funds to pay for litigation has a right
of subrogation against the named party who was awarded costs by the
court and thus the awarding of such costs is appropriate. 275 The ruling
264. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.441(h)(1) (footnote omitted).
265. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.441(h)(1)(A).
266. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.441(h)(1)(B)(i)(ii).
267. Martin v. Brousseau, 564 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 241.
270. Id. (footnote omitted).
271. 564 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1990).
272. Id. at 1082.
273. Id. at 1083.
274.. Id. at 1083.
275. Id. at 1082.
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in Aspen should provide guidance in the cases involving a conflict be-
tween Rule 1.442 (offers of judgment) and section 768.79, Florida
Statutes, regarding the amount of entitlement which may be taxed fol-
lowing the rejection of an offer of settlement.276
XI. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In contrast with the trend toward the increased use of summary
judgment in federal courts in recent years,2 77 the Florida courts have
maintained a more conservative approach by demanding more of the
moving party. For example, in Freeman v. Fleet Supply, Inc., 78 the
court reviewed a summary judgment entered in favor of defendant in a
faulty brake case. The trial court had found that the plaintiff's allega-
tions failed to establish that the defective brakes proximately caused
his injury, based on his testimony in deposition that he had performed
a routine brake inspection before the accident, but that his knowledge
of braking systems was limited. In reversing the lower tribunal, the ap-
pellate court outlined its restrictive view that:
IT]he movant carries the considerable burden of showing conclu-
sively that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Until it is
determined that the movant has successfully met this burden, the
opposing party is under no obligation to show that there are no
issues remaining to be tried.2 71
Freeman's failure, in his deposition, to establish the exact cause of
the brake failure "did not mean that Fleet Supply had conclusively
demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. '280 Simi-
larly, in Mason v. McCrory Corp., the court found that evidence of
276. Kanaar v. Goodwin, 567 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990). In
Royster v. Van Der Meulen, 564 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1990), the trial
judge denied appellant's motion to tax costs and attorney's fees because his insurance
company had paid the costs of the litigation. The first district reversed, and certified a
conflict with the 1989 second district ruling in Aspen. Oddly enough, this case was
decided on July 25, 1990 - just one day before the Florida Supreme Court ruling in
Aspen.
277. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Lib-
erty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Electric Indus. Co.. Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
278. 565 So. 2d 870, 871 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
279. Id. at 871 (citations omitted).
280. Id.
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faulty shampoo packaging, "susceptible to different reasonable infer-
ences," was more than adequate to establish a jury question and defeat
a motion for summary judgment advanced by the defendant."' 1
The appellate court also found an abuse of discretion in denials of
requests for relief and rehearing in Jeff-Ray Corp. v. Jacobson,8 2
where the trial court had granted summary judgment against a party
which "made an unrebutted showing that it did not receive notice of
the summary judgment motion or hearing until receipt of the judgment
itself."2 3 In Hialeah, Inc. v. ,Adams, the appellate court found a simi-
lar abuse of discretion where the lower court had "denied the motion to
vacate solely on the basis that the registered agent's affidavit failed to
establish excusable neglect" in the mishandling of a complaint and
summons. 84 On the other hand, in Slachter v. Ahundio Inv., Co., a
case where a moving party did properly meet his burden, the simple
allegation that the non-moving party had "'meritorious defenses"' was
held to be insufficient to preclude summary judgment.28 5
XII. DIRECTED VERDICT
Motions for a directed verdict are governed by Rule 1.480.286 A
directed verdict is improper unless the evidence, viewed in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party, shows that the jury "could not rea-
sonably differ as to the existence of any material fact" and that the
moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law."'2 7 In Jones
v. Heil Co., the court overturned a directed verdict for the defendant
and held that a directed verdict will not be upheld on appeal unless no
evidence, or reasonable inferences from evidence presented, would sup-
port a jury's verdict for the non-moving party.288 While a directed ver-
dict should not be granted without serious consideration, a failure to
present competent evidence to support a claim will support the trial
court's setting aside the jury's verdict. 89 However, as the court noted
281. 567 So. 2d 1011, 1012 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
282. 566 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
283. Id.
284. 566 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
285. 566 So. 2d 348, 349 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
286. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.480.
287. Garrahan v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 569 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
288. 566 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
289. Yanks v. Barnett, 563 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (directed
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in Reaves v. Armstrong World Industries Inc., if there is no evidence in
the record to support the jury verdict, then a directed verdict is appro-
priate.290 A directed verdict is also appropriate if a claim is barred by
an affirmative defense such as the statute of frauds.21' As the appellate
court recognized in Cho v. Mackey, certain issues, such as the question
of foreseeability prior to imposing tort liability, are questions for the
jury and a directed verdict is improper in such cases.292
Rule 1.480 requires that a motion for a directed verdict be made
at the close of all the evidence. 293 A judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict and a directed verdict are interrelated. Judgment notwithstanding
the verdict will not be entered unless a party earlier moved for a di-
rected verdict.2 4 Additionally, judgment notwithstanding the verdict is
determined under the same test as a directed verdict: "[I]t will be
granted only if there is no evidence or reasonable inference therefrom
supporting a verdict for the other party. 295
XIII. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST/COSTS AND INTEREST/
ATTORNEYS' FEES
A. Prejudgment Interest
Prejudgment interest compensates the aggrieved party for the time
and use of his money beginning on the date, as determined by the ver-
dict, when the claim began to accrue. For example, in a construction
contract, the date of accrual could be the date the claim became liqui-
dated by agreement of the parties.29 6 When there is no liquidation
agreement fixing the rate of interest in the event of a breach, a court
should impose the current statutory interest rate29 7 of 12 percent per
verdict upheld because of plaintiffs failure to present competent evidence in fraudulent
misrepresentation claim).
290. Reaves v. Armstrong World Indus., 569 So. 2d 1307, 1309 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1990) (testimony insufficient, as a matter of law, to support a jury finding of
proximate causation).
291. Kay v. Katzen, 568 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
292. 567 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
293. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.480(b).
294. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner v. Anderson, 501 So. 2d 635 (Fla. Ist Dist.
Ct. App. 1986).
295. Id. at 638.
296. Delta D. Constr. Corp. v. Triangle Marine Constr., Inc., 567 So. 2d 1010
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
297. Id. at 1010.
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annum simple interest."' 8
When the statutory interest rate changes between the date of the
original judgment and a later judgment, the court will apply the rate
imposed on the date of each rendering of judgment. 99 In Herskowitz v.
Herskowitz,300 the appellate court reversed the trial court's modifica-
tion of interest on an action to enforce a judgment. The court imposed
six percent "from the entry of judgment" in June of 1972 to October
1985, "the date the judgment disposing of all pending matters was en-
tered," with twelve percent interest thereafter. 30 1 Finally, it should be
noted that while prejudgment interest is available in contract-based
causes of action - if previously pled by the prevailing party - it is not
recoverable in tort actions or usurious transactions.
B. Costs and Interest
Under section 57.041 of the Florida Statutes,302 certain legal costs
and charges may be awarded to the prevailing party in a civil action. 03
The court may award costs and attorney's fees to the prevailing plain-
tiff of the original action even if the defendant prevailed on a counter-
claim, causing both to be "prevailing parties. 304 If the significant relief
awarded to the prevailing plaintiff is "'limited in comparison to the
scope of the litigation,'" a reduced fee may be awarded at the court's
discretion.30 5 As noted by the court in Oriental Imports Inc., v. Alilin,
a trial court no longer has the discretion to deny costs to the party
prevailing in the judgment,3 06 especially when taxed for refusal of a
pre-trial offer of judgment.0 The "prevailing party" rule applies even
when the counter claimant recovers an award of damages in excess of
298. 244. FLA. STAT. § 55.031 (1989).
299. Herskowitz v. Herskowitz, 569 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. FLA. STAT. § 57.041 (1989).
303. Reinhardt v. Bono, 564 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
304. Malagon v. Solari, 566 So. 2d 352, 354 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)(a
landlord-tenant action with damages awarded under FLA. STAT. §83.49(3)(c)).
305. Id. at 354 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983)
("Where the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the district court should award
only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained.")).
306. Oriental Imports, Inc. v. Alilin, 559 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
307. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442; Reinhardt, 564 So. 2d 1233.
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those awarded to the prevailing plaintiff.3"' Additionally, any sales tax
incurred due to the Florida service tax on attorney's fees will be added
onto the sum total of any cost awards.30 9
The prevailing party may recover costs under Rule 1.442, even
when someone other than the named party, such as an insurer, has paid
the costs."' 0 In a case where a party is awarded costs but the actual
costs were paid by another party, no real windfall occurs because the
party who actually paid the costs of the litigation has subrogation
rights against the named party for reimbursement of those costs.311
Taxation of costs for discovery purposes, depositions, and requests
for production, are allowed or disallowed depending on whether they
serve a useful purpose in determining issues before the trial court.
However, reliance upon the information gleaned through discovery dep-
ositions is not enough to invoke taxation of those costs.3 -2 Attorneys
who are found guilty of charges brought by the Florida Bar during
disciplinary proceedings will be taxed any costs incurred by the Bar,
including witness fees. 3
While the court has great discretion in taxation of costs, the cost
of depositions should not be disallowed merely as a result of voluntary
dismissal.314 Finally, as to the appropriate amount of costs surrounding
a party's use of expert witnesses, all that is required of the court in
calculating taxation of fees for expert witnesses - who actually attend
court to testify - is consideration of a listing of itemized costs per ex-
pert witness used and a determination as to whether the cost listed was
reasonable.3 15
308. Salisbury Constr. Corp. v. Mitchell, 491 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1986).
309. See FLA.'STAT. § 57.071(3) (1989); Waller v. Baxley, 565 So. 2d 808, 809
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
310. Aspen, 564 So. 2d 1081.
311. Balseca v. Callies Electric, Inc., 566 So. 2d 322, 324 (Fla 3rd Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
312. See generally Balseca, 566 So. 2d at 328 (taxation of costs rests largely
within the discretion of the trial court).
313. The Florida Bar v. Blunt, 564 So. 2d 129, 130 (Fla. 1990).
314. Balseca, 566 So. 2d at 324; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jasiecki, 549 So. 2d 816
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
315. Balseca, 566 So. 2d at 324; Allstate, 549 So. 2d 816.
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C. Attorneys' Fees
Except where awarded by statute, 16 the taxing of attorneys' fees
is a product of the common law. Section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes
provides "for the award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party where
'the court finds that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue
of either law or fact raised by the losing party.' "317 Fees are similarly
awarded to the prevailing parties of post-divorce harassment cases
through the continuous filing of motions318 and frivolous action cases
that are so devoid of merit, both on the facts and the law, as to be
completely untenable. 319
If properly pled, a motion for attorneys fees may be made after
final judgment and accompanied by proof of fees, personal testimony of
the attorney who performed the services, and sufficient proof of reason-
able time spent in arriving at the total amount of fees requested. The
Florida Supreme Court has recognized that there are different catego-
ries of attorneys fees. In Standard Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Quan-
strom, the court stated that "different types of cases require different
criteria to achieve the legislative or court objective in authorizing the
setting of a reasonable attorney's fee."320 Because of prevailing confu-
sion among lawyers as to when the application of a multiplier is appro-
priate, the Florida Supreme Court discussed the logistics of proper
multiplier usage in Quanstrom.321 According to the court, the multi-
plier is not ordinarily used in estate and trust, eminent domain, or do-
mestic relations cases.322 In contractual disputes, the trial court should
consider: (1) the market availability of competent counsel, (2) attorney
mitigation of expenses/fees, and, (3) the relevance of the Rowe32 fac-
316. FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (Supp. 1990).
317. Simmons v. Schimmel, 476 So. 2d 1342, 1345-46 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
318. Steinfeld v. Steinfeld, 565 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990);
Elenewski v. Elenewski, 528 So. 2d 1354, 1356 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
319. Rojas v. Drake, 569 So. 2d 859, 860 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
320. 555 So. 2d 828, 833 (Fla. 1990).
321. Id.
322. Id. Attorney's fees are usually guaranteed in the first two, while ethically
inappropriate in the later cases.
323. See Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.
1985). Fee computation should be based on: 1) number of hours reasonably spent in
litigation; 2) the reasonable hourly rate applicable to the specific type of litigation in-
volved; 3) multiply (1) and (2), and when necessary; 4) allow adjustment of the fee to
compensate for failure to prevail on the claims or based on the nature of the litigation.
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tors, especially the total amount, post litigation results, and attorney/
client fee agreements. 24 As the First District Court of Appeal noted in
Jones v. Associates Fin. Inc., the Rowe factors must be applied by the
trial court when determining attorney's fees in order to avoid reversible
error.
32 5
XIV. RES JUDICATA/COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
A final judgment will bar further litigation under principles of res
judicata (claim preclusion) when the judgment includes the identity of
the cause of action, the identity of the thing sued for, the identity of
the persons and parties to the action, and the identity of quality for or
against whom the claim is made.3 1 6 Res judicata must be pled as an
affirmative defense and is generally utilized in conjunction with a mo-
tion for summary judgment.21 Once a judgment has been entered, a
second suit, filed by the same parties or parties who could have been in
privity in the first suit, is barred by res judicata in order to inhibit the
splitting of causes of action into multiple suits.328 Exceptions to the
principle of res judicata may be raised in connection with recurring
claims; however, without proof compelling modification of a previous
final order, non-recurring issues which were clearly litigated in the first
suit are barred by res judicata in all subsequent suits for recurring
damages.3 29
Under res judicata or claim preclusion (also sometimes referred to
as estoppel by judgment), all matters that were part of the initial cause
of action are said to be merged into the final judgment and a party is
said to be barred from relitigating any matters that were, or could have
been, included as a part of that cause of action. The'principle problem
Id.
324. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 834; see also Sun Bank v. Ford, 564 So. 2d 1078,
1080 (Fla. 1990) (trial judge appropriately set the attorney's fees by the terms of the
promissory note, $150/hr for the time reasonably spent).
325. Jones v. Associates Fin., Inc., 565 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
326. Personnel One, Inc. v. John Sommerer & Co., 564 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
327. Id. at 1218.
328. DeCarlo v. Palm Beach Auto Brokers, Inc., 566 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1990).
329. See, e.g., Nelson & Co. v. Holtzclaw, 566 So. 2d 307, 309 (Fla. Ist Dist.
Ct. App. 1990) (worker's compensation case); Walker v. Walker, 566 So. 2d 1350
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (child support case).
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of the application of claim preclusion generally concerns whether a
matter which was not litigated could have been litigated as part of the
cause of action. Issue preclusion or collateral estoppel (also sometimes
called estoppel by verdict) precludes relitigation of an issue that was
actually litigated and necessary to the holding. Three typical problems
emerge in reference to collateral estoppel: (1) is it the same identical
issue (i.e. same burden of proof); (2) was the litigated issue necessary
to the court's judgment; and (3) whether the requirement of mutuality
should be relaxed so that issue preclusion can be used as a shield or a
sword.
When the first and second suits involve different causes of action
between the same parties or parties who were in privity in the first suit,
the doctrine of collateral estoppel is invoked; thus, the parties are es-
topped from litigating any common issues that were actually adjudi-
cated in prior litigation.33 0 One example of collateral estoppel is seen in
section 775.089(8) of Florida Statutes,33 1 which dictates that, in civil
suits for restitution arising from criminal convictions, collateral estop-
pel prevents the denial of any essential allegations which led to the
criminal conviction in the previous proceeding.332
"Collateral Estoppel" (issue preclusion) and its synonymous term
"estoppel by verdict" should not be confused with "estoppel by judg-
ment" which refers to a res judicata bar (claim preclusion). Because of
the confusion that could result, even synonymous terms should not be
redundantly used together.3 33 Some Florida courts have used these
terms interchangeably, much to the befuddlement of the reader. It
would be helpful if Florida courts would adopt the definitions used by
the Restatement of Judgments (Second) in order to provide greater
uniformity.334
The modern view, allowing the use of collateral estoppel as a
"sword" or a "shield," has been accepted by the United States Su-
preme Court in the landmark cases of Blonder-Tongue Laboratories.,
Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,"5 and Parklane Hosiery Co.
330. Personnel One, Inc. 564 So. 2d 1217.
331. Fla. Stat § 775.089(8) (1989).
332. Paterno v. Fernandez, 569 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
333. Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Russell, 567 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
334. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980).
335. 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (defensive "shield" usage - defendant in second patent
infringement suit was able to defeat the action because the plaintiff had previously lost
on an infringement action on the same patent against a different defendant).
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v. Shore.3 '
Res judicata and collateral estoppel are dependant upon the entry
of a final judgment or order.33 7 When the order is not final - such as
when an evidentiary hearing is required or when a petition for a writ of
certiorari is denied without an opinion, or when the first case is dis-
missed for lack of prosecution or as a sanction without adjudication on
the merits - the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel may
not be invoked in the case.38" In the absence of a reversal, an order or
judgment that is voidable bars later adjudication for res judicata
purposes.339
336. 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (offensive "sword" usage - plaintiff was able to prevail
in second suit by using a prior determination in an action by the United States against
the same defendant).
337. DeCarlo, 566 So. 2d 318.
338. See, e.g., Accent Realty, Inc. v. Crudele, 496 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1986).
339. See, e.g., Walker v. Walker, 566 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1990); HRS v. Morley, 570 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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Substantive Criminal Law
Pamela Cole Bell*
This article is a brief survey of substantive criminal law cases de-
cided by the Florida Supreme Court between December 1, 1989, and
December 1, 1990.
I. CRIMINAL OFFENSES: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES
In Stall v. State,1 the Florida Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether prosecution under Florida's Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organization (RICO) Act,2 predicated upon violations of Florida's
obscenity statute,3 violates the Florida constitutional right to privacy.4
The court recognized that the right to privacy protects one's right to
possess obscene materials in the privacy of one's home.5 However, the
court found that the right to privacy does not extend to vendors of ob-
scene materials and held the obscenity and RICO statutes
constitutional. 6
The court also reviewed the constitutionality of Florida Statute
section 893.12(1)(e), which prohibits selling, purchasing, delivering,
etc., a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school.7 The statute
was attacked as being violative of the single-subject provision of the
Florida Constitution.8 The court held that the statute did not violate
* J.D., Stetson College of Law; practices with John D. Fernandez, P.A. in Clear-
water, Florida; adjunct professor at Stetson College of Law.
1. 570 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1990).
2. FLA. STAT. § 895.01-.06 (1985).
3. FLA. STAT. § 847.011 (1985). This statute is violated through the showing,
sale, distribution, and rental of obscene writings, tapes, and objects intended for ob-
scene purposes. Id.
4. See FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
5. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 262; see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
6. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 258.
7. Burch v. State, 558 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1990); see also Leonardi v. State, 567 So.
2d 408 (Fla. 1990); Bennett v. State, 559 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1990); Morrow v. State,
557 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1990); Lewis v. State, 556 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1990); Blankenship
v. State, 556 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 1990); Dame v. State, 556 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1990).
8. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6.
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this constitutional provision.9
II. SENTENCING
A. Length of Sentence
Florida Statute section 948.01(5) limits the duration of a sentence
of community control to two years.' However, where a defendant has
been convicted of separate crimes, the sentencing court may- impose
consecutive terms of community control even if the sentences are im-
posed at the same sentencing hearing."
Additionally, community control and probation may be stacked,
provided the total term does not exceed the recommended guidelines
range.' 2 Minimum mandatory sentences in capital felony cases may
also be stacked.' 3 Such consecutive sentences are permitted in homicide
cases as well as in other capital felony cases and even if the crimes
arise out of the same criminal episode.' 4
The supreme court also addressed the issue of whether or not im-
prisonment in the county jail may exceed one year if successive
sentences for various offenses are pending. 15 The court held that if the
sentences are imposed at the same time, the total time in the county
jail may not exceed one year. 16 However, if the defendant has previ-
ously been sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail, a subsequent
sentence may be imposed for additional county jail time up to one year,
even if the cumulative effect is that the defendant will be in the county
jail for over one year.17
B. Resentencing Upon Violation of Probation or Community
Control
When a defendant's probation is violated, upon resentencing, the
9. Burch, 558 So. 2d 1.
10. FLA. STAT. § 948.01(5) (Supp. 1988).
11. Crawford v. State, 567 So. 2d 428, 429 (Fla. 1990).
12. State v. Reed, 557 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1990); Skeens v. State, 556 So. 2d 1113
(Fla. 1990).
13. State v. Boatwright, 559 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1990); State v. Boyd, 558 So. 2d
1025 (Fla. 1990).
14. Boatwright, 559 So. 2d at 211.
15. Singleton v. State, 554 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1990).
16. Id. at 1163.
17. Id.
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defendant is entitled to gain time earned during his prior imprisonment
on the charge for which probation was revoked."' Accrued gain time
equals time spent in prison." A defendant sentenced as a youthful of-
fender whose probation is revoked is still entitled to the benefit of Flor-
ida Statute 958.14, which limits imprisonment to a maximum of six
years.20
III. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A. In General
Since the adoption of the sentencing guidelines, sentencing courts
have been required to sentence all defendants convicted of a felony
committed after the effective date of July 1, 1985, within the recom-
mended guidelines range. Even where the statutory minimum or maxi-
mum sentences preclude sentencing within the guidelines, the court
must impose either concurrent or consecutive sentences if there are
multiple convictions in order to come as close as possible to the guide-
lines recommendation." The court must provide written reasons for de-
parture at the time the sentence is imposed or the sentence will be in-
validated.22 If the court does not provide written reasons, the reviewing
court must remand for resentencing within the guidelines with no possi-
bility of departure.2"
In determining the recommended range, prior convictions include
all convictions for crimes obtained prior to sentencing.24 The trial court
18. State v. Carter, 553 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1989).
19. Heuring v. State, 559 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1990) (imposition of a sentence of
imprisonment for a specific term may not include probation for the time remaining
when the defendant is released early due to gain time or otherwise).
20. State v. Watts, 558 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 1990). The court in Watts discussed the
1985 amendment to section 958.14, which limits the sentences of youthful offenders to
six years, and held that the amendment was applicable to all violations of probation
and community control occurring after the effective date of the amendment, even if the
original offense occurred prior to the amendment. See also State v. Kerklin, 566 So. 2d
513 (Fla. 1990); Cole v. State, 565 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 1990); State v. Warren, 559 So.
2d 1139 (Fla. 1990); State v. Johnson, 559 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1990); State v. Dixon,
558 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 1990); State v. Miles, 558 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 1990); James v.
State, 558 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1990).
21. Branam v. State, 554 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1990).
22. Ree v. State, 565 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 1990).
23. Robinson v. State, 571 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1990); Ferguson v. State, 566 So. 2d
255 (Fla. 1990); Pope v. State, 561 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1990).
24. Thorp v. State, 555 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1990).
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should also score juvenile furlough, attendance in juvenile programs,
and conditions of bail as legal constraint.2 5
B. Departure Sentences
During the survey period, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed va-
rious departure sentences. In State v. Vanhorn,26 an escalating pattern
of criminal conduct was sufficient to justify a upward departure, even
where the remaining reasons were invalid. However, in Herrin v.
State,217 the court found that substance abuse, coupled with reasonable
possibility of successful treatment, was a valid reason for a downward
departure.
In State v. Simpson,28 the court held that although defendant's
crimes were committed two days apart, it did not sustain a finding of
an escalating criminal pattern and sentence departure. The mere fact
the defendant committed a second offense while on probation, but was
not convicted therefor, was not sufficient for the court i'n Wesson v.
State to depart on the sentencing on the first offense. 9 The court in
Brown v. State"0 held a violation of a condition of bail an invalid reason
for departure. Additionally, in Wilson v. State31 the court held that an
abuse of a position of familial authority over the victim was not reason
to justify the imposition of departure sentence on convictions of lewd
and lascivious assault of child under sixteen years of age, even when
the child is mildly retarded.
IV. DEATH PENALTY
The Florida Supreme Court reviewed numerous death penalty
cases during the survey period. The court was again called upon to
weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors present in each case to
determine if the trial court properly imposed the most severe punish-
ment our law allows.
25. Brown v. State, 569 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 1990); State v. Young. 561 So. 2d 583
(Fla. 1990); State v. Ellison, 561 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1990).
26. 561 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 1990).
27. 568 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1990).
28. 554 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 1989).
29. 559 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 1990).
30. 569 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 1990).
31. 567 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1990).
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A. Constitutionality of Death Imposed in Florida's Electric
Chair
During the survey period, the supreme court reviewed the novel
issue of whether the death penalty was violative of the United States
and Florida Constitutions' prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment because of a malfunction in the electric chair.32 The issue
arose after the execution of Jesse Tafero on May 4, 1990. Flames and
smoke spurted from Tafero's head and emanated from the area of the
metallic skull cap.3 3 The state concluded, after an investigation, that
the use of a synthetic sponge in the skull cap caused the problem.3 4 The
court found that one malfunction is insufficient to justify additional in-
quiry and held the death penalty not to be cruel and unusual punish-
ment under these circumstances.35
B. Written Findings
To impose a sentence of death, the sentencing court must issue
written findings regarding aggravating and mitigating factors. 36 Merely
stating that "[t]he court has considered the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in evidence . . . and determines that sufficient aggravat-
ing circumstances exist, and there are insufficient mitigating circum-
stances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances" does not comport
with the statute and is insufficient to justify a death sentence. 37 The
trial court d6es not have to expressly address each nonstatutory miti-
gating factor to sufficiently reject them.38 However, the written findings
must be sufficient so as to allow an opportunity for meaningful review
by the supreme court.39 If the written findings are insufficient, the
death penalty will be vacated and a life sentence imposed.40
32. Bertolotti v. State, 565 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1990); White v. State, 565 So. 2d
322 (Fla. 1990); Hamblen v. State, 565 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1990); Squires v. State, 565
So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1990); Buenoano v. State, 565 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 19901.
33. Buenoano, 565 So. 2d at 310.
34. Id. at 311.
35. Id.; see also Bertolotti, 565 So. 2d at 1343; White, 565 So. 2d at 323; Ham-
blen, 565 So. 2d at 321; Squires, 565 So. 2d at 319.
36. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1989).
37. Bouie v. State, 559 So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 1990).
38. Lucas v. State, 568 So. 2d 18, 23-24 (Fla. 1990).
39. Id.
40. Id.; see also Bouie, 559 So. 2d at 1115-16; FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1989).
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C. Jury Recommendation of Life
During the survey period, the supreme court reviewed five cases
wherein the trial court overrode the jury's recommendation of life im-
prisonment.41 In all five cases, the supreme court vacated the death
sentence. In four of the cases, the supreme court remanded for imposi-
tion of a life sentence.42 In one case, the court remanded for an eviden-
tiary hearing on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel during the
sentencing hearing.4"
D. Mitigating Factors
1. Statutory
Section 921.141(6) of the Florida Statutes sets out ".he statutory
mitigating factors to be considered in determining whether or not to
impose the death penalty.44 The defendant is entitled to an instruction
41. Cheshire v. State, 568 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1990) (trial court failed to consider
emotional disturbance as mitigating factor and erred in finding aggravating factor of
heinous, atrocious or cruel where defendant shot his estranged wife); Carter v. State,
560 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1990) (statutory and nonstatutory mitigating factors outweigh
evidence of five aggravating factors found by the trial court); Hallman ". State, 560 So.
2d 223 (Fla. 1990) (four of six aggravating factors found to be valid but insufficient to
outweigh the nonstatutory mitigating factors present); Heiney v. Dugger, 558 So. 2d
398 (Fla. 1990) (Hitchcock error found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, case
remanded for an evidentiary hearing on defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel at sentencing); Morris v. State, 557 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1990) (override of jury
recommendation of death penalty based on finding of single aggravatirg factor of hei-
nous, atrocious, or cruel, insufficient to overcome the great weig It given jury's
recommendation).
42. See Cheshire, 568 So. 2d at 913; Carter, 560 So. 2d at 1169; Hallman, 560
So. 2d at 228; Morris, 557 So. 2d at 30.
43. Heiney, 558 So. 2d at 400.
44. The mitigating factors include:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was ander the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or -zonsented
to the act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by
another person and his participation was relatively minor,
(e) the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial
domination of another person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his con-
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regarding each factor for which evidence was adduced, unless the de-
fendant specifically waives such an instruction. 45 If the trial court fails
to appropriately instruct the jury, the reviewing court must determine
whether the failure to so instruct the jury affected the jury's recom-
mendation.46 If the court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that
the failure had no effect on the jury's recommendation, a. new sentenc-
ing proceeding must be held.
2. Nonstatutory
The supreme court again reviewed Hitchcock violations. 8 Once
the court determines that there is a Hitchcock violation, it must apply
the harmless error doctrine to determine if reversible error occurred.49
Where the jury recommends life, there is no doubt that the error is
harmless. 50 Where the jury recommends death, the error could be prej-
udicial or harmless depending on the evidence of mitigating factors
presented during the penalty phase.5'
E. Aggravating Factors
Aggravating factors to be considered by the court are dictated by
duct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substan-
tially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1989).
45. Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1990).
46. Stewart v. State, 558 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1990).
47. Id. at 421.
48. See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (death sentence held invalid
where trial court failed to instruct jury that it may consider all mitigating circum-
stances in determining whether to recommend death). The trial court must allow the
consideration of nonstatutory as well as statutory mitigating circumstances to avoid a
Hitchcock violation.
49. See Copeland v. Dugger, 565 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 1990) (state conceded error
and record contained many items of potentially mitigating evidence and also was un-
clear as to whether trial court was aware that it could consider nonstatutory mitigating
factors); Smith v. State, 556 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1990) (state conceded error but met
burden of proving harmless error where overwhelming body of aggravating factors
exist).
50. Heiney, 558 So. 2d 398.
51. Way v. Dugger, 568 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 1990) (not harmless error where evi-
dence of numerous mitigating factors presented during penalty phase which the jury
should have considered); see also Copeland, 565 So. 2d 1348; Smith, 556 So. 2d 1096.
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section 921.141(5) of the Florida Statutes.5 2 Once the jury makes its
recommendation, the trial court must weigh the aggravating factors
present before imposing sentence.
In the cases surveyed in this subsection, the jury recommended
death. The supreme court upheld the death sentence in fourteen cases.
The cases reviewed contained the following aggravating factors: prior
conviction of a felony involving the use or threat of violence; 3 felony
committed for pecuniary gain;54 felony committed in a cold, calculated,
and premeditated manner; 5 felony committed while engaged in an
enumerated felony; 56 felony particularly heinous, atrocious, or cruel;51
felony committed to avoid lawful arrest;58 felony committed under sen-
52. Aggravating factors include:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of
imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of
a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many
persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or
was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or
flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, sexual bat-
tery, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throw-
ing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) the capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exer-
cise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(i) The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calcu-
lated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal
justification.
() The victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged
in the performance of his official duties.
(k) The victim of the capital felony was an elected or appointed public
official engaged in the performance of his official duties if the motive for
the capital felony was related, in whole or in part, to the victim's official
capacity.
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5) (1989).
53. § 921.141(5)(b).
54. § 921.141(5)(f).
55. § 921.141(5)(i).
56. § 921.141(5)(d).
57. § 921.141(5)(h).
58. § 921.141(5)(e).
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tence of imprisonment;59 defendant created a great risk of death to
many persons;6° and felony committed to disrupt a governmental
function. 6 '
59. § 921.141(5)(a).
60. § 921.141(5)(c).
61. § 921.141(5)(g); see Holton v. State, 573 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1990) (prior con-
viction of violent felony for a contemporaneous sexual battery and arson not upheld but
proper as to prior attempted robbery conviction; committed during commission of sex-
ual battery; heinous, atrocious, and cruel; cold, calculated, and premeditated not up-'
held - two mitigating factors insufficient to outweigh the valid aggravating factors);
Downs v. State, 572 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1990) (prior conviction of violent felony; commit-
ted for pecuniary gain; and cold, calculated, and premeditated not overcome by evi-
dence of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances); Sanchez-Velasco v. State, 570 So. 2d
908 (Fla. 1990) (heinous, atrocious, and cruel; committed during commission of sexual
battery - no mitigating factors found); Occhicone v. State, 570 So. 2d 902 (Fla.
1990) (prior conviction of violent felony; committed during a burglary; and cold, calcu-
lated, and premeditated supported by the record and death not disproportionate); Floyd
v. State, 569 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1990) (committed for pecuniary gain and heinous,
atrocious, and cruel sufficient to justify death penalty); Brown v. State, 565 So. 2d 304
(Fla. 1990) (committed during commission of a felony; previous conviction of a violent
felony; and committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner not outweighed
by mitigating circumstances presented); Van Poyck v. State, 564 So. 2d 1066 (Fla.
1990) (committed while under sentence of imprisonment, committed to escape from
custody, created great risk of death to many persons and prior conviction of violent
felony sufficiently outweighed mitigating evidence to sustain sentence of death); Porter
v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1990) (prior conviction of violent felony; committed
during commission of burglary; cold, calculated, and premeditated; heinous, atrocious,
or cruel not upheld but the three valid aggravating factors sufficient to justify death
penalty); Pardo v. State, 563 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1990) (multiple murders - cold, calcu-
lated, and premeditated apply to all and committed to disrupt governmental function
and committed for pecuniary gain applied to individual murders; additional aggravat-
ing factor present but not found by court is prior conviction of violent felony even
though the conviction contemporaneous with other convictions where multiple victims
or separate episodes involved); Freeman v. State, 563 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1990) (prior
conviction of violent felony and committed for pecuniary gain outweighed nonstatutory
mitigating factors); Randolph v. State, 562 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1990) (committed during
commission of sexual battery; committed to avoid lawful arrest; committed for pecuni-
ary gain; and heinous, atrocious, or cruel sufficient where no statutory mitigating fac-
tors found and only two nonstatutory mitigating factors present); Rivera v. State, 561
So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1990) (prior conviction of violent felony; committed during commis-
sion of enumerated felony; heinous, atrocious, or cruel; cold, calculated, and premedi-
tated not upheld-three remaining factors sufficient where only one statutory mitigat-
ing circumstance present and no nonstatutory mitigating circumstances); Haliburton v.
State, 561 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1990) (under sentence of imprisonment; prior conviction of
violent felony; committed during commission of a burglary; and cold, calculated, and
premeditated sufficient to impose death where nonstatutory mitigating factors did not
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The supreme court found the death penalty inappropriate in eight
of the cases included under this subsection. In doing so, the court found
in some of these cases that certain aggravating factors had not been
established by the evidence.62 Consistent with prior decisions, the court
also found that introduction of evidence of the defendant's lack of re-
morse is improper and requires resentencing.6" In other cases, the court
found the death penalty disproportionate under the particular circum-
stances of the case. 64
Once the supreme court vacates the death penalty, it may remand
for a new sentencing hearing or for imposition of a life sentence. The
supreme court remanded four of the above cases for a new sentencing
hearing and four for imposition of a life sentence.6 5
outweigh these aggravating factors); Reed v. State, 560 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1990) (com-
mitted while engaged in commission of sexual battery; committed to avoid lawful ar-
rest; committed for pecuniary gain; and heinous, atrocious, or cruel sufficient even
where aggravating factors of prior conviction of felony of violence and cold, calculated,
and premeditated held invalid-total absence of mitigating circumstances).
62. Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990) (cold, calculated, and premed-
itated improperly found); Jones v. State, 569 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1990) (trial court found
aggravating factors of committed for pecuniary gain and cold, calculated, and premedi-
tated; error to instruct jury as to heinous, atrocious, or cruel); Farinas v. State, 569 So.
2d 425 (Fla. 1990) (cold, calculated, and premeditated not present); Thompson v.
State, 565 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 1990) (single aggravating circumstance of cold, calcu-
lated, and premeditated inapplicable where the heightened premeditation required to
support this finding not present); Preston v. State, 564 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1990) (prior
conviction of violent felony inapplicable where conviction vacated; cold, calculated, and
premeditated previously eliminated).
63. Colina v. State, 570 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1990).
64. Nibert v. State, 59 U.S.L.W. 3 (Fla. July 26, 1990) (one aggravating factor
and trial court failed to find mitigating circumstances where such evidence presented
and unrefuted); Farinas, 569 So. 2d 425; Blakely v. State, 561 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1990)
(disproportionate in light of penalty imposed in factually similar cases -- killing result-
ing from ongoing domestic problems).
65. Nibert, 59 U.S.L.W. 3; Campbell, 571 So. 2d 415 (remanded for new sen-
tencing hearing); Colina, 570 So. 2d 929; Farinas, 569 So. 2d 425; Jones v. State, 569
So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1990), Thompson, 565 So. 2d 1311 (remanded for imposition of life
sentence); Preston, 564 So. 2d 120; Blakely, 561 So. 2d 425.
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Lastly, the supreme court approved an addition to the standard
jury instruction on the aggravating factor of heinous, atrocious, or
cruel. 66 The addition defines the terms heinous, atrocious, and cruel.6
66. In re Florida Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.), 563 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1990).
67. Id.
('Heinous' means extremely wicked or shockingly evil. 'Atrocious' means
outrageously wicked and vile. 'Cruel' means designed to inflict a high de-
gree of pain with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering
of others. The kind of crime intended to be included as heinous, atrocious,
or cruel is one accompanied by additional acts that show that the crime
was conscienceless or pitiless and was unnecessarily torturous to the
victim.)
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This is a comprehensive survey of the decisions of the Su-
preme Court of Florida that construed the bill of rights contained
in article I of the state constitution during 1990. It supplements
this Review's 1989 Survey of Florida Law, which examined the
article I cases released by the court during the decade past.1 Con-
tinuing the same format and case selection criteria,2 the following
1. See Hawkins, Florida Constitutional Law: A Ten-year Retrospective on the
State Bill of Rights, 14 NOVA L. REV. 693 (1990). That project provides clear indica-
tions that the court is engaged in producing an active body of state constitutional juris-
prudence. To briefly abstract its principal findings, the project concluded that: The
court's decisions create a hierarchical order of rights in article I, with the order depen-
dent solely upon the particular standard chosen by the court to measure the justifica-
tion for the state's encroachment; article I rights are not absolute, despite rhetoric to
the contrary; those rights eclipsed the protection against government interference af-
forded by their federal analogues on five occasions during the decade; litigants should
exploit the textual differences between state and federal provisions, thereby promoting
constitutional imperatives that are unique to Florida; and the court has promoted the
independence of the state constitution on several occasions when it eschewed relevant
federal precedent.
2. What follows is a section-by-section summary of the cases that addressed arti-
cle I during 1990. This survey accepts the premise that each opinion citing to the state
bill of rights, whether by principled analysis or passing reference, uniquely contributes
to the development of the Florida Constitution. In profile, the opinion must confirm
that the state constitution was relied upon by the court, addressed by a lower court, or
advanced by a litigant in support of a claim. Conversely, an opinion that generically
refers to equal protection, double jeopardy, and the like, cannot be said to directly add
to the body of state constitutional law. Several recent cases support this position. In
them, the court specifically declined to distinguish the nature of the state and federal
protections, very likely because the claimants sought no particular relief under the
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work marks, for the moment, the contours of Florida's evolving
constitutional landscape.
A. INTRODUCTION
The bill of rights is the constitutional pedigree of personal free-
doms. The integrity of the pedigree is only as sound as the barriers it
establishes as protection from governmental excess. Conflict between
the state sovereign and its constituents occurs inevitably when the state
seeks to limit the exercise of personal freedom in the name of the com-
mon good, or wields its power in disregard of constitutional safeguards.
A challenging array of personal rights issues tested the limits of
the state constitution this year. Among them are those that asked
whether the state can:
- authorize a disinherited daughter to avoid her deceased mother's
devise to charity;
- prohibit candidates for statewide offices from accepting campaign
contributions during legislative sessions;
• tax the retail sales of magazines while exempting newspapers;
" enter judgment against a delinquent obligor of child support pay-
ments without allowing the obligor an opportunity to be heard in
court;
- refuse with impunity for two years to comply with an order di-
recting the state to restore wrongfully confiscated and withheld
property to the owner;
- search the carry-on luggage of boarded bus passengers without a
Florida Constitution. See White v. Pepsico, Inc., 568 So. 2d 886, 888 n.2 (Fla. 1990)
(due process); Wemett v. State, 567 So. 2d 882, 884 n.2 (Fla. 1990) (due process);
State v. Smith, 573 So. 2d 306, 316 n.5 (1990) (per curiam) (right to silence).
There is one exception to these case selection criteria. Occasionally, the court cites
to a prior constitutional decision as precedent, without mentioning that the holding has
constitutional significance. The line of cases beginning with State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d
481 (Fla. 1984), offers several illustrations. Cases of that ilk are included to the extent
research successfully identified them.
The five district courts of appeal also contribute to the shaping of constitutional
parameters, and their decisions oftentimes have statewide import. See Stanfill v. State,
384 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 1980) (state constitutional decisions of the district courts
"represent the law of Florida unless and until overruled by the supreme court"); Wei-
man v. McHaffie, 470 So. 2d 682, 684 (Fla. 1985) (absent conflicting precedent of its
district court or the supreme court, a trial court is obliged to follow state constitutional
decisions of other district courts). Time limits alone prevented review of district court
cases in this survey.
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whisper of suspicion of wrongdoing;
- execute roadside stops of law-abiding motorists merely because
they satisfied an officer's self-styled drug courier profile;
- provide constitutionally effective legal representation when the de-
fendant's state-paid assistant public defender is also a special dep-
uty sheriff;
• relegate citrus growers, whose crops the state destroyed in a citrus
canker eradication program, to an administrative rather than a ju-
dicial determination of damages;
• sanction the seller of allegedly obscene material that the buyer
has a constitutionally protected right to possess; and
• deny a person the right to refuse unwanted medical intervention,
without which death would certainly follow.
Article I cases occasionally spring from emotionally-charged socie-
tal disputes, which are fired by the cultural passions of a diverse citi-
zenry. Once reduced to legal claims, those cases often produce frac-
tured opinions that express doctrinal positions no less impassioned. The
opinions in 1990 crystallized numerous driving principles at work be-
hind the positions advocated by the court's membership. For instance,
the justices on occasion displayed an ambitious aspiration to expand the
scope of protection afforded by the constitutional imperatives of article
I. Other times, a majority returned to the safe harbor of precedent and
narrow construction to deny protection. Some opinions clearly at-
tempted to reach a proper accommodation between the competing in-
terests of the governed and those who govern. Others sought to acheive
a just result, without regard to accommodation. Some turned deferen-
tially upon the court's perception of its own role as a coordinate branch
of government. Others cast the judiciary into the role of guardian of
human dignity when another branch defaulted by failing to provide ad-
equate protection. And there were cases that made apparent the ongo-
ing tension between law, as a dynamic, evolutionary process, and law,
as an interdiction comprised of prohibitory rules. To be sure, the hold-
ings of the court's 1990 cases are of no greater interest and importance
than the collegial and doctrinal forces that produced them.
B. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
1. Political Power
All political power is inherent in the people. The enunciation
herein of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or impair
[Vol. 151052
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others retained by the people. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
No decisions construed this section during the survey period.
2. Basic Rights
Article I, section 2 makes three separate declarations. The first
expresses the central constitutional concept that the state must deal
with similar persons in a similar manner. The second declares that per-
sons have inalienable rights, and specifically enumerates many of those
rights. The third protects all basic rights of natural persons from depri-
vation, especially on account of race, religion, or physical handicap.
a. Equal Protection Clause
"All natural persons are equal before the law ... " FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 2.
In Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children v. Zrillic,3 the court
considered a will executed by Lorraine Romans that intentionally lim-
ited the inheritance of her daughter, Lorraine Zrillic, to several boxes
of antique dishes and figurines, and left the remainder of the estate to
Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children. Romans died approximately
two-and-one-half months after executing her will. Zrillic sought to
avoid the devise to Shriners Hospitals in circuit court, relying upon
Florida's version of a "mortmain" statute, a statute that essentially en-
abled a lineal descendent to avoid a charitable devise made within six
months of the testator's death." The circuit court declared the statute
unconstitutional, and the district court reversed that decision.
On review, the Supreme Court of Florida first decided that Zrillic
had standing under the mortmain statute to avoid her mother's devise
to Shriners Hospitals, and then measured the statute against two sepa-
rate clauses within article I, section 2--the equal protection clause, and
the inalienable rights clause. Regarding the first clause, five justices
agreed that Florida Statutes section 732.803(1) violated state and fed-
3. 563 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1990) (Barkett, J., author. Ehrlich, C.J,, Shaw, and Ko-
gan, JJ, concurred. Justice Grimes concurred in result. Justice McDonald concurred in
result, and dissented in part, with an opinion in which Justice Overton concurred).
4. FLA. STAT. § 732.803 (1985).
5. Zrillic v. Estate of Romans, 535 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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eral equal protection guarantees.' To survive equal protection analysis,
the scheme "must appear to be based at a minimum on a rational dis-
tinction having a just and reasonable relation to a legitimate state ob-
jective."' 7 The statutory scheme here created a class of testators who
die within six months of executing a charitable devise. The court said
that there exists no rational basis for considering differently devises ex-
ecuted six months or more before death, from those executed less than
six months before death. Moreover, the class cannot be said to advance
the statutory aim, for it may operate to uphold charitable devises made
hastily, without adequate deliberation, albeit outside the six month
limit, and may void those devises made without undue influence.8
Three other cases touched upon Florida's equal protection guaran-
tee. The petitioners in the first case, Amendments to Rules Regulating
The Florida Bar-il-3.1(a) and Rules of Judicial Administra-
tion-2.065 (Legal Aid),9 were fifty-eight members of The Florida Bar
who requested the court to exercise its rule-making power to create a
mandatory pro bono program for the state's practicing lawyers. The
justices declined for the moment to take action on the rules proposed
by the petitioners, pending receipt of a special committee's report on
the subject, but did reach agreement on an interim statement of princi-
ple. Unanimously, the court held: "[E]very . . . member of The Flor-
ida Bar has an obligation to represent the poor when called upon by the
courts . . . Pro bono is a part of a lawyer's public responsibility as an
officer of the court.
'
"
10
Petitioners asserted that mandatory pro bono legal services were
compelled by the state equal protection clause, as well as other article I
sections." The justices never reached the constitutional claims. Instead,
the decision is clearly pegged upon the professional obligation under-
taken in the lawyer's oath,' 2 and imposed by common law anteced-
6. FLA. STAT. § 732.803(1) (1985). On this point, Justice Grimes concurred with
the four-member majority. Shriners Hospitals, 563 So. 2d at 71 (Grimes, J., concur-
ring in result).
7. Id. at 69 (citations omitted).
8. Id. at 70-71.
9. 573 So. 2d 800 (1990) (unanimous) (Overton, J., author).
10. Id. at 806.
11. They also contended that mandatory pro bono legal services were required by
article I, sections 9 (due process clause) and 21 (access to courts). Id.
12. The oath states, in part, that "'I will never reject, from ary consideration
personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed .... ' " Id. at 803 (quot-
ing Rules Relating to Ethics Governing Bench and Bar, 145 Fla. 763, 797 (1941) (em-
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ents.' 3 Thus, a lawyer's duty to provide pro bono legal services does not
rest upon any express constitutional entitlement of the poor. The
court's avoidance of the constitutional claims may be explained by the
strong likelihood that it chose the more prudential course of resolving
the cause on non-constitutional grounds. 4
White v. Dugger15 dealt with a habeas petitioner's equal protection
claim that the state obtained the indictment against him in a funda-
mentally flawed manner. The stated basis for his argument was that
the indictment against him was returned by a grand jury comprised of
twenty-three jurors, and that the presence of persons during grand jury
deliberations that exceeded the statutory limit of eighteen raised a con-
stitutional violation. The court rejected the claim as meritless. 16
Finally, Department of Revenue v. Magazine Publishers of
America, Inc.' 7 considered a 'statute that taxed the retail sales of
magazines, while exempting from taxation the retail sales of newspa-
pers."s Various magazine publishers charged that the statute violated
the Speech and Press Clauses of the first amendment, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the fourteenth amendment, and the state constitu-
tional counterparts. The court never reached the equal protection
claim, but instead resolved the case in favor of the publishers on first
amendment grounds, very likely because there existed clear first
amendment precedent. Magazine Publishers is more fully discussed be-
low, under article I, section 4.
b. Inalienable Rights and Deprivation Clauses
All natural persons. . . have inalienable rights, among which are
the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness,
phasis deleted)).
13. The opinion emphasized that "'one who is allowed the privilege to practice
law accepts a professional obligation to defend the poor.'" Id. at 804 (quoting In Inter-
est of D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 92 (Fla. 1980) (emphasis deleted)), and added that lawyers
are essential to our common law adversarial system. Id.
14. See Fleeman v. Case, 342 So. 2d 815, 818 (Fla. 1976).
15. 565 So. 2d 700 (1990) (per curiam).
16. Id. at 703 (citing Thompson v. State, 565 So. 2d 1311, 1313 n.2 (1990)).
17. 565 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1990) (unanimous) (Ehrlich, C.J., author, Overton,
Shaw, Barkett, Grimes, and Kogan, JJ., concurring. McDonald, J., did not partici-
pate.), petition for cert. filed, No. 90-904 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1990).
18. FLA. STAT. § 212.05(1)(i) (Supp. 1988) (imposing tax of six percent on retail
magazine sales); FLA. STAT. § 212.08(7)(w) (Supp. 1988) (exempting newspapers).
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to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect
property; except that the ownership, inheritance, disposition and
possession of real property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may
be regulated or prohibited by law. No person shall be deprived of
any right because of race, religion or physical handicap. FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 2.
Shriners Hospitals, introduced in the preceding section, made two
significant contributions to the state's constitutional jurisprudence.
First, it elevated the right of persons to dispose of property by will from
legislative creation to constitutional dimension. At issue was the scope
of protection afforded by the inalienable rights clause, in light of the
mortmain statute's restriction of certain devises to charity. The clause
expressly protects the right of natural persons "to acquire, possess and
protect property." To ascertain the meaning of that right, the majority
of four justices turned to a principle of constitutional construction that
requires a "common sense reading of the plain and ordinary meaning
of the language." '19 Resorting to dictionary definitions, the justices in-
terpreted the right to "possess" property as meaning "to have, hold,
own, or control 'anything which may be the subject of property, for
one's own use and enjoyment, either as owner or as the proprietor of a
qualified right in it.' "20 They determined that the right to "acquire,
possess and protect property" necessarily includes the incidents of prop-
erty ownership,21 which, in turn, includes the "'right to transmit'"
property to others.22 The mortmain statute directly restrained that
right.
A second contribution is apparent from the court's reliance upon a
principle of constitutional construction that permits it "to carry out the
19. Id. at 67 (citation omitted). Shriners Hospitals is consistent with Florida's
legal tradition of ascertaining intent of the legislature and constitutional adopters by
resort to a plain meaning of the text. For other recent illustrations, see In re Order on
Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender, 561
So. 2d 1130, 1137 (Fla. 1990); State v. Dodd, 556 So. 2d 1104, 1106 (Fla. 1990).
20. Shriners Hospitals, 563 So. 2d at 67 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1046-47 (5th ed. 1979)).
21. Id.
22. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 997 (5th ed. 1979) (.mphasis omit-
ted)). Article I, section 2 permits the legislature to regulate or prohibit property inheri-
tance and possession by a narrowly limited class-aliens ineligible for citizenship. The
court also reasoned that the framers must have intended that persons outside that class,
including testators, ought to "be free from unreasonable legislative restraint." Id.
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intent of the framers as applied to the context of our times."23 Histori-
cally, courts have distinguished property rights from testamentary
rights. The former were grounded in natural law, and incorporated into
the common law of England. The latter were foreign to the common
law, and were creatures of statute, originally intended to retain for the
monarchs the power of testamentary disposition in their struggle for
power with the organized church.24 The failure of modern-day courts to
question the basis for the distinction only served to blindly perpetuate
it. Finding that those "long-abandoned feudal notions of property"
were now "inapplicable" in Florida, the majority reasoned that the
adopters necessarily had rejected blind adherence to the old English
distinction, and in its place elevated testamentary disposition to consti-
tutional stature as an article I, section 2 property right.25
However, property rights are not absolute, and may yield to valid
exercises of the state's police power. But here, the statutory limit on
charitable devises was not "reasonably necessary" to accomplish the
state's aim of protecting a decedent's spouse or lineal descendants from
disinheritance. That protection formerly was said to avert undue influ-
ence by charitable organizations, or the peculiar susceptibility to influ-
ence by testators facing impending death.26 Fatally, the mortmain stat-
ute enabled a lineal descendent having no contact with a testator to
realize a windfall if a charitable devise were avoided, and enabled art-
ful will drafters to deprive a spouse or lineal descendent of standing to
contest the devise altogether.
Three justices would have upheld the mortmain statute because its
23. Id. (emphasis added). More recent case law indicates that a majority of the
court is committed to viewing article I, section 2 property protections in light of pre-
vailing social and economic conditions. See Harris v. Martin Regency, Ltd., 16 Fla. L.
Weekly s98 (Fla. Jan. 17, 1991) (Barkett, J., author. McDonald, and Kogan, JJ., and
Ehrlich, Senior Justice, concurred. Shaw, C.J., Overton, and Grimes, JJ., dissented.).
24. Id. at 67-68 (citations omitted).
25. Id. at 68. For another recent instance of the court's rejecting outmoded us-
age, see Warren v. State, 572 So. 2d 1376 (1991). Warren struck down on grounds of
vaguefiess an anti-prostitution law that proscribed the keeping of a house of 'ill fame.'
The court effectively receded from prior case law upholding the law, writing: "While
the general population might have understood the meaning of 'ill fame' a century ago,
the lack of definition in the statutes, jury instructions, and cases is fatal to its continued
validity. Since the legislature first adopted the "ill-fame" statute, both our society and
our language have changed." Id. at 1377.
26. Shriners Hospitals, 563 So. 2d at 69.
27. Id.
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earlier version survived constitutional scrutiny.2 8 Previously, the court
rejected claims that the predecessor statute denied the testator and leg-
atees the right to receive, enjoy, and dispose of property without due
process, and denied them equal protection by unfairly limiting their
right to acquire and dispose of property. 29 Shriners Hospitals illus-
trates the majority's willingness to favor article I rights over unjustified
state regulation, even though it requires the court to expressly overturn
a line of opposing case law.
One other case, In re Forfeiture of 1976 Kenworth Tractor
Trailer Truck, Altered VIN 243340M,30 has importance for personal
property rights protected under article I, section 2. The justices held
that the owners of a truck were entitled to seek damages for loss of use
under the implied constitutional remedy of inverse condemnation. The
owner's right arose when the state wrongfully seized the truck, and
wrongfully detained it for a period of two years after the trial court
ordered the state to restore the truck to the owner. This case is more
fully discussed below, under article I, section 9.
3. Religious Freedom
There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or
prohibiting or penalizing the free exercise thereof. Religious free-
dom shall not justify practices inconsistent with public morals,
peace or safety. No revenue of the state or any political subdivi-
sion or agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public rreasury
directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious de-
nomination or in aid of any sectarian institution. FLA. CONST. art.
I, § 3.
28. Id. at 71 (Grimes, J., concurring in result); id. (McDonald, J, concurring in
result, dissenting in part. Overton, J., concurring). Justice McDonald added that the
legislature was well within its prerogatives when it sought to protect "the widow and
children from improvident gifts made to their neglect by the testator." Id. at 72 (cita-
tion omitted). "Surely one would have to say that, had the testator, in her last few
days, succumbed to a television evangelist's call to be with the Lord by delivering her
property to his church and thus leave unprotected a physically handicapped child, a
rational basis for the statute would exist." Id.
29. Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615, appeal dismissed, 323 U.S.
666 (1944).
30. 569 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam) (the mandate did not issue until
March 13, 1991, therefore this opinion was prematurely published. Check subsequent
case history for the citation of the official opinion).
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No decisions construed this section during the survey period.
4. Freedom of Speech and Press
Every person may speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No
law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or
of the press. In all criminal prosecutions and civil actions for def-
amation the truth may be given in evidence. If the matter charged
as defamatory is true and was published with good motives, the
party shall be acquitted or exonerated. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
In State v. Dodd,3 1 the court considered whether Florida's Cam-
paign Financing Act3 2 may constitutionally prohibit a candidate for the
1990 Republican nomination for state agriculture commissioner from
accepting or soliciting campaign contributions during a regular or spe-
cial legislative session. Candidate Dodd argued that the act violated his
free speech and associational rights, and a clear majority of the court
agreed.33
The plurality wrote that independent campaign expenditures in
support of a political candidate are said to lie "'at the core of our
electoral process and the First Amendment freedoms,' "s' in particular,
those relating to speech and association. Governmental restrictions of
those freedoms are "particularly grave" 35 when they prevent political
candidates "'from amassing the resources for effective advocacy.' "3
Here, the act effectively cut off all campaign financing during any
meeting of the legislature. That burden is particularly onerous because
Florida law imposes no limit on the number of legislative sessions that
might be convened.
31. 561 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1990) (plurality) (Kogan, J., author. Barkett and
Grimes, JJ., concurred. Overton, J., concurred in a separate opinion. Ehrlich, C.J., con-
curred in result only in an opinion in which McDonald, J., concurred. McDonald, J.,
concurred in result with an opinion. Shaw, J., did not participate.).
32. FLA. STAT. § 106.08(8) (1989).
33. Adding to the three justices who signed onto the lead opinion, Justice Over-
ton wrote separately that he "fully agree[d] with the majority .... " Dodd, 561 So.
2d at 267 (Overton, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 264 (quoting Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct.
1391, 1396 (1990)).
35. Id. at 264.
36. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)).
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Because the act implicated "weighty" free speech and associa-
tional rights protected under the state37 and federal constitutions, with
an intrusion said to be "particularly grave," the act's restrictions must
meet the compelling state interest test.8 The plurality said there is no
doubt that the act promotes a compelling state interest,39 however, the
act failed to advance its goals through the least intrusive means. In-
deed, the act was a "drastic, overbroad curtailment" of speech and as-
sociational rights.40 For instance, the act applied without exception to
all office-seekers, yet, an incumbent cabinet officer, a position sought by
Dodd, only marginally affects the legislative process; and others, such
as judges, have absolutely no role in that process. Moreover, corrupt
campaign practices may occur as easily during the legislative session as
during any other time. 1 The legislature's effort to remove the appear-
ance of corruption from the campaign podium, though laudably moti-
vated, simply went too far.42
In separate opinions, two justices wrote that the statute suffered
from unconstitutional overbreadth,' 3 and another would hold the stat-
ute facially unconstitutional because its sweeping application to all
candidates was not the least restrictive means of achieving the state's
interest.4
37. In addition to the speech protections assured under article I, section 4, the
court relied upon the equally availing associational rights protection under article I,
section 5.
38. Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 264.
39. Id. at 265 (citing Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Politi-
cal Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985)) (acknowledging that the "only legiti-
mate and compelling governmental interests" are the prevention of corruption and the
appearance of corruption) (emphasis omitted). The state argued that Florida politicians
suffered a "crisis of confidence" with the voters, which the act was speclfically targeted
to improve. Id. at 266.
40. Id. at 267.
41. Id. at 265-66.
42. Id. at 267. The plurality elaborated:
[F]ew rights are more basic to the American tradition than the ability of
people to work for political reform through grassroots or personal
campaigning. The raising of money from private sources is a crucial com-
ponent of this right. In its commendable effort to stop the appearance of
corruption caused by well-heeled special interests, the Campaign Financ-
ing Act imposes too heavy a hand on the innocent.
Id.
43. Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 268 (Overton, J., concurring); id. (McDonald, J., con-
curring in result).
44. Id. (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring in result only. McDonald, J., concurring).
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Two other cases were decided on' federal first amendment grounds,
with passing reference to article I, section 4. In one, Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Morejon,45 the court determined that a news journal-
ist enjoyed no qualified privilege under the federal first amendment to
refuse to disclose information learned on a newsgathering mission as an
eyewitness to a police arrest. The defendant issued a subpoena duces
tecum to the reporter to appear for a discovery deposition. Asserting a
reporter's qualified privilege against disclosing information or docu-
ments obtained in connection with newsgathering activities, the re-
porter moved the trial court to quash the subpoena. The trial court
denied the motion and ordered the reporter to appear. That decision
was affirmed by the district court and approved by the Supreme Court
of Florida. 4
Noting that the Florida Legislature had not enacted a "shield"
law or statutory reporter's privilege, the court explained that any re-
porter's privilege must be based upon the first amendment and article I,
section 4.47 Turning to the leading first amendment decision in this
area, Branzburg v. Hayes,"' the court ruled that in Florida "there is no
privilege, qualified, limited, or otherwise, which protects journalists
from testifying as to their eyewitness observations of a relevant event in
45. 561 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1990) (McDonald, J., author. Ehrlich, C.J., Overton,
Shaw, Grimes, and Kogan, JJ., concurring. Barkett, J., concurring specially).
46. The rationale for the qualified journalist privilege under the first amendment
has been broadly expressed as follows: "'The concept of freedom of the press as guar-
anteed by the First Amendment is the keystone of our constitutional democracy and is
broad enough to include virtually all activities for the press to fulfill its First Amend-
ment functions.'" DiResta & Fee, Unanswered Questions Regarding the Journalist's
Privilege in Florida, 64 FLA. BAR J. 26 (1990) (quoting Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F.
Supp. 1299, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 1975)). The district court explained that the underlying
rationale for protecting confidential news sources does not apply to most non-confiden-
tial sources of information. "Unlike confidential news sources which are likely to dry up
if disclosed, non-confidential news sources and like evidence seem, for the most part,
unlikely to disappear if journalists are required to testify concerning the same in a
subsequent court proceeding. . . ." Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Morejon, 529 So.
2d 1204, 1207 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988). Moreover, "the ability of the journalist to
gather and report on the witnessed event is not substantially threatened .... "' Id. at
1208.
47. Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 579 n.1.
48. 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (plurality) (acknowledging that the states were free to
construe their own laws to recognize a reporters' privilege, whether qualified or abso-
lute, the plurality decided that reporters have no qualified privilege under the first
amendment to refuse to respond to subpoenas issued by grand juries, acting in good
faith, in criminal investigations).
1991] 1061
138
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/18
Nova Law Review
a subsequent court proceeding.149 Because the journalist could point to
no privilege, the court found it "unnecessary" to apply a balancing
test.50 Moreover, the court rejected the newspaper's claim ':hat the first
amendment privilege should apply unqualifiedly, and that compelling
testimony might chill the newsgathering process.51 Morejon treats the
eyewitness news journalist like all other citizen eyewitnesses, although
it left unanswered whether the journalist could successfully assert a
privilege against disclosure of eyewitness information if the source of
his or her eyewitness information is confidential.52
In another case, various magazine publishers challenged the con-
stitutionality of a state statute that imposed a sales tax on the retail
sale of magazines, while exempting the retail sale of newspapers.5"
Some publishers in Department of Revenue v. Magazine Publishers of
America, Inc.54 argued that the statute violated the Speech and Press
Clauses of the first amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the
fourteenth amendment, and the state counterparts.
The court did not address the state constitutional claims, and de-
cided the issue entirely on first amendment grounds. The first amend-
ment poses no absolute bar against state regulation of the press. For
instance, the state can legitimately subject the press to "generally ap-
plicable economic regulation[s]." 5 However, a scheme like Florida's
sales tax on magazines singles out an individual press entity, which
poses a danger of abuse by the state, thereby implicating first amend-
ment protections.56
49. Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 580 (emphasis added). Earlier decisions had upheld
the right of a journalist to protect his or her confidential sources of information. Trib-
une Co. v. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1986); Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951
(Fla. 1976).
50. On that point, there is dispute among the justices. See Morijon, 561 So. 2d
at 582 (Barkett, J., concurring specially) (arguing that decisions of the United States
Supreme Court and Supreme Court of Florida consistently apply a balancing test
when, as here, first amendment interests are implicated).
51. Id. at 580. The justices aligned Florida with other state courts that declined
to adopt an absolute journalist privilege. Id. at 581 (citations omitted).
52. See DiResta & Fee, supra note 46, at 32.
53. FLA. STAT. § 212.05(1)(i) (Supp. 1988) (imposing tax of six percent on retail
magazine sales); FLA. STAT. § 212.08(7)(w) (Supp. 1988) (exempting newspapers).
54. 565 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1990) (unanimous) (Ehrlich, C.J., author. Overton,
Shaw, Barkett, Grimes, and Kogan, JJ., concurring), petition for cert. filed, No 90-904
(U.S. Dec. 10, 1990).
55. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987).
56. Magazine Publishers, 565 So. 2d at 1305-06 (citing Arkansas Writers' Pro-
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To justify a differential tax that implicates the first amendment,
the state must satisfy the strict scrutiny standard. Here, the tax assert-
edly advanced the public interest of promoting those publishers en-
gaged in the dissemination of news while it was still new.57 Concluding
that the state's interest clearly was not compelling (and likely not even
rational), the court determined that the state failed to meet its burden,
and consequently the statutory scheme could not stand.58 Having so
concluded, the court struck the exemption granted to newspapers and
allowed the statute to otherwise survive.5 9
Typical of the court's speech and press decisions Dodd, Morejon,
and Magazine Publishers are firmly rooted in federal first amendment
precedent. The occasional, if only passing, references to article I, sec-
tion 4 suggest that the court is disinclined to craft a decision indepen-
dent of federal case law based on the facts at issue in those cases or the
arguments of counsel. Even passing references to the state constitution
indicate, however, that litigants and jurists view the cases as represent-
ing equally important, but not necessarily identical, state constitutional
markers.
5. Right to Assemble
The people shall have the right peaceably to assemble, to instruct
their representatives, and to petition for redress of grievances. FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 5.
State v. Dodd60 was the only case to cite article I, section 5. Dodd
was presented in the preceding section, and demonstrates a factual con-
text where the freedom of speech and the freedom to associate are co-
extensive protections.
6. Right to Work
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on
account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or
ject, 481 U.S. at 227).
57. Id. at 1308.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1310-11.
60. 561 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1990).
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labor organization. The right of employees, by and through a la-
bor organization, to bargain collectively shall not be denied or
abridged. Public employees shall not have the right to strike. FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 6.
No decisions construed this section during the survey period.
7. Military Power
The military power shall be subordinate to the civil. FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 7.
No decisions construed this section during the survey period.
8. Right to Bear Arms
The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of them-
selves and of the lawful authority of the state shall not be in-
fringed, except that the manner of bearing arms may be regulated
by law. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
No decisions construed this section during the survey period. Of
note, the legislature proposed an amendment to article I, section 8, that
imposed a three-day waiting period between the purchase and delivery
of any handgun. 61 The voters adopted the legislative proposal during
the general election of November, 1990.
61. The amendment added three subsections to the existing section:
(b) There shall be a mandatory period of three days, excluding weekends
and legal holidays, between the purchase and delivery at retail of any
handgun. For the purposes of this section, "purchase" means the transfer
of money or other valuable consideration to the retailer, and "handgun"
means a firearm capable of being carried and used by one hand, such as a
pistol or revolver. Holders of a concealed weapon permit as prescribed in
Florida law shall not be subject to the provisions of this paragraph.
(c) The legislature shall enact legislation implementing subsection (b) of
this section, effective no later than December 31, 1991, which shall provide
that anyone violating the provisions of subsection (b) shall be guilty of a
felony.
(d) This restriction shall not apply to a trade-in of another handgun.
FLA. S.J.R. 43 (1990).
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9. Due Process
Florida's due process section combines three discrete categories of
rights. The first category creates interests commonly understood to en-
joy due process protections-the guarantees of life, liberty, and prop-
erty. The due process section also lumps together two other categories
that generally are regarded as protections independent of due pro-
cess-the protection against double jeopardy, and the protection
against self-incrimination.
a. Life, Liberty, or Property
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law. . . . FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
The article I, section 9 cases decided in 1990 addressed the safe-
guards afforded to persons whose liberty or property rights the state
impinged, either by legislation or by action of its agents. Typically,
challenges to state action arise in a variety of contexts, and the year's
cases proved to be no exception. The court reviewed, on state due pro-
cess grounds, state procedures that involved enforcement of child sup-
port judgments, administrative permitting procedures, use of eviden-
tiary devices to facilitate the trial of defendants in criminal cases, and
procedures of particular importance in the prosecution of and sentenc-
ing for capital crimes. Finally, the court considered a constitutional
claim for damages by owners whose property the state wrongfully
seized and confiscated. Those cases are treated in turn.
To sharpen the teeth of the state's child support enforcement laws,
the Florida legislature declared in section 61.14(5)(a) and (b) that an
unpaid support payment that became final after July 1, 1987, automat-
ically became a final judgment by operation of law once the clerk of
the circuit court notified the obligor.62 Two district court panels inter-
preted the statute as directing the clerk to enter judgment without
hearing, without an opportunity for the obligor to present defenses, and
without opportunity for the trial court to alter unpaid installments
when warranted. Each panel struck the statute as a violation of various
provisions of the state constitution. 63 Those decisions were consolidated
62. FLA. STAT. § 61.14(5)(a), (b) (1987).
63. State ex rel. Pittman v. Stanjeski, 541 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1989); and Attorney General v. D'Agosto, 541 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1991] 1065
142
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/18
Nova Law Review
for review, and quashed in State ex rel. Pittman v. Stanjeski.64
The court couched the "critical question" as whether the law re-
quires the clerk of court to enter judgment without opportunity for the
obligor to present a defense before a judge.6 5 To answer that question,
the court relied upon guiding principles of statutory construction that
required it "'if reasonably possible . . to adopt a reasonable interpre-
tation ... '66 and to "'avoid declaring a statute unconstitutional if
such statute can be fairly construed in a constitutional manner.' "67
The court avoided declaring section 61.14(5)(a) and (b) unconsti-
tutional by reading into it a requirement that the obligor was entitled
to an opportunity to be heard. State and federal due process required
that the section "should be interpreted" to allow a hearing before entry
of a final judgment, provided the obligor timely responds to the clerk's
notice. That notice should advise the obligor to respond by a date cer-
tain, failing which a default judgment will be entered. The hearing
should be held by a judicial officer, before whom the obligor may pre-
sent equitable defenses. 8 Several reasons support the judicial gloss:
Child support enforcement is a major governmental concern which the
statute advances; all branches of government have a shared interest in
the maintenance and support of children; federal legislation requires
states to follow certain procedures toward this end; and Florida has
long supported effective child support collection procedure. 69
In another setting, a unanimous court in Ridgewood Properties,
Inc. v. Department of Community Affairs"0 held that the Secretary of
the Department of Community Affairs may not testify at an adminis-
trative hearing as the sole witness to establish a material fact, and then
pass upon his own evidence by reviewing the hearing officer's proposed
findings and legal conclusions. Here, the Department notified Ridge-
1989). In particular, the district courts determined that section 61.14(5) violated arti-
cle I, sections 9 (due process) and 21 (access to courts), and article II, section 3 (sepa-
ration of powers) of the state constitution.
64. 562 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1990) (Overton, J., author. Ehrlich, C.J., McDonald,
Shaw, Barkett, and Grimes, JJ., concurring. Kogan, J., concurred in result only.).
65. Id. at 674.
66. Id. at 677 (quoting Sandlin v. Criminal Justice Standards and Training
Comm'n, 531 So. 2d 1344, 1346 (Fla. 1988)).
67. Id. (citation omitted).
68. Id. at 678-79.
69. Stanjeski, 562 So. 2d at 677-78.
70. 562 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1990) (Grimes, J., author. Ehrlich, C.J.. Overton, Mc-
Donald, Shaw, Barkett, and Kogan, JJ., concurring.).
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wood that it was required to obtain approval for its office park develop-
ment as a development of regional impact. Ridgewood contested that
decision in an administrative hearing, at which the secretary testified as
an expert that Ridgewood held no vested development rights under the
Department's policy that would exempt it from compliance. The hear-
ing officer so found, and the Department, over the secretary's signature,
issued a final order against Ridgewood. The justices held, however, that
the secretary violated Ridgewood's state and federal due process rights
by acting as prosecutor at an administrative hearing, testifying as the
Department's sole witness, and "[m]ost significantly" by passing on his
own evidence. 1 The opinion does not distinguish the state and federal
rights.
In criminal prosecutions, due process requires the state to prove
every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. It is axiomatic
that this burden remains with the state, and may not be shifted onto
the defendant. State v. Cohen 2 considered the limits of burden shifting
in the context of a purported affirmative defense created in the witness
tampering statute. The statute included a subsection that provided:
"[I]t is an affirmative defense. . . that the conduct consisted solely of
lawful conduct and that the defendant's sole intention was to en-
courage, induce, or cause the other person to testify truthfully."73
The justices saw through the transparency of the statutory lan-
guage. An affirmative defense "is any defense that assumes the com-
plaint or charges to be correct but raises other facts that, if true, would
establish a valid excuse or justification or a right to engage in the con-
duct in question. ' 74 In effect, an affirmative defense concedes the of-
fense. This section, though labeled an affirmative defense, actually re-
quired the defendant to negate an element of the offense with proof
that his or her conduct was lawful. Relying exclusively on article I,
section 9, the court held that the legislature improperly shifted the bur-
den of proving an element of the crime from the state to the
defendant.7 5
71. Id. at 323-24.
72. 568 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1990) (Kogan, J., author; Shaw, C.J., Ehrlich, Barkett,
and Grimes, JJ., concurring; Overton, J., dissented in an opinion joined by McDonald,
J., who also dissented with an opinion).
73. FLA. STAT. § 914.22(3) (1985).
74. Cohen, 568 So. 2d at 51.
75. Id. at 52. The court also concluded that section 914.22(3) was illusory be-
cause it shifted to the defendant a burden of proof that is impossible to meet. FLA.
STAT. § 914.22(3) (1985). That section requires the defendant to prove that "the con-
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On vagueness grounds, Cohen struck down another subsection of
the witness tampering statute, which proscribed conduct intended to
"influence" a person's testimony in an official proceeding. 73 Because it
was unclear whether the legislature intended to proscribe conduct
designed to induce either false testimony, truthful testimony, or both,
the section suffered from vagueness, and facially violated article I, sec-
tion 9.7
Cohen departed from federal precedent by construing the state due
process clause to provide a degree of protection greater than that af-
forded under the federal Due Process Clause. One federal district court
upheld the federal analogue against constitutional attack, reasoning
that the elements of the affirmative defense allow a defendant to avoid
criminal liability upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and
do not relieve the government of its burden of proving the elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 7
8
Due process protections are also at work in criminal prosecutions
when the state relies at trial upon evidentiary devices, such as presump-
tions and inferences. Construing the federal Due Process Clause, State
v. Rolle7 9 upheld Florida's drunk driving law,80 which permitted the
state to proceed upon the alternative theories of impairment, or unlaw-
ful blood alcohol level. The court said that the law did not impermissi-
bly relieve the state of proving every element of the crime. The court
also sustained the use of the related jury instruction which provided
that evidence of unlawful blood alcohol level "'would be sufficient by
duct consisted solely of lawful conduct." Cohen, 568 So. 2d at 52. Yet, section
914.22(1)(a) proscribes conduct intended "to influence the testimony of any person in
an official proceeding." Id. It is impossible to prove the lawfulness of conduct, on the
one hand, which the legislature declared unlawful, on the other.
76. FLA. STAT. § 914.22(1)(a) (1985).
77. Cohen, 568 So. 2d at 52-53. Two justices would have avoided declaring the
statute unconstitutional. Both agreed that a "reasonable and proper" interpretation was
that the legislature intended to criminalize conduct that intended to induce untruthful,
not truthful, testimony. Id. at 53 (Overton, J., dissenting. McDonald, J., concurring.).
Justice McDonald strictly interpreted the statute as intending to protect witnesses, vic-
tims, and informants from tampering, for whatever reason. Id. (McDonald, J.,
dissenting).
78. Id. at 53-54 (McDonald, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Kalevas, 622
F. Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
79. 560 So. 2d 1154 (Fla.) (Ehrlich, C.J., author. Overton, McDonald, Shaw,
and Grimes, JJ., concurring. Barkett, J., concurred specially with an opinion in which
Kogan, J., concurred.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 181 (1990).
80. FLA. STAT. § 316.193(1) (1985).
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itself" to establish impairment.81
The statute underlying the jury instruction provides that proof of
unlawful blood alcohol "shall be prima facie evidence" of impair-
ment.8" The court let the statute stand because the phrase was com-
monly understood to create an inference that the jury was free to ac-
cept or reject, and thus, the jury was not bound unconstitutionally to
find impairment from evidence of unlawful blood alcohol. Moreover,
the court said, the legislature would have used the term "presumption,"
had it intended to create a presumption.83 Justice Barkett's special con-
currence made an important clarification of Rolle by noting that the
effect of an evidentiary device, not its label, determines its validity
under state and federal due process standards.84
Death-sentenced prisoners frequently assert due process protec-
tions on appeal. The court reached the merits in four such cases, and
unanimously resolved the due process issues. In the first, Randolph v.
State,85 the trial court excused for cause a prospective juror who
"guessed" that she could vote to impose the death penalty in an appro-
priate case. Randolph argued that the state and federal due process
clauses prohibited the court from excusing a juror " 'simply because
[she] voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed con-
scientious or religious scruples against its infliction.' ",, After evaluat-
ing the voir dire colloquy, the court was unable to hold that the trial
81. Rolle, 560 So. 2d 1155 (emphasis in original) (quoting the jury instruction).
82. FLA. STAT. § 316.1934(2)(c) (1985).
83. Rolle, 560 So. 2d at 1157; see also Frazier v. State, 559 So. 2d 1121 (Fla.
1990) (applying Rolle).
84. Id. at 1161. (Barkett, J., specially concurring, Kogan, J., concurring). The
special concurrence suggests that several of the court's previous decisions improperly
concluded that the phrase "prima facie evidence" meant inference, rather than pre-
sumption. The opinion is significant for its principled analysis of the operation of infer-
ences and presumptions, and pointedly demonstrates that the profusion of terms led to
a confusing body of law.
Six months later, the court revisited section 316.1934(2)(c) in Wilhelm v. State,
568 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1990), and held that a jury instruction virtually identical to that
section violated federal due process by relieving the state of its burden of proof. Five of
the seven justices agreed that "' [p] rima facie' is a technical term without common
meaning for the lay person. Confronted with such a term in the jury instructions, and
provided with no definition, a reasonable juror would be forced to guess at its meaning
." Id. at 3. Rolle and Wilhelm are easily reconciled by noting that the instruction
in Rolle contained no undefined terms, and avoided using "prima facie evidence." Con-
sequently, Rolle never measured the term against due process standards.
85. 562 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1990) (unanimous) (Barkett, J., author).
86. Id. at 334 (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 (1986)).
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court abused its discretion. Citing federal precedent to resolve the
claim, the justices explained: "The trial court had the opportunity to
evaluate the demeanor of the prospective juror, and given [the juror's]
equivocal answers, we cannot say that the record evinces [her] clear
ability to set aside her own beliefs 'in deference to the rule of law.' ,,7
In the second case, Scull v. State,88 the trial court held a resen-
tencing hearing on December 28, 1988, only three weeks after the state
supreme court denied rehearing, but before the trial court received the
mandate. Defense counsel returned from Christmas vacation on De-
cember 27, learned of the impending hearing, and asked the prosecutor
to explain the sudden and hurried case activity. He responded that the
trial judge was expected to soon leave his position and did not want to
"dump" the case on his successor.89 Realizing that he had no authority
to conduct that hearing before receipt of the mandate, the trial judge
held a second resentencing hearing on December 30, after receiving the
mandate. On appeal of the judgment reimposing the death sentence,
Scull claimed that the trial court's haste to resentence him violated his
due process rights.90 The justices unanimously agreed.
Article I, section 9, the court wrote, requires that "all proceedings
affecting life, liberty, or property must be conducted according to due
process.""1 In one sense, the term is incapable of precise definition, and
"embodies a fundamental conception of fairness that derives ultimately
from the natural rights of all individuals." 9 In another sense, the term
subsumes certain well-defined rights, among which are fair notice and
reasonable opportunity to be heard. 3 The trial court's haste to conduct
Scull's resentencing proceeding violated those basic rights, in part, be-
cause "[h]aste has no place in a proceeding in which a person may be
sentenced to death." '94 Perhaps equally important to the decision, the
justices agreed that the "appearance of irregularity so permeates these
87. Id. at 337 (quoting Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402. 416 (1987)).
88. 569 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 1990) (unanimous) (Kogan, J., author).
89. Id. at 1252.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. (citation omitted); compare Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247, 1250 (Fla.
1990) (citing principle, and holding that trial court abused its discretion by striking
motion for post-conviction relief filed by death-sentenced defendant, without first ruling
on contemporaneously-filed motion to admit foreign attorney pro hac vice).
93. Scull, 569 So. 2d at 1252.
94. Id.
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proceedings as to justify suspicion of unfairness." 9 The court vacated
the sentence of death, and remanded for another sentencing hearing.
In the third capital appeal, Nowitzke v. State,96 the court agreed
with the defendant who charged that the trial court erred in refusing to
order a competency hearing immediately before trial. On the Friday
before the scheduled trial date, the prosecution offered a plea that in-
cluded concurrent life sentences on two murder counts. Defense counsel
conveyed the offer to Nowitzke, who rejected it, stating that he could
not be executed. He explained that he would be "spiritually released on
July 4, 1989 . . .because it was Independence Day and because of the
number of letters in his three names." 97
Defense counsel moved for a competency hearing. The trial court
summarily denied counsel's request because Nowitzke had been pro-
nounced competent to stand trial on his return from a state mental
health facility three months earlier. A unanimous court reversed the
convictions and remanded for another trial. Due process prohibits the
prosecution of a person while he or she is incompetent.98 Even though
competency has once been established, the trial court has a continuing
obligation to order a competency examination, and conduct a hearing
when it "'has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is not
mentally competent to proceed.' "9 Here, the importance of a second
competency hearing was indicated by Nowitzke's irrational reasons for
rejecting the state's plea offer, which in turn cast doubt upon his ability
to assist in his defense or understand the proceedings against him.100
White v. Dugger,11 the fourth capital appeal, rejected as meritless
the defendant's claim that a grand jury allegedly consisting of more
than the statutory limit of eighteen violated state and federal due
process.
In the remaining due process case, the owners of a truck that the
state wrongfully confiscated sued to recover damages. In re Forfeiture
of 1976 Kenworth Tractor Trailer Truck, Altered VIN 243340M'0 2
posed the following certified question: "Does a trial court have jurisdic-
tion to order a payment of damages based on the failure of the state
95. Id.
96. 572 So. 2d 1346 (1990) (per curiam) (unanimous).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (quoting FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210).
100. Id. at 646. Nowitzke also appears below, in article I, section 16.
101. 565 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam) (unanimous on this issue).
102. 569 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 19 0) (per curiam).
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over a two-year period to honor that court's order returning confiscated
property to its owner[?]"'' 3 Unanimous on the point, the: justices an-
swered the question affirmatively. The facts showed thai the Florida
Highway Patrol (FHP) seized a truck in 1983, and prevailed in a later
forfeiture proceeding. The owners appealed that decision. During the
pendency of the appeal, the FHP transferred the truck and title to the
state Department of Transportation, which incurred costs for storage
and improvements.
The owners succeeded in overturning the forfeiture,' after which
the trial court entered an order on July 22, 1986, directing the state to
return the truck to them. One year later, the trial court entered an
amended order, granting the FHP's motion to add the Department as a
necessary party. Thereafter, the owners filed a motion to determine
damages, in which they sought to recover the value of the truck at the
time of seizure, depreciation, loss of use during the period of confisca-
tion, prejudgment interest, and attorney's fees. 10 5 On April 11, 1988,
the trial court ordered the Department to return the truck within ten
days. It entered a final order on May 12, 1988, which denied the dam-
ages claim, and again directed the Department to return he truck, al-
though that was not accomplished until July, 1988, two years after the
court entered its initial order. 06
The trial court denied the owners' claim for damages, apparently
concluding that their recourse was through an action separate from the
claim to recover possession of the truck.10 7 The district court reversed
that decision, stating that the owners were entitled to include a dam-
ages claim in the supplemental proceedings incident to their claim for
return of property. "It defies common sense," the panel explained, "to
require [the owner] to initiate independent legal proceedings involving
the same identical parties in order to secure relief that is predicated
upon the failure to comply with the trial court's order directing return
of the property."'' 08
103. Id. at 1275.
104. Hales v. State ex rel. Florida Highway Patrol, 487 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
105. Motion To Determine Damages at 2, In re Forfeiture, 569 So. 2d at 1274.
106. In re Forfeiture, 569 So. 2d at 1275-76.
107. That course would have been fatal to the owners' cause because the second
suit extended beyond the time permitted by the applicable statute of limitations. An-
swer Brief of Respondents at 3, In re Forfeiture, 569 So. 2d at 1274
108. In re Forfeiture of 1976 Kenworth Tractor Trailer Truck Altered VIN
243340M, 546 So. 2d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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The justices declined to affirm the opinion of the district court, but
approved the result. Turning to the jurisdictional issue, they creatively
interpreted the rules governing civil pleading practice, so that the own-
ers' motion to determine damages could be treated as a counterclaim
by supplemental pleading. In that way, the trial court was empowered
to exercise its jurisdiction to entertain the claim for damages in the
original suit, although it arose after service of pleadings.1 9
Next, the justices rejected the state's argument that damages
claim sounded exclusively in tort, which would have required dismissal
because the doctrine of sovereign immunity shielded the state from tort
liability. Instead, they characterized the suit as "nbthing less than a
[constitutional] claim of inverse condemnation," 110 against which the
statutory doctrine of sovereign immunity posed no bar."' Expressing
uncustomary conviction, the justices wrote that "the Florida Constitu-
tion dictates that a remedy of this type must exist under the facts of
the present case.""' 2 Those circumstances showed unmistakably that
the state deprived the owners of the use of their truck for two years, in
"outright refusal" to return it after the trial court ordered the state to
do so."'3
On remand, the truck owners were entitled to seek damages for
inverse condemnation under article X, section 6(a) of the Florida Con-
109. In re Forfeiture, 569 So. 2d at 1277 (citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(e)).
110. Id. (citation omitted).
111. See, e.g., State Road Dep't v. Tharp, 1 So. 2d 868, 869 (Fla. 1941)
("neither will it be permitted as a plea to defeat the recovery of land or other property
wrongfully taken by the State through its officers and held in the name of the State");
Schick v. Florida Dep't of Agriculture, 504 So. 2d 1318, 1322 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1987).
112. In re Forfeiture, 569 So. 2d at 1277 (emphasis added). Why the constitu-
tion "dictates" such a remedy is not explained in the court's opinion. Probably, the
answer lies in the notion that the constitutional remedy of inverse condemnation is self-
executing in character, see Department of Agriculture & Consumer Servs. v. Mid-
Florida Growers, Inc., 521 So. 2d 101, 103 n.2 (Fla. 1988); United States v. Clarke,
445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (citation omitted) (construing fifth amendment counterpart),
and that an owner of private property appropriated for public use may compel compen-
sation via that remedy. Village of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 663, 669
(Fla.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 965 (1979).
113. In re Forfeiture, 569 So. 2d at 1276. The tone of the majority opinion sug-
gests that a court might wield the constitutional remedy of inverse condemnation as if
it were a sanction against a contemnor. With great charity to the state, however, Jus-
tice McDonald explained that the delay in restoring the truck to the owners was the
result of the Department's efforts to protect its expenditures repairing and improving
the vehicle. Id. at 1277 (McDonald, J., concurring. Overton, J., concurring).
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stitution ("takings" clause).11" Those damages include loss of use be-
tween the date of the initial order directing the return of the truck, and
the date when the Department returned the truck. Also, they were enti-
tled to prejudgment interest on that amount, and attorney's fees. 11 5
In re Forfeiture effectively illustrates the interrelationship of sev-
eral state constitutional sections that bond together to protect personal
property rights-article I, section 2 (inalienable rights clause), article
I, section 9 (due process clause), and article X, section 6(a). However,
several aspects of the opinion counsel that its holding will be limited to
the facts. First, the court on its own resorted to inverse condemnation
as a means for affording the owners relief. Indeed, the two district
court opinions that decided this case, and the record itself, are void of
discussion about or pleading asserting a constitutional remedy." 6 The
sole record reference that would give rise even to the barest allegation
of constitutional infringement cannot be said to contemplate an action
in inverse condemnation." 1 The decision is explained by the court's
search for a fair result, no doubt at least partially motivated by its
disdain for the state's contemptuous disregard of the trial court's order
directing the state to restore the forfeited truck to the owners. For that
reason alone, the circumstances should be viewed as "unique,""" and
unlikely to recur.
Second, the majority attempted to distinguish Wheeler v.
Corbin,"9 a case where the state deprived Gailyn Wheeler of the use of
her car for 524 days after a wrongful forfeiture. The majority reasoned
that the police had probable cause, and thus lawfully seized Wheeler's
114. The section provides: "No private property shall be taken except for a pub-
lic purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or secured by de-
posit in the registry of the court and available to the owner." FLA. CoNsr. art. X, §
6(a).
115. Id. at 1277 (McDonald, J., concurring).
116. The theory advanced by the owner was premised on inherent power, and not
on inverse condemnation: "[A] court has the power to enforce its orders and judg-
ments, including ordering the payment of incidental damages for the violation and long
delay in complying with an order to return confiscated property." Answer Brief of Re-
spondents at 4, In re Forfeiture, 569 So. 2d at 1274.
117. The owners charged that the Florida Highway Patrol violated a valid court
order without lawful cause, and that its actions offended "'due process' and the orderly
process of the court." Answer Brief of Respondents at 6, In re Forfeiture, 569 So. 2d at
1274.
118. In re Forfeiture, 569 So. 2d at 1277 (McDonald, J., concurring).
119. 546 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1989).
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car, whereas the seizure of the truck here was unlawful.
2 0
In re Forfeiture offers precedential value for private property
rights that extends beyond the four corners of the majority opinion.
The opinion plainly holds that the owner of private property may look
to the remedy of inverse condemnation to vindicate temporary, rather
than permanent, interferences by the state with the use of his or her
property. Another of the court's recent opinions impliedly reached that
result,'12' and the two decisions effectively overturned Florida's histori-
cal position that denied damage claims for mere temporary "tak-
ings.' 22 The decisions have the salutary effect of firmly aligning Flor-
120. The majority explained that Wheeler did not claim that the state failed to
honor a court order directing the return of the confiscated car, "nor did Wheeler seek
damages for any period of time after such an order was entered." In re Forfeiture, 569
So. 2d at 1276 (emphasis in original). But those reasons make Wheeler's cause no less
compensable than the owners' claim in the instant case. In each case, there was no
doubt that the property belonged to the challenging party. More to the point, the cases
are easily distinguished by looking to the validity of the state's conduct in the first
instance. The majority added that Wheeler does not control because it dealt with an
impoundment based on probable cause, whereas the instant case relates to "an outright
refusal of the state to return seized property to its lawful owner after ordered to do so
by a court of competent jurisdiction." Id.
121. Joint Ventures, Inc., v. Department of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990)
(striking state statute under state and federal "takings" clauses because it allows the
Department, without compensation, to impose a development moratorium up to ten
years on vacant land located within area reserved for highway expansion). Compare
Wheeler v. Corbin, 546 So. 2d 723, 724 n.2 (Fla. 1989) (declining to reach constitu-
tional "taking" claim because it was not pled, and denying tort-based claim for loss of
use of car during 524 days of impoundment).
122. See, e.g., Morton v. Gardner, 513 So. 2d 725, 729 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1987) (rejecting claim for damages for loss of use by owner of commercial lobster
fishing boat that the trial court ordered returned after 124-day period of confiscation,
because "[iun Florida, an action for inverse condemnation does not arise from a tempo-
rary 'taking' ") (emphasis in original; citation omitted); Hillsborough County v. Gu-
tierrez, 433 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (flooding of plaintiffs' property
occasioned by ineffective County-enforced plan for disposal of surface drainage water
resulted in only temporary ouster); State, Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v.
Scott, 418 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (four month holdover by depart-
ment beyond expiration of lease term did not permanently deprive landowner of use
and enjoyment of his property); State Dep't of Transp. v. Donahoo, 412 So. 2d 400
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (certain acts by the Department in connection with
interstate road construction, including the mistaken placement of boundary markers,
stacking of equipment, piling of dirt, and placement of drain curb in alleyway running
alongside plaintiff's hotel, did not amount to a permanent invasion that would sustain a
"taking" claim); Dudley v. Orange County, 137 So. 2d 859, 863 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1962) (the record failed to show that the county's dam caused "continuous flood-
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ida with federal precedent. 12 3
In conclusion, the court contributed significantly in 1990 to the
development of a body of state constitutional law independent of fed-
eral standards. Cohen" struck down the witness tampering law be-
cause it impermissibly shifted the burden of proving the elements of the
crime from the state to the defendant in violation of state due process,
although a federal court had previously upheld the federal analogue.
Two other cases relied exclusively on article I, section 9. Scull'2 5 va-
cated a death sentence and remanded for another sentencing hearing
because the trial court's hastily conducted sentencing hearing created
an impermissible appearance of irregularity and suspicion of unfair-
ness. In re Forfeiture2 ' held that state due process dictated that prop-
erty owners were entitled to damages for inverse condemnation after
the state wrongfully confiscated and withheld their property. The re-
maining cases resolved claims on both state and federal due process
grounds, but drew no distinction between the nature of those indepen-
dent sources.
b. Double Jeopardy
No person shall. . . be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense
... .FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
Most successive prosect-tion or punishment claims are waged ge-
nerically as double jeopardy claims, and do not expressly rely on article
I, section 9. Of the numerous double jeopardy claims raised in 1990,
only two expressly addressed the state constitution. In one, Fridovich v.
ing [of plaintiff's lands] for a long period of time"); Poe v. State Road Dep't, 127 So.
2d 898, 901 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (diversion of surface water from its natural
drainage onto plaintiff's property as the result of state highway reconstruction, held to
be only a consequential damage where the drainage results in "recurrent but temporary
flooding").
123. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los An-
geles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987) ("'temporary' takings which, as here, deny a land-
owner all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for
which the Constitution clearly requires compensation"); United States v. Westinghouse
Electric & Mfg. Co., 39 U.S. 261, 263-65 (1950); United States v. Petty Motor Co.,
327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
124. 568 So. 2d at 52.
125. 569 So. 2d at 1252.
126. 569 So. 2d at 1274.
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State,127 the state prosecuted Fridovich for first-degree murder and
sought to retry him after the district court overturned the conviction
for manslaughter. In a second trial, the state proceeded upon a "Refile
Information for Manslaughter," and obtained a conviction for
manslaughter.'
There was no doubt that state and federal double jeopardy clauses
limit the state on retrial to prosecuting Fridovich for the lesser included
offense of manslaughter. Fridovich argued, however, that the state had
abandoned its prosecution because the refiled information bore a differ-
ent case number than the one appearing on the original indictment.
The court rejected his claim, noting that the new case number was the
product of a clerical error, and that Fridovich was not prejudiced by a
reprosecution of the identical offense for which he was convicted in the
first trial.129
In the other case, State v. Glenn, 30 the defendant sought post-
conviction relief following multiple convictions and sentences for traf-
ficking in, and delivery of cocaine and heroin, all arising out of a single
episode. He charged that Carawan v. State'31 prohibited the state from
obtaining convictions on each offense under the state and federal
double jeopardy clauses. That claim required the court to revisit
Carawan to determine whether Glenn, who was convicted and sen-
tenced at the time when Carawan became final, but who had not then
challenged his conviction and sentence collaterally, could rely upon the
decision as precedent.
Applying the rule of lenity in section 775.021(1), Carawan deter-
mined that the state could not sentence a defendant for both man-
slaughter and aggravated battery when it failed to adequately prove
that those crimes arose from more than a single shotgun blast.132 The
127. 562 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1990) (unanimous) (Overton, J., author).
128. Id. at 329.
129. Id. at 330.
130. 558 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (McDonald, J., author. Ehrlich, C.J., Overton,
Shaw, Grimes, and Kogan, JJ., concurring. Barkett, J., concurred in result only.).
131. 515 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1987).
132. Carawan was actually a statutory construction case, and never reached the
constitutional concerns of the state double jeopardy clause. However, because the rule
of lenity incorporated into that statute lies at the very heart of double jeopardy guaran-
tees, Carawan and those cases adhering to it are reported here. See State v. Smith, 547
So. 2d 613, 621 (Fla. 1989) (Barkett, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part. Kogan,
J., concurring).
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legislature subsequently amended that statute effective July 1, 1988,133
providing, in part, that offenses were to be viewed as separate if each
required proof of an element not required by the other. In so doing, the
legislature overruled the court's decision prospectively.'3  Carawan,
however, has precedential value for pipeline cases, that is, cases with
direct appeals pending at the time the decision became final.' 3" Glenn
asked whether Carawan was similarly available to persons whose direct
appeals were final, but who had not yet resolved their collateral
appeals.
The court held that Glenn was not entitled to rely upon
Carawan.36 It reasoned that Carawan was no revolutionary change in
the law, but an evolutionary refinement that merely clarified past deci-
sions.1' 7 The policy interest of decisional finality, coupled with the ab-
sence of any manifest injustice brought about by the court's refusal to
revisit his case (post-Carawan laws would permit the state to convict
Glenn separately for his crimes), argued against applying Carawan ret-
roactively to collateral appeals. 38
133. Ch. 88-131, § 7, 1988 Fla. Laws 699, 709 (codified at Fla. Stat. §
775.021(4) (Supp. 1988)).
134. State v. Smith, 547 So. 2d 613, 617 (Fla. 1989) (acknowledging that the
legislative amendment effectively overruled Carawan).
135. Rehearing was denied in Carawan on December 10, 1987. Carawan's pipe-
line cases decided this year include: State v. Reddick, 568 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1990)
(separate convictions for homicide and shooting into an occupied dwelling have no com-
mon elements, address separate evils, and therefore may properly be imposed);
Porterfield v. State, 567 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1990) (remanding for resentencing where
defendants were convicted and sentenced for sale or delivery of controlled substance
and for possession of that substance); State v. McCray, 561 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1990)
(sale and delivery of a drug in a container are two crimes that address the same evil
where the drug paraphernalia is used to facilitate the sale or delivery, and may not give
rise to separate convictions or sentences); Skeens v. State, 556 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1990)
(unanimous) (carrying a concealed firearm and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon are separate offenses and may arise out of a single act); Jones v. State, 569 So. 2d
1234 (Fla. 1990) (finding that Carawan imposed no impediment to sentencing defend-
ant for two murders and for shooting into a vehicle occupied by the victims, when
evidence showed that defendant fired three shots).
136. 558 So. 2d at 8.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 7-8. Numerous cases followed Glenn this year. See Love v. State, 559
So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1990); State v. Finney, 558 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1990); State, v. Jensen,
557 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 1990); State v. Spadaro, 556 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1990); State v.
Etlinger, 556 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 1990); State v. Pastor, 556 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1990);
State v. Merckle, 556 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1990).
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c. Self-Incrimination
No person shall ... be compelled to be a witness against himself.
FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 9.
Only Holton v. State"9 addressed this section during the survey
period. Holton appealed a sentence of death imposed after his convic-
tion of first-degree murder. He argued that the trial court failed to
consider the statutory mitigating circumstance of impaired capacity,
which assertedly applied due to his longstanding drug addiction. The
court disagreed and ruled that the trial court considered the matter, as
evidenced in part by the sentencing order: "The defendant testified that
he was addicted to drugs but still maintained his innocence of these
offenses. This [circumstance] would not apply in view of that sworn
testimony.' 40
The importance of the opinion for article I, section 9 lies with the
court's recognition that a protestation of innocence, which due process
generally prohibits the trial court from using against a defendant in
either guilt phase or penalty phase of a capital trial, may be considered
by the sentencer if it is relevant to mitigation.' 4'
10. Prohibited Laws
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts shall be passed. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
The court struck down two legislative enactments as violations of
article I, section 10. One prohibited awarding attorney's fees under cer-
tain circumstances, and the other prohibited escalation clauses in recre-
ational leases. The first, Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v.
Scherer,'41 involved a medical malpractice action brought by Clara
Scherer for injuries that occurred in June, 1979. She filed her claim on
139. 573 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam) (unanimous). Holton is also dis-
cussed under article I, section 16, below.
140. Id. at 292.
141. Id.
142. 558 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1990) (Kogan, J., author. Ehrlich, C.J., Overton,
Shaw, and Grimes, JJ., concurring. McDonald, J., dissented in part, but concurred on
the constitutional issue discussed here. Justice Barkett did not participate in the
decision.).
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September 20, 1982. Following the jury verdict awarding her damages,
the trial court awarded her an attorney's fee under a law that entitled
the prevailing party to an attorney's fee in medical malpractice ac-
tions., 3 That same law prohibited an attorney's fee for any action filed
before July 1, 1980.'" The district court affirmed the fee award, find-
ing that Scherer's cause of action accrued when she discovered or
should have discovered the existence of malpractice.145
The Supreme Court of Florida vacated the attorney's fee award
and quashed the district court's opinion. It found that the cause of ac-
tion under the attorney's fee statute accrued in June, 1979, when the
negligent act itself occurred, and not when the negligence was discov-
ered. "[D]amages and penalties, including an award of attorney's fees,
for which a physician may be held liable cannot be constitutionally en-
larged after the date of the alleged malpractice . . . [without violating]
state and federal prohibitions against ex post facto laws.146
The prohibition against retrospective application of laws was also
tested when the court allowed enforcement of a rent escalation clause
in condominium recreational leases despite a later-enacted statute that
voided such clauses. The dispute in Association of Golden Glades Con-
dominium Club, Inc. v. Security Management Corp. 47 centered on two
documents, a lease and a declaration of condominium. Cn March 14,
1970, the recreation corporation, as lessor, entered into a long term
lease with the Association, as lessee, which included an escalation
clause allowing for rental adjustments based upon the cost of living
index. On the same date, the developer entered into a declaration of
condominium with the Association, which bound the parties to the
state's condominium act "'as the same may be amended from time to
143. Id. at 413.
144. Fla. Stat. § 768.56 (1981). This section was repealed effective October 1,
1985, Ch. 85-175, § 43, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1225, but continues in force for causes
then pending.
145. Morales v. Scherer, 528 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (reason-
ing that the award of attorney's fees was controlled by the statute of limitation, rather
than section 766.56, and concluding that the jury's determination that the cause of
action accrued after September 20, 1980 should control).
146. Scherer, 558 So. 2d at 414 (agreeing with Morales, 528 So. 2d at 3 (An-
stead, J., dissenting, in part)).
147. 557 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1990) (Overton, J., author. Ehrlich, C.J., Grimes,
and Kogan, JJ., concurring. McDonald, J., concurred with a separate opinion. Barkett
and Shaw, JJ., concurred in result only.).
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time.' ",148 The recreation corporation was not a party on that docu-
ment. On November 30, 1981, by way of merger, Security Manage-
ment Corporation became the successor in interest to the corporation
on the lease, and to the developer on the declaration of condominium.
This litigation involved Security's suit for rent from the Association
between July, 1980 and January, 1987.149
Between 1975 and 1989, the legislature enacted various laws that
declared void all escalation clauses in residential condominium recrea-
tional leases. 150 Section 718.4015(2), Florida Statutes, in particular,
provided that this policy did not apply "to contracts entered into prior
to June 4, 1975, may not divest the parties of any benefits or obliga-
tions arising from the escalation of fees prior to October 1, 1988, but
only prohibits further escalation of fees pursuant to the escalation
clauses, on or after October 1, 1988. " 151 The court decided that under
the circumstances, Security Management Corporation was entitled to
enforce a rent escalation clause in its lease with the Association.
Several reasons appear to support the court's decision. First, by its
own terms, section 718.4015(2) had no effect on the enforceability of
the contested rent escalation clause because the lease was entered into
before June 4, 1975. Moreover, that section could not be applied retro-
actively, even if the legislature so intended, because to do so would
violate article I, section 10, and the corresponding federal protection
against ex post facto laws.152 Second, the decision was controlled by
precedent.153 In summary, a subsequent merger binds the lessor to the
148. Id. at 1352 (citation omitted).
149. Id. at 1351-52.
150. Id. at 1352-53 (recountipg the history of this legislation).
151. FLA. STAT. § 718.4015(2) (Supp. 1988).
152. Id. at 1354 (citing Fleeman v. Case, 342 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976) (dictum)).
Emphasizing the point, Justice McDonald wrote that "[n]o matter how hard the legis-
lature may try, it cannot affect the terms of a contract" in existence before the enact-
ment. Id. at 1355 (McDonald, J., concurring). But see Pomponio v. Claridge of Pom-
pano Condominium, Inc., 378 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1979) (reh'g denied) (looking to the
"actual effect" of a statute on the contractual right, and applying balancing test to
weigh the competing interests); United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Department
of Insurance, 453 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 1984) ("minimal" impairment outweighed by rea-
sonable state action); Hawkins, supra note 1, at 767-71 (demonstrating that the protec-
tions of article I, section 10 are not absolute, and have yielded to acts of the legislature
under certain circumstances).
153. Association of Golden Glades, 557 So. 2d at 1355 (citing Cove Club Inves-
tors, Ltd. v. Sandalfoot S. One, Inc., 438 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1983)) (successor lessor
under a recreational lease with an escalation clause, not a party on the declaration of
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declaration of condominium"" only when the lessor expressly agrees to
be bound prospectively by amendments to the condominium act,155 or
the lessor and developer are a single. entity.' 56
11. Imprisonment for Debt
No person shall be imprisoned for debt, except in cases of fraud.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
In this survey period, the court considered whether article I, sec-
tion 11 protects from imprisonment a parent found delinquent in child
support payments. In Gibson v. Bennett, 5 7 an ex-wife sought to enforce
a final judgment from a Virginia court, which awarded child support
arrearages, in a Florida court by invoking its equitable powers, includ-
ing contempt. The justices noted that Florida has long recognized the
use of equitable remedies to enforce foreign support decrees.' 58 More-
over, the legislature has authorized the use of contempt proceedings to
enforce judgments for arrearage as a means of enhancing enforcement
of family support obligations. 59
Gibson argued, however, that enforcement of a "judgment for sup-
port" by contempt violates article I, section 11.160 The court rejected
condominium, held not bound by the declaration).
154. Association of Golden Glades, 557 So. 2d at 1354-55 (citing Cove Club
Investors, Inc., 438 So. 2d at 355); see also Condominium Ass'n of Plaza Towers N.,
Inc. v. Plaza Recreation Development Corp., 557 So. 2d 1356 (Fla 1990) (holding
enforceable, escalation clause in recreation lease entered into before 1975 statute
prohibiting such clauses).
155. Association of Golden Glades, 557 So. 2d at 1354 (citing Century Village,
Inc. v. Wellington, E, F, K, L, H, J, M, & G, Condominium Ass'n, 361 So. 2d 128
(Fla. 1978)).
156. Id. at 1355 n.2.
157. 561 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1990) (Kogan, J., author. Ehrlich, C.J., Shaw, Bar-
kett, and Grimes, JJ. Overton and McDonald, JJ., each concurred specially with sepa-
rate opinions.).
158. See, e.g., Haas v. Haas, 59 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1952); McDuffie v. McDuffie,
155 Fla. 63, 19 So. 2d 511 (1944).
159. FLA. STAT. § 61.17(3) (1989) ("The entry of a judgment for arrearage for
child support, alimony, or attorney's fees and costs does not preclude a subsequent
contempt proceeding ... for failure of the obligor to pay .... ").
160. Gibson, 561 So. 2d at 570. More precisely stated, Gibson challenges his ex-
wife's attempt to enforce a judgment of arrearage of child support, as distinct from a
judgment or decree awarding support in the first instance.
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Gibson's claim. The obligation to pay alimony or child support is not a
debt, but rather a personal duty to the ex-spouse or child, as the case
may be, and society.161 Reducing a support decree to a money judg-
ment does not destroy the decree as an obligation to pay support. 62
Nor is the character of the award altered when the obligor relocates to
another state. The purpose remains the same-fulfillment of a continu-
ing moral and legal obligation to support the former spouse or chil-
dren. 63 So important are these obligations, that a judgment for support
arrearage may be enforced by contempt even after a child reaches
majority.16 4
Justices Overton and McDonald wrote separately165 to argue that
the decision required the court to recede from Lamm v. Chapman, 66
which held that "the acceptance of public assistance for the support of
a dependent child vests in the [Florida Department of Health and Re-
habilitative Services] the authority to proceed with all remedies availa-
ble to the child's custodian.1' 61 7 In so holding, the court approved the
use of contempt, as well as other remedies, to enforce judgments for
support, and thereby rejected the claim that the obligation to pay child
support or alimony is a debt for which a delinquent obligor cannot be
imprisoned under article I, section 11. The two justices asserted that
Larnm was premised upon the election of remedies doctrine, which ob-
ligates a party to adhere to a remedy, once chosen. In particular,
Lanm stated that contempt would not be available to enforce a decree
that awarded child support once arrearages were reduced to judg-
ment. 6 8 That is, the aggrieved spouse may seek to secure a money
judgment for the delinquent alimony in a court of law, or alternatively
seek enforcement of the original decree in a court of equity, 69 but con-
tempt is unavailable to enforce the latter. Although the distinction be-
tween a judgment of arrearage and a decree awarding child support is
"technical," and "important in deciding whether contempt lies" under
161. Id..
162. Id. at 572.
163. Id. at 569 (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 572.
165. Gibson, 561 So. 2d at 572 (Overton, J., concurring specially); id. at 573
(McDonald, J., concurring specially).
166. 413 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1982).
167. Id. at 753 (emphasis in original).
168. Id.
169. Gibson, 561 So. 2d at 574 (McDonald, J., specially concurring) (citing
Haas v. Haas, 59 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1952)).
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the election of remedies doctrine, Justice McDonald wrote that the doc-
trine has no further utility and should not impede enforcement in the
child support and alimony context. 170
12. Searches and Seizures
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and
against the unreasonable interception of private communications
by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued
except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly
describing the place or places to be searched, the person or per-
sons, thing or things to be seized, the communication to be inter-
cepted, and the nature of the evidence to be obtained. This right
shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the
United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of
this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or
information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United
States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the
United States Constitution. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
Frequently referred to as the "conformity amendment," the cur-
rent version of article I, section 12 took effect on January 1, 1983. Its
principal aim is to assure that Florida courts construe that section iden-
tical to decisions of the United States Supreme Court that interpreted
its fourth amendment counterpart. 17 The section makes two principle
textual contributions beyond the protections secured by the federal ver-
sion. It incorporates an exclusionary rule as a part of Florida's organic
law, whereas the federal exclusionary rule is a product of judicial con-
struction, and merely procedural in nature.7 2 In addition to a great
170. Id. at 573.
171. This was not always the case, for the court construed the pre-1983 article I,
section 12 version independent of the fourth amendment. The body of decisional law
developed under that version has continuing currency in many instances. See Hawkins,
supra note 1, at 773-75 (identifying cases decided during the three-year period 1980-
82, before the conformity amendment took effect).
172. The conformity requirement had two effects upon the exc'tusionary rule of
article I, section 12: First, it stripped the rule of its constitutional stature, by relegating
it to a judicial construct of the United States Supreme Court; and second, it laid vul-
nerable an entire body of state law interpreting that rule.
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deal more descriptive language, the section also expressly affords pro-
tection "against the unreasonable interception of private communica-
tions," whereas the fourth amendment contains no such expression.
Twice in 1990, the court considered whether the conformity
amendment protected persons who became the object of the state's war
on drugs in two very commonplace settings-as passengers on commer-
cial carriers, and as motorists on the open road. In each instance, the
court determined that the state enterprise reached too far into the en-
velope of personal freedom, and held the line on unwarranted police
practices.
In Bostick v. State,173 a four-member majority struck down a
Broward County Sheriff Department's drug interdiction practice, which
consisted of plain-clothed narcotics officers, without a whisper of suspi-
cion of wrongdoing, boarding busses and confronting passengers, re-
questing consent to search their carry-on luggage for contraband. The
"crucial question" was whether "a reasonable person would have be-
lieved he was not free to leave," such that voluntary consent could be
given under the circumstances.1 74 In light of facts that the trial judge
characterized as "very intimidating,"' 75 the majority determined that
Bostick was not free to leave, or "'to disregard the [officers'] questions
and walk away.' ",176 With the protections of article I, section 12 impli-
cated, the state was required to justify its detention of Bostick. It could
not do so. The majority wrote that "[t]here were no articulable facts
and no rational inferences to support the police activity involved
here.' 177 Moreover, the state could not justify the ensuing luggage
173. 554 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989) (Barkett, J., author, Ehrlich, C.J., Shaw, and
Kogan, JJ., concurring. Justices McDonald and Grimes each filed dissenting opinions
in which the other, and Justice Overton concurred.), cert. granted, No. 89-1717 (U.S.
Oct. 9, 1990). The court released Bostick on November 30, 1989, and the decision was
addressed in Hawkins, supra note 1, at 781-83. Because the decision became final dur-
ing the survey period, brief mention is made here. A series of bus cases that relied upon
Bostick also became final this year. See McPherson v. State, 566 So. 2d 255 (Fla.
1990); Jones v. State, 559 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1990); Nazario v. State, 554 So. 2d 515
(Fla. 1990); McBride v. State, 554 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1989); Mendez v. State, 554 So.
2d 1161 (Fla. 1989); Shaw v. State, 555 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1989); Avery v. State, 555
So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1989).
174. Id. at 1157 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554
(1980)).
175. Id.
176. Id. (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).
177. Id. at 1158 (relying upon United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989);
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 442
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search, for it failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that Bostick freely and voluntarily consented to that search.1 8
Then in State v. Johnson,17 9 five justices concluded that a drug
courier profile developed by Florida Highway Patrol Trooper Vogel to
stop and detain passing motorists violated article I, section 12. Trooper
Vogel stopped Paul Clive Johnson because he matched the self-styled
profile:
(1) the car was driving at 4:15 a.m.; (2) the driver was alone; (3)
the driver was about thirty years of age; (4) the car had out-of-
state tags; (5) the car was of a large model type; (6) the driver was
male; (7) the driver was wearing casual clothes; (8) the driver was
being "overly cautious" by driving at precisely the speed limit; and
(9) the car was driving on a known drug corridor, Interstate 95.10
At roadside, Trooper Vogel searched the trunk of Johnson's car and
discovered marijuana inside. The trooper arrested Johnson and seized
the marijuana, which the trial court later suppressed. The district court
affirmed the trial court's decision to suppress the evidence.,8
On review by the Supreme Court of Florida, a five-member major-
ity acknowledged that police officers may exercise discretion to stop an
individual under circumstances indicating a likelihood of wrongdo-
ing.182 It said that a "profile" is permissible "precisely to the degree
that it reasonably describes behavior likely to indicate a crime.' 8 3 The
fourth amendment, in an analogous context, requires a roving border
patrol officer in search of illegal aliens to point to "'specific articulable
facts, together with rational inferences from those facts'" that warrant
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing before the officer is justified in mak-
U.S. 873 (1975)).
178. Id. at 1158-59.
179. 561 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1990) (Barkett, J., author. Overton, Shaw, Grimes,
and Kogan, JJ., concurring. Ehrlich, C.J., dissented with an opinion, and McDonald,
J., dissented with an opinion in which Ehrlich, C.J. concurred.).
180. Id. at 1140. Trooper Vogel testified that he developed the profile based upon
elements common to thirty arrests he made during a thirteen month period before
Johnson's arrest. That profile differed from the Patrol's own profile, which included the
presence of air shocks on the car, window opaquing, and evidence that the car was
loaded heavily. Id. at 1140-41.
181. State v. Johnson, 516 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
182. Johnson, 561 So. 2d at 1142.
183. Id.
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ing a stop.18 4 "At the very least," the justices reasoned, the same stan-
dard applies to "roving stops of state citizens by state police." 18 5
Two justices disputed the majority's conclusion that Trooper Vogel
lacked sufficient justification to conduct a stop. Chief Justice Ehrlich
conceded that several factors relied upon by the trooper were inappro-
priate, but argued that other factors were sufficient to support reasona-
ble suspicion. He viewed reasonable suspicion as "'seen and weighed
not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those
versed in the field of law enforcement.' "186 Justice McDonald argued
that the trooper's accumulation of factors was "reasonable," and "rea-
sonable profile stops of an automobile on a state highway should be
contemplated by users of the highway," whose expectation of privacy is
necessarily diminished due to the fight against Florida's "huge drug
problem." ' 7
The majority responded that an individual's "unusual" conduct,
conduct that sets him or her apart from others, may justify a stop, 88 as
illustrated by the United States Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Sokolow.8 9 There, agents of the Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration became suspicious that Sokolow was engaged in drug traffick-
ing, and stopped him at the Honolulu International Airport, where he
had two day's earlier purchased two round-trip airplane tickets from
Honolulu to Miami. In what it described as "a typical attempt to
smuggle drugs" through an airport, 190 a seven-justice majority deter-
mined that the agents demonstrated sufficient justification to stop Soko-
low. Important to that opinion, Sokolow's arrest was supported by sev-
eral factors of probative significance such as: the agents' "reasonable
ground to believe" that Sokolow used an alias when he purchased the
tickets;- and their knowledge that he paid $2,100 in cash for them.' 9'
That latter factor was "out of the ordinary," especially because Soko-
low made payment from a roll of $20 bills containing nearly twice that
amount of cash. 92 When taken together with other factors known to
184. Id. (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975)).
185. Id. (emphasis in original).
186. Id. at 1145 (Ehrlich, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
187. Id. at 1146 (McDonald, J., dissenting. Ehrlich, C.J., concurring).
188. Id. at 1142 (emphasis in original).
189. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
190. Id. at 4.
191. Id. at 8-9.
192. Id. at 8.
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agents," 3 the government had a reasonable basis under the fourth
amendment to suspect that Sokolow was transporting illegal drugs.
To satisfy an article I, section 12 infringement, the state must
demonstrate that there exists "a strong and articulable link-a 'ra-
tional inference'-between the sequence of acts observed by the police
and the concealed criminal conduct believed to exist, whether or not
this sequence is described as a 'profile.' "194 Johnson, unlike Sokolow,
contained no record evidence that the defendant behaved unusually. In-
deed, Johnson matched a profile that included an enormous class of
law-abiding travelers. The court noted that the "sole basis" for Trooper
Vogel's decision to stop Johnson was the coincidence of similarities be-
tween Johnson and the trooper's personal profile. Thus, his detention
and arrest upon that basis alone were unjustified.
In an opinion released the same day as Johnson, Creswell v.
State,195 a realigned majority reached an opposite result. The majority
of four justices held that factors in a drug courier profile, when viewed
in light of the officer's experience, may provide an articulable or
founded suspicion that will justify under fourth amendment standards a
brief investigatory detention of a motorist after a legitimate traffic
stop. 96 It distinguished the two cases by noting that Johnson consid-
ered whether a profile could justify a brief investigatory stop, whereas
Cresswell concerned a brief investigatory detention following a lawful
193. Sokolow's original destination was Miami, "a source city' for illicit drugs;
• . .he stayed in Miami for only 48 hours, even though a round-trip flight from Hono-
lulu to Miami takes 20 hours; . . .he appeared nervous during his trip; and ... he
checked none of his luggage." Id. at 3.
194. Johnson, 561 So. 2d at 1143 (quoting Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884).
195. 564 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1990) (Ehrlich, C.J., author. Overton, McDonald, and
Grimes, JJ., concurring. Justices Shaw and Kogan dissented with separate opinions in
which Justice Barkett joined).
196. Trooper Vogel stopped Cresswell for "following too closely,' and justified
the roadside detention in the following manner:
Cresswell was very nervous, was driving along a known drug route in a
vehicle with a large trunk, had a Massachusetts driver's license but was
driving a car registered to someone else with Maine license plates and
New York state insurance and inspection stickers, there was a CB radio in
the car, the ignition key was separate from the other keys, and the back
seat contained items normally found in the trunk.
Id. at 483. Trooper Vogel then detained Cresswell to await the arrival of a narcotics
canine unit. The court wrote: "'when viewed together by a trained law enforcement
officer such facts... "'can be combined with permissible deductions. . . to form a
legitimate basis for suspicion of a particular person and for action on that suspicion.'"
Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419 (1981)).
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traffic stop. 9 7 Moreover, it regarded the factors in Cresswell "at least
as strong as those approved in Sokolow."' 98
Looking beyond the record facts, Justice Kogan argued in dissent
that the experience of precedent disproved the constitutional validity of
Trooper Vogel's profile. The earlier cases that had considered the
trooper's profile showed that he had applied it "with such extreme in-
consistency as to make it extremely unreliable." 199
13. Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus shall be grantable of right, freely and
without cost. It shall be returnable without delay, and shall never
be suspended unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, suspension is
essential to the public safety. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
No decisions construed this section during the survey period.
14. Pretrial Release and Detention
Unless charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by
life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presump-
tion is great, every person charged with a crime or violation of
municipal or county ordinance shall be entitled to pretrial release
on reasonable conditions. If no conditions of release can reasona-
bly protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons,
assure the presence of the accused. at trial, or assure the integrity
of the judicial process, the accused may be detained. FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 14.
No decisions construed this section during the survey period.
15. Prosecution for Crime; Offenses Committed by Children
(a) No person shall be tried for capital crime without presentment
197. Id. at 482 n.2.
198. Id. at 483. Justice Shaw viewed the facts relied upon by the majority as
vastly different from those in Sokolow; and concluded that the trooper lacked the justi-
fication for detaining Creswell. Id. (Shaw, J., dissenting, Barkett, J., concurring).
199. Id. (Kogan, J., dissenting, Barkett, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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or indictment by a grand jury, or for other felony without such
presentment or indictment or an information under oath filed by
the prosecuting officer of the court, except persons on active duty
in the militia when tried by courts martial.
(b) When authorized by law, a child as therein defined may be
charged with a violation of law as an act of delinquency instead of
crime and tried without a jury or other requirements applicable to
criminal cases. Any child so charged shall, upon demand made as
provided by law before a trial in a juvenile proceeding, be tried in
an appropriate court as a adult. A child found delinquent shall be
disciplined as provided by law. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 15.
A lone dissenting justice in State v. Smith 00 argued that article I,
section 15 should be construed to permit prior inconsistent statements
made by a declarant during a prosecutorial investigation to be intro-
duced at trial. The court relied upon the controlling statute without
reaching the constitutional position advanced by the dissent.
Evidence of an out-of-court prior inconsistent statement is gener-
ally regarded as unreliable, and inadmissible under the hearsay stat-
utes. Florida Statutes section 90.801(2)(a) creates a narrow exception
when the declarant testifies at trial, and has made the prior inconsistent
statement at some "other proceeding." ' 20 ' The exception admits the
statements as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted. In Smith, the prosecutor interrogated a witness, in the presence
of a deputy sheriff and court reporter, about her involvement in a homi-
cide.202 The court was asked to decide whether a prosecutor's investiga-
tion qualified as an "other proceeding" under section 90.801(2)(a).
The court in an earlier case said that the statute required formal-
ity, no less than a deposition, but no more than a hearing,2'3 and that a
police investigative interrogation, even though under oath, does not
qualify as an "other proceeding. ' 20 4 In Smith, the court held that the
section applied equally to a prosecutor's investigation, and ruled the
witness's prior statements inadmissible because the investigation lacked
the requisite "'degree of formality, convention, structure, regularity
200. 573 So. 2d 306, 318 (Fla. 1990) (Overton, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
201. FLA. STAT. § 90.801 (2)(a) (1985).
202. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 313-14.
203. Delgado-Santos v. State, 471 So. 2d 74, 77 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985),
adopted, 497 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 1986).
204. State v. Delgado-Santos, 497 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 1986).
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and replicability of the process in question.' "205
Relying in part on article I, section 15 to dispute the majority's
decision, Justice Overton argued in dissent that the state constitution
gives to an assistant state attorney virtually the same power to charge
that it gives to the grand jury. Because grand jury proceedings have
been held to satisfy the requirements of the statute, Justice Overton
argued that the prosecutor should be no less entitled to rely upon its
provisions.206
16. Rights of Accused and Victims
(a) In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall, upon demand,
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, and shall be furnished a copy of the charges, and shall have
the right to have compulsory process for witnesses, to confront at
trial adverse witnesses, to be heard in person, by counsel or both,
and to have a speedy and public trial by impartial jury in the
county where the crime was committed. If the county is not
known, the indictment or information may charge venue in two or
more counties conjunctively and proof that the crime was commit-
ted in that area shall be sufficient; but before pleading the accused
may elect in which of those counties he will be tried. Venue for
prosecution of crimes committed beyond the boundaries of the
state shall be fixed by law.
(b) Victims of crimes or their lawful representatives, including the
next of kin of homicide victims, are entitled to the right to be
informed, to be present, and to be heard when relevant, at all cru-
cial stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights
do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused. FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 16.
Article I, section 16(a) creates a cluster of rights designed to pro-
tect persons subject to criminal prosecution. Among those rights con-
sidered this year were the right to confront adverse witnesses, the right
of representation, and the right to trial by an impartial jury.
a. Confrontation
The right "to confront at trial adverse witnesses" was one of.sev-
205. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 314 (citation omitted).
206. Id. at 320.
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eral constitutional rights abused by prosecutorial misconduct that re-
sulted in the court's reversal of two murder convictions in Nowitzke v.
State."'7 Through a psychiatrist, the defense established that Nowitzke
was insane at the time of the offenses. On cross-examination, the prose-
cutor asked the psychiatrist whether he had been accused of being a
"hired gun" by another psychiatrist, who was unconnected with the
case. The prosecutor asked the question several more times and but-
tressed the accusation by emphasizing it during closing argument. The
court wrote that the prosecutor's introduction of the opinion was irrele-
vant and misleading on the issue of the psychiatrist's credibility, was
improper impeachment of an expert, and violated the defendant's right
to confront the declarant under the state and federal constitutions. 08
b. Representation
Indigent persons may qualify for the assistance of court-appointed
counsel in both felony trial proceedings and any ensuing appeal. The
appointment of counsel advances the right of the accused "'to be heard
. . . by counsel," assured under article I, section 16. In re Order of the
First District Court of Appeal Regarding Brief Filed in Forrester v.
State"9 addressed the nature and extent of appellate counsel's role in
prosecuting the initial appeal on behalf of an indigent defendant.
Forrester is best understood against the backdrop of the sixth
amendment's requirement that "the accused shall enjoy the right...
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense,"'2 10 and Anders v.
California,211 where the United States Supreme Court stated that
counsel's "bare conclusion" that there was no merit to an appeal
"'[could not] be an adequate substitute for the right to full appellate
review available to all defendants' who may not be able to afford such
an expense. "212 The Court in Anders continued:
The constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair pro-
cess can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an advo-
207. 15 Fla. L. Weekly 645 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam) (unanimous). Nowitzke is
also addressed above, in article I, section 9.
208. Id. at 647.
209. 556 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1990) (unanimous) (McDonald, J., author.).
210. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (deciding that the sixth
amendment was obligatory on the states through the fourteenth amendment).
211. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
212. Id. at 742-43 (citation omitted).
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cate in behalf of his client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae
... . Of course, if counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous,
after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the
court and request permission to withdraw. That request must, how-
ever be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record
that might arguably support the appeal.
213
Forrester pled nolo contendere to possession of cocaine and mari-
juana that were seized from his automobile without a warrant, and re-
served the right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to sup-
press that evidence.214 Forrester's appellate counsel filed an Anders
brief, in which he concluded that an appeal would be frivolous and to-
tally without merit.15 Counsel stated that no good faith argument
could be made in support of the suppression claim.216
The district court ordered counsel to file a supplemental brief on
the suppression issue, and to advocate "'whether, in the context of a
non-consensual, warrantless search, a canine alert, without more, con-
stitutes probable cause.' "217 Counsel appealed that order to the Su-
preme Court of Florida, arguing that it violated article I, section 16
and its federal counterparts by shifting counsel's role from advocate for
the client to amicus curiae for the court, which would infringe upon a
defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.
The court unanimously rejected that constitutional argument. Ex-
ercising its inherent power, "an appellate court can order supplemental
briefs in any case before it, regardless of the type of brief originally
filed." 218 Anders requires a "complete and careful review of the record"
to support counsel's claim that an appeal would be wholly frivolous. In
so doing, counsel serves the dual aims of effective client representation
and assisting the court in its independent evaluation of the record. 219
Harich v. State220 also addressed the right to effective legal repre-
sentation assured by article I, section 16. Harich argued in a collateral
appeal of his conviction that his assistant public defender's appoint-
ment as a special deputy sheriff created a conflict of interest that vio-
213. Id. at 744.
214. Forrester, 556 So. 2d at 1115.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1115 n.2.
217. Id. at 1116 (citation omitted).
218. Id. at 1117.
219. Id.
220. 573 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam) (unanimous).
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lated that section. At an evidentiary hearing on the claim, the trial
court found that the sheriffs of three Florida counties issued "special"
or "honorary!' deputy sheriff cards to Harich's trial counsel,221 but that
counsel neither acted nor held himself out as a regular deputy. Not
only did Harich fail to produce any evidence in support of his claim,
but the evidence disproved it. The justices unanimously approved the
findings of the trial court that counsel's status as a special deputy was
widely known to members of the legal community, and easily discover-
able through due diligence. 222 They also rejected Harich's arguments
that counsel's appointment as a deputy sheriff amounted to an actual
conflict, that prejudice must be presumed from that appointment, and
that the allegation of these facts creates a per se constitutional
violation.223
c. Impartiality
The right to "trial by impartial jury" is the most frequently liti-
gated of the cluster of rights created under article I, section 16. Trial
impartiality includes the assurance that a party will not exclude pro-
spective jurors solely because of their membership in a discrete racial
group. In 1984, State v. Nell224 established the standard for determin-
ing whether a party's peremptory challenges were racially motivated,
and thus violated article I, section 16. Briefly stated, the challenging
party must make a timely objection, and demonstrate on the record,
first, that the challenged prospective juror belongs to a distinct racial
group, and second, that there exists a strong likelihood that the other
party exercised a peremptory challenge to remove that juror solely on
account of race.225 If the trial court agrees with the movant, the burden
shifts to the other party to show the existence of valid non-racial rea-
sons for striking the juror.226 State v. Slappy227 later confirmed the
court's commitment to "a vigorously impartial system of selecting
221. Those counties were Volusia County, located in the Seventh Judicial Cir-
cuit, the venue of the trial, and Marion and Lake Counties, located in the adjoining
Fifth Judicial Circuit.
222. Id. at 305.
223. Id.
224. 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
225. Id. at 484.
226. Id. at 486-87.
227. 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988).
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jurors. ' ' 22
After Neil, the court declared that a defendant has standing to
raise an article I, section 16 violation, even though he or she is not of
the same race as the juror peremptorily challenged by the state. How-
ever, it acknowledged that such a defendant may have more difficulty
in making a prima facie showing of racial bias than a defendant who is
of a race different from the challenged juror.229 Reed v. State"0 is the
most recent illustration of the point. Reed, a white man charged with
murdering a white victim, moved for mistrial following the prosecutor's
use of eight of ten peremptory challenges to excuse blacks from the
jury. The trial court found, virtually without any explanation by the
state, that the challenges were not based purely on race. With due re-
gard for the "inherent fairness and color blindness" of trial judges,23 '
the Supreme Court of Florida agreed:
Given the circumstances that both the defendant and the victim
were white and that two black jurors were already seated, we can-
not say that the trial judge abused his discretion in concluding that
the defense had failed to make a prima facie showing that there
was a strong likelihood that the jurors were challenged because of
their race.2 32
Although Reed illustrates the court's deference to the role of the
trial court in assuring trial impartiality under article I, section 16, the
court is unlikely to address the merits of a Neil claim in the absence of
record support. Only by adequately developing the record can trial at-
torneys protect a valid Neil claim, or defend against it, as the case may
be. For example, in Bryant v. State,2 3 the state proffered no reasons to
justify its excusing five blacks during the course of its first seven pe-
remptory challenges, yet the trial court summarily denied defense
counsel's request for a Neil inquiry. Ultimately, six white and six black
jurors were impanelled, but not until the state exercised seven of its
228. Id. at 21. A four-justice majority in Slappy agreed that any doubt about
whether the complaining party met the initial burden under Neil would be resolved in
favor of that party. Id. at 22.
229. Kibler v. State, 546 So. 2d 710, 712 (Fla. 1989).
230. 560 So. 2d 203 (Fla.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 230 (1990).
231. Id. at 206.
232. Id.
233. 565 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam).
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sixteen peremptories to strike blacks."3 4 On appeal, the state argued
that the reasons for the peremptories were race-neutral and not pretex-
tual.2 35 The majority acknowledged that some of the excused jurors'
responses indicated valid basis for challenge, but found the responses of
others impossible to evaluate. Without benefit of an independent evalu-
ation of the state's reasons by the trial court, the supreme court de-
clined to review the bare record.23 6
The absence of record clarity was also central to Floyd v. State.237
Defense counsel timely objected to the prosecutor's attempt to peremp-
torily excuse the last of two black prospective jurors remaining on the
panel. The prosecutor offered a factually erroneous, but race-neutral,
explanation for the peremptory. He said that during voir dire, the juror
had expressed the view that twenty-five years' imprisonment was
enough for Floyd's crime, which suggested a predisposition against im-
posing the death penalty. The trial court denied defense counsel's ob-
jection, conceding that it did not recall the juror's response, but noting
that it was "'on the record.' "1238 In fact, however, the record confirmed
that the excused juror never made such a response.23 9
A five-justice majority rejected Floyd's claim of error because de-
fense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's erroneous explanation,
and thereby failed to preserve the claim for appellate review.
There is no question that the state's explanation was race-neutral,
and if true, would have satisfied the test established in [Neil and
Slappy]. It is uncontroverted, however, that the explanation was
not true . . . .Thus, we must determine the parameters of the trial
court's responsibility to ascertain if the state has satisfied its bur-
den of producing a race-neutral reason for the challenge 40
234. Id. at 1300.
235. Id. at 1301.
236. Id.. Justice McDonald dissented on the Neil issue, declaring that it was
"manifest from the record" the state's exercise of peremptory challenges was not ra-
cially motivated. He believed that record proof of the state's race-neutrality was
demonstrated by the ultimate composition of the jury, which included six black and six
white jurors. Id. at 1303 (McDonald, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part).
237. 569 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam) (Shaw, C.J., Overton, Ehrlich,
Grimes, and Kogan, JJ., concurred; McDonald, J., dissented with an opinion in which
Barkett, J., concurred).
238. Id. at 1229 (footnote omitted).
239. Id.
240. Id.
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The duty of the trial court is to establish record support for the state's
reason, and it may assume the verity of any race-neutral reason if un-
challenged by defense counsel. Had defense counsel disputed the prose-
cutor's reason, the trial court could have easily reviewed the record,
discovered, and then corrected the error.24'
Floyd accomplishes two ends. First, it reiterates the court's com-
mitment to the Neil-Slappy formulation-defense counsel can preserve
a claim for appellate review only by timely objecting when the state
strikes a prospective juror who is a member of a distinct racial group,
and by showing that there exists a strong likelihood of a racially im-
proper motive. The court could have rejected Floyd's Neil claim be-
cause defense counsel failed to clearly satisfy the latter component of
this standard. 42 By assuming that counsel satisfied the threshold, how-
ever, the court was able to address the more vexing problem posed by
an unresolved record conflict. Second, Floyd imposes upon defense
counsel the requirement to object when the state's explanation for its
peremptory challenge lacks record support.
In stark contrast to the record uncertainty in Bryant and Floyd,
the record "clearly support[ed]" the trial court's ruling to summarily
deny defense counsel's Neil objection in Holton v. State.243 The record
showed that one prospective juror peremptorily excused by the prosecu-
tor harbored reservations about capital punishment, and another was
ambivalent toward recommending the death penalty. For those reasons,
defense counsel was unable to demonstrate a "strong likelihood" that
the state excused the two prospective jurors solely because they were,
black.244
When asked to explain his excuse of a third prospective black ju-
ror, the prosecutor stated his belief that the juror might be unsympa-
thetic toward the murder victim, who was a female prostitute. The jus-
tices agreed that "one could reasonably conclude that the prospective
juror could not be sympathetic toward a prostitute. ' 245 Holton is a
straightforward application of Slappy,24' and reconfirms that the
state's peremptory challenge will be sustained on appeal if the record
241. Id. at 1229. Two justices took no issue with the majority's resolution of the
Neil claim, but dissented, arguing that the facts of the murder made the death penalty
inappropriate. Id. at 1233 (McDonald, J., dissenting; Barkett, J., concurring).
242. Id. at 1229 n.4.
243. 573 So. 2d 284 (per curiam) (unanimous).
244. Id. at 287.
245. Id. (emphasis added).
246. 522 So. 2d at 22.
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demonstrates that its proffer is both race-neutral and reasonable.
Collateral claimants only unsuccessfully raised Neil issues this
year. Roberts v. State241 rejected an argument on collateral appeal that
the trial court employed an improper Neil standard. The claim was
procedurally barred because appellate counsel failed to raise it on di-
rect appeal.248 However, the court reached the merits of Roberts' claim
for habeas relief, which charged that appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to challenge the trial court's reliance upon Neil, rather than
the prevailing federal standard. The court held that counsel's failure to
challenge the jury selection was not ineffective assistance because it
amounted to neither defective performance, nor prejudiced the
appeal.2 4 9
Lastly, State v. Griffith250 may be fairly viewed as recognizing
that the right of an accused to a trial by an impartial jury is a coordi-
nate protection with article I, section 22, which provides that the quali-
fications and the number of jurors, no fewer than six, shall be fixed by
law.
17. Excessive Punishments
Excessive fines, cruel or unusual punishment, attainder, forfeiture
of estate, indefinite imprisonment, and unreasonable detention of
witnesses are forbidden. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17.
Claims of excessive or disproportionate punishment are litigated
247. 568 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam).
248. Id. at 1258; see also Hill v. Dugger, 556 So. 2d 1385, 1387-88 (Fla. 1990)
(per curiam) (without approving or disapproving the claim that the state violated Hill's
rights by peremptorily excusing black prospective jurors on account of race, the court
simply noted that the trial court denied the latter as procedurally barred because ap-
pellate counsel failed to raise it on direct appeal).
249. Roberts, 568 So. 2d at 1262-68; see also Hill, 556 So. 2d 1385. Hill pro-
vides no glimpse into the allegedly offending colloquy, and it sheds little light onto the
ineffective assistance claim:
Given the state of the law on the Neil issue at the time of this appeal, as
well as the record in this case on the inquiry and reasons given by the
prosecution for the excusal of the prospective jurors, we find that appellate
counsel was not ineffective under the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984)] test.
Hill, 556 So. 2d at 1389.
250. 561 So. 2d 528, 530 n.3 (Fla. 1990). Griffith is discussed more fully under
article I, section 22.
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virtually entirely on federal eighth amendment grounds. It is indeed
unusual to find mention of article I, section 17. For that reason, Judy
Buenoano's last-minute collateral appeal to stay her impending electro-
cution, and in particular Justice Kogan's dissenting opinion, warrant
special mention. In Buenoano v. State,2 51 the court considered Bue-
noano's request for an evidentiary hearing on her claim that her execu-
tion would be "cruel and unusual"25 2 because, she asserted, the electric
chair used by the state prison system would malfunction. Her legal the-
ory seized upon the macabre, grizzly circumstances of Jesse Tafero's
electrocution, which occurred only weeks earlier. The evidence showed
that smoke and twelve-inch flames spurted from Tafero's head immedi-
ately after he received the first jolt of electricity. Tafero was pro-
nounced dead approximately seven minutes later and only after'a third
jolt of electricity was administered.253 Relying upon the strength of an
affidavit from her own expert, Buenoano argued on appeal that a
"'homemade'" electrode caused the chair to malfunction, a condition
which she claimed the Florida Department of Corrections had failed to
remedy.254
A four-justice majority reached the merits of Buenoano's constitu-
tional claim, and found that the record as proffered failed to justify
judicial interference with the Department's function. The majority de-
ferred to the Department as the agency charged with executing con-
demned prisoners, and presumed that the Department properly per-
formed that function. It noted that the Department's own investigation
showed that the "irregularities in Tafero's execution" were the result of
using a synthetic, rather than a natural sponge, which apparently did
not affect the functioning of the electrode. "Death by electrocution,"
the majority concluded, "is not cruel and unusual punishment, and one
malfunction is not sufficient to justify a judicial inquiry into the De-
partment of Corrections' competence. ' 255
251. 565 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam) (Ehrlich, C.J., Overton, McDon-
ald, and Grimes, JJ., concurring; Shaw, J., dissented with an opinion in which Barkett
and Kogan, JJ., concurred; Barkett, J., dissented with an opinion in which Kogan, J.,
concurred; Kogan, J., dissented with an opinion).
252. Id. at 311.
253. Id. at 310-11.
254. Id. at 311. One expert attributed the malfunctioning to the Department's
use of "only a single 'homemade' leg electrode[,] . . . haphazardly constructed from an
old Army boot and other spare parts." Id. at 315 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 311 (citing Louisiana ex reL Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463
(1947)). This conclusion was hotly disputed. Justice Barkett charged that the majority,
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Buenoano decided a federal question, as is evident by the major-
ity's use of eighth amendment phraseology, "cruel and unusual," and
by its reliance upon federal precedent. In marked contrast, article I,
section 17 uses the disjunctive form, "cruel or unusual." Arguably, the
adopters of article I, section 17 intended to create a protection against
barbaric, arbitrary, non-individualized, and disproportionate punish-
ment that is qualitatively different from the eighth amendment protec-
tion. Otherwise, the adopters would have replicated federal phraseology
in this section, as they had in many other article I sections. 56 However,
Buenoano took no occasion to consider the distinction.
Buenoano's importance for state constitutional law is not lost, for
Justice Kogan's dissenting opinion provides a glimpse of the contours of
this right from the viewpoint of one justice. Believing that article I,
section 17 requires "swift and sure punishment," he argued the court
should remand for an evidentiary hearing to establish whether "any
reasonable possibility" existed that the flames observed during Tafero's
execution were the result of faulty electrodes.2 57 If so, the trial court
should stay future executions until the state overhauls the electric
chair, for "any electrical malfunction that results in needless charring
of human flesh or an unnecessarily slow death" violates state and fed-
eral protections.258
by denying Buenoano a hearing, "departs not only from any semblance of due process
but from any process at all . . . [, and adds] a bizarre twist to death penalty jurispru-
dence." Id. at 312 (Barkett, J., dissenting). Two other justices would have remanded
for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 311 (Shaw, J., dissenting); id. at 313 (Kogan, J.,
dissenting) (adding that the Department failed to take "any meaningful step to investi-
gate or correct the possible malfunctioning of the electric chair").
256. Compare People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 640, 493 P.2d 880, 883, 100
Cal. Rptr. 152, 155, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972) (concluding that the use of the
disjunctive form in article I, section 6 of the Constitution of California--"nor shall
cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted"-was purposeful, and that capital punish-
ment violates the section) (en banc); People v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.3c6 797, 808, 647
P.2d 76, 82, 183 Cal. Rptr. 800, 806 (1982) (en banc) (noting that a popular initiative
effectively cancelled the holding of Anderson, and restored the death penalty "'to the
extent permitted by the federal Constitution' ") (citation and emphasis omitted).
257. Buenoano, 565 So. 2d at 315 (Kogan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
258. Id. Several other death row inmates collaterally challenged the Depart-
ment's competence to carry out the death penalty. Relying upon Buenoano, five mem-
bers of the court affirmed the trial courts' summary dismissals. See Hamblen v. State,
565 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1990); White v. State, 565 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam);
Squires v. State, 565 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam). Those opinions report that
the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, held a hearing and found
that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the constitutional claim against the De-
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On another subject, there is minority support for the view that
conviction under Florida's RICO statutes,2 59 and the predicate obscen-
ity laws,260 produces the potential of "draconian," unconstitutionally
excessive penalties. That argument appeared in a dissent to Stall v.
State,2 1 and expresses the concern that the state could impose upon a
defendant convicted of showing, selling, distributing, or renting obscene
materials, the same severe maximum penalties intended for organized
criminals, drug smugglers, and contract murders (life imprisonment,
heavy fines, and likely forfeiture of assets) .262
18. Administrative Penalties
No administrative agency shall impose a sentence of imprison-
ment, nor shall it impose any other penalty except as provided by
law. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 18.
No decisions construed this section during the survey period.
19. Costs
No person charged with crime shall be compelled to pay costs
before a judgment of conviction has become final. FLA. CONST. art.
I, § 19.
No decisions construed this section during the survey period.
partment, id. at 320 (citation omitted), and that there existed no substantial
probability of recurrence of the problems that accompanied Tafero's execution. Ham-
blen, 565 So. 2d at 321 (citation omitted). Ultimately, the Department carried out
subsequent executions without recurrence of those problems.
259. Florida RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization) Act, codi-
fied at FLA. STAT. §§ 895.01-.06 (1985).
260. FLA. STAT. § 847.011 (1985).
261. 570 So. 2d 257, 274 (Fla. 1990) (Kogan, J., dissenting; Barkett, J.,
concurring).
262. Id. at 527-28; see also Comment, RICO's Forfeiture Provision: A First
Amendment Restraint on Adult Bookstores, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 419, 446-47 (1988)
(concluding that RICO's forfeiture provision amounts to a prior restraint on the distri-
bution of non-obscene materials, which are entitled to first amendment protection, and
suggesting that the government's goal of eradicating organized crime is not sufficiently
compelling to justify total forfeiture of all assets of an adult bookstore).
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20. Treason
Treason against the state shall consist only in levying war against
it, adhering to its enemies, or giving them aid and comfort, and no
person shall be convicted of treason except on the testimony of two
witnesses to the same overt act or on confession in open court.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 20.
No decisions construed this section during the survey period.
21. Access to Courts
The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury,
and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.
FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 21.
Many litigants during the 1980s challenged statutes that sought to
limit product liability claims by imposing time bars on recovery. One
type of statute, a statute of repose, cuts off a right of action after a
specified time, such as the completion of work or delivery of goods. It
not only bars an accrued action, but also prevents accruad where the
final element essential to the accrual occurs beyond the period estab-
lished by the statute.263 In 1980, Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Manufac-
turing Co. 264 held that the twelve-year statute of repose, which required
that product liability actions must be commenced "within twelve (12)
years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original
purchaser, 265 violated article I, section 21 as applied. The court re-
ceded from Battilla in Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc.,266 and held that the
statute of repose did not violate article I, section 21. The court rea-
soned that manufacturers should not be held perpetually accountable
263. See University of Miami v. Bogorff, No. 74,797 slip op. at 3-4 (Fla. Jan. 18,
1991); Bauld v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 357 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. 1978); Carr v. Brow-
ard County, 505 So. 2d 568, 570 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 541 So. 2d 92
(Fla. 1989). Those cases also explain that the statute of repose operates differently
from another time bar to recovery, the statute of limitation. The latter establishes a
time limit within which an action must be commenced, bars enforcement of an accrued
cause of action, and runs from the date the cause of action accrues.
264. 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980).
265. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3) (1975).
266. 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1114 (1986).
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for injuries caused by their products, and that the legislature could rea-
sonably decide that the risk of liability should not extend beyond a
twelve-year period beginning with the date of a product's sale.167
In 1990, Frazier v. Baker Material Handling Corp.268 decided the
fate of product liability claims that accrued in the window between
Battilla and Pullum. Frazier was injured by a product delivered before
the court issued Battilla. His injury occurred after Battilla, yet within
the twelve-year statute of repose declared unconstitutional by that deci-
sion. Only the four-year statute of limitation posed a time bar to his
claim, and Frazier filed suit within that period. Nonetheless, the trial
court entered summary judgment against him, reasoning that Pullum
reinstated the twelve-year statute of repose, which operated to cut off
his claim. The district court affirmed the trial court.2 69
The Supreme Court of Florida expressed the general rule: "'[A]
decision of a court of last resort which overrules a prior decision is
retrospective as well as prospective in its application unless declared by
the opinion to have prospective effect only.' ,,270 Because Pullum was
silent on the issue of retroactivity, the rule applied to reinstate the stat-
ute of repose, making it binding on Frazier. However, Frazier con-
vinced four justices that his case fell within a well-established exception
to the general rule, which provides that "[a] claimant with a viable
cause of action is entitled to rely on the existing law which provides
that claimant access to the court. 27 1 Thus, a claimant who relies upon
a then-prevailing judicial interpretation of the controlling statute can-
not be penalized by a later decision that leaves the claimant without
relief.272
267. Id. at 659 (adopting Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg Co., 392 So. 2d 874,
874-75 (Fla. 1980) (McDonald, J., dissenting)).
268. 559 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1990) (Barkett, J., author; Shaw, Grimes, and Ko-
gan, JJ., concurring; McDonald, J., dissented in an opinion concurred in by Ehrlich,
C.J., and Overton, J.).
269. Frazier v. Baker Material Handling Corp., 540 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1989).
270. Frazier, 559 So. 2d at 1092 (quoting Melendez v. Dreis and Krump Mfg.
Co., 515 So. 2d 735, 736 (Fla. 1987)).
271. Id. at 1093 (citing FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 21).
272. Id. at 1092 (citations omitted). In dissent, Justice McDonald argued that
the exception relied upon by the majority did not apply. He wrote that Frazier had no
reason to rely on Battilla at the time he filed his claim, because that decision had no
bearing on his case. Battilla simply held the statute of repose unconstitutional as ap-
plied, that is, as applied to suits initiated against a manufacturer more than twelve
years after the date of sale. Id. at 1093 n.1 (McDonald, J., dissenting; Ehrlich, C.J.,
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Turning to the subject of child support enforcement, the justices in
State ex rel. Pittman v. Stanjeski7 3 rejected the finding of two lower
courts that section 61.14(5), Florida Statutes (1987), denied delinquent
obligors access to courts. The statute provided that unpaid support pay-
ments became a final judgment by operation of law after notice by the
clerk of court to the obligor. However, it omitted from its text any
provision that would allow the obligor to challenge the facts upon
which the judgment was based. The court salvaged the statute by "rea-
sonably constru[ing]" it to require a hearing before any such judgment
became final, provided that the obligor timely responded to the clerk's
notice of arrearage.27 4
Another topic of constitutional significance emerged from the
state's exercise of its police power in 1984, when it eradicated a blight
on Florida's valuable citrus industry known as citrus canker. The eradi-
cation program spawned a series of cases by citrus growers who sued in
inverse condemnation to recover damages for property destroyed by the
state. In the first of those cases to reach the court, a five-member ma-
jority held in 1988 that the eradication program was a valid exercise of
the state's police power, and that owners were entitled to full and just
compensation for destroyed "healthy, but suspect" citrus plants.275
Among the cases that followed were three suits consolidated for
relief in Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services v.
Bonanno.76 In circuit court, the Department moved to dismiss the
suits, arguing that the act,27 7 which established procedures for citrus
canker claims, deprived the court of jurisdiction. The act created an
administrative hearing process as the "'sole and exclusive remedy' "
and Overton, J., concurring). He added that the two cases were also distinguishable on
their facts-Battilla was injured beyond the twelve-year cut-off, whereas, Frazier was
injured within that period. Thus, the statute did not deny Frazier access to courts by
barring his claim altogether, but merely shortened the time allotted fcr bringing suit.
Id. at 1094.
273. 562 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1990). This case is discussed more fully under article
I, section 9.
274. Id. at 678-79.
275. Department of Agriculture & Consumer Servs. v. Mid-Florida Growers,
Inc., 521 So. 2d 101, 102, 105 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988).
276. 568 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam). The court released two other deci-
sions that emerged from challenges to the state's eradication program. Both involved
liability and damages issues. Department of Agriculture & Consumer Servs. v. Polk,
568 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1990), and Department of Agriculture & Consumer Servs. v. Mid-
Florida Growers, Inc., 570 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1990).
277. Ch. 89-91, 1989 Fla. Laws 143.
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for owners who opted to accept a schedule of compensation. That
schedule prescribed presumptive values for categories of destroyed cit-
rus plants, and presumed that those values represented full and fair
compensation. The circuit court declared the act unconstitutional, and
denied the Department's motion. The Department then petitioned the
supreme court for a writ of prohibition to restrain the circuit court
from exercising jurisdiction.2 78
The owners responded by arguing, in part, that the act unconstitu-
tionally deprived them of their right of access to courts under article I,
section 21 .279 A four-justice majority disagreed, and prohibited the cir-
cuit court from proceeding further with the suits.
[T]o the extent that the statute could be said to place a limitation
upon access, there is no violation of article I, section 21. In Kluger
v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), this Court held that the legisla-
ture may abolish a common law right of access to the courts if it
provides a reasonable alternative to protect the rights of the people
to redress for injuries.280
Clearly, the legislature abolished a right of access enjoyed at common
law. By itself that action would have been fatal to the act. However,
the majority concluded that the act survived constitutional scrutiny be-
cause the legislature put in its place a "reasonable alternative" remedy,
by assuring the owners the opportunity for review of the administrative
decision by the First District Court of Appeal. 81
Three justices dissented on this point, arguing that the legislature
impermissibly interfered with the exercise of constitutionally conferred
judicial power.212 In particular, the Administrative Procedures Act 283
278. Bonanno, 568 So. 2d at 27.
279. That theory is grounded in the notion that the trial judge, not an adminis-
trative agency, is the trier of all legal and factual issues in an inverse condemnation
suit, except those relating to damages. See Mid-Florida Growers, Inc., 521 So. 2d at
104.
280. Bonanno, 568 So. 2d at 30.
281. Id. (Shaw, C.J., Overton, McDonald, and Grimes, JJ., concurring). The
majority added that the act also provided salutary advantages to affected owners. It
conferred some benefits not available in circuit court, permitted the payment of claims
barred by the statute of limitations, and eliminated the obligation that claimants invali-
date releases they signed to obtain partial compensation under the act. Id.
282. Id. at 35 (Ehrlich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Barkett and
Kogan, JJ., concurring).
283. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(10) (1987).
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insulates the agency from effective judicial review. A court reviewing
an agency's decision under the canker eradication program may not
reweigh the evidence, but may only decide whether there exists on the
record sufficient evidentiary support for the final decision.
Another of Bonanno's constitutional contributions is addressed in
the following section.
22. Trial by Jury
The right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and remain invio-
late. The qualifications and the number of jurors, not fewer than
six, shall be fixed by law. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22.
The first of two cases to consider this section focused upon the
meaning of the guarantee that the right to a jury trial shall be secure
and inviolate. Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services v.
Bonanno,s8 4 introduced in the preceding section, considered a claim by
nursery and grove owners that the canker eradication program deprived
them of their right to litigate their inverse condemnation suits before a
court and jury, and impermissibly relegated them to the administrative
process. The majority rejected their claim.
Relying upon principles familiar to this section, the court deter-
mined that the right to jury trial is assured in those cases where the
right was recognized "'at the time Florida's first constitution became
effective in 1845.' ",285 Because there then existed no right to jury trial
in condemnation proceedings, 288 and the right to have a jury determine
damages is a creature of modern statute, the legislature is free to
change or take away that right. Thus, the citrus owners have no consti-
tutionally protected right to prosecute inverse condemnation suits
before a jury.
The second of the two cases focused upon this section's numeric
requirement for jury size. By law, twelve persons are required to try
capital cases, and six persons are required to try all other criminal
284. 568 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam).
285. Id. at 28 (quoting In re Forfeiture of 1978 Chevrolet Van, 493 So. 2d 433,
435 (Fla. 1986)). Actually, Florida adopted its first constitution in 1838, although it
did not become effective until Florida gained admission into the Union in 1845. Dudley
v. Harrison, McCready & Co., 127 Fla. 687, 698, 173 So. 820, 825 (1937).
286. Bonanno, 568 So. 2d at 28 (citing Carter v. State Rd. Dep't, 189 So. 2d
793, 799 (Fla. 1966)).
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cases.281 In State v. Griffith,288 the state waived the death penalty
before jury selection in exchange for an agreement with Griffith's coun-
sel to accept a six-person rather than a twelve-person jury. Describing
the right to a jury trial as "indisputably one of the most basic rights
guaranteed by our constitution," 2 9 the court determined that the
state's waiver of the death penalty in a capital case does not automati-
cally entitle a defendant to trial by a six-person jury.29° However,
where the record indicates that defense counsel discussed the waiver of
the twelve-person jury with the prosecutor and trial court, counsel's
choice to proceed with a six-person jury will be viewed as tactical.
Under those circumstances, there is no need that the record contain the
defendant's personal waiver for the waiver to be effective.29'
23. Right of Privacy
Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise
provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the
public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided
by law. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
The right of privacy, or as it is more precisely phrased in the state
constitutional context, "the right to be let alone," expresses the power
of natural persons to define for themselves the boundary of their per-
287. FLA. STAT. § 913.10 (1985); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.270.
288. 561 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1990) (McDonald, J., author. Ehrlich, C.J., Shaw,
Barkett, Grimes, and Kogan, JJ, concurring. Overton, J., concurred in result only).
289. Id. at 530.
290. The state claimed that its waiver of the death penalty in a first-degree mur-
der case precluded a defendant from demanding a trial by twelve persons because
death was no longer a possible punishment. One justice accepted this argument. Id. at
531 (Overton, J., concurring in result only). The other members of the court rejected
the claim, agreeing instead that the legislature defines the crime, classifies the crime,
sets the punishment, and prescribes the number of jurors required for trial. A prosecu-
tor has no authority to unilaterally alter those parameters. Id. at 529.
291. Id. at 530; see also, State v. Enriquez, 572 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1990) (no
showing that defendant's waiver, as evinced by stipulation between defense counsel and
prosecutor to trial by six-person jury, was invalid); State v. Rodriguez-Acosta, 561 So.
2d 531 (Fla. 1990); State v. Jones, 561 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1990); State v. Mustelier, 561
So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1990). Cf. State v. Joseph, 561 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1990) (unwilling to
imply waiver from a silent record, the court approved the district court's reversal of
defendant's murder conviction).
1991] 1107
184
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/18
Nova Law Review
sonal lives, and imposes a correlative limit upon the state that prevents
its encroachment into that boundary.2"2 To assure that this "indepen-
dent, freestanding, [and] fundamental" right 93 will remain "as strong
as possible," ' 4 the court measures state intrusions under the most ex-
acting standard of review, the compelling state interest test.2 95 Once
the protections of the privacy amendment are implicated, the state may
justify its interference with that right only by showing that interference
was necessary to advance a compelling state interest, and that it ac-
complished the interference by the least intrusive means.
The "right to be let alone" is inherently subjective, and, in its ab-
solute sense, respects a universe of personal choices. That partially ac-
counts for the diversity of definitions found in much of the commentary
on the subject. Grouping the court's privacy decisions into broad cate-
gories representing spheres of personal interest promotes our under-
standing of the concept, and suggests how an asserted interest will fare
under article I, section 23 analysis by facilitating comparison with fac-
tually similar cases.
To accomplish those aims, the decade survey organized the court's
article I, section 23 cases into three general categories of privacy
interests:
disclosural or informational privacy (how, when, and to what ex-
tent a person allows private information to be communicated to
others); traditional search and seizure contexts (the privacy pro-
tected by article I, section 23 that is similarly protected by the
292. The distinction between "right of privacy" and "right to b- let alone" has
significance beyond the obvious turn of the phrase. Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257, 264
(Fla. 1990) (Kogan, J., dissenting). For one, it respects the framers' intent to set apart
Florida's express constitutional guarantee from the right to privacy implied in the fed-
eral constitution. See Dore, Of Rights Lost and Gained, 6 FLA. ST. U.L REv. 609, 652-
53 n.268 (1978). Moreover, the "right to be let alone" borrows from an historical con-
cept that reveres privacy as the most valued fundamental right. See Hawkins, supra
note 1, at 827 n.674. Finally, it bears note that the text of a constituticnal section, and
not its title, determines its construction. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 12(h). For that reason,
courts must look to the text itself, not the caption, to ascertain its meaning.
293. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla.
1985).
294. Id. at 544.
295. The court has uniformly applied this standard in civil cases See, e.g., In re
T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989); Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443
So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983); administrative cases, see, e.g., Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548; and
criminal contexts, see, e.g., State v. Wells, 539 So. 2d 464 (Fla.), af'd, 110 S. Ct. 1632
(1989).
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warrant and reasonableness requirements of article I, section 12
and the fourth amendment); and decisional autonomy or self-deter-
mination (control over one's character, identity, and
associations).298
This survey adheres to that model. Twice in 1990 the court construed
article I, section 23. The two decisions, In re Guardianship of Estelle
M. Browning297 and Stall v. State,298 addressed claims that the state
unjustifiedly interfered with the freedom of personal choice assured
under that section.
Personal dignity, individual autonomy, and the right to make for
oneself decisions affecting matters of purely personal destiny lie at the
heart of the right to be let alone, or as it is also described in this con-
text, the right of self-determination. Persons make decisions of this sort
daily, seldom with interference. Yet, some decisions, such as the diffi-
cult choice made by persons to refuse or discontinue life-sustaining
medical intervention,299 often run head-on into a "regulatory purga-
tory"3 00 that effectively circumscribes personal choice. Browning poign-
antly illustrates the unfortunate consequences of misguided
296. Hawkins, supra note 1, at 831. Functionally, these categories aid the defini-
tional understanding of privacy by focusing on the varied qualities of individual life
that persons seek to reserve for themselves, apart from outside scrutiny. See Stall v.
State, 570 So. 2d 257, 264 (Fla. 1990) (Kogan, J., dissenting). Privacy interests derive
from constitutional sources other than article I, section 23, including the search and
seizure, substantive due process, and liberty clauses. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 561 So.
2d 1139, 1143 (Fla. 1990) (unjustified stops of motorists with similarity to drug courier
profile intrude upon privacy rights protected under article I, section 12 of the Florida
Constitution); Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1987)
(privacy interests are inherent in the concept of ordered liberty). Compare Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (the right to privacy is founded in the concept of
personal liberty of the fourteenth amendment).
297. 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (Barkett, J., author; Shaw, C.J., Ehrlich, Grimes,
and Kogan, JJ., concurring; McDonald, J., concurred with an opinion; Overton, J., con-
curred in part and dissented in part with an opinion).
298. 570 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1990) (McDonald, J., author; Shaw, C.J., Overton,
Ehrlich, and Grimes, JJ., concurring; Barkett, J. and Kogan, J., each dissented with an
opinion in which the other concurred).
299. Often referred to as "death with dignity" or the "right to die," the term
right of choice more precisely describes the particular decisions made under the rubric
self-determination, whether the decision is either to choose or to refuse a particular
course.
300. Tallahassee Democrat, Oct. 11, 1990, at 3B, col. 2.
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regulation. 301
Like many others, Mrs. Browning took care to execute a living
will, an instrument that is essentially a directive to physicians and fam-
ily expressing preferences about the medical course to be followed in
the event she were to face incapacity. Her declaration provided:
If at any time I should have a terminal condition and my attending
physician has determined that there can be no recovery from such
condition and my death is imminent, where the application of life-
sustaining procedures would serve only to artificially prolong the
dying process, I direct that such procedures be withheld or with-
drawn, and that I be permitted to die naturally with only the ad-
ministration of medication or the performance of any medical pro-
cedure deemed necessary to provide me with comfort care or to
alleviate pain.302
Mrs. Browning expressly added that she did not desire to be fed nutri-
tion or hydration, either by gastric tube or intravenously.303
The year following her declaration, Mrs. Browning suffered a mas-
sive stroke that caused major, permanent, and irreversible damage to
her brain, and left her totally unresponsive and unable to communicate.
On the day of her accident, Mrs. Browning was hospitalized, and a
gastrostomy tube was inserted into her stomach. Through it, she re-
ceived food and liquid. The same month, she was transferred to a nurs-
ing home, where a nasogastric tube was inserted after her gastrostomy
tube became dislodged and she encountered numerous unpleasant,
301. Many reported decisions, Browning among them, confirm that patients
often predecease the resolution of legal proceedings initiated on their behalf. See
Browning, 568 So. 2d at 16 n.17.
302. In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 275 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1989). That provision substantially comports with Florida's Life-Prolonging Pro-
cedure Act, Ch. 84-58, 1984 Fla. Laws 136 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 765.01.15 (Supp.
1984)).
303. The removal of nutrition or hydration was foreign to the Life-Prolonging
Procedure Act. Although any competent adult could declare a written intent to with-
hold or withdraw "life-prolonging procedures" under specified circumstances, the act
excluded the "provision of sustenance" (food and water) from its definition. FLA. STAT.
§ 765.03(3) (Supp. 1984). For that reason, the issue before the court did not involve
the import of remedial protections afforded under the act, but Mrs. Browning's right of
privacy under the state constitution. Meanwhile, the legislature amended the act to
eliminate the exclusion, now including sustenance within the scope of "life-prolonging
procedures." Ch. 90-223, § 1, 1990 Fla. Laws 1644.
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chronic maladies. 0 4
Several months after Mrs. Browning's relocation to the nursing
home, the circuit court appointed a guardian. Some two years after the
debilitating stroke, the guardian petitioned the circuit court to order
that artificial feeding be discontinued. At a hearing on the guardian's
petition, medical evidence showed that Mrs. Browning was non-coma-
tose, and lived in a persistent vegetative state.30 5 The circuit court
found that Mrs. Browning's death was not imminent,306 a prerequisite
to the withdrawal of medical support under Florida's Life-Prolonging
Procedure Act,3 07 and denied the petition.
The district court affirmed the circuit court, finding, however, that
even though Mrs. Browning had no remedy under the act, she did have
a remedy under article I, section 23.308 It declared that "a remedy
must exist to fulfill Mrs. Browning's constitutional right of privacy,"30 9
and in particular, her right to refuse medical treatment. The district
court panel took the initiative, and proposed a thoughtfully crafted pro-
cedural scheme to give effect to that right.310 It then certified the fol-
304. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 8 n.3; Browning, 543 So. 2d at 261-62.
305. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 9; Browning, 543 So. 2d at 261.
306. That finding was premised upon medical opinion testimony that Mrs.
Browning could continue to live for an "indeterminate" time with the feeding tube left
in place. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 9. To the mind of the district court panel, and at
least one commentator, this distinction, like others in the act, warrants rethinking. See
Browning, 543 So. 2d at 265 (defining imminent death under conditions where medical
treatment is continued, effectively renders the statute "useless"); Morgan, Florida Law
and Feeding Tubes-The Right of Removal, 17 STETSON, L. REv. 109 (1987) (such a
construction effectively disenfranchises persons whose condition, though not terminal, is
irreversible). As will be seen, the state supreme court rejected the trial court's method
of determining "imminence" for constitutional purposes. See infra at note 338.
307. Ch. 84-58, 1984 Fla. Laws 136.
308. Browning, 543 So. 2d at 261. The district court observed that the case was
presented to the trial court almost exclusively under the Florida Statutes, and that both
the guardian's attorney and the trial court were understandably confused about the
distinction between the procedural requirements for a statutory, versus a constitutional
claim. Id. at 262.
309. Id. at 266.
310. The district court outlined procedures that took into account the selection of
the surrogate (either a guardian or the circuit court in exceptional cases), id. at 270;
the need for an informal forum, preferably without judicial review, id. at 270-71; evi-
dence essential to the decision to forego treatment, including physicians' certificates to
establish the patient's current medical condition, evidence that the patient will not
regain competency, evidence that the patient, if competent, would have selected the
course chosen by the surrogate, and proof that the state's interests are not paramount,
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lowing question to the state supreme court as having great public
importance:
Whether the guardian of a patient who is incompetent but not in a
permanent vegetative state and who suffers from an incurable, but
not terminal condition, may exercise the patient's right of self-de-
termination to forego sustenance provided artificially by a nasogas-
tric tube? 311
The court answered affirmatively with qualification. In this, only
the second self-determination case to expressly construe article I, sec-
tion 23,12 the justices began with a broadly-stated premise-"everyone
has a fundamental right to the sole control of his or her person.'- 3 An
"integral component" of self-determination is the inherent right to
make personal medical treatment decisions, which necessarily encom-
passes "all medical choices. 3 14 Competent persons have the right to
refuse medical intervention, 315 regardless of the denomination of the
procedure at issue,3 16 and regardless of the subjectivity of the choice.
Indeed, mainstream judicial thought has often honored the subjec-
tive medical decisions of patients. For instance, courts have enforced
the wishes of competent adults to forego medical intervention when
id. at 271-73; the requirement that the surrogate support a decision to forego treatment
by clear and convincing evidence, id. at 273; and the scope of judicial review, when
required, id. at 273-74.
311. Id. at 274.
312. Only In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989), clearly decided a self-deter-
mination claim under article I, section 23. That decision struck down Florida's parental
consent law because it impermissibly interfered with the right of an unmarried, fifteen-
year-old pregnant female to decide for herself whether to terminate her pregnancy dur-
ing the first trimester. It bears repeating, however, that the court's privacy cases that
construed common law and the federal constitution may strongly suggest principles
incorporated into article I, section 23.
313. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 10.
314. Id. (emphasis added).
315. Id. (citing Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989); Cruzan
ex rel. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990)). Cf. id.
at 2851-52 (regarding the right of a competent person to refuse unwanted medical
treatment, including lifesaving hydration and nutrition, as a liberty interest that derives
from the fourteenth amendment).
316. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 11 n.6 (regarding as legally indistinguishable, med-
ical procedure denominated as "major or minor, ordinary or extraordinary, life-pro-
longing, life-maintaining, life-sustaining, or otherwise").
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premised on tenets of religious faith,3 17 on the desire to avoid a dimin-
ished quality of life,318 and on the refusal to endure prolonged and in-
sufferable pain.31 9 Notably, the court has yet to insist that a claimant
first demonstrate an objective manifestation of reasonableness as a pre-
condition to the threshold finding that personal medical choice deserves
protection. 20
The inviolability of the personal right to decide a medical course
does not turn on whether the person is competent or incompetent. The
317. See, e.g.. Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989) (compe-
tent adult, who is also a practicing Jehovah's Witness, has a lawful right to refuse a
blood transfusion, without which she may well die).
318. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1142, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 297, 304 (Ct. App. 1986) (patient in a public hospital, whose life has been di-
minished to the point of "hopelessness, uselessness, unenjoyability and frustration," has
the right to forego life-support); Drabick v. Drabick, 200 Cal. App 3d 185, 196, 245
Cal. Rptr. 840, 846 (Ct. App. 1988) ("Whether the benefits of treatment outweigh its
detriments is a decision that engages on personal and medical values, including ideas
about the quality of life. It is not a decision that courts are constituted or especially
well-qualified to make."); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417,
434, 497 N.E.2d 626, 635 (1986) (recognizing a right "to avoid circumstances in which
the individual himself would feel that efforts to sustain life demean or degrade his
humanity") (citation omitted); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 955 (Me. 1987) ("Gard-
ner has himself done the balancing of his own values and their bearing on the question
of whether to be kept alive in a persistent vegetative state by artificial means. That
personal weighing of values is the essence of self-determination . . . . [W]e judges do
not ourselves engage in an independent assessment of the value of his life."); In re
Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 340 (Minn. 1984) (a terminally ill patient might choose to
avoid "'[t]he ultimate horror . . . of being maintained in limbo, in a sterile room, by
machines controlled by strangers' ") (ditation omitted); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 26,
355 A.2d 647, 663 ("We have no hesitancy in deciding . . . that no external compel-
ling interest of the State could compel Karen to endure the unendurable, only to vege-
tate a few measurable months with no realistic possibility of returning to any sem-
blance of cognitive or sapient life"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Cf. Cruzan, 110
S. Ct. at 2853 (states may decline to make judgments about a particular person's
"quality" of life, and simply assert "an unqualified interest in the preservation of
human life").
319. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 161 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (terminally ill adult, who testified at bedside hearing to being "miserable" with
use of a respirator, has a right to remove it, even though death would follow within one
hour), approved, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wash.
2d 545, 555, 747 P.2d 445, 450-51 (1987) (en banc) (the amount of pain endured by a
terminally ill, noncomatose person is a significant factor, although not the only factor,
to be considered in deciding whether to withhold life sustaining treatment).
320. In contrast, the court has imposed an objectivity requirement in disclosural
privacy cases, and cases decided in traditional search and seizure contexts.
11131991]
190
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/18
Nova Law Review
justices agreed that there was no constitutional basis for distinguishing
the protections inuring to competent persons, and those whose non-cog-
nitive condition prevented the personal exercise of their choice.321
Having decided that competent and incompetent persons alike en-
joy a constitutional right to make decisions involving their personal
medical care, the justices addressed three remaining questions-who
may exercise the right for an incompetent person, under what circum-
stances may the state regulate this area, and what procedures give
force to the right. Concerning the first question, precedent established
that a close family member, or a court-appointed guardian, may exer-
cise the right for an irreversibly comatose patient, whose essentially
vegetative existence was sustained by a mechanical respirator. 22
Browning extended the class of persons capable of exercising the pa-
tient's right to include proxies,3 23 and surrogates, such as close family
members and friends. 324 The role of those decision makers is a narrow
one:
We emphasize and caution that when the patient has left instruc-
tions regarding life-sustaining treatment, the surrogate must make
the medical choice that the patient, if competent, would have
made, and not one that the surrogate might make for himself or
321. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 12 (citing John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc.
v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 924 (Fla. 1984)).
322. Id. at 13 (citing Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 926).
323. Persons to whom the patient delegated full responsibility for future medical
decision making. Id. at 15.
324. Id. (footnote omitted). Browning is a logical and warranted extension of
Bludworth. It makes little sense to limit the class of surrogate decision makers in this
context to court-appointed guardians and "close" family members. Friends, for in-
stance, may be well-suited to exercise the patient's charted medical ccurse. Moreover,
the patient may prefer to designate a friend, rather than a family member, or there
may be no family that could be said to be "close," whether by consanguinity or famili-
arity. Indeed, delegations of friends by patients are commonplace. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct.
at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
The durable family power of attorney is another device used in this setting. The
legislature authorizes a principle to create a durable family power of attorney by
designating his or her "spouse, brother, sister, niece, nephew, or a person related to the
principal by lineal consanguinity" FLA. STAT. § 709.08(1) (Supp. 1990). But see Wa-
ters, Florida Durable Power of Attorney Law: The Need For Reform, 17 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 519 (1990). Mr. Waters argues that the durable power as presently enacted "af-
fords only a limited and frequently unhelpful alternative to guardianship," id at 521,
by illogically restricting the class of attorneys-in-fact to a narrow group of relatives,
and failing to provide procedural safeguards for exercise of the power. Id. at 546.
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herself, or that the surrogate might think is in the patient's best
interests .3
25
Regarding the second question, the state must first show a compel-
ling state interest before it regulates the exercise of personal medical
care choices protected under article I, section 23. Often repeated as the
state's interests in cases involving a person's refusal of unwanted medi-
cal treatment are a non-exclusive list of factors that include preserving
life, protecting innocent third parties, preventing suicide, and helping to
maintain the ethical integrity of the medical profession.126
Browning makes a significant contribution to state constitutional
doctrine by recognizing that among the state's interests is its overarch-
ing responsibility to safeguard the inalienable rights of its citizens. The
court wrote with great clarity that "[t]he state has a duty to assure
that a person's wishes regarding medical treatment are respected. '327
Continuing, it said that: "obligation serves to protect the rights of the
individual from intrusion by the state unless the state has a compelling
interest great enough to override this constitutional right.3 28 On bal-
ance, the state's interests failed to outweigh Mrs. Browning's right to
self-determine her medical course.3 29 Moreover, there is no state inter-
325. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 13. The opinion does not suggest the parameters of
the constitutional right of privacy when the patient left no instructions regarding future
medical care.
326. Courts have recognized other state interests in this context. See Browning,
568 So. 2d at 14 n.13 (protecting incompetents from erroneous decisions, avoiding un-
wanted medical care, and assuring that the person's wishes are faithfully executed);
Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 98 (Fla. 1989) (holding that the state's
interest in maintaining a home with two parents for two minor children is insufficient to
override one parent's choice to forego lifesaving blood transfusion on religious and pri-
vacy grounds); Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2853 (states are entitled to guard against poten-
tial abuse, and to establish procedures that guarantee accurate fact-finding).
327. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 13 (emphasis added). The notion that the state has
a duty to secure the inalienable rights of all persons was a truth self-evident to the
signers on the nation's Declaration of Independence. The court noted Justice Stevens's
recent observation of the principle in the context of the federal constitution: "'Our
Constitution is born of the proposition that all legitimate governments must secure the
equal right of every person to 'Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.'" Id. at 13
n.12 (quoting Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2878-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omit-
ted) (quoting Declaration of Independence). Browning makes a novel addition to the
court's constitutional jurisprudence by declaring that the Florida Constitution em-
braces those same ideals.
328. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 13-14.
329. Id. at 14. Because the state failed to demonstrate a compelling state interest
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est that overrides the interest of the state in protecting its people.
Finally, the court addressed the procedures designed to protect the
patient's chosen medical course. The court declared that the decision
maker need not obtain prior judicial approval to carry out the wishes of
the patient, provided the patient specifically expressed those wishes
orally or in writing in the event of later incapacity. 330 If a patient dele-
gates decision making power to a proxy, the designation must be in
writing. Because the proxy by nature has full decision making responsi-
bility, the patient need not express any instructions. However, when a
patient provides instructions, the patient need not designate a decision
maker. In that event, a close family member or friend may carry out
the patient's wishes, and a designation, if made, may be oral or
written.33'
Browning charges the decision maker with two responsibilities.
First, the decision maker must take "great care" in exercising a pa-
tient's medical choice.33 2 Second, the decision maker must support a
decision with clear and convincing evidence. 3  If the particular deci-
sion is to forego medical treatment of an incompetent patient, the deci-
sion maker must satisfy three conditions by clear and convincing
evidence:
1. . . . that the patient executed any document knowingly, will-
ingly, and without undue influence, and that the evidence of the
patient's oral declarations is reliable;
2.. . . that the patient does not have a reasonable probability of
recovering competency so that the right could be exercised directly
by the patient; and
that would justify its regulation of a person's decision to forego life-sustaining medical
intervention, there was no need to consider whether the means to carry out the state's
interest was "narrowly tailored in the least intrusive manner possible." Id.
330. Id. at 15. This was not the first time the court opted for a nonjudicial proce-
dure that facilitated an individual's choice. See John F. Kennedy Hosp., Inc. v. Blud-
worth, 452 So. 2d 921, 925 (Fla. 1984) (rejecting the need to obtain prior court ap-
proval as "too burdensome" under the circumstances).
331. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 15.
332. Id. The requirement of "great care" does not insist upon bright lines. The
case sheds no light on what facts might satisfy the requirement, and its true meaning
remains to be charted by future cases. Its usage, however, suggests that it is a standard
entirely independent of the second requirement imposed upon the decision maker.
333. Id. Accord Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852 (holding that the United States Con-
stitution does not forbid a state from requiring clear and convincing evidence of an
incompetent's wishes to withdraw treatment).
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3. . . . that any limitations or. conditions expressed either orally or
in the written declaration have been carefully considered and
satisfied." 4 .
The third condition does not apply to proxies, nor does the provision for
oral declarations contained in the first condition. 335
Trial courts are available to proxies or surrogates who seek a dec-
laration of their powers, and to interested parties who challenge the
decision of a proxy or surrogate. If questioned or challenged in court, a
written declaration or designation of proxy, in the absence of contrary
evidence of intent, establishes a rebuttable presumption that constitutes
clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes. The decision
maker may rely upon physicians' certificates to establish a rebuttable
presumption that the medical condition described in the declaration has
been satisfied. 336 Oral statements by the patient to forego treatment, if
made while competent, are admissible on the issue of intent, but stand-
ing alone, are not presumptively clear and convincing. 33
Turning to the record facts, the court found that the conditions
Mrs. Browning established in her declaration were satisfied. There was
no question concerning the validity of the declaration, or that she suf-
fered from a terminal condition. Only the question of imminence re-
mained to be decided. Medical evidence established that death would
occur within four-to-nine days were the nasogastric tube removed.
Thus, there was clear and convincing evidence on the record that satis-
fied the condition of imminence, and the surrogate could confidently
instruct Mrs. Browning's health care providers to discontinue
334. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 15.
335. Id. at 15-16.
336. The decision maker "must obtain, and may rely upon" certificates (affida-
vits, sworn statements, or depositions) from at least three physicians, including the pri-
mary treating physician and two others who are specialists. Id. at 16 (adhering to
Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 926).
337. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 16. Justice Overton's objection to the majority
opinion was limited to its authorization of oral statements as proof of the patient's
intent. He argued that judicial involvement was "appropriate" to assure the validity of
the statements, and to avoid conflicts of interest between patient and surrogate, for
instance, when the surrogate stands to financially benefit from the premature termina-
tion of the patient's life support, Id. at 18 (Overton, J., concurring in part, and dissent-
ing in part.). The majority addressed these concerns by stating: "We cannot ignore the
possibility that a surrogate might act contrary to the wishes of the patient. Yet, we are
loath to impose a cumbersome legal proceeding at such a delicate time in those many
cases where the patient neither needs nor desires additional protection." Id. at 15.
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feeding.338
With unmistakable clarity, Browning advances the core concept
that article I, section 23 makes inviolable certain personal freedoms.
The case holds that persons have a constitutionally protected right to
make all personal medical decisions, without prior judicial approval,
and that they may freely delegate to others the power to make those
decisions on their behalf in the event of incapacity.339 If a person loses
competence after making a declaration that charts a future medical
course, the decision maker may exercise the medical choice that the
patient would have wanted, provided that the patient's intent is sup-
ported by clear and convincing evidence. Several features in the opinion
underscore the significance of that holding including: the unanimity of
the justices on the turning principles of the opinion; the repeated rejec-
tion of factors traditionally thought to justify state intervention into
this area; the recognition of a constitutional right not asserted by a
claimant, and previously undefined by the court's case law; and the sel-
dom-seen crafting of rules to safeguard the exercise of the constitu-
tional right.
Browning's importance extends beyond the four corners of the
opinion, for it signals that the Florida Constitution's right of privacy
may eclipse the privacy protections of the United States Constitution in
the area of self-determination. Only months before Browning, the
United States Supreme Court decided Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Missouri Department of Health,3 40 and acknowledged for the first
time that a person's choice to discontinue life-sustaining medical treat-
ment is a liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. The
justices stood noticeably silent on the question logically presented by
the case, whether the choice deserved protection under the implied fed-
eral right to privacy. To some, it matters not whether the right of self-
determination derives from liberty, privacy, or some other fundamental
guarantee.34 1 Prudence cautions, however, that the textual basis of an
338. Id. at 17. A declaration that instructs the decision maker to remove life-
support in the event of "imminent" death, will be satisfied constitutionally by looking
to the length of time a patient will survive after removal of life-support, not to the
length of time the patient will survive if life-support measures are introduced, or
maintained.
339. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 17.
340. Id.
341. Indeed, Browning acknowledges that "privacy" encompasss.s a concept of
freedom that has been interchangeably used with the commonly understood notion of
"liberty," both of which imply a fundamental right of self-determination. Browning,
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asserted right cannot be lightly considered. 342 Cruzan's silence about
whether federal privacy protects the right to make personal medical
decisions leaves federal constitutional privacy law unsettled, and raises
the possibility that the Court no longer views privacy as a fundamental
right.3 3 Alternatively, the decision may signal that the Court has no
desire to nationalize privacy law in this context, and for the moment
leaves the states free to fashion federal privacy protections.
When read together, In re T.W.344 and Browning in one year's
time seemingly demonstrate a commitment of the court to hold that the
exercise of personal choice within the realm of self-determination ought
to remain largely unimpeded by state regulation. The release of Stall
one month after Browning, however, cast into doubt the court's true
resolve to vigorously defend expressions of personal freedom classified
under that rubric. Review of Stall follows.
The state charged Stall and others with violating Florida's RICO
act,345 and the predicate offenses under the obscenity statute, 46 for al-
legedly showing, selling, distributing, or renting obscene material. The
trial court dismissed the information, finding in part that the obscenity
statute violated article I, section 23. On appeal to the district court,
Stall maintained that he had standing to vicariously assert the privacy
rights of his customers. Relying upon Stanley v. Georgia,41 which de-
clared that the first and fourteenth amendments prohibited states from
568 So. 2d at 9-10; see also Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2856 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(the notion of liberty is "inextricably entwined with our idea of physical freedom and
self-determination").
342. Pegging an asserted interest to a particular constitutional text offers a de-
gree of analytical certainty. For one, the textual basis of a right may indicate its rela-
tive strength. Some sections afford a greater standard of protection than other sections.
Compare FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (measuring state infringement of the express right of
privacy according to the compelling state interest test) with FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12
(measuring state infringement of privacy right by standards of reasonableness and le-
gitimacy). For another, rights expressly conferred, rather than implied, provide the
clearest evidence of their existence and importance. See Thornburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 790 (1986) (White, J.,
dissenting).
343. Allen, Court Disables Disputed Legacy of Privacy Right, Supreme Court
Review, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13, 1990, at 8 (criticizing Cruzan for its failure to endorse
the privacy analyses it acknowledged).
344. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
345. Florida RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization) Act, FLA.
STAT. §§ 895.01-.06 (1985).
346. FLA. STAT. §§ 847.011 (1985 & Supp. 1986).
347. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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proscribing the mere possession of obscene material,348 Stall argued
that the right to possess would be meaningless unless sellers and dis-
tributors of obscene material were similarly able to seek protection
from governmental intrusion.
Citing two federal decisions, Griswold v. Connecticut4"1 and Eisen-
stadt v. Baird,3 50 the district court panel expressly found that Stall was
entitled to assert the privacy right of his customers to possess obscene
material.351 It reasoned that Stall's customers had no effective means of
protecting their right of possession in a prosecution for distribution, un-
less Stall had standing to raise the claim on their behalf.
On review, a majority of five justices found the two federal cases
easily distinguishable. Griswold rested on different facts. The State of
Connecticut prosecuted as accessories the executive director of the
state planned parenthood league, and a licensed physician because they
prescribed contraceptives to married persons in violation of a statute
that forbade the use of contraceptives. Ultimately, the Griswold de-
fendants were allowed to champion the fundamental right of marital
privacy held by the patients with whom they had a professional rela-
tionship. Otherwise, their patients' right would have had no voice
against the infringement occasioned by Connecticut's contraceptive
ban. The majority in Stall relied upon Paris Adult Theater I v. Sla-
ton,3152 where the United States Supreme Court had disapproved the
348. In Stanley, state and federal officers gained entry into Stanley's home upon
the strength of a search warrant, which entitled them to seize illegal bookmaking
equipment, records, and materials. While looking through a desk drawer in an upstairs
bedroom, they discovered three eight-millimeter reels of film. After viewing the films
on a projector, the officers determined that the films were obscene and seized them.
The state prosecuted Stanley under a Georgia obscenity law, which among other
things, proscribed the "possession . . . of obscene matter," id. at 558 n. ', and obtained
a conviction. The Court overturned that conviction with its familiar holding:
[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere private
possession of obscene material a crime .... [T]he States retain broad
power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere
possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home.
Id. at 568 (footnote omitted).
349. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
350. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
351. State v. Long, 544 So. 2d 219, 221-22 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989), ap-
proved sub nom. Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1990). Ultimately, the district
court held that article I, section 23 did not shield Stall from criminal prosecution under
the obscenity statute, id. at 222, and that the statute did not impermissibly interfere
with the constitutional right of privacy. Id. at 223.
352. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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analogy by saying that "'it is unavailing to compare a theater, open to
the public for a fee, with the private home of Stanley v. Georgia, and
the marital bedroom of Griswold v. Connecticut.' 353
Eisenstadt was also unavailing. There, the defendant who distrib-
uted vaginal foam to an unmarried adult woman in violation of Massa-
chusetts law was entitled to assert the rights of unmarried persons who
were denied access to contraceptives under that law. The majority dis-
tinguished Eisenstadt upon the stated basis that it clearly was premised
on the statute's unequal treatment of married and unmarried persons in
violation of the fourteenth amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The
two cases were easily contrasted:
There is no such distinction between adults who may have access to
obscene materials. Moreover, private users and commercial sellers
are separate and distinct classes and may be treated differently.
Eisenstadt provides a vehicle, as do other cases, to raise the consti-
tutionality of a statute by holding that persons or entities in differ-
ent positions have the same rights and must be treated the same. It
certainly does not sustain the rationale that, because one has a
right to view obscene material in one's home, statutes forbidding
the sale and commercial distribution of such material are
invalid.354
Stall's Stanley argument was equally unpersuasive to the majority
because the United States Supreme Court has consistently limited
Stanley to its facts. In particular, United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels
of Super 8mm. Film355 directly stated: "'[T]he protected right to pos-
sess obscene material in the privacy of one's home does not give rise to
a correlative right to have someone sell or give it to others.' "9356
Having distinguished Griswold and Eisenstadt, and limited Stan-
ley to its facts, the majority implicitly rejected the district court's find-
353. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 261 (quoting Paris Adult Theater 1, 413 U.S. at 65).
354. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 262-63. A fiery dissent charged that the majority
grossly misrepresented federal law by concluding that Eisenstadt is simply an equal
protection case, thus implying that no privacy concerns were implicated. "[T]he hold-
ing of Eisenstadt is unintelligible unless it is premised upon a privacy right involved in
the purchase and sale of contraceptives." Id. at 273 (Kogan, J., dissenting; Barkett, J.,
concurring) (footnote omitted). Also, Eisenstadt clearly relied on Griswold, which ad-
dressed the right of privacy in the marital relationship. Id. at 273 n.21.
355. 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
356. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 260 (quoting United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of
Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973)).
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ing that Stall had standing to assert the constitutionally protected right
of privacy enjoyed by his customers. 357 Gratuitously, the majority
added that the privacy amendment does not apply to vendors of obscen-
ity either. 58 Normally, a claimant's failure to assert successfully a pro-
tected interest disposes the issue. Once Stall failed to meet that thresh-
old, he could advance no constitutional privacy claim, and the inquiry
into the merits was unnecessary. Perhaps it was to more fully establish
its position on obscenity regulation that the majority continued.
The five-member majority reached the merits of Stall's privacy
claim by engaging in the following hypothetical: "Assuming that [those
who show, sell, distribute, or rent allegedly obscene material] have vi-
carious standing to raise their customers' privacy interest, we agree
with the district court that their customers' right of privacy does not
extend to [them] . ' 3 9
As a threshold matter, the right of privacy in the context of ob-
scenity regulations attaches only when a claimant demonstrates a "rea-
sonable" expectation of privacy.360 Borrowing from Paris Adult Thea-
ter 1,36' the majority wrote: "'The idea of a 'privacy' right and a place
357. The majority's disagreement with the district court on the standing issue
may explain why the majority approved the decision of the district court, see Stall, 570
So. 2d at 258, 262, and did not approve the opinion.
358. Id. (relying upon 12 200-Foot Reels, 413 U.S. at 128). The only question
posed by Stall asks whether the right of the vendor's customers to privately possess
obscene material extends to the point of sale, and if so, whether the vendor can take
advantage of that protection in a criminal prosecution for unlawful distribution.
Whether Stall himself, as a distributor, has a personal privacy interest i:s a concern not
directly presented by the case as framed by the four corners of the opinion.
359. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 258 (citation omitted).
360. The reasonableness of one's expectation of privacy takes into account all the
circumstances, and in particular, the objective manifestations of that expectation. Id. at
260 (citations omitted). Requiring a claimant to show objective reasonableness is a
standard that is characteristic of disclosural privacy, and search and seizure cases.
Before Stall, the court had not yet imposed that requirement on matters of personal
choice grouped under the rubric of self-determination.
361. Paris Adult Theater I, 413 U.S. at 49. That opinion involved the civil pros-
ecution of two Atlanta movie theaters, together with their owners and managers, under
the Georgia Code, for the exhibition of allegedly obscene films to the public for paid
admission. The Court reaffirmed the principle that obscene material enjoys no first
amendment protection, and held: "[T]he States have a legitimate interest in regulating
commerce in obscene material and in regulating exhibition of obscene material in
places of public accommodation, including so-called 'adult' theaters from which minors
are excluded." Id. at 69.
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of public accommodation are, in this context, mutually exclusive.' "362
The justices summarily declared that a customer has no "legitimate
reasonable" expectation of privacy to patronize a retail establishment
in order to purchase obscene material.36 3 Stall is the first instance
where the court declined to find even the bare existence of an asserted
privacy interest under article I, section 23.364
The majority declared that the state has a "legitimate interest 'in
stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity.' "1365 To accomplish
that aim, the state is empowered to make "'morally neutral'" judg-
ments that commercialized obscenity injures the community as a
whole.366 Unless those choices "'clearly transgress private rights,' ",367
362. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 261 (quoting Paris Adult Theater 1, 413 U.S. at 66-
67).
363. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 257. The majority implied in dicta that Stall could not
succeed on his claim because he failed to present persons whose constitutionally pro-
tected right to possess obscene material was affected by the state action. Id. However,
the court had already concluded that there exists no constitutionally protected right to
purchase such material. Thus, it would be futile for Stall to produce persons who were
entitled to privately possess that material. That dicta raises speculation whether the
court would have been less reticent to seriously explore the limits of article I, section
23, were the right asserted by such individuals personally. Stall's close link to the com-
mercial enterprise, which was the focus of the legislative policy, made him an unlikely
candidate to champion the right vicariously in a case of first impression.
364. In a few pre-article I, section 23 cases, the court was unwilling to find an
implied right of privacy in the Florida Constitution. See, e.g., Shevin v. Byron, Harless,
Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., Inc., 379 So. 2d 633, 639 (Fla. 1980); In re Post-Newsweek
Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 779 (Fla. 1979); Laird v. State, 342 So. 2d 962,
965 (Fla. 1977).
365. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 260 (quoting Paris Adult Theater 1, 413 U.S. at 57)
(emphasis added). Federal constitutional analysis accepts as the state's interests in this
context, "the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total community devel-
opment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly, the public safety
itself." Paris Adult Theater I, 413 U.S. at 58.
366. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 261 (quoting Paris Adult Theater 1, 413 U.S. at 69).
Unwilling to accept the notion that obscene materials are inherently harmful, the dis-
sent looked to the record for evidence that would show actual injury to one or more
persons. Having found "no shred of evidence" to support the state's regulation, Justice
Kogan wrote, "I do not believe that abstract, unproven harm is a sufficient reason to
invade the right to be let alone." Id. at 270. He would hold that the article I, section 2
prohibits governmental intrusion into the noninjurious aspects of one's personal life,
including the acquisition of "noninjurious reading materials and entertainment for dis-
crete personal use." Id. at 269. Accord Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1155 (Fla.
1989) (construing privacy in the context of article I, section 12, the court's majority
wrote that the "right of personal autonomy or privacy. . . is forfeited when an individ-
ual acts to harm another").
1991] 1123
200
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/18
Nova Law Review
it is the role of the judicial branch to defer to a coordinate branch.
There is no breach of private rights when the state regulates obscene
works that "'depict or describe sexual conduct.' ",368
The anti-obscenity statute at issue proscribes the distribution and
exhibition of" 'obscene'" material, as well as "'lewd, lascivious, filthy,
indecent, sadistic, or masochistic' material. 3 6' The majority reasoned
that those statutes are "sufficiently limited, both by their terms and by
common sense"3 0 to pass constitutional scrutiny. Conceding that the
terms have different shades of meaning, the majority accepted that the
federal analogue to Florida's obscenity statute, which uses the identical
terms, "'has always been taken as aimed at obnoxiously debasing por-
trayals of sex.' "1371
That analysis provoked Justice Kogan and Justice Barkett to
charge that the majority's mode of statutory interpretation was "legally
indefensible." The fundamental legal obstacle posed by the anti-ob-
scenity law, they argued, is that the term "obscenity" itself defies a
legally comprehensible definition. Consequently, a handful of people
"define" the crime after-the-fact, and thereby impose their personal
views of morality on others.3 72 Such unbridled censorship impermissibly
restricts individual autonomy, and offends the very spirit of the privacy
amendment.37 3
The majority also reasoned that the weight of state court prece-
367. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 261 (quoting In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1204 (Grimes,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
368. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 259 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973)). Miller set standards for state regulation of obscenity, which were incorporated
in Florida law. See FLA. STAT. § 847.001(7), (11) (Supp. 1986).
369. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 259 (citations omitted).
370. Id.
371. Id. (quoting Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1962)
(footnotes omitted)). But cf. Warren v. State, 572 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 1991) (striking on
vagueness grounds a statute that proscribes the keeping of house of "ill fame:" even
though "the general population might have understood the meaning of 'ill fame' a cen-
tury ago, the lack of definition in the statutes, jury instruction, and cases is fatal to its
continued validity") (unanimous on point); Hicks v. State, 572 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 1991)
(following Warren) (unanimous); Palmieri v. State, 572 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 1991) (fol-
lowing Warren) (unanimous).
372. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 263 (Barkett, J., dissenting; Kogan, J., concurring.); id.
at 263 (Kogan, J., dissenting; Barkett, J., concurring). History records; with irony the
numerous, short-lived attempts by the censorship police to suppress literary works, now
regarded as masterpieces. Don Juan, An American Tragedy, Lady Chatterly's Lover,
God's Little Acre, and Ulysses are among them. Id. (citations omitted).
373. Id.
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dent opposes Stall. It claimed that the court had several years ago "ad-
dressed" Stall's Stanley claim in State v. Kraham,3 4 which specifically
rejected the argument that it was illogical and arbitrary to sanction one
person for providing material to another who was entitled to possess
that material. 375
To say that the court had before "addressed" the issue now raised
by Stall is imprecise. Kraham considered whether the 1975 version of
the obscenity statute, which proscribed the sale of obscene material,
was unconstitutional in light of one's right to possess such material
under Stanley. However, the voters approved article I, section 23 in
November 1980, over two years after Kraham. Thus, the court never
even considered whether a person could vicariously assert the protec-
tions of the state privacy amendment. This criticism of the majority's
opinion is all the more valid in light of its repeated reliance in earlier
privacy cases upon the teachings of Winfield v. Division of Pari-
Mutuel Wagering,37 6 which firmly established Florida's general privacy
right as affording greater protections than those implied in the federal
Bill of Rights.
Finally, Stall makes an intriguing contribution to the principles of
constitutional construction. Said the majority:
There is no indication that the drafters of article I, section 23
meant to broaden the right of privacy [beyond then-existing state
or federal protections] as it relates to obscene materials or that the
validity of [the anti-obscenity statute] is affected by the privacy
provision. Indeed, had the public been aware of such an applica-
tion, we seriously doubt that the amendment would have been
adopted.3 77
But this is not a case where the court must divine the adopters' intent.
Unlike many personal rights with ancient origins and no recorded his-
torical materials to aid constitutional interpretation, Florida's right of
privacy is a recent addition to the organic law, with much available
material to its credit. The majority's use of unwarranted, unsupported
374. 360 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1978), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 941 (1979).
375. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 258.
376. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985); see also In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191; Public
Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 102 (Fla. 1989) (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring spe-
cially); Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, 6 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 671, 740 (1978).
377. Stall, 570 So. 2d at 262 (footnote omitted).
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speculation implicitly discredits precedent. First, past privacy cases
were guided by the knowledge that the adopters intended to assure a
level of protection beyond the level afforded by federal law. Second,
there can be no doubt that Florida's privacy amendment imported state
and federal cases in existence at the time of its adoption.3 78 Among
them are several cases that recognized the right of persons to possess
obscene materials in their homes.3 79 These cases are necessarily woven
into the state constitutional fabric.
Third, Stall is out of sync with the court's two most recent article
I, section 23 cases, Browning and In re T.W. Unlike Stall, both cases
addressed the constitutional claims head-on, and broke new ground by
extending constitutional horizons beyond the perimeter of precedent.
And unlike Stall, neither case speculated about the adopters' intent.
No doubt the court could have avoided reaching the heart of those
claims by engaging in the selfsame speculation: "had the public been
aware" that the amendment would one day be interpreted to protect
the decision of a person to terminate his or her life by refusing medical
intervention,38 0 or to protect the decision of a minor female to termi-
nate her pregnancy without her parents' consent,38' "we seriously doubt
that the amendment would have been adopted."3 2
But it did not. Instead, Browning began boldly with the premise
that "everyone has a fundamental right to the sole control of his or her
person." 8 ' And In re T.W. observed initially that "'[t]he citizens of
Florida opted for more protection from governmental intrusion when
they approved article I, section 23'" than that required by federal
law.384 Only one year before the court released Stall, Chief Justice
Ehrlich acknowledged the central importance of precedent in constru-
378. Id. at 264 (citing Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1357 (Fla. 1980); see
also Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So. 2d 120, 127 (Fla. 1970) (adopting cases that
construed predecessor version of article I, section 4).
379. Id. (citing Stanley, 394 U.S. at 557; State v. Keaton, 371 So. 2d 86 (Fla.
1979)).
380. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 4.
381. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1186.
382. Indeed, the court could have avoided a substantial portion of the political
controversy spurred by In re T. W. had it declined to face the issue head-on. See Ander-
son, Judicial Politics, 77 A.B.A. J. 34 (Jan. 1991) (reporting that this case threatened
the very composition of the court by "caus[ing] such a ruckus among abortion-rights
opponents" as to cast into doubt the outcome of the retention campaigr of the opinion's
author).
383. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 10.
384. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191-92 (quoting Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548).
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ing article I, section 23-the certain knowledge that Floridians chose a
greater degree of privacy than provided under federal law "alone could
justify broadening the scope of [precedent]. '' 385 Rather than engage in
unsupported speculation about what the adopters might have intended,
the majority should have ascertained the adopters' intent in light of
historically known fact and relevant precedent. 86
Stall is a decisional oddity that leaves much to ponder. One might
argue that the majority actually decided Stall by applying the doctrine
of standing. Clearly, the court concluded that Stall could not vicari-
ously assert the privacy rights of his customers. Under that interpreta-
tion, the majority had no need to reach the merits of the underlying
privacy claim. However, much of the majority opinion addresses the
very nature of the substantive right of privacy, and indeed declares that
Stall failed to satisfy the threshold for asserting a privacy right. Conse-
quently, one might alternatively argue that the majority effectively
mooted the standing issue, rendering its discussion of the standing doc-
trine mere dicta, and reached the merits. In the final analysis, the
standing theory advances the narrower of the two alternative holdings
and therefore presents the stronger argument.
Several factors argue that Stall is an aberrational distortion on the
landscape of article I, section 23. Among them are its lack of analytical
clarity, disregard of constitutionally relevant precedent, and casting
upon the claimant a requirement of objectivity when the court in nu-
merous other instances has honored purely subjective wishes of persons
to self-determine matters of personal choice. These factors caution that
the decision lacks precedential importance outside the circumstances
presented.
385. Wons, 541 So. 2d at 102 (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring specially) (emphasis
added).
386. Compare Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64
(Fla. 1990). In Shriners Hospitals, released only four months before Stall, a four-
member majority struck down the centuries-old mortmain statute as the result of a
''common sense reading of the plain and ordinary meaning" of the text of article I,
section 2. Id. at 67. It is beyond dispute that a like reading of the personal "right to be
let alone," especially when taken together with extant privacy case law, would have
amply supported the conclusion that, as a threshold matter, article I, section 23 em-
braced a person's right to procure or view obscene material, free from state interfer-
ence. Whether that right could survive state regulation, however, is altogether another
matter.
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C. CONCLUSION
The single most noteworthy conclusion to be drawn from the
court's state constitutional jurisprudence of 1990 is that the court has
accepted major responsibility for protecting personal rights from gov-
ernmental excess. The court convincingly asserted its role as guardian
of article I rights when it twice reached outside the record pleadings,
and imposed a constitutional remedy to achieve a just result.8 " In mat-
ters of personal medical health care choices, a decisive majority of the
membership showed its commitment to reshaping the constitutional
landscape by pushing the frontiers of protection beyond the perimeter
of precedent. Moreover, the majority added a component to compelling
state interest analysis by declaring that the state has an overarching
responsibility to safeguard the inalienable rights of its citizens.388
On three occasions, the court also assumed a role for "the judiciary
that deferred to the policy choices and functions of coordinate branches
of government. A majority declined to interfere with the legislature's
efforts to regulate commercialized obscenity without any record evi-
dence that justified the state's action;38 9 accepted the legislature's ex-
clusive procedures to compensate owners whose property the state de-
stroyed in a citrus canker eradication program, as a "reasonable
alternative" to the time-honored common law remedy of inverse con-
demnation;390 and presumed that the Department of Corrections prop-
erly performed its function of executing condemned prisoners in the
face of macabre evidence of a malfunctioning electric chair. 39'
The opinions teach that the selection of a particular principle of
constitutional interpretation greatly influences the court's constitutional
logic. Although it is impossible to predict with precision which princi-
ple the justices will rely upon in any given case, two cases this year
deserve particular attention, because they illustrate the importance of
principle selection on the outcome. 392
387. See supra notes 116 and 308 and accompanying text.
388. See supra notes 327-28 and accompanying text.
389. See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
390. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
392. In any analytical scheme, the point of departure is of vital importance. As
Justice Frankfurter noted years ago: in law, as in history, "the place you reach depends
upon the direction you are taking[, and] where one comes out on a case depends on
where one goes in." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
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Courts often glean the meaning of constitutional text from the
original intent of the adopters, and there are a variety of theories used
to ascertain that intent. One theory proved to be critical to the analysis
of Shriners Hospitals,39 3 where a clear majority of four justices made a
"common sense reading of the plain and ordinary meaning" of the text
of article I, section 2. It decided that the adopters must have intended
that the ability to transmit property to others is included within the
grasp of that section's right "to acquire, possess and protect property,"
and then tossed out Florida's mortmain statute because it allowed cer-
tain persons to avoid charitable devises.
Another theory of construction emerged in Stall,94 where a five-
member majority relied upon an intriguing, common sense-like inter-
pretation of article I, section 23 to reject a claim that argued essen-
tially, because the section entitles persons to possess obscene materials
privately, free from state regulation, then it must necessarily entitle
persons to acquire such materials. Said the court: "[H]ad the public
been aware of such an applicatioh, we seriously doubt that the amend-
ment would have been adopted." Stall, unlike Shriners Hospitals,
never considered the black letter text of article I, section 23. It never
asked whether the express textual protection afforded to the "right to
be let alone" entitled persons to acquire such materials for private use.
Had the majority applied Shriners Hospitals, it very likely would have
begun with the analytical premise that the text raises the potential of
such an entitlement, rather than reject the claim at the outset by the
unwarranted use of unsupported speculation.
Shriners Hospitals is instructive for its use of another approach to
constitutional interpretation, one unconcerned with original intent of
the adopters. The majority struck down the centuries-old mortmain
statute because its feudal rationale had no constitutional relevance in
"the context of our times." Shriners Hospitals aptly supports the prin-
ciples that the constitution must be viewed as a dynamic, "living" doc-
ument, and that courts must interpret the state's organic law free of
anachronistic strain upon its order.
The court's state constitutional labors concentrate on the personal
rights created in article I. In all, the court framed 102 state constitu-
tional issues in 80 cases. Of those, 73 issues and 62 cases directly per-
tained to article I. The decade survey of the 1980s identified five in-
stances where a state constitutional right eclipsed the corresponding
393. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
394. See supra note 377 and accompanying text.
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federal right .3 5 Already this decade, two cases, Browning"' and Co-
hen, 97 clearly illustrate circumstances where the state constitution pro-
vides a degree of protection of personal rights greater than the federal
constitutional minimum.
395. Hawkins, supra note 1, at 857-58.
396. See supra notes 297-344 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida evidence has continued to develop in the same predictable
patterns as seen in previous survey years.' The areas of relevance and
hearsay generated the most case law during the survey period, and
criminal decisions again outnumbered civil cases in generating eviden-
tiary case law.
Changes made during the 1990 legislative session should have a
distinct impact on Florida evidence. These changes will have the big-
gest affect in the areas of relevance,2 impeachment,3 exclusion of wit-
nesses4 and hearsay. 5 The change that will probably generate the most
1. This is the fifth annual survey of Florida evidence that the Nova Law Review
has published. The annual survey generally runs from December of one calendar year
through November of the following year. A break in the annual survey of evidence
occurred last year. Therefore, to bring the evidence survey up to date, this issue will
consider Florida evidence decisions from October 1988 through October 1990.
2. 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 40 (West) amended section 794.022 of the Florida
Statutes which affects the rules of evidence concerning relevancy. This change directly
affects section 90.404(1)(b)1 (Supp. 1990) regarding the character of the victim by
"excluding evidence presented for the purpose of showing that manner of dress of the
victim at the time of the offense incited the sexual battery." 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
90-40 (West).
3. 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 174 (West), amending FLA. STAT. § 90.608 (1989).
This change allows a party to impeach his own witness. See FLA. STAT. § 90.608
(1989).
4. 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 174 (West) created section 90.616 of the Florida
Statutes, which is a codification of the term "invoking the rule," or more commonly
stated as sequestration of witnesses. The section reads as follows:
(1) At the request of a party the court shall order, or upon its own motion
the court may order, witnesses excluded from a proceeding so that they
cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses except as provided in subsec-
tion (2).
(2) A witness may not be excluded if he is:
(a) A party who is a natural person.
(b) In a civil case, an officer or employee of a party that is not a
natural person. The party's attorney shall designate the officer or employee
who shall be the party's representative.
(c) A person whose presence is shown by the party's attorney to be
essential to the presentation of the party's cause.
FLA. STAT. § 90.616 (Supp. 1990).
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problems, and the most case law, will be the change in impeachment.
The impact of this change will be distinctly felt in the criminal area.'
This article will discuss the major cases affecting Florida evidence
law. As with prior surveys, the focus will be on Florida Supreme Court
cases. District and circuit court cases will be discussed if the impact on
Florida evidence is significant, or an important conflict between Florida
jurisdictions is present.
II. CONTEMPORANEOUS OBIECTION RULE AND OFFERS OF
PROOF
Though a varying amount of case law was generated in this evi-
dentiary area during the survey period, the importance of making con-
temporaneous objections and offers of proof at trial cannot be under-
stated.' Although no significant changes occurred in this evidentiary
5. 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 174 (West), amending FLA. STAT. §§ 90.803(23),
90.804(2)(c) (1989).
6. Though there will be an impact on civil cases as well as criminal, the criminal
cases will probably generate more law since prosecutors will be able to call hostile or
adverse witnesses and impeach them without the necessity of using section
90.801(2)(a) or declaring the witness adverse under section 90.608(2). Subsection (2)
was eliminated after the 1990 amendment to section 90.608.
Some attorneys, on a literal reading of section 90.801(2)(a), believe that this sec-
tion merely makes inconsistent statements nonhearsay because they are not used to
prove the truth of the matter asserted but are simply used to demonstrate that an in
court statement differs from an out of court statement. This is a misreading of section
90.801(2)(a) because it allows the prior inconsistent statement to be offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. Professor Ehrhardt stated it best in his treatise on
evidence:
Although normally a witness may not be impeached by the party who calls
him, that restriction is not applicable to a statement offered under
[s]ection 90.801(2)(a) because the purpose for offering the evidence is to
prove the truth of the contents of the prior statement rather than to attack
the credibility of the witness.
C. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE 449 (2d ed. 1984). This is important in criminal
cases because it allows the prosecutor to argue the truth of the inconsistent statements
in closing. This area has caused a lot of reversals, if the appellate court finds that
impeachment under section 90.801(2)(a) does not meet all the prerequisites of that
section.
7. See FLA. STAT. § 90.104 (1989), providing in part that:
(1) A court may predicate error . . . on the basis of admitted . . . evi-
dence when a substantial right of the party is adversely affected and: (a)
When the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to
strike appears on the record, stating the specific ground of objection . ..
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area, Florida courts examined various cases during the survey period of
which the following are worth noting.
In Glendening v. State,8 the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the
defendant's conviction because defense counsel failed to object when
the State's expert witness testified that the father of the sexual abuse
victim was the person who actually committed the sexual offense. The
court ruled that the testimony was more prejudicial than probative, but
declined to reverse the conviction finding that "[d]efense counsel
neither objected to the answer nor moved to strike it and the error was
not of a fundamental nature . [Therefore], the issue was not prop-
erly preserved for appeal . ... " Additionally, the court stated that
although the State's expert witness was "improperly allowed to vouch
for the credibility of a witness," the issue was not cognizable on appeal
because defense counsel objected on the grounds of relevance, and not
because "the question called for improper vouching for the credibility
of the hearsay declarant."' 10
(b) When the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evi-
dence was made known to the court by offer of proof or was apparent from
the context within which the questions were asked.
A proper contemporaneous objection has two primary ingredients, both of which are
needed to preserve objections for appellate review. First, the objection must be timely.
If counsel does not promptly object, the problem is waived. Second, the objection must
be specific. Failure to state the correct grounds for objection will waive it. The appel-
late courts have strictly monitored this rule.
A proper offer of proof merely requires that when evidence is excluded, the sub-
stance of the evidence must be made known to the court. If the substance of the proof
is not apparent from the record, the appellate court will be unable to render a decision
on the excluded evidence and will thus dismiss the argument for failare to properly
have substance of the excluded evidence before it.
8. 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988).
9. Id. at 221.
10. Id. The court seems to be splitting hairs regarding the specificity needed to
preserve an issue for appeal. Though the court did not elaborate on the relevance objec-
tion by defense counsel, it would seem that counsel may have made the correct objec-
tion. Vouching for the credibility of a witness brings into play a witness's character
under section 90.404, which states that "[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of
his character is inadmissible to prove that he acted in conformity with it on a particular
occasion . . . ." FLA. STAT. § 90.404 (Supp. 1989). Additionally, vouching for an indi-
vidual's credibility can, in fact, be more prejudicial than probative since the jury may
give that individual's testimony more weight than it normally would have. See FLA.
STAT. § 90.403 (1989). This is alleviated when the individual's credibility has already
been attacked.
Some trial judges may not allow objections such as "improper vouching for the
credibility of the hearsay declarant" but may instead ask for the "legal objection."
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In Assiag v. State,"1 the Fifth District Court of Appeal also af-
firmed a defendant's conviction, even though two expert witnesses im-
properly vouched for the credibility of the sex crime victim. The court
stated that, by itself, the error was not fundamental and therefore,
failed to justify reversal in the absence of a timely objection. 2 The
district court went on to compare other cases where similar errors oc-
curred and no objection was made, but the court, nevertheless, found
those errors fundamental. The Fifth District stated that those cases in-
volved cumulative errors which combined to deny the defendant a fair
trial and rose to the level of fundamental error. 13
Making an objection, based on relevance under section 90.404 because the question
calls for improper character evidence, should be specific enough. However, a proper,
and perhaps more specific objection, could be fnade under section 90.609, which pro-
vides that evidence of the truthful character of a witness is only admissible "after the
character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by reputation evidence."
FLA. STAT. § 90.609 (1989).
Another specific "legal objection" could be made under section 90.806 regarding
attacking and supporting the credibility of a hearsay declarant. FLA. STAT. § 90.806
(1989). It is improper to vouch for the credibility of a hearsay declarant whose credi-
bility has not been attacked. However, both section 90.609 and section 90.806 are
grounded in the rule of relevance, which states that the jury will attach more weight to
a witness whose credibility is bolstered by others. Since the court did not elaborate on
the specifics of the relevance objection in the Glendening case, the reader is left to
speculate regarding the proper specificity of these other objections. See Glendening,
536 So. 2d at 212.
This case, once again, illustrates the importance of making specific objections at
trial. It also demonstrates that all possible objections should be raised if there is a
reasonable basis for the objection.
11. 565 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
12. Id. at 388.
13. Id. Cumulative error cases generally point out that counsel was ineffective
during trial. In criminal cases, this type of error may be more appropriate under the
collateral attack provisions of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 for ineffective
assistance of counsel. Although an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is
rarely allowed on direct appeal, it may be brought before the court when the errors are
apparent on the record. Stewart v. State, 420 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct 2575 (1991); Foster v. State, 387 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1052 (1984). However, since ineffective assistance of counsel claims are rarely appar-
ent from the record, this would preclude direct review and would confine this claim to
collateral attack. This would, in essence, deter the appellate court from examining the
case in light of cumulative error on direct appeal and move the court to examine the
case from a more advantageous perspective under the standard set out in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), for ineffective assistance of counsel, after a collat-
eral attack has been made. In this way the court can examine the case from the per-
spective of whether counsel's lack of objection was a strategic decision designed to al-
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In Fernandez v. State,4 the trial court excluded two statements
directly affecting the defendant's alibi defense. The district court af-
firmed the conviction because there was no proffer of the statements,
nor were the statements apparent from the record. 5
Finally, the district court, in G.A. v. State,"6 reversed the trial
court when the trial court refused to allow the defense attorney to prof-
fer excluded testimony. The district court concluded that defense coun-
sel's failure to state the relevancy and materiality did not preclude re-
view of the issue, because the trial court cut off defense counsel's
proffer. The proffer was necessary for the appellate court to determine
whether the testimony was relevant, and material, and the trial court
erred by refusing to allow the proffer. 7
III. RELEVANCY
Relevance forms the basic foundation for every evidentiary princi-
ple "'8 and should be closely examined whenever evidence is being en-
tered pursuant to any rule in the evidence code.' 9 Relevance is best
understood by remembering two basic fundamentals. First, is the evi-
low the defense to explore previously closed evidentiary areas in defending the client,
by allowing the State to "open the door" to previously excluded evidence, instead of
from the prospective of cumulative error.
14. 555 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
15. In a somewhat similar case, the district court in Reaves v. State, 531 So. 2d
401 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988), a case reported in the last survey period, reversed a
conviction even though there was no proffer of the surrebuttal testimony in the trial
court. The district court stated that the proffer was not needed because the trial judge
believed that surrebuttal did not exist in Florida and, therefore, the proffer would have
been unavailing. The attorney in Reaves was fortunate that the trial jadge stated that
he did not believe surrebuttal existed in Florida, otherwise the error would not have
been preserved for review.
16. 549 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
17. Id. at 1204.
18. See Garcia v. State, 564 So. 2d 124, 126 (Fla. 1990); Swafford v. State, 533
So. 2d 270, 274-75 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100 (1989) (standing for the
proposition that relevance permeates all other evidentiary rules).
For an excellent article on relevancy, see Pearson, Ungarbling Relevancy, FLA.
BAR J. 45 (Feb. 1990).
19. As an example, even though evidence may fall clearly within an exception to
the hearsay rule, if the hearsay is not relevant it should not come into evidence. Simi-
larly, even though a piece of evidence is authentic, or self-authenticating, if the evi-
dence is not relevant to any fact in issue, or the evidence is more prejudicial than
probative, it should not come into evidence.
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dence logically relevant? That is, will the evidence prove or disprove a
material fact in issue? 20 Second, is the evidence legally relevant? In
other words, will the evidence be prohibited by specific statutory law21
or will its probative value be "outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or needless pres-
20. FLA. STAT. § 90.401 (1989).
21. FLA. STAT. § 90.402 (1989). The author's position is that once it has been
demonstrated that an item of evidence will make a material fact in issue more or less
probative, then the only basis for excluding the item from evidence is a legal rule of
law. Therefore, the author finds that section 90.402 and section 90.403 should be
lumped together under the term of legal relevance. Professor Ehrhardt has recognized
the broad concept of legal relevance and stated that "[t]hese exclusionary policy rules,
often referred to under the concept of legal relevancy, are included in sections 90.403-
404 and 90-407-410 of the Code." C. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 90.402.1 (2d
ed. 1984).
Section 90.402 states that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as pro-
vided by law." FLA. STAT. § 90.402 (1989). This section would exclude logically rele-
vant evidence when a statute specifically prohibits it. Two examples excluding relevant
evidence are section 934.06, which excludes logically relevant evidence obtained by a
wire-tap in violation of the Florida Statutes, and section 794.022, which excludes spe-
cific instances of sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the
offender. See FLA. STAT. §§ 794.022, 934.06 (1989).
Section 90.403 is also a rule of law that excludes logically relevant evidence when
its probative value is outweighed by "unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading
the jury or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1989).
Therefore, both sections are categorized under the term of legal relevance.
11371991]
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entation of cumulative evidence?"'2 2 By examining all evidence for logi-
cal and legal relevance, the trial attorney can minimize the use of
harmful evidence and safeguard against error and possible reversal.23
The following flow chart demonstrates the relationship between logical and legal
relevance:
evidence
-NO excluded
-NO---Jevidence
-NO excluded
evidence
YES excluded
NOI
The evidence is
ADMISSIBLE
22. FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1989).
23. Logical and legal relevance are the watchdogs of evidence. For example, an
improper evidentiary foundation can be excluded from evidence based on relevance
grounds.
A typical scenario has opposing counsel attempting to enter a hearsay statement in
evidence as an excited utterance. The foundation for an excited utterance is:
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A. Logical Relevance
Logical relevance is defined in section 90.401 of the Florida Stat-
utes and determines whether the relevant evidence is evidence "tending
to prove or disprove a material fact." '24 Though many cases discuss log-
ical relevance, they are dependant on the logical connection between
the evidence and the matter it is being offered to prove or disprove in
that particular factual setting. Therefore, a slight change in the fact
pattern can produce a substantially different result. This does not lead
to sound precedential value and, generally, offers little guidance, other
than the court's analysis during that particular factual setting. How-
ever, a few cases are worth discussing.
In Martinez v. State,2 5 the issue of DNA fingerprinting in Florida
was once again the center of attention. The issue was whether the over-
whelming statistical probabilities of DNA fingerprint evidence invades
the province of the jury by suggesting proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 26 The court held that it did not. The court stated that rigorous
1. A statement or utterance,
2. relating to a startling event or condition,
3. while the declarant,
4. was under the stress of excitement,
5. caused by the event or condition.
FLA. STAT. § 90.803 (Supp. 1990).
Opposing counsel does not elicit testimony that the statement was made under the
stress of excitement. The statement must be examined under the auspices of logical and
legal relevance. First, does the statement make some fact in issue more or less proba-
tive? If the statement does not make a fact in issue more or less probative, then the
statement is not relevant and does not go into evidence. There is no need to examine
the statement for legal relevance. If the statement does make a fact in issue more or
less probative, then it is logically relevant and to this point, admissible.
Second, is the statement outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of issues, misleading the jury, or needless cumulative evidence? If the statement was
not made under the stress of excitement, then it is more prejudicial than probative and
not legally relevant, and should be inadmissible as evidence. The reasoning is simple. A
person who is excited as a result of a startling event does not have the reflective capac-
ity which is essential for conscious misrepresentation. If the foundational element of
excitement is left out, then the individual making the statement could easily fabricate
it. The reliability of the hearsay statement is, therefore, in question. The statement's
probative value may be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice it
could cause the opposing party, and it could also mislead the jury. The jury could reach
an incorrect verdict based on an unreliable statement fabricated out of court.
24. FLA. STAT. § 90.401 (1989).
25. 549 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
26. DNA material recovered from the victim's clothing matched the defendant's
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cross-examination of expert witnesses, or an attack upon the scientific
bases upon which the statistical proofs are based, will guard against
such errors.2 8 The Martinez court agreed with the large majority of out
of state courts in reaching its conclusion that overwhelming statistical
probability is both relevant and probative in assisting the jury in mak-
ing its final decision, when the statistical probability testimony is scien-
tifically and reliably grounded.29
In Odice v. Pearson,30 plaintiff was stabbed in a restaurant park-
ing lot. The plaintiff brought suit against the restaurant owners for
negligent lighting and security. At trial, plaintiff attempted to enter
police reports concerning prior crimes committed near the restaurant
owners' property in order to establish the owners' failure to foresee
criminal activity and take reasonable precautions to guard against
crime on the restaurant premises. The trial court excluded the police
reports regarding the prior crimes. 31 The appellate court reversed, find-
ing the police reports of prior crimes relevant and probative of a mate-
rial fact in issue, foreseeability. 32 The appellate court stated that
"[e]vidence as to the nature and likelihood of any crime occurring has
a direct bearing on whether the preventive measures taken by the prop-
erty owner were reasonable in light of all the other relevant facts and
circumstances in the case."33
DNA. The State's expert testified that only one individual in 243 billion would have
the same DNA pattern. Id. at 695. Since the present population of the world is only
five billion, it makes the argument of identity rather overwhelming, as well as
compelling.
27. Id. at 694.
28. Id. at 697.
29. The State had little evidence to prove the identity of the victim's attacker.
The victim suffered from a form of night blindness and the attack took place at night
with the electrical current severed from outside the house. The victim's description of
her attacker was less than accurate and the best piece of evidence the State had to
prove the defendant's identity was a fingerprint from the victim's electrical box. There-
fore, the DNA fingerprint material was highly probative of a material fact in issue, the
defendant's identity. Because there was little other identity evidence, its probative value
simply outweighed the prejudicial effect of the overwhelming statistics. Id.
30. 549 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
31. Id. at 706.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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B. Exclusion on the Grounds of Unfair Prejudice or Confu-
sion-Legal Relevance
One form of legal relevance is defined in Florida Statutes section
90.403.14 Once the prerequisites of logical relevance have been satis-
fied, it must be determined if the evidence is legally relevant. Is there a
statutory law which excludes the evidence or is the evidence more prej-
udicial than probative? Numerous cases decided during the survey pe-
riod relied upon section 90.403. However, few cases demonstrated any
remarkable significance. 5 For example, appellate courts have contin-
ued to examine gruesome photographs, which are entered into evidence
at the trial level, to determine if they are unduly prejudicial.3 6 How-
ever, no cases demonstrate a break or change in the courts' analysis of
such evidence. Additionally, no courts have changed the standard usage
or analysis of section 90.403 regarding other relevant evidence.
In one application of section 90.403, the Second District Court of
Appeal, in State v. Sawyer,3 7 held that the admission of a single hair
found in the murder victim's apartment, alleged to be that of the de-
fendant, had the danger of unfairly prejudicing the defendant. During
a pre-trial hearing on a motion in limine, an FBI hair and fiber expert
testified that the hair in question matched the defendant's in twenty
34. FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1989).
35. Cases excluding evidence based on statutory law under section 90.402 are
discussed under the specific evidentiary sections they affect.
36. See Thompson v. State, 565 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 1990). In Thompson, the
Florida Supreme Court held that the trial court has discretion to admit photographic
evidence as long as that evidence is relevant. Photographs of the murder victim were
relevant to establish the victim's identity and to demonstrate that the defendant's out-
of-court confessions were consistent with the physical evidence found at the scene, so
that the gruesome nature of the photographs did not render the decision to admit them
an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1315; see also Gomaco Corp. v. Faith, 550 So. 2d 482
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989). In Gomaco, the court held that photographs of the
accident victim's nearly severed foot may have been tangentially relevant to the vic-
tim's action against the manufacturer of the curbing machine the victim was operating
when he suffered the injury. However, relevance was overwhelmingly outweighed by
the photographs' gruesome and inflammatory nature, which was prejudicial to the
manufacturer. Id. at 483. The photographs did not in themselves independently estab-
lish any material part of the victim's case, nor were they necessary to corroborate some
disputed factual issue. Id. But see Tompkins v. Dugger, 549 So. .2d 1370 (Fla. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1170 (1990) (decision of the trial judge to admit inflammatory
photographs of murder victim's skeletal remains was within his discretion).
37. 561 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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observable characteristics. 8 However, this only meant that the hair
came from a class of individuals having the same hair characteristics.
The expert also testified with regard to how hair is transferred from
place to place. Although the defendant had stated he was never in the
victim's apartment, he lived next door and the victim had visited his
apartment a few days before the murder. The trial court ruled that the
hair had no probative value regarding the defendant's presence in the
victim's apartment at the time of the murder.39 The appellate court
affirmed and indicated that admission of the hair would seriously
prejudice the defendant before the jury.40 The court explained:
[T]he probative value of the single hair cannot be positively identi-
fied as being from [the defendant]. Even if it is his hair, it is simply
not probative of proving that [the defendant] was even in [the vic-
tim's] apartment much less that he was there at the time of the
murder in light of the extensive contamination of the crime scene.
However, [the defendant] could have been seriously prejudiced
before the jury if this hair evidence were presented to them.4'
In West v. State,42 the appellate court reversed the defendant's
conviction for DUI manslaughter, stating that the trial court commit-
ted reversible error in admitting evidence that the defendant had a
trace of valium in his blood. Expert testimony in the case indicated that
the valium had no measurable effect on the defendant's driving. There-
fore, the evidence concerning the valium had no probative value, or
relevance, to the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol and
was unfairly prejudicial.43
The West court cited to State v. McClain in finding error in ad-
mitting this evidence.44 McClain was a case similar to West, where the
court found testimony regarding drugs found in the defendant's system
more prejudicial than probative since the State already had a high
blood alcohol reading on which to prove impairment.45 There is still
38. Id. at 283.
39. Id. at 284.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 553 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
43. Id. at 255.
44. 508 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987), af'd, 525 So. 2d 420 (Fla.
1988).
45. Id. at 1260.
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some confusion caused by State v. Weitz," even after the Florida Su-
preme Court's decision in McClain resolved the apparent conflict be-
tween the cases.4" Weitz involved the introduction of evidence regard-
ing drugs in the defendant's system after the State had already taken a
breath reading. However, the breath reading in the case was only
0.017 %, and the drugs offered the only reasonable explanation for the
defendant's acute intoxication, even though the drugs in the defend-
ant's system could not be quantified.48 It can only be assumed that in
West, the State had the necessary blood alcohol level needed to prove
impairment, since this information was not included in the case facts.
C. Character Evidence in General
Character evidence inevitably causes judges and attorneys innu-
merable headaches and numerous reversals. General character evidence
is codified in section 90.404(1) of the Florida Statutes, and is a general
prohibition against using a person's character, or a trait of the person's
character, to prove that the person acted in conformity with that char-
acter trait on a particular occasion.49 This general prohibition has a few
enumerated exceptions,5" generally limited to criminal cases.51
46. 500 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986), overruled, 525 So. 2d 420
(Fla. 1988).
47. The Florida Supreme Court addressed Weitz in McClain and stated:
In both cases, it could be said that the prejudicial impact of permitting the
jury to hear that the defendant had taken illegal drugs was equal but that
it was the difference in probative value which tipped the scales. In Weitz,
the defendant's low blood alcohol test belied the other evidence of his in-
toxication. Thus, the presence of even a small amount of drugs in the de-
fendant's urine was significant because it provided an explanation for his
impaired conduct. In the instant case, McClain's blood alcohol level sub-
stantially exceeded the figure necessary to raise a presumption of impair-
ment. Therefore, evidence of a trace amount of cocaine in McClain's blood
added little to the state's proof of intoxication.
McClain, 525 So. 2d at 423.
48. Weitz, 500 So. 2d at 657-58.
49. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(1) (Supp. 1990).
50. The particular character of the accused, of the victim, or of a witness all
have special exemptions. FLA. STAT. § 90.401(1)(a)-(c) (Supp. 1990). Similar fact evi-
dence is basically character evidence which is admissible under specific circumstances.
Similar fact evidence, otherwise known as the "Williams Rule," from the case of Wil-
liams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 (1959), will be
discussed infra note 65 and accompanying text.
51. Section 90.404(1) provides that character evidence is inadmissible to prove
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In Erickson v. State,52 the defendant objected to expert psychiat-
ric testimony presented by the State in an indecent assault case on a
child under sixteen. The State's expert witness testified that the defend-
ant's condition was diagnosed as pedophilia and antisocial behavior.53
The expert also testified that the defendant had not been truthful dur-
ing the psychiatric interview. The State claimed that this testimony
was needed to rebut the defendant's defense, regarding lack of intent,
and to establish the defendant's capacity to understand and waive his
rights.54 The Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed with the
State's position and found that the testimony was inadmissible charac-
ter evidence. 55 The court determined that: (1) the testimony was used
to demonstrate the defendant's bad character and propensity to the
commit the crime charged; and (2) expert testimony is not allowed to
attack the credibility of the defendant when the defendant has not be-
come a witness in the case. 56
A type of character evidence which causes innumerable problems
is "high crime area" testimony. A number of cases have been devoted
to this scenario.5" The problem arises when a state witness describes
the area where the defendant was apprehended, or lived, as a high
crime area. The argument takes the following form: since the defend-
ant was located in a high crime area, he must be associated with the
criminal activity occurring there. In other words, if the area is one
where criminal activity takes place, the defendant must be a criminal.
This association could prejudice the defendant in the eyes of a jury,
especially when the defendant comes from an impoverished neighbor-
hood. A jury with a different cultural background than the defendant
that a person acted in conformity with that character, unless one of three exceptions
appear. The first two exceptions specifically refer to the "prosecution" and the "ac-
cused" and are only applicable in criminal cases. The third exception concerns attack-
ing the credibility of a witness, which is permitted in both civil and criminal cases
under sections 90.608-90.610. See C. EHRHARDT, supra note 21, at § 404.
52. 565 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
53. Id. at 330.
54. Id. at 331.
55. Id.
56. Id. The court ultimately affirmed the defendant's conviction, finding the error
to be harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
57. Jefferson v. State, 560 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Gillion v.
State, 547 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Black v. State, 545 So. 2d 498
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Huffman v. State, 500 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1987); Beneby v. State, 354 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 359
So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 1978).
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may simply be unable to accept the fact that an individual who lives in
a "designated high crime area" may not be a criminal.
The Florida courts have tried to address the issue to prevent the
needless reversal of convictions. The key issue is one of prejudice. Did
the evidence presented in court have the effect of demonstrating the
defendant's bad character, or was the use of this evidence admissible
for some other purpose which simply outweighs any prejudice it may
have had on the defendant? The courts have pointed to two factors
which prevent this evidence from reversing a defendant's convictions.
First, the identification of a neighborhood as a "high crime area" may
be considered de minimus if its use was merely descriptive.58 Second,
the evidence must be used for some purpose other than to demonstrate
the defendant's bad character .5  Typically the evidence is used to
demonstrate why a witness was in the neighborhood or why a witness
was more observant or alert than normal.
The "high crime area" evidence is fact specific. Therefore, what is
reversible in one case may not be in the next case. In Black v. State,6"
the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a drug conviction when
an objection was made to the testimony given by one of the police of-
ficers in the case. The officer stated that he had been watching several
areas of drug activity called "crack houses" and in particular the
"crack house" where the defendant was arrested. The officer also testi-
fied that numerous arrests were made here and that no "normal peo-
ple" live there.6 '
In Gillion v. State,e2 the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed
a drug conviction even though "high crime area" testimony was admit-
ted into evidence. The police officer in the case testified that the area
58. See, e.g., Jefferson v. State, 560 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990);
Gillion v. State, 547 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989). The description was
considered de minimus since it was used for "mere identification." No mention was
made that the prosecutor in either case used the "high crime area" testimony in argu-
ment to the jury or that the prosecution tried to deliberately elicit the "high crime
area" testimony from the witness to demonstrate propensity. In Gillion, the fact that
the neighborhood was described as a high crime area was completely irrelevant and
could not have prejudiced the defendant, since the defendant was claiming mistaken
identity. Gillian, 547 So. 2d 719.
59. In Jefferson, the evidence was used to explain why the witness was sent to
this particular location and why the witness was monitored. Jefferson, 560 So. 2d at
1374.
60. 545 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
61. Id. at 499.
62. 547 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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was a "high crime area," and that several narcotics transactions were
taking place there. Additionally, he testified that there were many indi-
viduals known to him as narcotics dealers in the area, and that the
defendant was arrested in this area.63 The Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal stated that the "mere identification of a neighborhood as a high-
crime area [should not] constitute [sic] reversible error in and of itself,
especially . . . where the defense is claiming mistaken identity. "64
D. Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts
Section 90.404(2) of the Florida Statutes, otherwise known as
"Williams Rule,"'65 or similar fact evidence, is one of the single biggest
causes for reversal in criminal cases. It prohibits the introduction of
other crimes, wrongs or acts to prove the defendant's propensity to
commit crime.6 However, evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue7
In order to utilize section 90.404(2), the State must notify the de-
fense in writing at least ten days prior to trial.6 8 The State must furnish
a written statement of the acts or offenses it intends to offer as similar
fact evidence.69 If the evidence is used for impeachment or on rebuttal,
no notice is required.70 Additionally, if the evidence presented at trial is
"inextricably interwoven" or "inseparable" from the crime being
charged, there is no notice requirement.
The State in a criminal prosecution should never rely solely on the
evidence being "inseparable" and thus being outside of the ten day pro-
vision. If the court disagrees with the State's interpretation of the evi-
dence, the State will be precluded from using the similar fact evidence
as Williams rule material because it did not comply with the ten day
provision. The State should always file its ten day notice when possible
and cover itself should the court disagree with the argument that the
evidence is inseparable. However, whenever the State would have to tell
the story of the crime in a vacuum, or would have to leave out parts of
63. Id. at 720.
64. Id.
65. See Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847
(1959).
66. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(a) (1989).
67. Id.
68. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(b)l (1989).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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the story that would disrupt the logical sequence of events, the court
has ruled that the evidence is admissible because it is "inextricably in-
terwoven" with the main crime. In other words, it would be impossible
to illustrate the events surrounding the main crime, and give a uniform
picture of the event, without evidence of both crimes being given.71
In Erikson v. State,72 the Fourth District Court of Appeal allowed
the admission of collateral crimes evidence even though the State did
not comply with the ten day notice provision. In this case, both the
victim and another little girl were assaulted in the course of the day's
activities at a Parents Without Partners beach picnic. The touching of
the one young girl lead to the defendant's apprehension after a witness
observed the incident. The court held that this testimony, regarding
this uncharged crime, was relevant because it was so "inextricably in-
tertwined" in the scenario of the crime charged.7 3 The events leading to
the apprehension and detention of the defendant could not be given
without reference to the other crime, and therefore, it was admissible.74
A recent trend in the last few years has been the use of "reverse"
Williams rule, which develops when the defendant wants to use evi-
dence of crimes, wrongs, or acts of another to prove his innocence. Sec-
tion 90.404(2)(a) does not specifically preclude this use. Invariably, the
problem with this type of usage is defining its application. When sec-
tion 90.404(2)(a) is used within the criminal context, the evidence is
limited to evidence proving a material fact in issue, such as motive,
opportunity, intent, or identity.7 5 However, when applied as reverse
Williams rule, it is more difficult to demonstrate that evidence of the
crimes, wrongs or acts of a third person will prove a material fact in
issue. The only legitimate claim may be when identity is in issue and
the similar fact evidence, which the defense wishes to use, demonstrates
that an individual other than the defendant committed the crime.
Other applications take on a strained relationship with the rule.
Reverse Williams rule has been addressed sparingly by our district
courts.76 However, during the survey period, the Florida Supreme
71. See Austin v. State, 500 So. 2d 262 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Tumulty
v. State, 489 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
72. 565 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
73. Id. at 333.
74. Id.
75. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(a) (1989).
76. See Brown v. State, 513 So. 2d 213 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Moreno v.
State, 418 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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Court faced this issue for the first time in Rivera v. State." In Rivera,
the defendant assaulted and killed a little girl and left her body in an
open field. The defendant attempted to establish that a crime of similar
nature had been committed by another person. The court stated that
"reverse" Williams rule is permissible and set out the standards on
which to base its admission.78 The court held that evidence which
tends, in any way, to establish a reasonable doubt should be admissi-
ble. 9 However, "the admissibility of this evidence must be gauged by
the same principle of relevancy as any other evidence offered by the
defendant."80 The court then examined the two crimes and found them
dissimilar.81 The Florida Supreme Court stated that since the two
crimes were dissimilar, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the evidence.82
The Florida Supreme Court again addressed the issue of reverse
Williams rule in State v. Savino. 3 In Savino, the defendant was
charged with the murder of his stepson. The stepson died of injuries
inflicted by blunt trauma to the stomach. The defendant advanced the
theory that his wife killed the boy. The defendant sought to introduce
evidence of the death of his wife's daughter seven years before, caused
by blunt trauma. However, the court found that the wife's alleged
abuse of a one month old child, in a different state, in a different mar-
riage, was not sufficiently similar to be admissible in the defendant's
trial for the death of the six year old child. 84 The court stated, once
again, that the admissibility of reverse Williams rule evidence is the
same as for any other evidence under section 90.404(b)(2).11 First, the
relevancy must be established, then the issue of prejudice must be
weighed.8 6 In Savino the court found that the defendant did not meet
the relevancy test.' In other words, the defendant did not demonstrate
the required close similarity of facts needed for the evidence to be
relevant.
77. 561 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1990).
78. Id. at 539.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 540.
82. Id.
83. 567 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1990).
84. Id. at 894.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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E. Rape Shield Law
Section 90.404(b) permits a criminal defendant to introduce perti-
nent character traits of a victim.88 However, this section of the evidence
code is specifically limited in rape cases by section 794.022, otherwise
known as the Florida Rape Shield Statute."9 This statute sets up a pro-
cedure to determine the admissibility of a victim's previous sexual con-
duct. Previous sexual conduct is ordinarily deemed inadmissible under
this statutory section, unless an in camera hearing is held prior to trial
to determine the relevance of the evidence.90
During the survey period, a significant amendment took place in
the Florida Rape Shield Statute.91 The amendment was fueled by a
highly publicized Broward County rape case. 2 In that case, the defense
claimed that the victim's provocative clothing was one of the catalysts
for the rape.93 The underlying defense theory was that it was a "drugs
for sex" scenario, which was set up by the victim's enticing clothing. 4
The verdict in the case came back not guilty, and the jury later stated
that the victim was "asking for it."' 95 The case caused a public furor
spurred on by newspaper and television coverage.
Fueled by public outrage, the legislature hastily amended section
794.022 to exclude evidence of the victim's manner of dress at the time
of the sexual assault.96 However, what the legislature failed to discover
was that the victim in the Broward rape case was later charged by the
State Attorney's Office for Trafficking and Conspiracy to Traffick in
88. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(b) (1989).
89. FLA. STAT. § 794.022 (1989).
90. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(2) (1989).
91. 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 40 (West) amending FLA. STAT. § 794.022 (1989).
The amendment affects the rules of evidence concerning relevancy. This change also
directly affects Florida Statutes section 90.404(1)(b)1, regarding the character of the
victim, by "excluding evidence presented for the purpose of showing that manner of
dress of the victim at the time of the offense incited the sexual battery." 1990 Fla.
Sess. Law Serv. 40 (West).
92. State v. Lord, No. 88-024726CF10A (Broward County Fla. 1988). The case
was prosecuted by James DeHart of the State Attorney's Office Sexual Battery Unit
and the case was defended by Timothy Day of the Public Defender's Office. Both attor-
neys had extensive experience in trying sexual battery cases.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. FLA. STAT. § 794.022 (1989).
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Cocaine of over 400 grams.9 7 She was found guilty in a jury trial of
Conspiracy to Traffick in Cocaine and was sentenced to the minimum
fifteen year mandatory drug trafficking sentence.9 8
It appears, based on the whole story, that the defense in the rape
case was, in fact, much more than mere puffery. The victim's drug
trafficking charges supported the defense theory that the rape was a
"drugs for sex" set-up that went bad.9 9 Provocative dress was needed in
the set-up to attract the next target. 00
Though the intention of the new legislation was to protect the vic-
tim, and discourage the jury from deciding the case based merely on
the manner of dress, the same protection could have been afforded by
relying on logical relevancy and the trial judge's common sense.
Though rapes are insidious crimes, the legislature's attempt to protect
the victim, at any cost, could backfire on the wrongly accused defend-
ant by unfairly preventing him from presenting favorable evidence on
his behalf.' 0 '
IV. PRIVILEGES
A significant case in the area of attorney-client privilege did not
come from the Florida Courts but instead emanated from the United
States Supreme Court. In United States v. Zolin,0 2 the Supreme
97. State v. Chiapponi, No. 89-26532CF10B (Broward County Fla. 1989).
98. Id.
99. The author does not wish to leave the impression that the defendant was not
a culpable party in this case. However, had all the facts been known to the prosecuting
attorney from the beginning, he may have attempted to try the case in a different
manner to alleviate any damaging testimony, thus, enhancing his chances for a
favorable outcome. The prosecuting attorney may also have changed his posture on
plea negotiations.
In trial, the jury was confronted with a very plausible defense, bolstered by the
victim's lack of emotion upon her narration of the rape. In contrast, another rape vic-
tim that testified at the trial was extremely emotional upon recounting the events sur-
rounding her rape by the same defendant. Additionally, the defense managed to hurt
the credibility of the victim by pointing out inconsistencies in her testimony and dem-
onstrating her unwillingness to cooperate with the State's prosecution of the case. The
victim's unwillingness to cooperate was all the more revealing when it was later learned
that she was involved in drug trafficking. Id.
100. Please see the case file and accompanying reports in State v. Chiapponi, No.
89-26532CF10B (Broward County Fla. 1989), located in the Broward County Clerk's
Office.
101. See, e.g., Dobson, Evidence, 11 NOVA L. REV. 1291, 1328 n.176 (1987).
102. 109 S. Ct. 2619 (1989).
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Court discussed the attorney-client privilege in relation to the "crime-
fraud" exception.103 The Court set up a procedure to determine how
the "crime-fraud" exception should be applied in privilege cases. Since
Florida has implicitly recognized the "crime-fraud" exception, the
opinion should offer guidance in privileged matters.1 04
In Zolin, the IRS, as part of its investigation of the tax returns of
L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of the Church of Scientology, attempted
to enforce a summons on the Clerk of the Los Angeles County Court
103. The "crime-fraud" exception to the attorney-client privilege simply stands
for the proposition that confidential communications between an attorney and his client
do not extend to communications made for the purpose of getting advice for the com-
mission of a fraud or crime. Though the phrase "crime-fraud exception" is not gener-
ally used in Florida courts, the exception has been recognized in -Florida cases. See
Florida Mining & Materials v. Continental Casualty, 556 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1990); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gellert, 431 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Leithauser v. Harrison, 168 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 19.64); see also
FLA. STAT. § 90.502(4)(a) (1989). The "crime-fraud" exception applies to both the
attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. See In re Doe,.662 F.2d 1073
(4th Cir. 1981); In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury, 640 F.2d 49 (7th Cir.
1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC), 604 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1979). The Third
Circuit Court of Appeal stated:
The two privileges [attorney-client and work-product] are separate and
distinct, but there is an overlap. Information furnished by the client to the
lawyer may merge into his work-product; moreover, the overriding purpose
of the two privileges is the same-to encourage proper functioning of the
adversary system. From this viewpoint, there is no actual inconsistency in
applying the crime-fraud exception to the work-product as well as to the
attorney-client privilege. The rationale supporting the exception in both
areas is virtually identical. The work-product privilege is perverted if it is
used to further illegal activities as is the attorney-client privilege, and
there are no overpowering considerations in either situation that would jus-
tify the shielding of evidence that aids continuing or future, criminal
activity.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d at 802.
The crime-fraud exception to attorney-client communications is becoming a popu-
lar tool to combat criminal activity of attorneys and their clients. As prosecutors ag-
gressively pursue their cases, the Florida courts will find more and more cases involving
confidential materials at their doorstep. See Glanzer & Taskier, Attorneys Before the
Grand Jury: Assertion of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Protect a Client's Identity,
75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1070 (1984); Silbert, The Crime-Fraud Exception to
the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine, The Lawyer's Obligations
of Disclosure, and the Lawyer's Response to Accusation of Wrongful Conduct, 23
AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 351 (1986).
104. Kneale v. Williams, 158 Fla. 811, 30 So. 2d 284 (1947); Roberts v. Jardine,
366 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); see also Zolin, 109 S. Ct. 2619.
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for documents and two tapes in his possession concerning a pending
suit. The Church of Scientology opposed the production of these mater-
ials by claiming they were privileged. The IRS claimed the materials
fell within the "crime-fraud" exception because the material was in
furtherance of future illegal conduct. The IRS urged the federal dis-
trict court to listen to the tapes in making its privilege de'termination.
The district court ruled that the tapes need not be produced, since they
contained privileged attorney-client communications to which the
crime-fraud exception did not apply. 10 5 The district court refused to
listen to the tapes in an in camera review to determine if the privilege
existed. 10 6 The court of appeal stated that the district court was power-
less to grant the IRS demand for in camera review of the tapes because
the Government's evidence of crime or fraud must come from sources
independent of the attorney-client communications on the tape.10 7
The United States Supreme Court, however, held that in camera
review may be used to determine whether allegedly privileged attorney-
client communications fall within the crime-fraud exception. 08 There-
fore, when determining whether material is privileged or not, the lower
court may examine the material in camera before it makes its determi-
nation. The Supreme Court reasoned that in camera review was a
lesser intrusion upon the confidentiality of the attorney-client relation-
ship than public disclosure. 10 9
The Court also held that before the lower court could engage in an
in camera review at the request of the party opposing the privilege,
"that party must present evidence sufficient to support a reasonable be-
lief that in camera review may yield evidence that establishes the ex-
ceptions's applicability."" 0 The Court believed that this would elimi-
nate "fishing expeditions" and the enormous burden on the court
system in examining voluminous records generated by parties opposing
the privilege."' The evidence does not have to be independent of the
privileged materials and, in fact, may be used not only for the in cam-
era review but can also be used for the ultimate showing that the
105. Zolin, 109 S. Ct. at 2621-22.
106. Id. at 2622.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2632.
109. Id. at 2630.
110. 109 S. Ct. at 2630. This rule only applies to a party who opposes the privi-
lege. The party that holds the privilege does not need to meet this criteria and may ask
for in camera review of the privileged material at anytime. Id.
111. Id.
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crime-fraud exception applies.
Finally, the Court stated that "the threshold showing to obtain in
camera review may be met by using any relevant evidence, lawfully
obtained, that has not been adjudicated to be privileged. 11'  In order
for evidence to be adjudicated privileged, the lower court must make
specific factual findings as to the privileged nature of the materials.
Therefore, simply because one of the parties claims that the material is
privileged does not prevent a court from considering the material. The
court must make a specific factual finding regarding the privileged na-
ture of the information to prevent its consideration.
Florida practitioners who have cases concerning privileged mate-
rial should examine the procedures promulgated by Zolin when there is
an attempt to abrogate the privilege using the "crime-fraud" exception.
A "Zolin Inquiry" should be used to determine the privileged nature of
the communications and the applicability of the "crime-fraud"
exception.
V. WITNESSES
A. Impeaching One's Own Witness
Perhaps the biggest change in the Florida Evidence Code deals
with impeachment. The legislature amended section 90.608 to allow
impeachment of one's own witness.1 3 This brings Florida in line with
the Federal Rules of Evidence which also allow impeachment of one's
own witness.: 4 The change will probably cause some initial problems
112. Id. at 2632 (emphasis added).
113. 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 174 (West), amending FLA. STAT. § 90.608
(1989). Section 90.608 now reads as follows:
Any party, including the party callingthe witness, may attack the credibil-
ity of a witness by:
(1) Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with his
present testimony.
(2) Showing that the witness is biased.
(3) Attacking the character of the witness in accordance with the provi-
sions of s. 90.609 or s. 90.610.
(4) Showing a defect of capacity, ability, or opportunity in the witness to
observe, remember, or recount the matters about which he testified.
(5) Proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by
the witness being impeached.
FLA. STAT. § 90.608 (1989).
114. See FED. R. EvID. 607 ("The credibility of a witness may be attacked by
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in criminal cases, since the prosecution may be -inclined to call "ad-
verse" witnesses and then impeach the witness in an attempt to use the
impeaching evidence to bolster its case." 5 Since prior inconsistent
statements used for impeachment purposes cannot be used as substan-
tive evidence,"16 the State must be cautious, and the defense must be on
guard to avoid having the impeaching statements argued to the jury as
substantive evidence." 7 After a witness is impeached, opposing counsel
should ask the court for a limiting instruction to inform the jury that
the impeaching statement cannot be used as substantive evidence.
B. Impeachment by Other Witnesses with Inconsistent Material
Facts
Section 90.608(1)(e) allows proof, by other witnesses, that the ma-
terial facts testified to are not the same as testified to by the witness
being impeached. 18 One case worth noting was heard during the sur-
vey period. In Garcia v. State,"' the defendant was charged with the
first degree murder of two elderly women. There was little evidence in
the case linking the defendant to the crime scene. However, the defend-
ant was a farm field laborer at the same time and place as one of the
State's witnesses. This witness overheard the defendant talk about the
murder and testified about this conversation at trial. The defense at-
tempted to impeach the witness by demonstrating that at the time of
the alleged conversation., the defendant was no longer working at the
farm. 20 The defense attempted to enter the payroll records to cast
doubt on the credibility of the State's witness. The trial court disal-
lowed this and the jury found the defendant guilty.' 2 '
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction
any party, including the party calling the witness.").
115. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The State cannot use the im-
peaching statements as substantive evidence unless the statement is brought in under
section 90.801(2)(a).
116. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations).
117. See Everett v. State, 530 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (where
the defendant's conviction was reversed because the State attempted to use the im-
peaching statements as substantive evidence during closing argument, despite the
court's earlier warning that the statements were not to be considered as substantive
evidence).
118. FLA. STAT. § 90.608(1)(e) (1989).
119. 564 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1990).
120. Id. at 125.
121. Id. at 126.
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and sentence of death in the case. 2 2 The court found that the failure of
the defense to impeach with the payroll records, plus the State's argu-
ment that the records were unavailable, lead the court to conclude that
the error could not be harmless.1 23 The court reasoned that the payroll
records could have impeached "a crucial link in the chain of circum-
stantial evidence."' 24 Without this link, there was little other evidence
to tie the defendant to the crime. Therefore, the credibility of the wit-
ness was central to the State's case and failure to allow the jury to
weigh this impeaching evidence against this witness justified the court's
reversal of the conviction.
C. Bias
Demonstrating a witness's bias or motivation to testify falsely is
one of the strongest arguments for the admissibility of what otherwise
would be considered highly prejudicial evidence. Counsel should always
examine a witness's testimony for any possible motivation or bias that
would allow the admissibility of such evidence.
In McCrae v. State,125 the Third District Court of Appeal reversed
the defendant's conviction of attempted murder when the trial court
refused to allow defense counsel to demonstrate a witness's bias. In
McCrae, the defendant attempted to elicit testimony that the State's
sole witness, and the victim of the crime, was in fact a drug dealer who
may have been shot by a third party during a drug deal.126 The defense
argued that the trial testimony was an attempt to conceal that fact by
blaming the shooting on the defendant. The district court dismissed the
State's argument that this was merely a facade to demonstrate the wit-
ness's bad character, and stated that evidence which is inadmissible for
one purpose can be admissible for another purpose under the rule of
"limited admissibility."' 27 Since the State's case rested solely on the
testimony of one witness, it was reversible error to exclude relevant evi-
dence demonstrating the possible bias or motivation of the witness to
testify falsely.
In Hernandez v. Ptomey,'12 the Third District Court of Appeal
122. Id. at 129.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 549 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
126. Id. at 1123.
127. See FLA. STAT. § 90.107 (1989).
128. 549 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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again discussed bias and motivation of a witness. In Hernandez, de-
fense counsel attempted to elicit that the State's witness was under in-
ternal review investigation for actions in other cases. 129 The court rec-
ognized that the defense has an absolute right to examine any possible
motivation of a State witness when that motivation may skew the wit-
ness' testimony in favor of the State. However, the district court went
on and discussed that "charges of unrelated offenses against a defense
witness are not proper grounds for impeachment." 30 The court con-
cluded that if the State can demonstrate, based on the pending charges,
that the defense witness would color his testimony, then tile bias testi-
mony should be admissible.' Note that the State should be cautious
and avoid attempting to demonstrate a "general bias" by the witness
against the State." 2 Though most witnesses being charged by the State
will probably have a general bias against the State, the testimony re-
garding a pending charge (such as murder) would probably be more
prejudicial than the general bias evidence would be probative.
D. Negative Impeachment
Florida case law has stated that mere negative use of a police re-
port for impeachment should not be allowed.' 3 3 However, this blanket
restriction is often interpreted too broadly. In State v. Johnson, the
preeminent case on negative impeachment, the Florida Supreme Court
set forth a four-part test to determine if negative impeachment should
be allowed. The court stated that "[i]t depends, as we have said, upon
1) being critical 2) upon a material and vital point 3) reasonably excul-
patory of defendant, within sound judicial discretion, and 4) after 'in
camera' review and deletion of any improper matter."' 34 The "critical"
issue in Johnson was the fact that the officer testified at trial that the
defendant had white powder on his jacket but left this information out
of his police report.3 5 The Johnson court found that failure to allow
129. Id. at 758.
130. Id. (emphasis in original)
131. Id.
132. See Fulton v. State, 335 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1976) (discussing that a general
bias is not a proper subject for impeachment).
133. State v. Johnson, 284 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973).
134. Id. at 201.
135. Id. at 199. The white powder was considered important because tle entry
point of the burglary in the Johnson case was a two by three foot hole surrounded by a
white powdery substance.
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the use of negative impeachment in that case caused reversible error. 136
Today, Florida courts use the Johnson case as a blanket restriction
on the use of negative impeachment for police reports and rarely con-
sider the four-part test promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court. A
prime illustration of this is the case of Jimenez v. State.137 In Jimenez,
the defendant appealed his conviction for possession and sale of cocaine
on the grounds the trial court precluded him from impeaching the of-
ficer's testimony regarding an incriminating fact which the officer left
off his police reports.13 8 At trial, the officer testified that he "observed
the defendant arrive at the scene of the transaction carrying a silver
box and exit shortly thereafter with a bag which officers had earlier
filled with cash."139 The officer did not note this in his police reports.140
The appellate court affirmed the conviction concluding that no error
had occurred concerning the precluded use of negative impeachment on
this issue.14 ' However, the appellate court failed to even acknowledge
that this evidence may have fit within the four-part test enunciated in
Johnson.42 Since the charge was for sale and possession of cocaine, it
would seem that the methodology of the transaction could be critical on
the material issue of possession and, therefore, could have exculpated
the defendant if the jury did not believe the officer.143 It is hard to
discern how the failure to report the methodology of a drug transaction
in Jimenez is any less critical than the failure to report a white pow-
dery substance on a jacket in Johnson. However, this will be left for
another day and another court. 44
136. Id. at 200.
137. 554 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
138. Id. at 16.
139. Id. at 16.
140. It seems somewhat odd that an officer doing a drug bust would fail to men-
tion in any of his reports the method by which the contraband was transported.
141. Jimenez, 554 So. 2d at 16.
142. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
143. The author believes the current viability of negative impeachment may be
in doubt.
144. The continued vitality of Johnson should also be questioned in light of the
changes in the rules of criminal discovery. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220
now restricts the use of depositions in cases where the officer's "knowledge of the case
is fully set out in a police report or other statement furnished to the defense." FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.220(b)(1)(i)(b) (emphasis added). Since the incident must be "fully set
out," this implies that material left out of the report should in all fairness be explored
by defense counsel by the use of negative impeachment.
Additionally, depositions in criminal misdemeanor cases no longer exist, unless
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E. Impeachment by Lack of Mental Capacity or Defect
The Florida Supreme Court, in Edwards v. State,145 settled a con-
flict between the district courts of appeal regarding the prejudicial use
of a witness' drug addiction during trial. In Edwards, the evidence at
trial established that the defendant stabbed the victim with a knife.
During the trial, the defense proffered the cross-examination testimony
of the victim concerning her prior drug use. The proffered testimony
demonstrated that the victim had been using drugs for twenty years
but had been clean for the past several years. The victim's proffer also
included the fact that she was not using drugs at the time of the inci-
dent and that during her testimony she was not using drugs. 4 ' Defense
counsel argued for the admittance of the victim's prior drug use to
demonstrate that the victim was not a credible witness and that her
prior drug use would impair her ability to perceive and remember. The
trial court rejected this argument and excluded the proffered testimony
but allowed the defense to question the victim about drug use on the
days preceding the incident and on the night of the incident. 47
The Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld the defendant's con-
viction and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed.' 48 The Florida Su-
preme Court noted that authoritative commentators have taken adverse
views regarding the relevance of prior drug usage. 49 The court cited
Professor Ehrhardt and Professor McCormick's views thai: evidence of
prior drug usage, other than during the incident or at trial, is admissi-
ble only if it can be demonstrated to be "relevant to the witness's abil-
ity to observe, remember and recount."' 50 However, the court noted
that Professor Graham took a contrary view indicating that drug addic-
tion possesses at least the minimum probative value necessary to estab-
lish relevancy, and the evidence could be excluded if it leads to unfair
prejudice or could possibly mislead the jury.15' The Supreme Court
good cause is demonstrated. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h)(iii). Therefore, failure to allow
the defense to fully utilize negative impeachment may cut off the defendant's only
method of defense.
145. 548 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 1989).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 657.
150. Id. (quoting C. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 608.6 (2d ed. 1984)); see
also E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 45 (3d ed. 1984).
151. Edwards, 548 So. 2d at 657-58 (citing M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FLOR-
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held that the introduction of evidence of drug use for the purpose of
impeachment would be excluded unless:
(a) it can be shown that the witness had been using drugs at or
about the time of the incident which is the subject of the witness's
testimony;
(b) it can be shown that the witness is using drugs at or about the
time of the testimony itself; or
(c) it is expressly shown by other relevant evidence that the prior
drug use affects the witness's ability to observe, remember and
recount. 152
This three-part test should aid the trial courts in discerning when
impeachment by drug use is admissible at trial. Through Professor
Graham's view that drug addiction possesses at least minimum proba-
tive value, it would seem that if the drug addiction did not fall within
the three-part test, it would probably be more prejudicial than proba-
tive and should be excluded.
F. Mode and Order of Interrogation and Presentation
Two cases during the survey period established the importance of
understanding the bounds of cross-examination. In Eberhardt v.
State,""' the appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction and
sentence for burglary when the trial court failed to allow the defense to
question and explore all the facts relevant to the defendant's intoxi-
cated state or condition. The State, on direct examination, elicited tes-
timony that two witnesses found the defendant asleep in a desk chair
inside the burglarized structure. On cross-examination, defense counsel
was prohibited from asking the witnesses whether the defendant ap-
peared to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The appellate
court found this to be error, since the State opened the door by asking
about the defendant's condition and appearance.15 4
The State also elicited testimony from a police witness regarding
statements made by the defendant. When defense counsel attempted to
elicit the whole conversation from the witness, the State objected on
IDA EVIDENCE § 608.4 (1987)).
152. Id. at 658.
153. 550 So. 2d 102 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
154. Id. at 105.
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hearsay grounds, and the trial court sustained the objection. 5 The ap-
pellate court once again found error and stated that the "rule of com-
pleteness"'156 allowed admission of the "balance of the conversation as
well as other related conversations that in fairness are necessary for the
jury to accurately perceive the whole context of what has transpired
between the two.' 57 Trial counsel should be aware that once a state-
ment is elicited, opposing counsel has the right to explore other parts of
the conversation free from any hearsay objections.
In Ellis v. State,58 the defendant was convicted of trafficking in
cocaine and conspiracy to traffick in cocaine. After the State rested its
case, the defendant took the stand and denied both of the charges. The
defense counsel argued that these denials did not open the door for
further questioning by the State. The trial court disagreed and in-
structed the jury to disregard the defendant's testimony after he re-
fused to answer the State's cross-examination questions.15" The appel-
late court affirmed the convictions and noted that once the defendant
takes the stand he does so as any other witness and, therefore, may be
cross-examined as any other witness.'6 0 Before committing a client to
the stand, defense counsel should always inform his client that he will
be treated, for cross-examination purposes, as any other witness and
will be unable to reclaim the safeguards against self-incrimination
whenever cross-examination becomes inconvenient.
VI. EXPERTS
One of the most interesting subjects to come along in recent years,
in the area of expert testimony, is the psychological autopsy. 16 The
admissibility of such evidence was first discussed in this state in Jack-
son v. State.' In Jackson, Judge Glickstein concurred specially and
framed the issue as follows:
[W]hether a psychological autopsy performed on a suicide victim is
155. Id.
156. FLA. STAT. § 90.108 (1989).
157. Eberhardt, 550 So. 2d at 105.
158. 550 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. A psychological autopsy is a retrospective look at an individual's suicide to
try to determine what lead the person to choose death over life.
162. 553 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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proper evidence in a criminal case charging the defendant with
child abuse in the form of the defendant causing her seventeen-
year old daughter mental injury by requiring her to work as a strip
dancer to earn money and that the defendant's demands on the
child caused her such stress that she took her own life to escape the
situation.163
The State charged the defendant with child abuse, pursuant to
section 827.04(1) of the Florida Statutes. In order to help establish the
child abuse, the State used a psychological autopsy to demonstrate that
the nature of the relationship between the defendant and her daughter
was a substantial contributing factor in the daughter's decision to com-
mit suicide. The underlying facts gleaned from Judge Glickstein's con-
curring opinion demonstrate that the victim wa's forced, by her mother,
the defendant, to work as a strip dancer at a nightclub to earn
money.164 Doctor Jacob, the State's expert witness, established the
foundation for his expert opinion by testifying to his previous work as a
pioneering psychologist at UCLA, interviewing people who attempted
suicide and the surrounding basis of his findings during that study.'65
He also testified that psychological autopsies are required by many hos-
pitals when there is a suicide. The doctor then examined the life of
Tina Mancini, the teenage victim. At trial, the doctor brought out a
previous suicide attempt of the victim, her dysfunctional family atmo-
sphere, her attempts to get away from her mother, her calls for help,
and the method of her death.
The appellate court found that the expert witness' review of the
victim's school records, police reports, medical records, testimony from
various witnesses at the trial, and an incident report from an earlier
suicide attempt established the foundation for his expert opinion that
the relationship between the defendant and her daughter contributed to
the daughter's decision to commit suicide.' 6 Additionally, the court
found that the State presented sufficient evidence to establish that the
"psychological autopsy is accepted in the field of psychiatry as a
method of evaluation for use in cases involving suicide and the trial
judge acted within his discretion in admitting this evidence at trial.' 61 7
163. Id. at 720 (Glickstein, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 719.
165. Id. at 721.
166. Id. at 720.
167. Id.
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VII. HEARSAY
Hearsay case law once again tops the list for the total number of
evidentiary cases contributed to this area. However, few cases made
any noticeable changes in the evidentiary law, though a fev are worth
discussing.
A. Inconsistent Statements as Substantive Evidence
Florida Statutes section 90.801(2)(a) allows a prior inconsistent
statement to be used as substantive evidence when certain prerequisites
are met."' In Dudley v. State,16 9 these prerequisites were not met. The
facts in Dudley surround a plan to kill an elderly woman who had fired
the defendant's mother from her job as the woman's companion. The
defendant, along with her boyfriend, went to the woman's house and
cut her throat. During the trial, the State attempted to have the de-
fendant's former boyfriend called as a witness to elicit statement's
made by the defendant regarding the murder. The statements were
made to a detective and an assistant state attorney during the police
investigation. The trial court granted the State's request, and the State
impeached the witness with the prior inconsistent statementsY.7 0 The
trial court initially instructed the jury that the testimony could not be
considered as substantive evidence. However, the State, in its final ar-
gument to the jury, and its argument before the judge, argued the prior
inconsistent statement as substantive evidence.17 '
On appeal, the State relied on section 90.801(2)(a) for the pro-
position that the statements could be argued as substantive evidence,
reasoning that they fell within the "other proceeding" section of the
rule.'17 The Florida Supreme Court disagreed and held "that this type
of law enforcement investigation and inquiry was not an 'other proceed-
168. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2) (1989). This section provides in part:
(2) A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hear-
ing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the
statement is:
(a) Inconsistent with his testimony and was given under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing or other proceeding or in a deposition
169. 545 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1989).
170. Id. at 858.
171. Id. at 859.
172. Id.
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ing' under the code and, consequently, section 90.801(2)(a) did not
apply. 173
B. Prior Consistent Statements
A typical problem associated with the use of prior consistent state-
ments is the failure of counsel attempting to admit this evidence to
properly have a time line of events squarely in place. 17-4 Basically, what
this amounts to is knowing whether the consistent statement was made
before or after the charge of improper influence, motive, or recent
fabrication. State v. Lazarowicz175 illustrates this problem. In
Lazarowicz, the State charged the defendant with sexual battery of a
child by a person in position of familial authority, pursuant to section
794.011 and 794.041 of the Florida Statutes. The defendant's seven-
teen-year old daughter testified that when she asked her father's per-
mission to attend a school function with her boyfriend, her father de-
nied the request and forced her to engage in sexual intercourse. He
then rescinded the refusal. The trial court admitted the statements
made by the daughter prior to trial, which were consistent with her in
court testimony.17 6
The appellate court found that the prior consistent statements
were in fact made after an improper motive arose.177 The defense
claimed that the daughter had fabricated the charges of sexual battery
to prevent her father from being in a position to prevent her from
maintaining an active sexual relationship with her boyfriend. 178 The
daughter's motive was indicated by her failure to report her father to
the authorities until one week after she first engaged in sexual inter-
course with her boyfriend. 7 9 Statements made after this improper mo-
tive would not be admissible under section 90.801(2)(b). At trial, vari-
ous witnesses testified regarding the prior consistent statements.
However, all these statements occurred after the improper motive
arose, not before, and therefore, all the statements were inadmissible
under section 90.801(2)(b).
173. Id.
174. See FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(b) (1989).
175. 561 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
176. Id. at 393.
177. Id. at 394.
178. Id. at 393.
179. Id.
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In Stewart v. State,18 ° a prior consistent statement was allowed
because the charge of recent fabrication occurred after the statement.
In Stewart, the defendant was charged with first degree murder. Dur-
ing trial, the state elicited testimony from a witness that the defendant
had related details of the crime to him. The defense claimed that the
witness fabricated his testimony to obtain favorable treatment from the
State in his sentencing on other charges.'" 1 However, the prior consis-
tent statement, regarding the details of the crime, was made before the
convictions had been obtained and the sentencing pending.'82 There-
fore, the statements were not hearsay under section 90.801(2)(b).
C. Spontaneous Statement and Excited Utterance
An interesting case analyzing both the spontaneous statement'83
and excited utterance'" exceptions to the hearsay rule arose in the case
of Sunn v. Colonial Penn Insurance Co.'85 In that case, after the plain-
tiff purchased a boat, he then purchased insurance coverage for it from
Colonial Penn Insurance Company. The plaintiff conspired with an-
other individual, Joseph Keeton, to burn the boat and collect the insur-
ance proceeds.' 88 The plan backfired when the boat exploded. Joseph
Keeton was badly burned and returned home. After approximately 20
hours, Mr. Keeton told his son how he got the burns and informed him
about the conspiracy. The insurance company denied the plaintiff's
claim for reimbursement for the loss of the boat because the coverage
excluded intentional acts done by the policy holder. On a motion for
summary judgment, the parties stipulated that judgement could be en-
tered for the insurance company if the statements constituted compe-
tent evidence.'8 7 The trial court held that the statements were admissi-
ble and granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers. 8 The
plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, the insurance company argued that the statements
were properly admitted as spontaneous statements or excited utter-
180. 558 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1990).
181. Id. at 419.
182. Id.
183. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(1) (1989).
184. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(2) (1989).
185. 556 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
186. Id. at 1157.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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ances. The appellate court listed the factors to be analyzed in determin-
ing whether a statement qualifies under the exceptions, stating that
these were "(a) the time gap between the incident and the statement,
(b) the voluntariness of the statement, (c) whether the statement is
self-serving, and (d) the declarant's mental and physical state at the
time the statement was made.1 8
9
The appellate court found that the most important of these factors
is the duration of time between the incident and the statement. 190 The
longer the time, the more chance of reflective thought in which to
fabricate a statement. The appellate court held that the case did not
provide a sufficient basis to conclude that the declarant made the state-
ments without reflective thought and, thus, the standards for spontane-
ity as to the hearsay statements had not been proven by the insurers. 91
Therefore, it was error to grant the summary judgement in favor of the
defendant. 192
D. Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis
In Bradley v. State,9 3 the appellate court reversed a rape convic-
tion when the trial court erroneously admitted a hearsay statement that
the victim was raped. The victim was raped by the defendant on July 4,
1987. The victim testified that a month later she told her mother about
the incident. A few days later, the victim went to a family planning
clinic for a pregnancy test and physical exam. While she was there she
told a staff member that she had been raped on July 4, 1987 and the
staff member wrote down "raped 7-4-87" on the victim's health history
form. 9 4
At trial, the State entered this form as a statement for medical
diagnosis under section 90.803(4). 111 The defense objected to the part
of the form where it mentioned the victim had been raped. The trial
189. Id. at 1157-58.
190. 556 So. 2d at 1158.
191. Id.
192. Compare Edmond v. State, 559 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(where the court held that an I 1 year old witness' emotional description of an assailant
to the police approximately two to three hours after the incident was admissible as an
excited utterance, because the child was still excited and hysterical at the time the
statement was made).
193. 546 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
194. Id. at 446.
195. See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(4) (1989).
1991] 1165
242
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/18
Nova Law Review
court overruled the objection and the jury found the defendant
guilty.' 96 The appellate court reversed and reasoned tha: it was im-
proper to allow the statement into evidence. 197 The court found that
only "statements which describe the inception or cause of the injury if
they are reasonably pertinent to the treatment are . . . within the ex-
ception."'9 8 The purpose of the victim's visit was not to receive treat-
ment for injuries due to the rape but to substantiate her suspicion that
she was pregnant. Therefore, the statement the victim gave to the
clinical staff member was not reasonably pertinent to the diagnosis of
whether the victim was pregnant, and it was error to allow the state-
ment into evidence as a hearsay exception under 90.803(4).
In Danzy v. State,'99 the same district court of appeal came to an
entirely different conclusion than the Bradley case. In this case, the
victim was staying with her girlfriend and the defendant while recover-
ing from a car accident. On the morning of the crime, the victim went
to wake the defendant for work. The defendant then picked the victim
up and carried her into the living room where the sexual assault oc-
curred. The victim attempted to leave the apartment and fell down the
stairs while exiting.
Upon returiing to the medical center for treatment of her injuries,
the doctor noticed that the victim was obviously upset and felt it was
necessary to learn why the victim was so upset and why she had fallen.
Upon learning of the incident the doctor instructed the victim to go to
the hospital to obtain a rape examination. 00
At trial, the defendant objected to the testimony of the doctor and
his nurse regarding the rape, arguing that it was hearsay. The appellate
court found that the statement fell within the hearsay exception for
purposes of medical diagnosis20' and distinguished the Bradley case.202
The court stated that in Bradley the only purpose was to determine
whether the victim was pregnant.203 In contrast, in Danzy the state-
ment made to the doctor was made only hours after the incident had
occurred and was made after repeated requests by the doctor who be-
lieved his patient's emotional condition was a consideration in his ex-
196. Bradley, 546 So. 2d at 446.
197. Id. at 447.
198. Id. (quoting C. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 803.4 (2d ed. 1984)).
199. 553 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st Dist, Ct. App. 1989).
200. Id.
201. See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(4) (1989).
202. Danzy, 553 So. 2d at 381.
203. Id.
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amination.114 Therefore, the court found that the "circumstances under
which the statement was made and the purpose for which the same was
elicited thus insure its trustworthiness and admissibility under the evi-
dence code."205
VIII. CONCLUSION
The vast number of evidentiary cases will continue to fill the case
books on a daily basis. Attorneys should be aware of the new changes
that have been made by our legislature and listed herein. Every attor-
ney should strive to understand how the changes can be applied in a
courtroom setting. Some of these changes will go by unnoticed, others
are sure to generate even more case law. Though not every evidentiary
case will cause earth-shaking changes, the methodology and analysis
supplied by the appellate courts will aid the trial attorney in the appli-
cation of these rules during trial.
With the volume of new evidentiary and substantive case law be-
ing produced every day, the trial attorney should strive to cull through
the cases to develop a notebook of helpful cases. In this manner the
attorney will have the cases he needs at his fingertips. With the advent
of computer technology, the trial attorney can keep a simple notebook
system of case law updated on a regular basis with a minimum of work.
204. Id.
205. Id. The court focused on the rationale behind the admissibility of the state-
ments by focusing in on the patient's motive to be truthful, because the diagnosis or
treatment will depend on what the patient will say. Id. An additional degree of trust-
worthiness is displayed when the information will be relied upon by the physician in
making his diagnosis or determining treatment.
1991] 1167
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Juvenile Law: 1990 Survey of Florida Law
Michael J. Dale*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past presidential campaign, President George Bush
asked the American people to "read my lips"1 in an effort to convince
the electorate of his position on a tax increase. In 1989 the Florida
appellate courts employed the same strategy to convince the legislature
and the lower courts of their apparent failure to cause Florida's juve-
nile justice and child welfare system to deal effectively with the state's
delinquent and dependent children.
During the 1990 session, the legislature responded at least in part,
making substantial changes in the juvenile delinquency provisions of
Florida's children's code when it passed the Juvenile Justice Reform
Act of 1990.2 On the other hand, a review of the appellate opinions
decided through September 30, 1990,3 suggests that the trial courts
were not reading the lips of the appellate judges. For example, in the
twelve month period between October 1, 1988 and September 30, 1989,
the intermediate appellate courts wrote seventeen separate opinions re-
versing the lower courts for failure to comply with statutory provisions
requiring consideration of six criteria when determining if a child is
suitable for sentencing and sanctioning as an adult, as opposed to dis-
position in the juvenile justice system after waiver or certification of the
child to adult court and subsequent conviction there.4 This past year
there were eleven additional reported opinions dealing with the same
* Professor of Law, Nova University, Shepard Broad Law Center; B.A., 1967
Colgate University; J.D., 1970 Boston College.
1. Speech by George Bush, then Presidential Candidate, at the Republican Nat'l
Convention (Aug. 18, 1988).
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.001-.516 (Supp. 1990). The legislature also passed The
Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act of 1990, FLA. STAT. § 874 (Supp.
1990), and the Juvenile Delinquency and Gang Prevention Act of 1990, FLA. STAT. §
39.025 (Supp. 1990).
3. This survey will cover the time period from October 1, 1989, to September 30,
1990. Appellate cases involving generic criminal and evidentiary issues are beyond the
scope of this article unless the issue is unique to juvenile law. A detailed analysis of
new legislation is also outside the purview of this article.
4. See infra notes 146-154 and accompanying text.
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technical issue.
The legislature's response to the perceived problems in the juvenile
justice field did not carry over substantially to child welfare.5 And even
in the juvenile justice arena, recent events suggest that resolution of the
problems under the new delinquency statute may be difficult to achieve.
A central component of the new statute is the appropriaticn of substan-
tial state funds which, at the time of this writing, are in jeopardy be-
cause of the state's projected revenue shortfall.6
This article will survey the case law in both the juvenile justice
and child welfare areas of juvenile law since September, 1989.7 The
survey is divided into two sections: Juvenile Delinquency and Depen-
dency.' The survey will not include a discussion of status offender pro-
ceedings because, for the second year in succession, there have been no
reported opinions interpreting the now two year-old .Part IV of the Act
which governs families in need of services and children in need of
services.'
5. The Legislature did pass the "William and Budd Bell Preven.ion and Protec-
tion Act," which made a number of specific changes in the dependency and termination
of parental rights parts of Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes. See FLA STAT. § 39.002
(1990).
6. See Chiles Tries to Spread the Pain, But Human Services Hurt the Most,
Editorial, Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, Jan. 12, 1991, at 22A; Law Maker Urges
State Income Tax to Boost Ailing Social Services Agency, Fort Lauderdale Sun-Senti-
nel, February 3, 1991, at 6B; Chiles Plan Would Cut Broward Child Services, Miami
Herald, Jan. 10, 1991, at IA (Broward Ed.).
7. Appellate opinions which raise no significant issues of general significance will
not be discussed.
8. The Florida Juvenile Justice Act, located at Chapter 39 of the Florida Stat-
utes, is divided into six sections. Relevant here are Part II governing delinquency mat-
ters, Part III governing dependency matters and Part VI governing termination of pa-
rental rights.
9. HRS has produced regulations governing such proceedings3. FLA. ADMIN.
CODE 1OM-28 (Families in Need of Services). HRS has also begur, the process of
contracting out a full continuum of CINS/FINS services to private providers under a
five year plan to achieve a full continuum of services. Letter from Ana M. Villar, Sen-
ior Human Services Program Specialist, HRS, March 22, 1991. For an overview of
Part IV of Chapter 39 governing CINS/FINS, see Dale, 1988 Survey of Florida Law:
Juvenile Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 1166, 1190-93 (1989) [hereinafter 1988 Survey].
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II. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
A. Detention
When a child is taken into custody-the equivalent of an adult
arrest-and charged with an act of delinquency, Florida's statute, like
those in most states, allows the child to go home, be placed in non-
secure detention or be held in secure detention. 10 Florida's approach to
detention has changed dramatically on several occasions over the past
decade. For example, prior to 1981 Florida had relatively narrow de-
tention criteria." The law was rewritten in 1981 to substantially ex-
pand the grounds upon which a child could be held in secure deten-
tion. 2 The new law narrows the grounds again.
Under current and prior law, when placed in detention "[n]o child
shall be held in non-secure or secure detention care or a crisis home
under a special detention order for more than 21 days unless an adjudi-
catory hearing for the case has been commenced by the court."' 3 The
appellate courts have issued a substantial number of opinions over the
past two years reversing trial court orders that violate the 21 day
rule.' 4 Indeed, the courts became so concerned that in J.F. v. Johnson'5
the Fourth District admonished a particular trial court that, given its
repeated failure to comply with orders to comply with the 21 day rule,
the trial court might find itself outside the limits of judicial immunity.
Over the past year, the failure to comply with the rule continued.
In R.C. v. Fryer,'" the Fourth District Court of Appeal reported that
the trial court had even suggested the possibility that the appeals court
itself would invite the child to bring suit against the trial judge for
refusing to release the child. Referring to its earlier decision in J.F. v.
10. FLA. STAT. § 39.044 (Supp. 1990).
11. Brummer & Levine, Incarcerating Children for Their Own Good: Florida's
Pre-Trial Detention Practices Revisited, 60 FLA. B.J. 17 (1986).
12. 1981 Fla. Laws 218, § 5, recodified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 39.032
(1981) (repealed 1990). See Dale, 1989 Survey of Florida Law: Juvenile Law, 14
NOVA L. REV. 859, 865 (1990) [hereinafter 1989 Survey]; Brummer & Levine, supra
note 11; Levine, Juvenile Justice in Florida: Bringing Rehabilitation Back Into Soci-
ety, 8 NOVA L. J. 255, 260 (1984).
13. FLA. STAT. § 39.032(6)(b) (1989), repealed by FLA. STAT. § 39.044(5)(b)
(Supp. 1990).
14. See Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 866-868 (discussing the cases de-
cided in 1989).
15. 543 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
16. 561 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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Johnson, in which it admonished the same trial court judge, the appel-
late court concluded, "continued and intentional disregard of the gov-
erning statutes by this trial judge will certainly invite harm to the trial
judge, as well as to the reputation of our courts and judicial system.' 17
On the same day, the Fourth District ruled in L.J. v. Fryer i that the
trial court could not retroactively and sua sponte continue detention
which had gone beyond the 21 day period on the ground that the
child's parents had failed to provide an attorney to represent the boy.
The court ruled that this did not constitute good cause to extend the 21
day limit.19 The court held further that the trial court's belief that the
child was represented by the public defender's office did not change the
result.20 Represented or not, the child was entitled to be released from
detention. When the detention period under the statute runs out, the
trial court lacks jurisdiction to extend the original detention. 1
Finally, in D.M. v. Korda,12 the court granted another writ of
habeas corpus relating to continued detention ordered by -:he same trial
judge. The appellate court stated: "Unfortunately, for reasons beyond
our comprehension, and despite this court's opinions in J.F. and in P.R.
v. Johnson, this pattern continues. Even with the purest intentions and
sentiments, no judge may put himself above the law." '23
It then explained that while judicial immunity may exist for
money damages, it is not a bar to claims for injunctive relief against
the judge or to an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the
Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act.24 The court concluded, "[w]e
will leave such considerations to the discretion of those parties who
may consider such claims in the future, should the particular division
continue to refuse to confine its rulings to the governing laws."' 25
17. Id.
18. 565 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
19. Id. at 713 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.032(6)(d) (1990)).
20. Id. at 714.
21. Id.
22. 562 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990). In prior reported opinions on
this issue, the appellate court removed the name of the judge sua sponte and substi-
tuted the name of the superintendent of the detention center. This time it did not. See
L.J. v, Fryer, 565 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990); R.C. v. Fryer, 561 So.2d
31 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
23. 562 So. 2d at 408 (citation omitted).
24. Id.
25. Id.; see also Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 868 (discussing the limits
of judicial immunity).
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In E.W. v. Brown,26 the First District Court of Appeal was faced
with a question of interpretation of the good cause exception to the 21-
day detention rule. The state's attorney argued that good cause to ex-
tend detention is met when the state establishes the need for continua-
tion of the original detention. The appellate court disagreed, holding
what seems obvious - good cause relates to the reason for the delay in
the commencement of the adjudicatory hearing process.17 Thus, if the
state can show that its investigation was incomplete or that a witness
could not be found, it may seek an extension of detention. However,
such is not the case when the basis for extension is the original justifi-
cation for detention. 8
In C.S. v. Brown,2 a question of first impression concerning the
21-day rule arose. The child had been detained on various charges, and
on the 21st day of his detention, the state filed an information against
him as an adult. The court determined that the filing of the informa-
tion removed the child from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for
the purposes of pre-trial detention. Thus, the state was obligated to
bring this child before a judge sitting in the criminal division for an
initial appearance under the rules of criminal procedure. 30 To do other-
wise, the court reasoned, would permit the state to extend the child's
period of deprivation of liberty without adequate procedural safe-
guards.-1 It found that the juvenile authorities lacked the ability to con-
tinue holding the child. The court concluded that if the state did not
bring the youngster before a judicial official for a first appearance
within 24 hours of the time the information was filed, the child would
be entitled to release by the juvenile authorities.-2
B. Adjudicatory Issues
Section 39.05(6), Florida Statutes, now renumbered as section
26. 559 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
27. Id. at 713.
28. Id.
29. 553 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
30. Id. at 319; see FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131, 3.132.
31. 553 So. 2d at 317 (citing P.R. v. Johnson, 541 So. 2d 791, 793 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1989)). The court also relied upon Rule 8.150 of the Florida Rules of
Juvenile Procedure, which provides specific procedures in order to waive jurisdiction of
the juvenile court and to certify the case for trial as if the child were an adult. FLA. R.
Juv. P. 8.150.
32. 553 So. 2d at 319.
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39.048(6), provides that a petition must be filed within 45 days of the
time the child is taken into custody."3 The courts in the past year have
been faced with several appeals relating to interpretations of the 45 day
rule. For example, in W.G.K. v. State, 4 while the original petition was
filed within 45 days, the state named the wrong victim, and then filed
an amended petition changing the name of the victim after the 45 day
period had run. The court concluded that the situation was controlled
by J.H. v. State,"5 and therefore, the adjudication of delinquency had
to be reversed.
The question of when the 45 day period begins to run was raised
in In Interest of S.V.36 The child, a suspect in a series of burglaries,
voluntarily surrendered to the police. He was then arrested for several
but not all of the burglaries. The state waited almost five months to file
a probable cause affidavit and almost six months to file a petition alleg-
ing delinquency as to the burglary which was the subject of the appeal.
The court held that while the child voluntarily surrendered himself to
the police months earlier, they did not arrest him for the specific
charge which was the subject of the appeal. Thus, 45 days had not run
from the time the youngster was taken into custody omi the instant
charges to the time the delinquency petition was filed. 37
It is possible for a juvenile to waive the 45 day time period. In
R.F.R. v. State,3 8 the child expressly and voluntarily waived his right
to have the petition filed in 45 days in exchange for a plea agreement
in which the state would place him in a youth diversionary program. 39
When the child failed to comply with the diversionary program agree-
ment, the state attorney filed a delinquency petition. The child's motion
to dismiss on the ground that the petition was filed beyond the 45 day
33. Section 39.05 of the 1989 Florida Statutes states:
On motions by or on behalf of a child, a petition alleging delinquency shall
be dismissed with prejudice if it was not filed within 45 days of the date
the child was taken into custody. The court may grant an extension of
time, not to exceed an additional 15 days, upon such motion as by the state
attorney for good cause shown.
FLA. STAT. § 39.05(6) (1989) recodified at FLA. STAT. § 39.048(b) (Supp. 1990).
34. 565 So. 2d 885 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
35. 424 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (filing of a defective original
petition, because it named the wrong party, does not toll the running of the 45 day
period. Thus, an amended petition not timely filed is invalid).
36. 560 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
37. Id. at 403.
38. 558 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
39. Id. at 1085.
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limit was denied. The First District held that the child should not be
allowed to agree to an alternative disposition, wait for the 45 days in
which a petition could be filed to pass, and then refuse to comply with
the conditions of the alternative program. ° Such a result is neither fair
nor logical. This was a reciprocal and interdependent compact."' On
appeal the child argued that the waiver was not expressly provided for
by statute.42 Thus, he argued, waiver was foreclosed as an option. The
appellate court disagreed as a matter of statutory interpretation.
In M.F. v. State,43 the child claimed that the delinquency petition
should have been dismissed because the amended petition, which was
filed more than 45 days after he was taken into custody, alleged an
entirely new charge. The amendment changed the type of controlled
substance the child was charged with selling, delivering, or possessing
with intent to sell, from cannabis to cocaine. Finding that the child was
not prejudiced in the preparation of his defense, the court held that
unlike a criminal case, in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the child
is not convicted of a crime. Therefore, he was adequately informed of
the charges against him when he was charged with the sale and deliv-
ery of a controlled substance. This information was enough to toll the
statutory filing period.45
The Second District Court of Appeal was faced with a similar
problem in State v. M.M.46 There, a child was charged with being a
40. Id.
41. If this were not such a compact, the rehabilitative purpose of the Juvenile
Code would be lost. Id. at 1086 n.3 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.001(2)(a) (1989) (amended
1990)) ("substituting for retributive punishment, whenever possible, methods of of-
fender rehabilitation"). The section was substantially rewritten in 1990 and the rele-
vant provision, section 39.001(c), states:
(c) To assure due process for each child, balanced with the state's
interest in the protection of society, by substituting methods of prevention,
early intervention, diversion, offender rehabilitation, treatment, community
services, and restitution in money or in kind for retributive punishment,
whenever possible, and by providing intensive treatment sanctions only
when most appropriate, recognizing that sanctions which are consistent
with the seriousness of the act committed and focus on treatment should
be applied in cases where necessary efforts have been made to divert the
child from the juvenile justice system.
FLA. STAT. § 39.001(c) (Supp. 1990).
42. R.F.R., 558 So. 2d at 1085.
43. 563 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
44. Id. at 172.
45. Id.
46. 557 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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principal to sexual battery. Subsequently, and outside the 45 day pe-
riod, the state filed amended petitions against the child charging him
with two additional counts of kidnapping and aggravated assault.4 7 The
appellate court concluded that the two amended petitions were a con-
tinuation of the initial petition, and therefore, the trial court's dismissal
of the petitions was in error.4 8 The court suggested two rationales for
upholding the amended petitions. First, they did not mislead the child
or prejudice the preparation of the defense as would have occurred
where the victim's name was misstated as in Interest of W.G.K.49 Sec-
ond, where the amended charges arise from the same factual situation
and where there is no showing of prejudice by the change, the amend-
ment will be allowed.50
In late 1988 the Florida Supreme Court changed the juvenile rule
of procedure concerning speedy trials to match the criminal rules. 1 In
State v. A.H., the Second District had an opportunity to interpret the
speedy trial rule.52 In that case, the defense requested discovery of the
informant and a tape recording in a case involving the sale of .1 gram
of rock cocaine to a confidential informant who was wearing a body
transmitter.5 3
When the defense demonstrated that the informant's testimony
conflicted with the testimony of the police officers who monitored the
drug transaction, it asked for a continuance to further depose the in-
formant. The court reset the hearing for a day after the time for expi-
ration under the speedy trial rules. The defense then moved for dis-
charge under the rule. The trial court granted the motion and the
Second District Court of Appeal reversed relying upon Rule
8.180(j)(3). That section provides that the state is allowed 10 days af-
47. Id. at 218.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see also J.H. v. State, 424 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
50. Id. (citing Interest of E.M., 362 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978)).
See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 15(e); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(c) (civil practice rules
known as the "relation back doctrine"). In a civil case, when the amended complaint
filed outside the statute of limitations alleges a cause of action arising out of a common
nucleus of operative fact with the original claim, the cause of action will relate back
and not violate the statute of limitations. See also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715 (1966).
51. See Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 868; FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.180; FLA. R.
CGRIM. P. 3.191.
52. 550 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1989).
53. Id. at 138-39.
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ter a hearing on a motion for discharge to bring the defendant to trial.
It was not given this opportunity and thus reversal was appropriate.5 4
In dicta, the court stated that the trial court has discretion to dismiss a
case if it finds that there has been an egregious discovery violation
which materially prejudices the defendant. However, the trial court did
not dismiss for this reason, but rather on the basis of the expiration of
the speedy trial time.5
A particularly sensitive discovery issue arose in B.E. v. State.5 1 In
that case a 14-year old child was charged with a lewd and lascivious
act upon a 3-year old girl. When the lawyer for the respondent sought
to take the three-year old's deposition, the trial court granted a protec-
tive order which not only precluded taking the deposition, but also for-
bade the lawyer from communicating with the child.57 The bases for
the denial were the unsworn representation of the prosecutor that the
child could not recount the events in question and thus would not be
called as a witness and the judge's personal feeling that no 3-year old
should be subjected to the legal process under any circumstance s.5 The
appellate court reversed on several grounds. First, it found that the
blanket preclusion violated the sixth amendment and article VI, section
16 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution. 9 Second, it
held that the age of the child of tender years does not itself demon-
54. Id. at 139.
55. Id.; see also State v. A.J., 558 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990)(re-
versing a dismissal on discovery abuse grounds because there was no showing of
prejudice).
56. 564 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 567.
59. Article VI, section 16, of the Florida Constitution provides, "the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor." It is not altogether clear that a respondent in a juvenile delinquency proceeding
has sixth amendment rights. In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has
held that the juvenile delinquency proceeding is not a criminal prosecution so as to
implicate the protections in the Constitution that apply to adults in criminal cases. On
the other hand, the Court in these cases did hold that due process rights apply under
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Thus, it seems clear that
the respondent would have the right to confront his accuser as a constitutional matter
but under the due process clause. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971);
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Of course, even
then there are limitations. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990)(limit-
ing defendants' sixth amendment rights to personally confront child accusers in sex
crime cases); B.E. v. State, 564 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990)(citing Coy v.
Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988)).
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strate lack of competency to testify. To the contrary, the court ex-
plained a body of Florida state law which suggests just the opposite. 60
The two judges assigned to the Fourth Judicial Circuit juvenile
court in 1990 had a general policy that all juveniles in secure detention
would be shackled at all times during court appearances. The policy
was challenged in S.Y. v. McMillan.61 The court denied a petition for a
writ of certiorari challenging the blanket system on the grounds that,
unlike adult cases involving the right to appear unshackled before a
jury, the child has no equivalent right.62 The appellate court concluded
further that the shackles were limited to juveniles being detained and
took into consideration the trial court testimony of the chief bailiff in
which he said that the use of shackles had a positive effect on the se-
curity and decorum of the courtroom. Additionally, he said that fights
among the juveniles and escape attempts had decreased. It is not clear
from the opinion whether any documentary evidence was presented. 63
The public defender argued on appeal that appearing in shackles vio-
lates the presumption of innocence. The court ruled that the lack of a
jury in a juvenile delinquency case was a significant distinguishing fac-
tor.6 4 The court, however, failed to mention decisions in other jurisdic-
tions, including cases involving juveniles in which the courts ruled that
the question of security was an individualized one.65
The more appropriate question was whether the particular child
was likely to create a security risk as balanced against the substantial
bias which might be created by the appearance of a child in court in
shackles. There is no explanation in the S.Y. opinion as to why only
children held in detention rather than all children charged are shackled
other than the assertion that detained children meet the statutory de-
tention criteria.66 Nor is there any explanation as to why this procedure
60. B.E., 564 So. 2d at 568 (providing relevant cases).
61. 563 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
62. Id. at 808. Although the court cited to no case in this regard, the Supreme
Court has distinguished between the constitutional rights of adults versus those of
juveniles. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
63. 563 So. 2d at 808-09.
64. Id.
65. See In re Staley, 67 I1l. 2d 33, 364 N.E.2d 72 (1977); In re Brown 45 Ill.
App. 3d 24, 358 N.E.2d 1362 (11. App. Ct. 1977).
66. It is not clear what conclusion the court was drawing. Perhaps it was sug-
gesting that detained children are more dangerous or are greater security risks. But see
Levine, supra note 12, at 255 (suggesting that the criteria are expansive and include
children charged with minor offenses). Nor did the court address whether any proce-
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is not followed elsewhere in Florida. Finally, the use of shackles seems
to run counter to the spirit of the Florida Juvenile Justice Act.6 7
In what is hopefully a unique case, the Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal was asked to decide the question of whether a trial court could
refuse to allow the prosecution to put on evidence by dismissing a delin-
quency petition over the prosecution's objection at arraignment.6 8 The
appellate court held in State v. S.C. that the decision to charge rests
with the prosecutor, and until both sides have an opportunity to present
evidence, the court cannot make a proper decision to dismiss.69
Technical questions concerning application of protected constitu-
tional rights have recently come up on several occasions in the appel-
late courts. For example, the right to counsel, set out over 20 years ago
by the United States Supreme Court in In re Gault,70 has been ex-
panded by Florida statute so that the child shall be advised of his right
to counsel at a dispositional hearing. 71 In Interest of J. CS.,72 the trial
court failed to advise the child of the right to counsel 3 and the court of
appeal reversed.
A second technical matter which has come up frequently involves
a Florida Supreme Court rule requiring written consent to employment
of a certified law student intern which must be filed in the case and
brought to the attention of the trial judge.74 In Interest of L.S.,76 the
court reversed and remanded for a new adjudicatory hearing when the
dure or substantive due process rights were violated.
67. See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.001(2)(a)(b) (Supp. 1990).
68. State v. S.C., 558 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
69. Id. at 523.
70. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
71. FLA. STAT. § 39.041 (Supp. 1990) (child entitled to representation at all
stages of any proceedings). See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.050(e)(1)(ii).
72. 560 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
73. Id. at 427. The court followed the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure which
provide:
Duty of the court. The court shall advise the child of the right to
counsel. The court shall appoint counsel as provided by law unless waived
by the child at each stage of the proceeding. This waiver shall be in writ-
ing if made at the time of a plea of guilty or no contest or at the adjudica-
tory hearing.
FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.290(a); see also B.I. v. State, 492 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1986).
74. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR 11-1.2(d) (1987); see also Dale,
1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 863 (discussing earlier cases).
75. 560 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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record was shown to be insufficient to establish that the child under-
stood his legal options and that he knowingly waived the right to be
represented by a lawyer when he consented to be represented by a cer-
tified legal intern.7 6 In Interest of A.R., 77 exactly the same issue came
up when there was no evidence of a written consent to be represented
by the legal intern in the file. Of similar constitutional significance is
the requirement that the court determine that a guilty plea or a plea of
nolo contendere shall be freely, knowingly, and voluntarily tendered.78
In two separate cases the trial court had failed to undertake the appro-
priate plea colloquy and as a result, in C. W. v. State 9 and M.C. v.
State,"° the appellate court reversed and remanded for appropriate
proceedings.
Sixteen years ago the United States Supreme Court ruled that the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment, also applies to juveniles. 81 In
D.L.V. v. Kirk,82 the Fifth District Court of Appeal granted a writ of
prohibition to prevent further proceedings in a delinquency case where
the state filed a petition alleging unlawful sale and delivery of cocaine
after a prior petition alleging the identical allegations was dismissed at
the adjudicatory hearing. At the hearing, the state was not prepared to
proceed and was unsuccessful in obtaining a continuance. The trial
court ruled on the first petition that the child was not delinquent as
charged. In a rather blunt opinion, the appeals court held that the or-
der of dismissal was a final order in the first case since the trial court
explicitly found that the child had not committed the act. The court
then added that the state's refiling of the petition was "a blatant at-
tempt to circumvent the court's final order of dismissal." 83
76. Id. at 425.
77. 554 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
78. See generally Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Florida applies the
totality of circumstances test for waiver of counsel. See State v. Evans, 462 So. 2d 596
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Cartwright, 448 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1984); Fields v. State, 402 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Hogan v.
State, 330 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
79. 554 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
80. 561 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
81. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); see also Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S.
204 (1978); Dale, Children Before the Supreme Court: In Whose Best Interests? 53
ALB. L. REv. 513, 532-34 (1989)(discussing the two cases).
82. 551 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
83. Id.
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The First District Court of Appeal in K.Y.E. v. State, " recently
decided a first amendment free speech case. A child was adjudged to
have breached the peace and obstructed a police officer without vio-
lence when she continually sang an obscene epithet in the presence of
the police officer, which allegedly interrupted the officer's conversation
with another individual. Because the record disclosed no evidence that
the singing epithet evoked a response intending to inflict injury or incite
breach of the peace under Florida law, the court found no breach. 5
Therefore, it concluded that the speech and conduct were protected by
the first amendment.86
A recent case, Interest of D.D.,s7 iivolved a question of the consti-
tutionality of the serious habitual juvenile offender dispositional place-
ment statute."8 The specific issue was whether arrests are a proper cri-
terion to determine serious offender placement. Relying upon the
Florida Supreme Court opinion in State v. Potts,"9 which held that the
state may not penalize someone merely for the status of being under
indictment or otherwise accused of a crime, the appellate court ruled
that an arrest cannot be taken into account in setting sentencing guide-
lines for juveniles." The court concluded the arrest criteria violated
substantive due process under the fourteenth amendment as well as ar-
ticle 1, section 9 of the Florida Constitution.9"
C. Dispositional Issues
Florida's Juvenile Justice Act provides a variety of dispositional
84. 557 So. 2d 956 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
85. Id. at 957 (there was evidence that her singing was heard by others and
attracted curious on-lookers).
86. Id.
87. 564 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 4th Dist.-Ct. App. 1990).
88. Section 39.01(47), Florida Statutes, provides:
(47) "Shelter" means a place for the temporary care of a child who is
alleged to be or who has been found to be dependent, a child from a family
in need of services, or a child in need of services, pending court disposition
before or after adjudication or after execution of a court order. "Shelter"
may include a facility which provides 24-hour continual supervision for the
temporary care of a child who is placed pursuant to s. 39.422.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01(47) (Supp. 1990).
89. 526 So. 2d 63, cert denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988).
90. D.D., 564 So. 2d at 1225.
91. Id.
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alternatives including community control,92 commitment to the Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), 93 commitment to a
licensed child-caring agency,94 restitution, 5 and juvenile dispositional
alternatives when the child has previously been transferred to the adult
court for trial.96 Each of these dispositional alternatives has been the
subject of regular appellate review over the past three years.97
In addition to the 21 day detention requirement, 8 Florida's law
provides that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
must move a child from secure detention and place the youngster in a
placement program within five days after the child has been commit-
ted.99 Seven different appellate court opinions over the past year have
dealt with this problem. In C.M. T. v. Department of Health and Reha-
bilitative Services,'00 the appellate court enforced the removal statute
and ruled explicitly that the statute is not discretionary.' 0 ' In a series
of three opinions, M.A. v. Coler,02 D.A.T. v. Coler,13 T.J.D. v.
Coler,0 and A.M.R. v. Coler,10 5 the Second District Court of Appeal
enforced the same five day rule adding that while it was not unsympa-
thetic to the HRS's argument that it was unable to comply with the
statute because of lack of resources, the court was obligated to enforce
the statute. It further suggested that the agency's argument was more
properly addressed to the legislature.10 6 In Interest of A.B., 07 the
Fourth District Court of Appeal was faced with sixteen separate peti-
92. FLA. STAT. § 39.054(1)(a) (Supp. 1990).
93. § 39.054(1)(a)5(c).
94. § 39.054(1)(a)5(b).
95. § 39.054(1)(a)5(f).
96. FLA. STAT. § 39.059 (Supp.1990).
97. See generally Dale, 1988 Survey, supra note 9, at 1163-64; Dale, 1989 Sur-
vey, supra note 12, at 870-83.
98. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
99. FLA. STAT. § 959.12 (1989) (repealed 1990) (the HRS may petition the
court for an additional 10 days to remove a child who has been committed to a place-
ment from the detention center).
100. 550 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
101. Id. at 127 (citing § 959.12).
102. 555 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
103. 552 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
104. 555 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
105. 555 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
106. A.M.R., 555 So. 2d at 1249; M.A., 555 So. 2d at 1248; T.J.D., 555 So. 2d
at 1246; D.A.T., 552 So. 2d at 320.
107. 553 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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tions for mandamus relating to the five day rule. Again, HRS argued
that there were no placement facilities available. Citing other cases, the
appellate court ruled that the statute is mandatory and requires release
of the juvenile held more than five days without placement into a com-
mitment program. 08 This issue appeared to be alleviated with the pas-
sage of the new Juvenile Justice Act and subsequent appropriations. As
noted earlier, as of this writing, the availability of funds for the appro-
priation to HRS to develop placement options which would stop the
backup of youngsters into detention, among other programs, remains
uncertain.
A second dispositional alternative under Florida law is restitu-
tion.1 09 Restitution is defined as money or "in kind" payment. 110 In a
dozen cases this past year the appeals courts have interpreted this
seemingly simple statute. In R.F. v. State,"' the Fourth District ruled
that the trial court must determine that the amount of restitution it
orders is an amount which the child can reasonably be expected to pay.
In this particular case, the court ordered $15,000 in restitution, which
the appellate court said "would inevitably be uncollectible." 112 In D.M.
v. State,' 3 the court ordered restitution of $988.00 in a matter involv-
ing the theft of an automobile. The appellate court reversed because
the trial court left it to the interested parties to develop the payment
schedule. In addition, although the child established that the amount
was beyond his financial ability to pay, he did not establish that it was
beyond the financial ability of his parents." 4 Florida law states that
when restitution is ordered by the court, the amount of restitution shall
not be greater than the amount the child and his parents can reasona-
bly be expected to pay or make." 5 This statute does, however, place a
maximum of $2,500 on parents." 6 In J.O. v. State,1 7 a case which
may have significance for restitution orders, the Third District Court of
Appeals recently reduced a grand theft adjudication to petty theft be-
108. Id. at 1350.
109. FLA. STAT. § 39.054 (Supp. 1990).
110. See FLA. STAT. § 39.11(a)(1) (1989), recodified at § 39.054(1)(a)(1)
(Supp. 1990).
111. 549 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
112. Id. at 1170 (the opinion is silent as to what the restitution was for).
113. 550 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
114. Id. at 150.
115. See FLA. STAT. § 39.054(1)(a)5(f) (Supp. 1990).
116. Id.
117. 552 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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cause no evidence was presented as to the value of the property stolen.
In G.C. v. State,"" another restitution case, the appellate court ex-
plained the obvious. A child is responsible for that portion of the dam-
age which he caused. In other words, as the Fourth District said In
Interest of J.C.S.,119 if the damage is not the result of the child's con-
duct, even when damage occurs, then restitution is not a proper
disposition.
Two obvious opinions are G.R. v. State,2 ° and L.A.R. v. State. 2'
G.R. involved a theft of $70.00 in American Express Travelers Checks.
The child was unable to cash the check, and the money was refunded
to the customer. Neither American Express nor the customer lost any
money. The court held that in order for restitution to be ordered, there
must be a loss.'22 In L.A.R., the Fifth District Court of Appeals re-
versed because it was not shown that the losses on which the order was
based were caused by the offenses to which the child plead guilty.' 3 .
Florida law does provide an exception to the parents' obligation to
pay restitution if it can be shown that they made "diligent good faith
efforts to prevent the child from engaging in delinquent acts.' 2 4 In
M.D. v. State, 25 the court, in a case of first impression, decided what
constitutes diligence. The court first ruled that the parent had the bur-
den of establishing diligence by the greater weight of the evidence. It
then defined diligence as an effort which is, over and above average, an
effort that is painstaking. 26
Community control, Florida's term for probation, is another dispo-
sitional alternative. The maximum time one may be placed on commu-
nity control is set in various respects by statute. Thus, for example, the
maximum period of community control which may be imposed for
petty theft is 60 days. 27 Therefore, in A.D.A. v. State, 28 the appellate
court ruled that the trial court could not impose community control for
118. 560 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
119. 560 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
120. 564 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
121. 563 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
122. G.R., 564 So. 2d at 208.
123. 563 So. 2d at 837.
124. FLA. STAT. § 39.054(1)(a)(5)(f) (Supp. 1990).
125. 561 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
126. Id. at 1261 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 386 (1988 ed.)).
127. See FLA. STAT. § 39.054(1)(a)(5)(f) (Supp. 1990)
128. 564 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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a longer period of time than the statute allowed. In M.G. v. State,129
the Fifth District ruled that an imposition of community control may
not exceed the time period to which the child could have been exposed
if the court had ordered a commitment within the juvenile system. The
court distinguished its holding from the adult system, where a distinc-
tion between time in prison and time on community control is allowable
by statute.1 30 Finally, Florida law provides that an order of community
control in a juvenile delinquency case may be revoked under certain
circumstances. In In Interest of L.S.,131 the court held that evidence of
arrest alone is insufficient to cause a violation of community control.
The appellate courts have regularly ruled that a child may not be com-
mitted to HRS or placed on community control for a term longer than
the sentence that could have been imposed if he were an adult.1 32 The
Florida statute is explicit.' 33 Yet, in J.S. v. State,134 the court once
again was obligated to reverse because the trial court ordered a 12-year
old to be committed until his 19th birthday for the burglary of a struc-
ture where, had he been adult, he could be punished for no more than
five years.135
Florida law also provides that at the dispositional stage, when the
court determines it will commit the child to HRS, the agency must
furnish the court with a list of not less than three placement options.
HRS must also rank the order of preference.13 6 The trial courts have
regularly failed to employ the ranked choices and the'appellate courts
have reluctantly ordered them to comply." 7 This year, in State v.
R. W.K.,1 8 the appellate court again dealt with a frustrated trial court
which had ordered HRS to place the child in a specific residential facil-
ity and fully fund the placement. The appellate court held that in the
absence of commitment under the Florida statute, a residential facility
129. 556 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990); see also FLA. STAT. §
39.054(1)(a)(2) (Supp. 1990).
130. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 948.04 (1987).
131. 553 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
132. See Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 877 (discussing C.P. v. State, 543
So. 2d 867 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
133. FLA. STAT. § 39.054(4) (Supp. 1990).
134. 552 So. 2d 327 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
135. Id. at 328.
136. FLA. STAT. § 39.052(3)(e)(1) (Supp. 1990).
137. See Dale, 1988 Survey, supra note 9, at 1168; Dale, 1989 Survey, supra
note 12, at 870-73.
138. 556 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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was not a proper placement alternative and, under the Florida statute
the court did not have the statutory authority to place the child in a
specific facility.'
Juvenile court jurisdiction exists until the child's 19th birthday.'4"
Thus, a dispositional order suspending a child's license beyond his 19th
birthday was reversed by the Second District Court of Appeal in
R.M.S. v. State.'41 In addition, in Lewis v. State, the First District
held that community service may not be imposed in lieu of court costs
because the court lacks authority to do so.' 42
Prior to 1988, juveniles could be placed in secure detention on the
basis of contempt adjudications. That year, the Florida. legislature
passed section 39.0321, Florida Statutes, which prohibited the place-
ment of juveniles in secure detention for punishment. 43 rn T.D.L. v.
Chinault,'" the appellate court ruled that placement in secure deten-
tion, based upon contempt, was a clear violation of the new 1988 stat-
ute. In T.D.L., the contemptuous act by the juvenile consisted of wad-
ding up commitment papers and throwing them onto the public
defender's table. The court held the child in criminal contempt and
entered a two-part disposition. It placed the child in secure detention
for 179 days and then converted that detention to a county jail sentence
when the child reached his 18th birthday some twenty days after the
contemptuous act occurred. In addition to vacating the placement of
the juvenile in the juvenile detention center, the appellate court also
139. Id.
140. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(4) (1989), recodified at § 39.022(4) (Supp. 1990).
141. 552 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
142. 564 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
143. Section 39.0321, 1988 Florida Statutes, provided:
Prohibited use of secure detention. - A child alleged to have commit-
ted a delinquent act shall not be placed in secure detention for the follow-
ing reasons:
(1) To punish, treat, or rehabilitate the child.
(2) To allow a parent to avoid his or her responsibility.
(3) To permit more convenient administrative access to the juvenile.
(4) To facilitate further interrogation or investigation.
(5) Due to a lack of more appropriate facilities.
FLA. STAT. § 39.0321 (1989), recodified at FLA. STAT. § 30.043 (Supp. 1990). See
generally Dale, 1988 Survey, supra note 9, at 1190-92 (discussing the contempt powers
prior to 1988 under Florida law in juvenile cases). It would appear that placement in
secure detention for contempt is once again permissible under the 1990 amendments.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.044(10) (Supp. 1990).
144. 570 So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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vacated the adult jail sentence. The appellate court concluded that in
order for an adult jail sentence to be properly imposed, the court had to
make specific findings pursuant to section 39.111(7), Florida
Statutes.145
D. Transfer Issues
The juvenile delinquency provisions of the Florida Juvenile Justice
Act provide that under certain circumstances the child may be tried in
adult court. 4 ' When a child has been tried as an adult and convicted,
the court shall determine whether the child should receive adult or ju-
venile sanctions. Six criteria are to be considered. 4 Application of the
criteria continues to produce a significant number of appellate opin-
ions.' 48 The appellate cases have uniformly enforced what the statute
plainly states:
Suitability for adult sanctions is determined by reference to
the six criteria and any decision shall be in writing and in conform-
ity with those criteria with the court maldng a specific finding of
fact and reasons for the decision.149
Yet, the lower courts continue to fail to make written findings as
required.'5 0 As the Third District properly noted in Ervin v. State,'5'
145. Section 39.111(7), Florida Statutes, provides:
(7) When a child has been transferred for criminal prosecution and
the child has been found to have committed a violation of Florida law, the
following procedure shall govern the disposition of the case:
(a) At the disposition hearing the court shall receive and consider a
predisposition report by the department regarding the suitability of the
child for disposition as a child.
FLA. STAT. § 39.111(7) (1989), recodified at FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(a) (Supp. 1990).
146. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.02(4), 39.04(5) (1989), recodified at FLA. STAT. 8
39.059 (Supp. 1990).
147. FLA. STAT. § 39.111(6) (1989), recodified at FLA. STAT. § 39.059(6) (Supp.
1990).
148. See Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 880.
149. FLA. STAT. § 39.111(7)(c)(5)(d) (1989).
150. See Lester v. State, 563 So. 2d 178, 179 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990);
Hope v. State, 562 So. 2d 863 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Dinks v. State, 561 So.
2d 1280 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Alan v. State, 560 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1990); State v. McCray, 556 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990);
Levesen v. State, 553 So. 2d 290, 291 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989)(holding that the
failure to order a pre-disposition report pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 39.111(7) (1989),
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not only must there be a written opinion, but that decision must include
specific factual findings to support the conclusion. The failure to make
such findings is reversible error. In Henschke v. State,152 the First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal also explained that the violation of this section
requires that the case be returned to the trial court for resentencing
and that the child is entitled to be present. According to the Fifth Dis-
trict in Youngblood v. State, 53 in making the written decision, the
court must consider all six factors and must not only track them using
conclusory language, but must provide specific underlying findings of
facts and reasons. The court commented on the many prior decisions
holding it reversible error to fail to make the findings under the six
criteria, but also explained that the written findings need not actually
be made at the sentencing, only before reaching the decision. The rec-
ord need only show that the trial court considered the factors at the
time of the sentencing. It would then be required to make a written
explanation.15 "
III. DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS
A. The Right to Counsel
Issues concerning the role of counsel in dependency proceedings
continue to appear in decisions of Florida's appellate courts. 155 In Met-
recodified at FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7) (Supp. 1990), prior to accepting the child's plea
and imposing adult sanctions was reversible error).
151. 561 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
152. 556 So. 2d 409, 410 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
153. 560 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
154. Id.; see also T.D.L. v. Chinault, 570 So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1990)(holding that the six criteria are applicable in the context of a contempt proceed-
ing where the court contemplates sanctioning the child by placement in the county
jail); Lang v. State, 566 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a
check list of the six criteria which is initialed by the court does not satisfy the statutory
requirement of a specific finding of fact and the reason for the decision) (citing Keith v.
State, 542 So. 2d 440, 441 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989)). The court in Lang also held
that a child could waive rights under the six criteria test, but the waiver must be mani-
fest either in the plea agreement or on the record. See also Dale, 1989 Survey, supra
note 12, at 881-83 (reviewing Keith and other earlier cases articulating the obligations
under the sanctions provision).
155. See Dale, 1988 Survey, supra note 9, at 1171-74; Dale, 1989 Survey, supra
note 12, at 885 (discussing cases decided in prior years together with a basic analysis of
the issue of right to counsel for parties in dependency cases).
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ropolitan Dade County v. Faber,156 the Third District Court of Appeal
certified to the Supreme Court the question of the availability of rea-
sonable attorneys' fees for court appointed lawyers in dependency and
termination proceedings. The issue involved an order by a trial court
that the lawyer for the mother in a dependency and termination case
be paid fees in a reasonable amount in excess of the $1000.00 maxi-
mum, which is provided for in section 39.415, Florida Statutes. The
Second District Court of Appeal had ruled a year earlier in Board of
County Commissioners v. Scruggs,157 that there was a constitutional
right to counsel, and that the fee limitation was an impermissible legis-
lative encroachment on the power of the judiciary. The Scruggs court
ruled that if the facts showed extraordinary circumstances, an award in
excess of the statutory maximum would be allowed. The court in Faber
explicitly agreed with the reasoning in Scruggs. 58
One possible source of representation of parents in dependency
cases is the Office of the Public Defender. However, in Yacucci v. Her-
shey, 59 the Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled that the public de-
fender had no obligation to represent indigent parents in dependency
cases. The case arose because there had been an unwritten policy in the
Office of the Public Defender in Martin County to represent defendants
in both criminal cases and dependency proceedings. When the succes-
sor public defender objected to the practice, and was still appointed,
the defender filed a writ of prohibition and subsequent appeal.6 0 The
court granted the petition and reversed. First, it found that section
27.51, Florida Statutes, which describes the functions of the public de-
fender, is silent as to any authorization to represent parents in depen-
dency proceedings. Similarly, the juvenile code does not allow for such
representation.
Second, the court relied upon an earlier decision in Public 'De-
fender v. Baker'6' which held that neither Chapter 27 nor Chapter 39
of the Florida Statutes gives the court power to appoint the public de-
fender to represent children in dependency proceedings. The court re-
156. 564 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
157. 545 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a fundamental
constitutional right was involved in such a case, albeit, not a sixth amendment criminal
law right, but a due process right).
158. Faber, 564 So. 2d at 186; see also Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at
885-86 (providing a more detailed discussion of Scruggs and the underlying issues).
159. 549 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
160. Id. at 783.
161. 371 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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jected the argument that Rule 3.111 of the Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure provides authority for the court to appoint the public defender. 16 2
The rule states only that lawyers may be provided to indigent individu-
als in all proceedings arising from the initiation of a criminal action
against the defendant which may result in imprisonment. It lists certain
proceedings as examples, although it does not include dependency mat-
ters. The court avoided the rule by saying that it gave no indication
that counsel can be from the public defender's office. This argument is
problematic because the section of the rule refers to counsel as a gen-
eral matter and could just as easily have been interpreted expansively
to include the office of the public defender. The court's third argument
appears to be that counsel need not be appointed because a liberty in-
terest is not a stake. This argument is problematic because indeed the
parent does have a liberty interest in a dependency proceeding. 163 Fi-
nally, the court did not address the fact that under Florida law the
parent does have an absolute right to counsel in a termination of paren-
tal rights proceeding."6
A separate issue, the appropriateness of HRS non-lawyer staff rep-
resenting the Department in uncontested dependency proceedings, has
finally been resolved. The matter had been presented to the Florida
Supreme Court two years ago by the Florida Bar, which sought an
advisory opinion.'6 5 Last year the supreme court ruled that HRS must
162. FLA. RULE CRIM. P. 3.111(c) states:
(c) Duty of Booking Officer. In addition to any other duty, the officer
who commits a defendant to custody has the following duties:
(1) He shall immediately advise the defendant:
(i) of his right to counsel;
(ii) that if the defendant is unable to pay a lawyer, one will be pro-
vided immediately at no charge.
(2) If the defendant requests counsel or advises the officer he cannot
afford counsel, said officer shall immediately and effectively place said de-
fendant in communication with the (office) Public Defender of the circuit
in which the arrest was made.
163. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (explicitly finding a liberty
interest referring specifically to the "interest of a parent and the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his or her children"); Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services,
452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding that while due process applied in termination of parental
rights cases, counsel as of right was not an element of the process to which the parent
was entitled. This analysis differs from the statement of the court in Yacucci.).
164. See FLA. STAT. § 39.465(l)(a) (1989).
165. See Florida Bar Re: Advisory Opinion HRS Non-Lawyer Counselor, 518
So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 1988).
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be represented by counsel. 6 The Florida Supreme Court has now
promulgated an amendment to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Proce-
dure, which addresses the unlicensed practice and provides that "the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services must be represented
by an attorney at every stage of these proceedings.' 67
B. Evidentiary Issues
Florida Statutes, section 39.409, provides that the court must
briefly state the facts upon which the finding of dependency is made.6 8
An issue about which there appears to be some confusion is whether a
finding of dependency must be reversed when the court fails to recite
the relevant facts supporting the adjudication of dependency pursuant
to the statute, but where the record is sufficient to support the adjudi-
cation. In L T. v. State, 9 the parents appealed from an order adjudi-
cating their son dependent. The Third District Court of Appeal ruled
that the trial court's failure to state the facts upon which its finding of
dependency was made, relying instead on the reasons set forth within
the petition, was clearly reversible error.' 70 However, the appeals court
also evaluated the evidence in the record and found that the state had
failed to show by preponderance of the evidence that the child was de-
pendent and for that reason reversed the order of adjudication. 7'
In Interest of K.S., 72 the parents also appealed from a depen-
dency adjudication. They argued the court's order omitted a recitation
of the specific facts upon which the determination was based and the
record was insufficient to support a finding of dependency. The appel-
late court held that when a court fails to make the appropriate recita-
tion of facts supporting the adjudication, and a sufficient factual basis
cannot be discerned, reversal may be required.' 7 ' However, in K.S., the
First District Court of Appeals found the necessary evidence in the rec-
166. In Re Advisory of Opinion HRS Non-Lawyer Counselor, 547 So. 2d 909
(Fla. 1989).
167. 557 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1990) (amending FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.610(a)).
168. FLA. STAT. § 39.409(3) (1989).
169. 532 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
170. Id. at 1088.
171. Id. at 1090.
172. 558 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
173. Id. at 158 (citing Interest of C.S., 503 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1987)).
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ord and thus affirmed. 174
Similarly, in T.S. v. State,175 parents appealed an order of depen-
dency on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient and that the
court failed to state the factual basis. The Second District Court of
Appeal found that an examination of the record of the proceedings dis-
closed sufficient evidence to support the finding of dependency.'1 6 How-
ever, the court also held that the specific factual basis stated by the
court-the children were found to be living in the conditions set forth
in the dependency petition-was insufficient to support an adjudication
of dependency under the mandate of section 39.409 of the Florida Stat-
utes. 177 Because, under the facts of this case, the trial court could have
withheld an adjudication of dependency, the appellate court remanded
and ruled that the adjudication be stricken.18 Thus, it is unclear from
T.S. what the court would have done if it had been faced with a situa-
tion where the record had proven the dependency, the findings had not
been made under section 39.409, and further intervention had appeared
necessary.
The court's reliance in T.S. on three earlier intermediate appellate
opinions in support of its conclusion that the court order failed to state
the facts upon which the finding was made as required by section
39.409(3) of the Florida Statutes, does not clarify matters. The three
cases are LT, 79 Fitzpatrick v. State,80 and Interest of C.S..'8' In two
of the cases, LT. and C.S., the courts ruled that failure to make the
order specifying the facts upon which the dependency was based was
clearly reversible error. 182 In Fitzpatrick, on the other hand, the appel-
late court held that the trial court erred by simply resolving the petition
without making the necessary factual findings, but it never concluded
that this alone was reversible error.' 83 All three courts also evaluated
the evidentiary record. In LT. and C.S., the appellate courts deter-
mined the state had failed to prove dependency.' In Fitzpatrick, the
174. Id. at 159.
175. 557 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
176. Id. at 677.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. 532 So. 2d 1085.
180. 515 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
181. 503 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
182. I.T., 532 So. 2d at 1088; C.S., 503 So. 2d at 418.
183. 515 So. 2d at 320-21.
184. LT., 532 So. 2d at 1088; C.S., 503 So. 2d at 418.
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court remanded with directions to make appropriate factual findings
because the evidence before the appellate court was in conflict.18 5 Fi-
nally, in Fitzpatrick, the court also noted that the reason for reviewing
a facially insufficient dependency order is to provide an early resolution
of the child's placement. 186
What these cases teach is that Florida courts will look beyond the
statutory authority to determine whether, despite the failure to make
factual findings, there was evidence in the record to substantiate the
determination of dependency. While they may be practical resolutions,
the decisions seem contrary to the clear statutory language of section
30.409, Florida Statutes. It does not seem at all difficult for the appel-
late courts to do with section 39.409 what they have done in the delin-
quency area with section 39.111, Florida Statutes. In other words, if
the factual findings are not stated on the record, the court simply re-
mands the case to the trial court for a recitation of the factual bases
for the decision. Proper findings will provide the parties and the appel-
late court a clear record against which to argue the legal significance of
the underlying facts.18 7
185. Fitzpatrick, 515 So. 2d at 321.
186. Id..
187. What is interesting about the development of the seeming exception to sec-
tion 39.409, Florida Statutes, based upon a review of the facts, is the process of reli-
ance on prior cases until one reaches the seminal case. See generally A.T. v. State, 409
So. 2d 155 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (its assertion is unsupported by statute or
doctrine). A.T. is a termination of parental rights case involving the failure of the trial
court to comply Rule 8.810 of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure which required
that a final order granting a petition for permanent commitment include a statement of
the facts upon which the court based its order. Despite the failure to comply with the
rule, the court upheld the determination based upon "overwhelming evidence support-
ing the permanent commitment, as well as the need for an early resolution of this case
in order to provide a stable, emotional environment for the children." Id. at 156.
The problem with this conclusion is that there is no support for it in either the rule
or the statute. One might argue that where there is a failure to comply with the factual
findings, affirmance may be justified on grounds of harmless error. But none of the
cases uses this argument. Even so, the problem with the harmless error argument is
that significant rights are in issue. See e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Furthermore, the statute is otherwise meaningless. It was clearly written for a purpose
and that purpose was to obligate the court to set out the factual basis for its opinion.
To do otherwise is to force the appellate court on a cold record to carry out what is in
effect a de novo review of the underlying facts. The trial court is in a much better
position to evaluate credibility and demeanor of witnesses. It may well be that the
appellate court upholds a finding of dependency in a case based upon facts which the
trial court, had it entered an order listing the factual basis for the opinion, would have
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The matter of proof in dependency cases is constantly litigated on
the appellate level."' 8 In C.C. v. HRS,189 the First District Court of
Appeal was faced with a question of whether the facts of the underly-
ing dependency amounted to a significant impairment of the child's
physical, mental or emotional health as is required under the statutory
definition of abuse.190 In this case, the court held that the mother's act
of loudly and angrily scolding a child, shaking the youngster by the
shoulders and striking the child's face and legs at the courthouse
amounted to an isolated event. There simply was no further evidence to
support the finding, although the court noted that uncontrolled and
hysterical behavior is to be condemned. Based upon a preponderance of
the evidence, the court could find no evidence of repeated activities and
so reversed and remanded the finding.' 9'
The difficulty of proving child abuse is demonstrated in In Inter-
est of N. W.,'1 2 where, despite evidence of severe physical abuse of the
child, the state could not prove who was the perpetrator. The court of
appeal reversed the finding that the father was the perpetrator. There
was testimony that both parents had access to the child and that the
child became rigid and exhibited hysterical behavior at the appearance
of the father. However, all staffing participants believed that identifica-
tion of the perpetrator was impossible, and the child had been cared for
by various family members at the relevant point in time.-"" The trial
court had also relied upon the father's personality type and potential
for cruel behavior as well as his institution of a paternity action prior to
the alleged abuse. According to the appellate court, such evidence
amounted to "little more then innuendo and speculation concerning the
father's surmised superior ability to abuse in the tragic manner to
which he was abused.' 94
In Paquin v. HRS,19 5 the court was faced with the question of
whether a finding of dependency as to one child can be used as the
rejected. Finally, it does not seem burdensome to require on remand that the trial court
simply state the facts for its decision.
188. See Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 890-92.
189. 556 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
190. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(2) (Supp. 1990).
191. 556 So. 2d at 417; see also Interest of T.S., 511 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1987); In re W.P., 434 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
192. 564 So. 2d 257 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
193. Id. at 258.
194. Id.
195. 561 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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basis for a finding as to second child. In the Paquin case, the court
found three children dependent. The facts demonstrated that the father
sexually abused one son and that the abuse occurred in 'the presence of
a second son. The court ruled that there was no competent evidence
that the third youngster, who did not live in the same household with
the two brothers, had witnessed any abuse or might be subjected to
abuse in the future. On that basis, the court ruled that there could be
no transfer of dependency. Thus, as to the single child the finding of
dependency was reversed. 96
C. Procedural Matters
The question of whether a child may see his file at the end of a
dependency case was before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
C.E.B. v. Birken.1 7 Reported in local newspapers, this case involved
pro se actions by a youngster to obtain the contents of his court file.
The circuit court judge had refused to unseal the social section of the
youngster's file and to turn the informatidn over to him."9 8 The district
court of appeal reversed the lower court and held that under Florida
law the petitioner had the right to review the official records. Origi-
nally, the court reasoned that under section 39.411(3), Florida Stat-
utes, the child is one person who has the right to inspect and copy the
official record.199 HRS had argued that providing the material was dis-
cretionary based upon the court's determination of the child's best in-
terests. The court rejected this argument on the ground that the use of
196. Id. at 1287.
197. 566 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
198. Id. at 908.
199. FLA. STAT. § 39.411(3) (Supp. 1990) provides:
(3) The clerk shall keep all court records required by this part sepa-
rate from other records of the circuit court. All court records required by
this part shall not be open to inspection by the public. All records shall be
inspected only upon order of the court by persons deemed by the court to
have a proper interest therein, except that, subject to the provisions of s.
63.162, a child and the parents or legal custodians of the child and their
attorneys, law enforcement agencies, and the department and its designees
shall always have the right to inspect and copy any official record pertain-
ing to the child. The court may permit authorized representatives of recog-
nized organizations compiling statistics for proper purposes to inspect and
make abstracts from official records, under whatever conditions upon their
use and disposition the court may deem proper, and punish by contempt
proceedings any violation of those conditions.
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the word "shall" made this statutory provision mandatory.200 The court
then decided what constitutes the total record given that there is a "so-
cial section" of the juvenile file. It found that the official record must
be turned over.201 The court found that whether HRS and other agency
reports constitute part of the official record is based upon whether the
court relied upon them or considered them in reaching its determina-
tion. If it did, the documents from the social file are part of the official
record.202
A difficult question of discovery was raised in In Interest of
C.W.203 In that case, the trial court granted a motion filed by the father
requiring a 4-year old child, alleged to be the victim of sexual abuse, to
undergo a physical and psychological examination.20 4 On appeal, the
court quashed the trial court's order on the basis that there was no
compelling reason advanced by the father to support the intrusion. The
court relied upon State v. Drab,2 °5 which held that in the context of a
criminal charge of sexual battery on a child, the defendant must show
the presence of extreme and compelling circumstances such that the
denial of the examination will deprive the defendant of due process. 20 6
Dependency proceedings continue to be entwined with custody
matters." In Ammons v. Hathaway,2" 8 the trial court ruled on a peti-
200. 566 So. 2d at 909. The court in dicta determined that if the child was ma-
ture enough to persuade the court on the law, he was old enough to "handle" the
disclosure of his own juveniles records on remand. Id.
201. Official records are defined at section 39.411(2), Florida Statutes:
(2) The court shall make and keep records of all cases brought before
it pursuant to this chapter and shall preserve the records pertaining to a
dependent child until 10 years after the last entry was made, or until the
child is 18 years of age, whichever date is first reached, and may then
destroy them, except that records of cases where orders were entered per-
manently depriving a parent of the custody of a juvenile shall be preserved
permanently. This court shall make official records, consisting of all peti-
tions and orders filed in a case arising pursuant to this part and any other
pleadings, certificates, proofs of publication, summonses, warrants, and
other writs which may be filed therein.
FLA. STAT. § 39.411(2) (Supp. 1990).
202. C.E.B., 556 So. 2d at 910.
203. 553 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
204. Id. at 293.
205. 546 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
206. Id. at 55-56. Rule 8.750 of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Prccedure provides
for examinations of children, guardians and other persons when custody is in issue. The
discovery rule, 8.770, is silent on the issue of physical examinations.
207. See Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 891 (discussing In Re F.B., 534
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tion for permanent custody filed by a mother. The children, who had
previously been declared dependent, were placed in the custody of their
paternal aunt and uncle where they remained after the mother filed her
petition. She alleged that she was now able to provide sufficient finan-
cial and emotional support to the youngsters. 0 9 After a hearing, the
trial court entered an order providing that the children be permanently
placed with the aunt and uncle. The order also gave the mother visita-
tion rights based upon the best interests of the child.210 The appellate
court ruled that the permanent status of dependency is not an option
available under Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes.211 The court ex-
plained that its primary obligation is to return the children to their
natural parents, and only when such efforts are exhausted is permanent
placement, with the aim of adoption, appropriate. The court noted that
custody in the natural parents "is an important interest which should
generally not be terminated absent certain circumstances constituting
abandonment or an unfitness which impacts the child's welfare." '212
The First District seems to have understood clearly the distinction
between the test for dependency and custody. The best interests of the
child is not the test in a dependency case, but may be proper when the
issue is one of custody. Clearly Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes does
not allow a dependency matter to be turned into a custody case.213 In
Ammons, the court also quite properly pointed out that the court
should not rely principally on material and economic benefits as op-
posed to personal, emotional and social welfare and stability as the ba-
sis for a custody determination.2 14
The rather technical matter of who can commence a dependency
proceeding was raised in the Fourth District Court of Appeal in In
So. 2d 899 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988)); Dale, 1988 Survey, supra note 9, at 1182
(discussing In re A.W., 519 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
208. 550 So. 2d 145 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
209. Id. at 146.
210. Id.
211. Id. (citing Interest of K.H., 444 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
212. Id.
213. See also Matter of Sanjivini K., 47 N.Y.2d 374, 391 N.E.2d 1316, 418
N.Y.S.2d 339 (1979); Bennett v. Jeffries, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.2d
821 (1978) (discussing the difference between the test for custody and dependency).
214. 550 So. 2d at 146; see also In re J.H., 535 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1988)(setting out the same proposition in the context of a dependency
proceeding).
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Interest of J.M..215 In this case, maternal grandparents appealed the
trial court's dismissal of their petition for dependency on the motion of
HRS, who desired dismissal. The court of appeals held that section
39.404(1), Florida Statutes, provides that any person with knowledge
of the facts may file the petition for dependency.216 HRS is not the only
agency or party who can commence a proceeding.2 17 Thus, the appel-
late court reversed.
A technical issue of appellate practice in dependency cases came
before the Fifth District Court of Appeal this past year. In HRS v.
C.G.,21 8 HRS sought to challenge by certiorari a court order adjudicat-
ing a child dependent and ordering the youngster to be placed in the
first available opening at a particular facility.21 9 The appellate court
held that the appropriate remedy was not certiorari but plenary appeal.
Although the Florida Supreme Court had previously held that under
certain circumstances the appellate court has jurisdiction to review a
case even when the form of appellate relief is misstated, the difficulty
in the particular case was that the 30-day time frame within which to
file a notice of appeal had expired. 2 0 The Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal refused to follow the holding of the Fourth District, which de-
clined jurisdiction over an appeal where the party incorrectly sought
relief by certiorari. 21 Rather, the Fifth District agreed with the dis-
sent, which viewed the timely filing of the application for certiorari as
sufficient to invoke appellate court jurisdiction.222
Florida, like many other states, has recently developed a state-
wide child abuse reporting system. It includes an abuse registry which
receives reports and pursuant to which HRS conducts investigations.
2 3
When a report is received and HRS conducts an investigation, the in-
215. 560 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
216. FLA. STAT. § 39.404(1) (Supp. 1990).
217. 560 So. 2d at 343 (citing Interest of J.R.T., 427 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1983)).
218. 556 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
219. The issue on the merits appears to be governed by Interest of K.A.B., 483
So. 2d 898 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1986) and FLA. STAT. § 39.41(5) (Supp. 1990),
which conclude that HRS determines when and with whom a dependent child shall
live. C.G., 556 So. 2d at 1244.
220. Id. at 1244; see Johnson v. Citizen State Bank, 537 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
221. See Skinner v. Skinner, 541 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989),
vacated, 561 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1990).
222. 556 So. 2d at 1244; Skinner, 541 So. 2d at 176.
223. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 415.501-.513 (1989).
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vestigator must determine whether abuse or neglect has occurred and
identify the perpetrator. 2 4 When the report stems from corporal pun-
ishment as occurred in B.R. v. HRS,226 the question is one of whether
the punishment was "excessive." HRS had an internal policy to con-
firm reports of excessive corporal punishment in those cases where the
bruises remained visible for least 24 hours.2" 6 In B.R., two school offi-
cials had paddled a student. The next day the student's mother re-
ported the incident to HRS which confirmed abuse under the 24-hour
rule.2 27 The court ruled on the definition of the term despite the fact
that HRS subsequently withdrew the 24-hour rule and conceded re-
versible error.22 8 The court held that "whether corporal punishment is
excessive must be proved in each case by competent, substantial evi-
dence, and all relevant issues presented must be considered without re-
sort to arbitrary presumptions fixed by the passage of time.2129
IV. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
In 1981, the United States Supreme Court held that the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment did not give natural parents
an absolute right to counsel in every termination of parental rights
case, although the court did suggest that generally a lawyer ought to be
provided.230 By statute, Florida authorizes the appointment of counsel
for parents in all termination of parental rights cases and further pro-
vides that the court shall appoint counsel for insolvent persons.231 In In
224. See FLA. STAT. § 415.503(5) (Supp. 1990).
225. 558 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
226. Id. at 1028.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1029. The court also noted that corporal punishment is authorized in
the public school system. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 231.085, 232.227 (1989)). See In-
graham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (discussing the constitutionality of corporal
punishment in schools); see also Dale, Children Before the Supreme-Court: In Whose
Best Interests?, 53 ALB. L. REv. 513, 552-557 (1989) (analyzing Ingraham); Rosen-
berg, A Study in Irrationality: Refusal to Grant Substantive Due Process Protection
Against Excessive Corporal Punishment in the Public Schools, 27 Hous. L. REv. 399
(1990) (analyzing constitutional claims for damages based upon corporal punishment
in schools).
230. Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
231. FLA. STAT. § 39.465(1)(a) (1989); see also Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note
12, at 899.
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Interest of M.R.,2 2 the court vacated an order terminating parental
rights on the ground that the record failed to reveal that the insolvent
parents were afforded meaningful assistance of counsel. In M.R., the
trial court appointed counsel pursuant to the statute, but the appellate
court found that the lawyer failed to appear at the adjudicatory hear-
ing and acted in other ways which raised doubts about his competence.
The court recognized the severity of this loss, stating that the right of
impoverished parents to a lawyer is a basic right guaranteed by the due
process clause of both the United States and Florida Constitutions.233
The opinion is imprecise in its interpretation of the federal constitu-
tional guarantee in light of the holding in Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services, in which the Supreme Court said that due process does
not require a court to appoint counsel for an indigent parent in all ter-
mination proceedings.23 4 However, while there is no constitutional right
to counsel per se, the First District is correct in its ruling that once
counsel is provided - and in Florida by statute it must be - the parents'
right to be protected is lost when there is no meaningful assistance. The
court did not articulate the exact contours of the principle of meaning-
ful assistance.23 5 However, the United States Supreme Court did say
232. 565 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
233. Id. at 372.
234. 452 U.S. at 26-27. The Court concluded that:
In some, the court's precedent speak with one voice about what 'fun-
damental fairness' has meant when the Court has considered the right to
appointed counsel, and we thus draw from them the presumption that an
indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he
may be deprived of his physical liberty.
Id. There being no deprivation of liberty to the parent, the Court held that there was
no absolute right to counsel. However, perhaps in an effort to ameliorate the impact of
its decision, the Court went on to say:
In its Fourteenth Amendment, our Constitution imposes on the State
the standards necessary to ensure the judicial proceedings are fundamen-
tally fair. A wise public policy, however, may require that higher stan-
dards be opted than those minimally tolerable under the Constitution. In-
formed opinion has clearly come to hold that an indigent parent is entitled
to the assistance of appointed counsel not only in parental termination pro-
ceedings, but in dependency and neglect proceedings as well . . . The
Court's opinion today in no way implies that the standards increasing the
urge by informed public opinion and now widely followed by the states are
other than enlightened and wise.
Id. at 34-35.
235. 565 So. 2d at 372; see Richardson & Smith, States Differ Over Compensa-
tion for Lawyers for Indigent Parents, Nat'l L. J., Oct. 22, 1990, at 16 (survey of the
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that counsel has to be present at critical stages of the proceedings and
that performance might otherwise fail to afford the most basic services
to be reasonably expected by competent counsel.23 6
Because Florida participates in the Federal Child Abuse Preven-
tion Act of 1974, it appoints guardians ad litem in dependency pro-
ceedings.237 In In Interest of C.B.,238 a court appointed guardian ad
litem appealed from an order dismissing her petition for termination of
parental rights. The trial court had ruled that the termination statute
was unconstitutional because it permitted any person who had knowl-
edge of the facts justifying the termination to file the petition.23 9 The
section in question states that "any other person who has knowledge of
the facts alleged or is informed of them and believes they are true,' 240
may file a petition. The court held that neither the privacy rights of the
parent nor the suggested limitation that only HRS or licensed child
care agencies could initiate the proceedings, was a valid basis for find-
ing the statute unconstitutional. 2 1 However, the court, without cita-
tion, then defined the phrase "any other person who has knowledge" as
"someone who is in peculiar position so that such knowledge can rea-
sonably be inferred; for example, the judge familiar with the file, the
guardian or attorney for the child, neighbors or friends of the parties
who, because of their proximity could be expected to have knowledge,
etc. ' 242 Perhaps the concern of the appellate court was that the action
might be commenced by someone with improper motives. However, this
dicta does not appear to be based on authority in the appellate courts
or the language of the statute. The matter should properly be handled
by the legislature.
Florida, like other states, has passed legislation aimed at guaran-
teeing either speedy return of the child to his or her parents or termina-
issue of compensation for lawyers for indigent parents, in which, significantly, the au-
thors misconstrue the Florida statute and case law on the right to counsel).
236. 452 U.S. at 372.
237. 42 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. (1989); FLA. STAT. § 415.508 (1989); FLA. R. Juv.
P. 8.590(c); see also Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 888.
238. 5671 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
239. Id.
240. FLA. STAT. § 39.461(1) (1989). Interestingly, HRS challenged the constitu-
tionality of the statute. The appellate court then raised the issue of whether HRS had
standing to do so. C.B., 561 So. 2d at 665.
241. Id. at 666.
242. Id.
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tion of parental rights.24 3 In compliance with federal legislation,244 af-
ter a finding of dependency, HRS will either provide the parent with a
performance agreement or a permanent placement plan, dependent on
whether the agency concludes that the child should go home or be
placed out ultimately for adoption.245 However, under certain circum-
stances HRS may move to terminate parental rights without requiring
a performance agreement or permanent placement plan.
In In Interest of D.J.,248 the mother of four minor children ap-
pealed from the final order terminating her parental rights, arguing
that the circumstances did not require this extraordinary procedure. 41
The court held that there was no requirement that HRS participate in
a performance agreement or permanent placement plan if evidence is
presented showing either abandonment or severe or continuous
abuse. 48 The court found that the extraordinary procedures -provision
applied because there was clear evidence of severe abuse of two of the
mother's children. 249 Significantly, the court terminated parental rights
to each of the children, although the opinion only described physical
injury to two of the youngsters. Although the court did not speak to the
issue of transferred neglect,250 it held that two physical manifestations
of abuse had the effect of threatening the life and well being of each of
the children.2 51
In Interest of J.A.,252 the court was faced with the difficult ques-
tion of whether it could terminate parental rights where the patients'
inability to comply with the performance agreement was caused by
chronic mental illness. The trial court had concluded that it was in the
best interests of the child to terminate parental rights bat ruled that
243. See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.451 (1989).
244. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272,
94 Stat. 500 (1980).
245. See generally Dale, 1988 Survey, supra note 9, at 1186-87.
246. 553 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
247. Id. at 379.
248. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 39.464(2) (Supp. 1990).
249. 553 So. 2d at 379. The childrens' injuries included a fractured skull as a
result of one youngster's head being struck against a door and the other suffering vigor-
ous shaking.
250. See FLA. STAT. § 39.464(2)(b)(2) (Supp. 1990) (providing a finding of
transferred neglect).
251. D.J., 553 So. 2d at 379; see infra notes 271-274 and accompanying text
(analyzing transferred neglect).
252. 561 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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section 39.467(2)(c), Florida Statutes, prevented the termination.2 53
The facts of the case indicated that the mother suffered from chronic
mental illness, and it was quite unlikely that she would ever be able to
safely raise her son.254 The appellate court concluded that the legisla-
ture did not intend to preclude termination of parental rights when
chronic mental illness of the parent prevents return of the child. The
court relied upon the legislative enactment, which refers to the location
of a permanent stable placement for children resulting either in the
return home or adoption. The appellate court also concluded that a
condition which is beyond the parent's control cannot be used to cate-
gorically preclude the termination of parental rights and placement for
adoption; to do so would be to frustrate the statute.255 The court ex-
plained that there might be circumstances beyond the parent's control
which are of a temporary nature. In situations unlike J.A. where
prompt safe return of the child to the parent is a realistic possibility,
the protection makes sense.256
The issue of prospective neglect continues to appear in the appel-
late case law, although the legislature amended Chapter 39 of the Flor-
ida Statutes in an effort to define the concept. 57 In Caso v. HRS,258
the appellate court affirmed a judgment terminating parental rights of
a mother with long standing and significant psychiatric problems.259
Relying upon earlier case law upholding termination of parental rights
253. Id. at 357. FLA. STAT. § 39.467(2)(c) (Supp. 1990) states:
(2) For the purpose of determining the manifest best interests of the
child, the court shall consider and evaluate all relevant factors, including,
but not limited to:
(c) The present mental and physical health needs of the child and the
future needs of the child to the extent that such future needs can be ascer-
tained based on the present condition of the child.
254. J.A., 561 So. 2d at 357.
255. Id. at 359-60.
256. Id. (relying upon the decision in Interest of T.D., 537 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that parental rights should not ordinarily be terminated
on the basis of a temporary deficiency beyond the parent's control)); see also Interest
of R.D.D. Jr., 518 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
257. See Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 895-99 (discussing earlier cases).
FLA. STAT. § 39.01(10)(e) (1989) defines a dependant child "to be at substantial risk of
imminent abuse or neglect by the parent or parents or custodian." See also Matter of
Charmine W., 61 A.D.2d 769, 402 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1st Dept. 1978); Matter of Valeric
Leonic T., 107 A.D.2d 327, 487 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1st Dept. 1985) (applying the doctrine
in another jurisdiction).
258. 569 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
259. Id. at 471.
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based upon the concept of prospective neglect,2 60 the court applied both
past factual information and its own projection about what would occur
in the future to uphold the termination. Specifically, the appellate court
found that the mother had failed to get medical care for her son, failed
to provide medication, failed to adequately supervise him, failed to
comply with a performance agreement, and failed to complete counsel-
ing. Additionally, the court found that the mother's psychiatric history
and past behavior would create a potentially significant impairment of
the child's mental and physical condition.261 The court concluded that
the mother had deprived the child of a physically and emotionally safe
environment in the past and that such deprivation would appear certain
to occur in the future.262
Chief Judge Schwartz dissented and, while bluntly recognizing
there were serious shortcomings in the mother,6 3 concluded that there
was no demonstration that the mother had forfeited parental interest as
defined under the Florida termination of parental rights statute. Chief
Judge Schwartz applied the same standards set out in a series of dis-
senting opinions written over the past several years by Judge Coward of
the Fifth District Court of Appeal.264
In In Interest of D.J.S.,26 decided this past year in the First Dis-
trict, can itself serve as an outline of the many issues confronting the
courts in matters of termination of parental rights. It is an en banc
reversal of a decision which had reversed a trial court order terminat-
260. See Palmer v. HRS, 547 So. 2d 981, 983 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. (1989),
caused dismissed, 553 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1989); I.T. v. State, 532 So 2d 1085, 1088
(Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Interest of R.D.D., 518 So. 2d at 412; Interest of
J.J.C., 498 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Interest of J.B.H., 491 So. 2d
1226 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Interest of J.L.P., 416 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1982).
261. Caso, 569 So. 2d at 468.
262. Id. at 471.
263. According to the Chief Judge, "the court's opinion conclusively demon-
strates in agonizing detail that [the child] would have been far better off with the
mother different from the early-flawed and seriously ill woman who gave him birth."
Id.
264. See Letts v. HRS, 547 So. 2d 328, 330 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989);
Manuel v. HRS, 537 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Gunter v.
HRS, 531 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Fredrick v. HRS, 523 So. 2d
1164, 1167 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 531 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 1988); see
also Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note 12, at 895-99 (discussing the issue of prospective
neglect).
265. 563 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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ing parental rights. The major issues concern the standard of review for
the termination of parental rights, the tests for child abuse and child
neglect, whether abuse and neglect can be applied prospectively, when
a finding of dependency may be transferred from one child to the other,
and what constitutes compliance with performance agreements under
Florida law.2"6
Before analyzing the majority and minority views on these issues,
it is necessary to discuss two procedural matters which appear in the
opinion. First, the dissents argue that en banc rehearing was predicated
in part on the ground that this was a case of exceptional importance
involving the application of the United States Supreme Court holding
in Lehr v. Robinson2 67 and the Florida Supreme Court opinion in Doe
v. Roe.268 In Lehr, the Supreme Court held that a putative father who
had not developed a substantial relationship with his child had no con-
stitutional right to challenge his child's adoption.26 9 The Florida Su-
preme Court ruled similarly in Doe. Careful reading of both the major-
ity and minority opinions in D.J.S. demonstrates that the issue decided
in Lehr and Doe was not dealt with in the en banc redetermination.
There is no explanation as to why this was the case.
The second procedural issue related to the content of the record on
appeal. The dissent argued that a number of documents, which it
viewed to be crucial, were missing from the recoid.2 70 Apparently miss-
ing were the performance agreements with which the department
claimed the father failed to comply, prior proceedings, motions, orders
and reports which the trial court judicially noticed, as well as the order
of adjudication of dependency of July, 1986, reports from the guardian
ad litem, and other reports. The majority concluded that these docu-
ments were not crucial to its determination. 1
D.J.S. involved the termination of parental rights of two children
of a man who was the putative father of one child (J.S.G.) and who,
while not the natural father of the second youngster (D.J.S.), raised
that child for some period of time while living with the child's mother.
266. Id. at 661-69.
267. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
268. 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1989).
269. 463 U.S. at 267; see Dale, The Evolving Constitutional Rights of Non-
Marital Children: Mixed Blessings, 5 GA. ST. L. REV. 523 (1989) (discussing in detail
Lehr v. Robinson and the body of Supreme Court case law relating to the rights of
putative fathers to contest termination of parental rights and adoptions).
270. D.J.S., 563 So. 2d at 684.
271. Id. at 668 n.16.
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When D.J.S. was 18 months of age, the appellant struck the child caus-
ing physical injury. He was subsequently charged with aggravated
child abuse and pleaded nolo contendere . 72 Approximately 16 months
after the incident, D.J.S.'s mother gave birth to J.S.G. Appellant and
the mother voluntarily placed the child with HRS. Thus, J.S.G. was
never in appellant's custody and D.J.S. was in his custody for a short
period of time prior to the beating. 73 Based upon a variety of asser-
tions, including physical assaults, alcohol and drug abuse, incarcera-
tion, and failure to comply with performance agreements, HRS eventu-
ally sought to terminate parental rights. After a hearing with 16
witnesses over a four day period, the trial court terminated parental
rights.2 74 On rehearing en banc, the majority held that the standard of
review of a termination proceeding, is that "a trial court's determina-
tion that evidence is clear and convincing will not be overturned unless
it may be said as a matter of law that no one would reasonably find
such evidence to be clear and convincing. "275 The appellate court noted
that it is not a matter of de novo review but rather, whether the deci-
sion is clearly erroneous or lacking in evidentiary support. 276
On the matter of child abuse, the issue was whether the proven
criminal offense against D.J.S. could be used to support evidence of
child abuse and subsequently a termination of parental rights as to
J.S.G. The majority opinion, relying upon a series of majority opinions
in other cases, concluded that it could. 7 The court further held that
the evidence of abuse as to one child could be used together with other
evidence to predict abuse against the other child, in other words em-
ploying the tests of transferred intent and prospective neglect. 278 The
majority held that the battery of the child was not an isolated act and
that the law did not require the child to continue to be at risk. As the
majority. rhetorically put it, "'how much more should this child be
forced to endure?'... That question and response, 'no more,' fits here
272. Id. at 658.
273. Id. at 657-58.
274. Id. at 659.
275. D.J.S., 563 So. 2d at 661-62 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.41(l)(f)3 (1989)).
276. Id. at 662 (citing The Florida Bar v. Hooper, 509 So. 2d 289, 290-91 (Fla.
1987)).
277. Id. at 663 (citing Interest of W.D.N., 443 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984)).
278. Id. (citing the various cases discussed earlier in this survey article); see
supra note 260.
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as well. 2 7 19 On the issue of child neglect, the court held that despite the
fact that the father never had legal or actual custody of the child he
fathered, he could nonetheless be held accountable for neglect because
a duty is imposed upon him regardless of the child's circumstances.
The appellate court recognized that the appellant had made some ef-
forts on behalf of the children, but concluded that the trial court was in
the best position to determine whether the concern.was genuine. 280
The court next ruled on the performance agreement. It held first,
as have other courts, that failure to comply with the performance
agreement cannot be the sole basis for a ruling terminating parental
rights.2"' However, it recognized that failure to comply can be consid-
ered as one of a number of factors. Taken together with other evidence,
it found that the lack of compliance was an element to be considered in
terminating parental rights. The majority found that under Florida law
when there is no prospect that the parent can ever assume parental
responsibilities, it is appropriate to terminate parental rights.282
The dissent disagreed vigorously about the facts in a detailed opin-
ion.283 Its stated purpose was to demonstrate that the evidence was le-
gally insufficient. Therefore, in its view there was no question of excep-
tional importance to allow an en banc review. 8s On the issue of abuse,
the dissent argued that the single episode of child abuse involving the
child D.J.S. and persistent aggressive and violent action toward the
mother, were not sufficient to prove that the father had abused J.S.G.
and that he was likely to abuse him in the future. 8 5 According to the
dissent, the facts of this case did not match those of other cases where
abuse of one child could be transferred to another. 286 On the issue of
neglect, the dissent again disagreed with the majorify over the facts. 87
The dissent argued that the father did what he should have under the
circumstances to protect his children by contacting HRS.2 s The dis-
279. Id. at 664 (citing J.M. v. HRS, 479 So. 2d 826, 828 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1985)).
280. D.J.S., 563 So. 2d at 667.
281. Id. at 668 (citing Interest of P.A.D., 498 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1986)).
282. Id. at 669-70 (citing FLA. STAT. § 409.168(1)(a) (Supp. 1986).
283. Id. at 672-81 (Zehmer, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 686.
285. D.J.S., 563 So. 2d at 687.
286. Id. at 688.
287. Id.
288. Id.
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sent agreed that the father's failure to comply with the performance
agreement cannot be the sole ground to terminate parental rights.18 9 It
concluded that because the performance agreements were not before it,
it was impossible to rule on this issue.290 Further, it concluded that the
performance agreements were invalid because neither contemplated re-
turn of the child to the father's custody as, according to the dissent,
Florida law requires.29x
At the heart of the dissent, and apparently independent of its view
of the facts and impact of the decision on the individual parties, is its
belief that the majority opinion sets bad legal precedent. "The ex-
traordinary length of this dissent alone serves to convey my deep con-
cern that the en banc decision will be allowed to stand as bad legal
precedent for seriously relaxing, if not judicially overriding, important
statutory requirements governing the termination of parental rights."2 9
It is not as clear that the majority misinterpreted the law as it is
that it applied the law differently to the facts than did the dissent.
However, it does seem odd that the case was heard en banc in light of
the fact that the issue raised in Lehr v. Robinson was never discussed
in the opinion. The last dissent, that of Judge Barfield, which expresses
this view, was never rebutted by the majority.2 93
V. CONCLUSION
It remains to be seen what impact the new Justice Reform Act of
1990 will have on delinquency matters in Florida's courts. The state's
current fiscal problems will make it more difficult to judge the impact
of the law in the near term. Independent of the new statute, the appel-
late courts continue to chide the trial courts for failure to comply with
289. Id. at 689.
290. D.J.S., 563 So. 2d at 689.
291. Id. at 690 (describing the statutory provisions in detail).
292. Id. at 699.
293. Id. at 700. According to Judge Barfield:
No where in the majority opinion is there a statement of the issue of
exceptional importance upon which this case was considered en banc. Ref-
erence is made to the order of supplemental briefing which suggested that
the court was concerned about the application of [Lehr v. Robinson], but
no suggestion is made that this court passed upon this matter en banc. Of
course, it could not be because no issue of abandonment was ever present
and none could be created.
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rudimentary statutory obligations. Undoubtedly, these appellate lec-
tures will continue under the new law.
On the dependency side, in addition to expressing similar concerns
about obvious failures to comply with statutory authority, the appellate
courts continue to express concern about the right to counsel provided
by statute to parents in termination cases. Most of the intermediate
appellate courts approve of the doctrine of prospective neglect, al-
though the subject awaits full resolution by the Florida Supreme Court.
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Mediation: Part II: Mediation in Florida
Geraldine Lee Waxman*
Sharon Press**
In Mediation: Part I: Background and Overview1 mediation as a
process was discussed. This article expands both on the philosophy of
mediation and on the mediation process itself, especially as it has
evolved in Florida.
I. THE ESSENCE OF MEDIATION
The mediation process starts when the parties have tentatively de-
cided to explore mediation as an option to resolve a dispute. In the first
session, it is the mediator's responsibility to explore the various forms
of dispute resoluiion with the parties. Litigation, negotiation, and arbi-
tration are all discussed. Once mediation is agreed upon as the best
alternative, the procedure begins.
A. What Mediation is Not
Mediation is neither the practice of law nor the practice of ther-
apy. This is so regardless of the background of the mediator. Thus,
although the mediator may explore the legal issues facing the parties
and may provide the parties with legal information, the mediator is
prohibited from imparting legal advice to the parties. An example of
this would be a mediator's ability to discuss what spousal support is but
not whether or not a party is entitled to spousal support in their partic-
ular circumstance. Succinctly, the mediator's job is not to interpret the
law, only to provide information about the law.
* J.D.; Family Mediation Trainer; President, Broward County Women Lawyers'
Association; Vice President, South Florida Council of Divorce Mediators.
** Director of the Florida Dispute Resolution Center; J.D. 1986, George Wash-
ington University; B.A. 1983, George Washington University.
1. Waxman, Mediation: Part I: Background and Overview, 14 NOVA L. REV.
933 (1990).
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B. Mediator Neutrality
Mediator neutrality is crucial to the effectiveness of mediation.
However, arriving at a clear definition has been the topic of frequent
debate. There are two basic standards defining mediator neutrality.
Neutrality is defined by the ethical standards for non-attorneys; neu-
trality contemplates the mediator as a non-judgmental, strict
facilitator.' Thus, if the parties are in accord, the mediator should be
satisfied with their agreement. However, ethical standards promulgated
by the American Bar Association for its attorney mediators recommend
mediator accordance with the agreement only insofar as that agree-
ment is "fair."'
The mediator who subscribes to the ABA's interventionist method
of mediator neutrality4 must ultimately decide whether or not the
agreement is "fair." This model may well place the burden for a suc-
cessful agreement on the mediator since the mediator must explore his
or her own biases, life experiences and experience as a mediator in de-
fining "fair."
C. Necessity of Party Presence
A mainstay of mediation as an approach to dispute resolution is
the physical presence of the parties. Other dispute forms may or may
not require the presence of the principals. However, in mediation it is
essential for the parties to be present since "all decisions are to be
made voluntarily by the parties themselves." 5 An exception to direct
involvement by the principals in mediation involves mediation of non-
family civil disputes where a representative of the parties may empower
the principals to participate in mediation. Such representatives have
the ability to agree to settlement.
2. B. Mayer, Standards of Practice for Social Worker Mediators D5 (May 31,
1989) (unpublished draft by author at Center for Dispute Resolution (CDR) Associ-
ates, Boulder, CO).
3. Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in Family Disputes, 18 FAM. L.
Q. 363 (1984).
4. See B. Mayer, Proposed Florida Standards of Professional Conduct for Court-
Ordered Mediators (May 31, 1989) (unpublished draft by author at CDR Associates,
Boulder, CO).
5. Id. at D3. But see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(b)(1), 1.750(c).
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D. Informal Yet Structured
Compared to litigation, mediation is a relatively informal process.
Generally, the parties control the speed with which they move through
the system. Thus, parties may wish to take several months, several
weeks or several hours to complete the mediation. As long as no outside
time constraints have been placed on the parties, the parties decide on
how much time they need to work out an 'agreement.6 Additionally,
parties who have voluntarily entered mediation may do away with
much of the legal paperwork normally generated by a dispute.
The informality of mediation should not suggest, however, that
mediation is without structure. Structure lies at the core of mediation.
Once issues have been defined and discussed, and after a priority rating
has been given to each, the mediator focuses the parties on specific
areas to be addressed. Each issue, newly defined, becomes a building
block toward the final agreement. Thus, the manner in which the medi-
ator structures the issues to be discussed becomes central to the resolu-
tion of the dispute between the parties. The resolved issues are com-
piled until there is complete agreement regarding all issues.
E. Confidentiality
Mediation is an open process between parties that encourages
problem solving. In order for the parties to be comfortable in their en-
vironment, they must be assured that they may explore all factors sur-
rounding their disagreement, without fear of this exploration becoming
detrimental at some subsequent point in time.7 "Being able to assure
confidentiality of disclosure is crucial to reaching an agreement and
may determine the success of the proceeding." 8
F. Trust in the Mediator
Finally, the parties need to trust the mediator. They must be able
to trust the mediator to understand the problems of the parties and to
assist them toward building an agreement, one step at a time. It has
6. Compare FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.710(a).
7. A. Davis & R. Salem, Dealing with Power Imbalances in the Mediation of
Interpersonal Disputes, 6 MEDIATION Q. 17 (1984); see also FLA. STAT. § 44.301
(1987).
8. J. WILKINSON, ADR PRACTICE BOOK 37 (ed. Donovan, Leisure, Newton &
Irvine 1990).
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been suggested 9 that the parties only begin to trust the mediator when
the mediator has been able to hear two opposing views, recognize that
they are different, and yet work with both as if they were compatible.10
II. THE MEDIATION PROCESS
While the mediator may occasionally be called upon to set limits
for the parties, the burden of reaching agreement rests with the parties
themselves. The mediation process is composed of many elements. Ba-
sic areas include (A) gathering relevant and pertinent information, in-
cluding when necessary, the use of experts; (B) reframing the issues
and focusing on interests of the parties; (C) exploring and providing
options for the parties; and (D) conducting private caucuses when
necessary.
A. Gathering Information and Objective Criteria
Inherent in any binding contract is the mutual disclosure of infor-
mation and open exchange of that information between the parties. The
exchange and disclosure must be sufficient enough to enable the parties
to the contract to make an informed choice when consenting to it.
Thus, the gathering of information is a necessary prerequisite, permit-
ting the parties to ultimately agree. Sometimes the parties are unsure
of what information is necessary or disagree as to what information
should be involved in assisting them to make an informed choice. Es-
sentially, all relevant, pertinent information must be brought to the
table.
Because each of the parties is frequently at odds with each other
regarding the accuracy of each other's claims, the mediator may dis-
cuss the use of an expert, agreed to by the parties, to resolve the di-
lemma of accuracy. The use of objective criteria and the utilization of
an outside and neutral expert often resolve the issue between the par-
ties. For example, the parties' disagreement about the value of a paint-
ing may be resolved with the use of an art appraiser. Of course, the
parties must be in accord with the individual expert and the method
used by him or her.
9. ZARTMAN & BERMAN, THE PRACTICAL NEGOTIATOR (1982).
10. See G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949). Orwell's famous "double think" used by the
bureaucrats is noteworthy for its similarity to the mediator's role in understanding di-
vergent viewpoints without negating either.
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B. Reframing the Issues and Focusing on Interests
When negotiators bargain over positions, they tend to lock them-
selves into those positions. The more you clarify your position and
defend it against attack, the more committed you become to
it .. ..
As more attention is paid to positions, less attention is devoted to
meeting the underlying concerns of the parties. Agreement be-
comes less likely. Any agreement reached may reflect a mechanical
splitting of the difference between final positions rather than a solu-
tion carefully crafted to meet the legitimate interests of the parties.
The result is frequently an agreement less satisfactory to each side
than it could have been."
When parties move away from their position and look to what
their interests are, their differences narrow. The mediator's ability to
reframe and rephrase one party's position to the other party is essen-
tial. For instance, one party's "I want the house," after exploring the
interest of that party may become "I need to stay in the house until I
find another house" or "I am concerned that I will not have any money
or a place to live." The true interest of the party, once uncovered and
discussed between the parties, may be readily resolved.
C. Exploring and Providing Options for the Parties
The mediator must overcome several obstacles before the parties
can begin to explore and provide each other with options that may lead
to agreement. First, each party initially thinks only of his or her own
self-interest, a common factor at the commencement of any disagree-
ment; second, the parties tend to think that many ideas muddy the wa-
ters and often only advance one idea; third, the parties desire to imme-
diately judge and concomitantly dismiss any new idea; and fourth, the
parties believe that the sum of the whole is greater than its parts.
(1) Self interest: When each party is interested only in their own
gain, agreement is limited. The parties must be made aware that only
when both or all of them have something to gain will an agreement
become viable. Thus, it is imperative for the mediator to explore and
assist the parties in identifying shared interests. Once shared interests
11. R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YEs 5 (1981).
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have been identified mutual benefits may be broached. For example, a
husband and wife both want custody. This may be translated into the
shared interest of both wanting time with the children. Rather than
focusing on a self-interest, custody, the parties have identified the
shared interest, time with the children. From this shared interest the
parties may explore and agree upon shared time and a specific method
to accomplish this mutual interest.
(2) Issues versus options: Because parties seem to think only one
idea is valid they limit themselves when making an attempt at problem
solving. But no single answer is "the" answer. The more choices that
are available to the parties, the more they have to review as possible
solutions. Thus, the parties are more likely to come to an agreement. In
short, the more there is on the menu, the less likely it is that anyone
will be stuck with something they cannot digest.
(3) Judging too soon: Parties tend to look at new ideas and dismiss
them immediately. One of the mediator's functions is to inform the
parties that creating a new option is not necessarily agreeing to that
option. The creation of options is merely an attempt at exploring
"possibilities."
(4) The sum of the whole: One of the best examples of redefining
the whole is exemplified in Fisher and Ury's famous story about an
orange. Two parties insist on owning an orange. Eventually the orange
is divided in half. Neither party has their needs met: yet, one party
needed the peel for an orange cake and the other party needed the pulp
for orange juice. Had they both explored their needs differently each
would have received not half but one hundred percent of the pie - or
orange!' 2
D. Caucus
Another key element to the process of mediation is the use of the
caucus. At one or several points during the mediation process, it may
be necessary to separate the principals and have private time with each
one. The caucus allows the mediator to (1) probe the separate interests
of a party; (2) permit a party to vent anger without escalating hostility;
(3) reinform a party on a point without dis-empowering that party; (4)
request more information from a party; or (5) discuss matters on an
individual basis. When all the parties have been informed at the outset
that caucusing is sometimes used and why, the caucus can become an
12. See R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 11, at 59.
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effective tool in the arsenal of the mediator and, when used properly,
can move the parties quickly and smoothly to agreement. When used
improperly or overused, it can create conflict and mistrust where there
was none. Parties subjected to continual caucus often feel betrayed by
the process because of their lack of control of that process. As a proce-
dural tool, the mediator must be very cautious in using separate and
private time with each party taking care not to alienate the other party.
III. HISTORY OF MEDIATION IN FLORIDA13
Florida's first formal entry into the field of mediation began in
May of 1975 when Dade County opened a CDS (Citizen Dispute Set-
tlement) Center. 4 This corresponded to a similar occurrence in several
other states.'5 The early success of this program led to expansion to
other counties, many of the programs being affiliated with the State
Attorney's offices. As of 1990, twelve judicial circuits established CDS
programs and another two circuits are in the process of establishing
these programs.'6
Also in 1975, the first juvenile arbitration/mediation program
opened in Duval County (Jacksonville). These programs, designed to
deal with children in need of supervision, have been established in dif-
ferent ways - some through the courts and some through HRS.17 Fur-
thermore, the methods used to resolve the conflicts vary from straight
mediation (where the neutral does not make any decisions for the par-
ties) to straight arbitration(where the neutral makes of finding for the
parties) to mixed mediation/arbitration process.' 8
13. See generally Alfini, Trashing, Bashing and Hashing it Out: Is This the End
of Good Mediation?, 18 F.S.U. L. REV. - (to be published 1991) (providing a more
detailed review of Florida's dispute resolution history).
14. Bridenback, Palmer & Planchard, Citizen Dispute Settlement: The Florida
Experience, 65 A.B.A.J. 570 (1979).
15. Bridenback, supra note 14, at 571.
16. J. Mason & S. Press, Florida Mediation and Arbitration Programs: A Com-
pendium (July 1990) (available at the Florida Dispute Resolution Center) (the follow-
ing circuits report the use of a CDS program: 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th, 11 th, 12th,
13th, 17th, 18th and 20th; the 3rd and 19th circuits are in the development stage).
17. See generally R. St. Onge Kadlec, Florida Juvenile Arbitration/Mediation
Programs (March 1, 1984); J. Kassack, Outcome Evaluation Report: A First Step To-
ward Accountability 155-66 (Dec. 31, 1989) (Both articles are HRS reports and are
available at the Florida Dispute Resolution Center).
18. The Florida Dispute Resolution Center will be publishing an updated study
of juvenile arbitration/mediation programs by 1992.
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The following year, 1976, legislation was introduced for both CDS
and Juvenile Mediation/Arbitration programs. Neither effort was suc-
cessful during this first attempt; however, juvenile arbitration legisla-
tion was adopted effective July 1, 1977.11 In January 1978, Chief Jus-
tice Benjamin Overton appointed the first Supreme Court Committee
on Dispute Resolution Alternatives. Justice Hatchet served as chair to
this committee which met eighteen times over the next two years.20
That same year, Florida's first family mediation program was es-
tablished in Broward County (Fort Lauderdale). The first attempt at
state-wide legislation for family mediation, in 1978, was not successful,
although the 1982 legislative session saw the passage of a family medi-
ation statute with an immediate effective date." As of 1990, nineteen
counties representing twelve judicial circuits established family media-
tion programs.22 These programs continue to be a popular alternative to
the traditional court system. The use of mediation in divorce settings
where children are involved has been strongly encouraged by the Fam-
ily Courts Commission2" and the recent amendments to the mediation
statute which require courts to send cases to family mediation under
certain circumstances.24
In 1984, the Florida Legislature created a study commission on
Alternative Dispute Resolution chaired by David Strawn.2" The follow-
19. See FLA. STAT. § 39.333 (1977), recodified at FLA. STAT. § 39.029 (Supp.
1990). CDS legislation was not adopted until June 1985, with an effective date of Oc-
tober 1, 1985. See FLA. STAT. § 44.201 (1985 & Supp. 1990).
20. J. Mason & S. Press, supra, note 16, at G-1. Additional Legislation passed
in 1987 entitled Family Mediation/Arbitration. 1987 Fla. Laws 133, amended by FLA.
STAT. §§ 44.101-.201 (Supp. 1990).
21. FLA. STAT. § 44.101 (1982) (repealed 1990).
22. J. Mason & S. Press, supra note 16, at 4-2 - 4-3.
23. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN & YOLTH, S.B. 3006,
1 th Leg. § 10 (1990) (creating a Commission on Family courts to develop specific
guidelines for the implementation of a family law division within each judicial circuit;
see their final report to be published mid 1991, for specific recommendations relating to
mediation).
"24. See FLA. STAT. § 44.102 (2)(b) (Supp. 1990) ("[iun circuits in which a fam-
ily mediation program has been established and upon a court finding of a dispute, [the
court] shall refer to mediation all or part of custody, visitation or other parental re-
sponsibility issues as defined in s. 61.13"). However, note that the court is expressly
forbidden from sending a case to mediation "if it finds there has been a significant
history of domestic abuse which would compromise the mediation process." §
44.102(2)(b).
25. Commission members included: Marsha B. Elser, the Honorable C. Welborn
Damiel, the Honorable Harvey Ford, William O.E. Henry, the Honorable Gavin K.
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ing year, the commission released its first report recommending a com-
prehensive mediation and arbitration program for Florida's courts.26
Over the next few years, mediation began to flourish in the State. In
1986, the first circuit civil mediation program opened in Lee County
27
and the Florida Dispute Resolution Center was created by Chief Jus-
tice Parker Lee McDonald and Florida State University College of
Law Dean Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte.28
Shortly after the Center's creation, the legislative study commis-
sion released its final report which included proposed legislation on
court-ordered mediation and arbitration. The legislation was introduced
unsuccessfully in 1986, but was passed when introduced the following
year.29 This was truly a watershed year in the development of court-
annexed mediation, not only for Florida but for the nation. The statute
authorized "a court, pursuant to rules adopted by the Supreme court,
[to] refer to mediation all or part of a filed civil action . . . ." The
supreme court adopted rules of procedure which established for the
first time three different types of mediation3 l with specific qualifications
Letts, Marshall McDonald, Alan Sundberg, and Thomas Testa.
26. Study Commission on Alternative Dispute Resolution: Final Report (1985)
(available at the Florida Dispute Resolution Center).
27. B. Duane & M. Bridenback, Florida Mediation Programs: A Compendium
(1988) (available at the Florida Dispute Resolution Center). The Lee County program
was established through the court administrator's office and handled cases where the
amount in dispute ranged from $5000 to $25,000. The program had one paid adminis-
trator and seven volunteer mediators. A total of 15 cases were handled during the ini-
tial year. Id.; see also J. Mason & S. Press, supra note 16, at 5-3 - 5-12. The program
currently has a program director, a program specialist and a secretary as paid staff who
handle all the mediation services for Lee and Charlotte Counties. One hundred part-
time paid mediators handled the 61 cases mediated in 1989.
28. The Center was formed as joint program of the Florida Supreme Court and
the Florida State University College of Law. Professor James J. Alfini was hired by
FSU to be the Director of Education and Research for the Center and Mike
Bridenback took on the role of Director of the Center.
29. 1987 Fla. Laws 173 (committee substitute for House Bill No. 379).
30. FLA. STAT. § 44.302 (1987), recodified at FLA. STAT. § 44.102(2)(a) (Supp.
1990).
31. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.700-1.780. The three types of mediation are county, family
(divorce) and circuit (civil, non-family). The Florida Legislature in 1990 created the
following definitions for the three types of mediation:
(b) 'Circuit court mediation' . . . means mediation of civil cases, other
than family matters, in circuit court. If a party is represented by counsel,
the counsel of record must appear unless stipulated to by the parties or
otherwise ordered by the court.
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for each. The cornerstone of the qualifications for each was training,
but threshold educational and experiential qualifications were also set
for family and circuit court mediation. 2
The 1987 legislation also authorized the establishment of a demon-
(c) 'County court mediation' . . . means mediation of civil cases within
the jurisdiction of county courts, including small claims. Negotiations in
county mediation are primarily conducted by the parties. Counsel for each
party may participate. However, presence of counsel is not required.
(d) 'Family mediation' . . . means mediation of family matters, includ-
ing married and unmarried persons, before and after judgments involving
dissolution of marriage; property division; shared or sole parental responsi-
bility; or child support, custody, and visitation involving emotional or fi-
nancial considerations not usually present in other circuit civil cases. Ne-
gotiations in family mediation are primarily conducted by the parties.
Counsel for each party may attend the mediation conference and privately
communicate with their clients. However, presence of counsel is not re-
quired, and, in the discretion of the mediator, and with the agreement of
the parties, mediation may proceed in the absence of counsel unless other-
wise ordered by the court.
FLA. STAT. § 44.1011 (Supp. 1990).
32. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.760(a)(b)(c). The following qualifications were set: 1)
County Court Mediators must complete a minimum of 20 hours in a training program
certified by the Supreme court. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.760(a); 2) Family Vlediators must
have a masters degree in social work, mental health, behavioral or social sciences; or be
a physician licensed to practice adult or child psychiatry; or be an attorney or Certified
Public Accountant licensed to practice in U.S. jurisdiction; and have at least four years
practical experience in one of the above mentioned fields; and have completed a mini-
mum of 40 hours in a mediation training course certified by the supreme court; or have
a Masters degree in family mediaiton from an accredited college or university. FLA. R.
Civ. P. 1.760(b); and 3) Circuit Court Mediators must be a former judge of a trial
court who was a member of the bar of the state in which the judge presided; or be a
member in good standing of the Florida Bar with at least five years Florida Practice;
and complete a minimum of a 40 hour mediation training program certified by the
supreme court. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.760(c).
Individuals who were currently mediating prior to the adoption of the rule were
allowed to continue to mediate under a grandfather clause. See FLA. R. CIv. P.
1.760(d). By 1990, all mediators must be of good moral character and must complete a
"mentorship." A "mentorship" for county mediators consists of the observation of four
county mediations conducted by a certified county mediator and the conducting of four
county mediations under the observation and supervision of a certified county mediator.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.760(a)(2). A family mediator must observe two family mediations
conducted by certified family mediator and conduct two family mediations under the
observation and supervision of a family mediator. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.760(b)(3). And a
circuit mediator must observe two circuit mediations conducted by a certified mediator
and conduct two circuit mediations under the observation and supervision of a certified
circuit mediator. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.760(c)(3).
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stration site for the new statute. The 13th Circuit, Hillsborough
County (Tampa), received state funds to implement the statute and
rules, and an evaluation was conducted. 3 While most observers
thought that this would be the sole testing ground of the legislation,
they were mistaken. Due to the interest of many skilled attorneys and
former judges, private mediation companies and mediators fervently
promoted the use of the large case mediation (small claims and family
mediation programs were already fairly well established).
IV. RULES GOVERNING MEDIATION
Court-ordered mediation is governed by Chapter 44 of the Florida
Statutes,34 Rules 1.700 - 1.760 Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and
several Florida Supreme Court Administrative Orders. The following is
a review of the law and procedures which govern court-ordered
mediation.
General rules of procedure were adopted to cover all types of me-
diation sessions, and specific rules of procedure were adopted for family
and small claims mediation to cover the differences. 35 In addition, qual-
33. K. Schultz, Florida's Alternative Dispute Resolution Demonstration Project:-
An Empirical Assessment (1990) (available at the Florida Dispute Resolution Center).
34. FLA. STAT. §§ 44.101-.308 (Supp. 1990).
35. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.740, 1.750. The rules for family mediation include the
following:
Limitation on Referral to Mediation. Unless otherwise agreed by the par-
ties, family mediation matters and issues may be referred to a mediator or
mediation program which charges a fee only after the court has deter-
mined that the parties have the financial ability to pay a fee.
FL..R. Civ. P. 1.740(c).
Appearances. Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties, a party is deemed
to appear at a family mediation convened pursuant to this rule if the
named party is physically present at the mediation conference.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.740(d).
Completion of Mediation. Mediation shall be completed within 75 days of
the first mediation conference unless extended by order of the court.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.740(e).
Report on Agreement. If agreement is reached as to any matter or issue
• . . the agreement shall be reduced to writing, signed by the parties and
their counsel, if present, and submitted to the court. If counsel for any
party is not present when the agreement is reached and does not sign the
agreement or object in writing to the agreement within 10 days after re-
ceipt, the agreement is presumed to be approved by counsel and shall be
filed with the court by the mediator.
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ifications were established for each type of mediation.3 6
The presiding judge is authorized to send all or any part of a civil
case, filed in circuit or county court, to mediation,3" subject to excep-
tions adopted by court rule3 Cases subject to these exceptions can
only be sent upon written stipulation of the parties. In addition to these
exceptions, cases which have been found to have "a significant history
of domestic abuse which would compromise the mediation process" can
not be referred to mediation.39
The first mediation conference must be held within sixty days of
the order of referral.40 The court or its designee, who may be the medi-
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.740(f)(1).
The rules for small claims mediation include the following:
Scheduling. The mediator shall be appointed and the mediation conference
held during or immediately after the pretrial conference unless otherwise
ordered by the court. In no event shall the mediation conference be held
more than 14 days after the pretrial conference.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.750(b).
Settlement Authority. If a party gives counsel or another representative
authority to settle the matter, the party need not appear in person.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.750(c).
Agreement. Any agreements reached as a result of small claims mediation
shall be written in the form of a stipulation. After court review the stipula-
tion shall be entered as an order of the court.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.750(d).
36. See supra note 32.
37. FLA. STAT. § 44.102(2) (Supp. 1990).
38. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.710(b) (listing the following exceptions: appeals from rul-
ings of administrative agencies, bond estreatures, forfeitures of seized property, habeas
corpus and extraordinary writs, bond validations, declaratory relief, any litigation expe-
dited by statute or rule, except issues of parental responsibility, and such other matters
as may be specified by order of the Chief Judge of the Circuit).
39. FLA. STAT. § 44.102(2)(b) (Supp. 1990). This language was amended during
the 1990 legislative session. The original language adopted in 1987 did not contain any
restriction on referrals of domestic violence cases to mediation. The 1989 Legislature
had enacted a broader restriction, effective January 1, 1990, which contained the fol-
lowing language: "A court: may refer all issues relating to custody, visitation, or child
support with the exception of those cases where there is a history of domestic violence,
to mediation, if an appropriate mediation program has been established in the circuit
or county over which the court has jurisdiction." FLA. STAT. § 44.302(1)(c) (1989)
(repealed 1990). The courts reported that this language was overboard based on the
high percentage of petitions for divorce which contain an allegation of domestic vio-
lence. If read strictly, mediation of family disputes would have been curtailed severely
and cases which could have benefitted from the use of mediation would be prohibited
from being referred.
40. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.700(a)(1); but see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.7z.0(e) (described
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ator, must notify the parties in writing within ten days after the order
of referral of the date, time and place of the mediation conference.4'
Within fifteen days after the order of referral, a party may make a
motion to disqualify a mediator or to forego the mediation process. 4
2
Sanctions, including the fees and costs of the mediator, may be as-
sessed against any party who, absent good cause, fails to appear at a
court-ordered mediation conference.
43
Mediation is to be completed within forty five days of the first
mediation conference, unless extended by court order or by stipulation
of the parties.44 Either party may apply to the court for interim or
emergency relief at any time.4 5 Mediation will continue while the mo-
tion is pending unless the court or the mediator determines otherwise."
Discovery may continue throughout the mediation process or be
delayed by agreement of the parties.47
supra note 35).
41. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.700(a)(2). But see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.750(b) (described
supra note 35).
42. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.700(b). Acceptable reasons to forego the mediation process
include: the issue has previously been mediated or arbitrated between the same parties;
the issue only presents a question of law; it is exempted from mediation pursuant to
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.710(b); or if other good cause is shown.
43. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(b). This rule was specifically drafted to refer to appear-
ance at the court-ordered mediation conference and not "good faith" participation or
negotiation in the process. Such a requirement was deemed by the supreme court and
their Committee on Mediation and Arbitration Rules to be unreasonable since media-
tion is by definition a consensual process. Appearance was defined in the 1990 Rule
revisions to require that the following persons be physically present, unless stipulated to
by the parties:
(1) the party or its representative having full authority to settle without
further consultation; and (2) the parties counsel of record, if any; and (3)
a representative of the insurance carrier for any insured party who is not
such carrier's outside counsel and who has full authority to settle without
further consultation.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(b). But see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.740(d) (family mediation appear-
ances, supra note 35).
44. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.710(a). In the original rules adopted by the court in 1988,
mediation was to be completed within 30 days to ensure that mediation would be a
speedy, low cost alternative. After two years of experience, the court was persuaded
that parties and their attorneys were not abusing the process and that some cases legiti-
mately needed more time to be resolved. Cf. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.740(e) (described supra
note 35) (allowing 75 days for the completion of family mediation).
45. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(a).
46. Id.
47. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.710(c).
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The rules of civil procedure provide a great deal of discretion to
the mediator.48 In the initial set of rules adopted by the court, effective
from January 1988 to June 30, 1990, court-ordered mediation could
only be handled by a certified mediator.49 In 1990, the rules were
amended to provide the parties ten days from the order of referral to
chose their own mediator by stipulation. This mediator can be a certi-
fied mediator, but if the parties agree otherwise, it need not be.5"
The supreme court has two standing committees on mediation and
arbitration, one on rules and the other on training.5 1 The next phase for
48. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(c)(d)(e). The mediator is in control at all times of
the mediation session and the procedures to be followed and has the liberty to
reschedule or adjourn the mediation at any time it is deemed to be inappropriate to
proceed. Mediation may proceed without the presence of counsel if the parties agree
and the mediator determines that it is appropriate to continue. In addition, the media-
tor may meet and consult privately with the any party or their counsel. Id. The media-
tor, however, was not given the authority to provide recommendations to the court in
the event no agreement was reached by the parties. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.730(a). The
mediator is to report the lack of agreement to the court without comment or recom-
mendation. Id. The 1990 Rule revisions allow the mediator to identify pending motions
or outstanding legal issues, discovery process or other action by any party which, if
resolved or completed, would facilitate the possibility of a settlement. Id.
49. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.760 (mediators were certified by the chief judge of a circuit
if they were deemed to have complied with the established qualifications); see supra
note 32. Chapter 44 of the Florida Statutes was amended in 1990 (effective July 1,
1990) to remove certification from the local level and place it with the supreme court.
FLA. STAT. § 44.102(4) (Supp. 1990).
50. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(f). The rule provides:
Within 10 days of the order of referral, the parties may agree upon a
stipulation with the court designating: (a) a certified mediator; or (b) a
mediator who does not meet the certification requirements of these rules
but who in the opinion of the parties and upon review by the presiding
judge, is otherwise qualified by training or experience to mediate all or
some of the issues in the particular case.
Id.
51. See J. MASON & S. PRESS, supra note 16, at C-1 - C-10. The Florida Su-
preme Court Standing Committee on Mediation/Arbitration Training was appointed in
February of 1988 by Chief Justice Parker Lee McDonald. The committee chaired by
Judge Frank Orlando was charged with: 1) recommending policies and procedures con-
cerning the certification of mediator and arbitrator training programs; and 2) reviewing
applications for the certification of such training programs and making recommenda-
tions to the supreme court by making other recommendations relating to the implemen-
tation of the provisions of the new rules governing mediation and arbitration qualifica-
tions and training, as deemed necessary. Id.
The Supreme Court Standing Committee on Mediation and Arbitration Rules was
created by Chief Justice Raymond Ehrlich on July 26, 1989. Chaired by Lawrence
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court-ordered mediation is to establish a code of conduct for court
mediators, a grievance procedure and discipline process.52
V. CONCLUSION
This is an exciting time for dispute resolution. Mediation has
made tremendous strides in Florida. In 'fact, Florida is becoming the
"national showcase for court-ordered mediation. ' 53
Watson, Esq., this committee was charged with evaluating the rules of civil procedure
and making recommendations reflecting proposed amendments, recommending a set of
Standards of Conduct. See J. MASON & S. PRESS, supra note 16, at D-1 - D-8 (evaluat-
ing Chapter 44, advising the supreme court of the need for changes and making any
other recommendations as would improve the use of mediation and arbitration). Both
committees continue to meet on a regular basis to establish policies on their respective
issues.
52. See generally FLA. STAT. § 44.307 (1990) (the 1989 amendments to chapter
44 provided immunity to the full extent of a judge to all mediators appointed pursuant
to the chapter).
53. B. Talcott, Court Ordered Mediation in Florida, 23 MEDIATION Q. 77, 84
(1989).
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This article surveys the decisions made by the Florida Su-
preme Court between October 1, 1989 and September 30, 1990
which deal with real property. The six decisions concern condo-
miniums, real estate sales, recording and wills. It is interesting
that there are so few supreme court decisions in this area despite
the fact that real estate is such an important and large part of
the practice of law in this state.
I. CONDOMINIUMS - RECREATION LEASES
Association of Golden Glades Condominium Club, Inc. v. Secur-
ity Management Corp.'
In 1970, the developer of the Golden Glades Condominium filed a
* Professor of Law, Nova University, Shepard Broad Law Center.
The author would like to thank his research assistant Keith Baron, class of '92, for
his assistance, and would also like to thank Professors Joseph Grohman, Michael
Masinter, and Donna Seiden for reading and commenting on parts of this paper.
1. 557 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1990). Justice Overton wrote the opinion in which Chief
Justice Ehrlich and Justices Grimes and Kogan concurred. Justices Shaw and Barkett
concurred in the result only. Justice McDonald concurred with an opinion.
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declaration of condominium. The condominium association2 immedi-
ately leased recreational property from the Golden Glades Club Recre-
ation Corporation; the lease included a rent escalation clause. Later,3
the lessor merged with the developer and with the Security Manage-
ment Corporation. As a result of the merger, Security Management
became the successor landlord. Security Management brought this suit
to collect what it claimed was due for the period between 1980 and
January 1987 under the rent escalation clause.
The question originally posed to the court was whether section
718.401(8) of the Florida Statutes prohibited rent escalation under a
lease entered into before June 4, 1975, when the statute became effec-
tive. 4 After the district court entered its decision in this case, the legis-
lature amended the statute, creating section 718.4015. 5 The 1989
amendment6 was intended to clarify the 1988 amendment.' The su-
preme court decided it would be appropriate to decide this case under
the amended statute, rephrasing the certified question as: "TO WHAT
EXTENT DOES SECTION 718.4015(2), FLORIDA STATUTES,
PROHIBIT ENFORCEMENT OF ESCALATION CLAUSES IN
LEASES ENTERED INTO PRIOR TO JUNE 4, 1975? " '8
The supreme court expressly rejected any claim that the 1988
amendment allowed the enforcement of escalation clauses contained in
leases, like the lease in this case, entered into prior to June 4, 1975.1
The statute did not change how escalation clauses entered into prior to
2. The association, the Golden Glades Condominium Club, Inc., was apparently
controlled at that moment by the developer.
3. The merger occurred in 1981.
4. 557 So. 2d at 1351.
5. See FLA. STAT. § 718.401(8)(a)(b) (1975), amended by FLA. STAT. §
718.4015 (1989).
6. See FLA. STAT. § 718.4015(2) (1989) (amending FLA. STAT. § 718.4015
(1988)).
7. As amended, the statute provides:
(2) [I]t prohibits the enforcement of escalation clauses in leases related to
condominiums for which the declaration of condominium was recorded
prior to June 4, 1975, but which have been refused enforcement on
grounds that the parties agreed to be bound by subsequent amendments to
the Florida Statutes or have been found to be void. . . or which bave been
refused enforcement . . ..
FLA. STAT. § 718.4015(2) (1989).
8. 557 So. 2d at 1351.
9. Id.
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June 4, 1975 were to be enforced, 10 but merely intended to "recognize
established case law and establish a statutory prohibition for escalated
rents pursuant to those escalation clauses due after October 1, 1988.
This interpretation is also consistent with the 1989 amendment
"11
Under the existing case law,12 passage of section 718.401(8) in
1975 invalidated any rent escalation clause in an existing lease if a
lessor and an association had intended to be bound by subsequent
amendments to the condominium act. Consequently, the question in
this case was whether this lessor had agreed to be bound by subsequent
amendments to the Florida Statutes, but in this case, the lessor trying
to enforce the rent escalation clause was not the original lessor. Nor
was the current lessor one of the parties to the condominium docu-
ments in which there was an agreement binding the parties to subse-
quent amendments to the Florida Statutes.
Even though Security Management had become the lessor and
also the successor to the developer, they were separate entities when the
declaration and the lease were entered into, and it was "never alleged
at trial that the lessor and developer should be viewed as one corpora-
tion and that the corporate veil should be pierced."' 8 Consequently, the
existing case law was not applicable because it applied only to parties
who had agreed to be bound by subsequent statutory amendments, and
these had not.
The outcome of this case might have been different if such a claim
had been successfully made at trial, and that leaves the reader to spec-
ulate on the precedential value of this case. The court might have been
hinting at a willingness to pierce the corporate veil under these circum-
stances. Unfortunately, the court did not reveal why the successor, by a
series of mergers, should not be bound by the agreements and the law,
which would have bound one of the merged parties. Hopefully, the
court did not intend to indicate that a business entity can escape its
contractual obligations by merging into another entity.
The court also concluded that there was nothing to suggest that
10. The treatment of escalation clauses remained unchanged at least for claims
arising prior to October 1,. 1988.
11. Id. at 1355.
12. See Angora Enter., Inc. v. Cole, 439 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 927 (1984).
13. Golden Glades, 557 So. 2d at 1355 n.2.
1991] 1229
303
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
the merger by itself was intended to change the terms of the lease. 4
Therefore, the merger did not have the effect of adding to the lease the
provision that the lease would subsequently incorporate amendments to
the Florida Statutes, and that the subsequent merger of these parties,
by itself, could not cause that change in the lease. This author cannot
imagine any logical reason why it would have.
The petitioner had also claimed that the adoption of the definitions
from the condominium declaration into the lease had the effect of also
adopting into the lease the part of the condominium document whereby
the parties would agree to be bound by subsequent amendments of the
Florida Statutes. The court apparently found this argument did not
merit analysis and simply ignored it.15
Justice McDonald concurred. He pointed out that article 1, section
10 of the Florida Constitution prohibits any law impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts. He stated: "No matter how hard the legislature may
try, it cannot affect the terms of a contract unless the contracting par-
ties indicated an intent to allow it to do so and agreed to follow future
legislative enactments. This did not happen here."' 6
Consequently, if the majority had found that this statute prohib-
ited enforcement of a rent escalation clause entered into before the
statute's enactment, Justice McDonald would have voted to hold the
statute unconstitutional.
II. REAL ESTATE SALES
A. Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act
Samara Development Corporation v. Marlow"
The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act 8 is a federal stat-
14. Id. at 1355.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1356 (McDonald, J., concurring).
17. 556 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1990). Chief Justice Ehrlich wrote the opinion in
which Justices Shaw, Barkett and Kogan joined. Justice Overton wrote a dissenting
opinion in which Justice Grimes concurred. Justice McDonald dissented without
opinion.
18. Housing & Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat.
476, as amended by Housing & Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-383, 88 Stat. 633; Housing & Community Development Amendments of 1979, Pub.
L 96-153; Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Amendments Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-628 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1700-1720 (1982)). Reference in
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ute which was designed to protect consumers. It prohibits developers
from engaging in certain activities 19 and requires that developers dis-
close certain information by filing registration statements2" and making
property reports available to prospective buyers or lessees.2 When
these requirements are violated, the act provides that "[a] purchaser or
lessee may bring an action at law or in equity . . .[and] the court may
order damages, specific performance, or such other relief as the court
deems fair, just, and equitable."22 When the seller in this case breached
the contract, 3 the buyer sought damages under this statute because the
contract had limited his remedies to rescission of the contract or to
specific performance.
The critical question was whether the Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act even applied. The act exempts from coverage any sales
contract which obligated the developer to erect a building within two
years.24 The contract to buy a condominium unit, which this buyer had
signed, required that the unit would be completed at a date less than
two years from the date of the agreement. Consequently, the seller
claimed it fit within the statutory exemption, but the district court had
not agreed,2 5 and, in this decision, the Florida Supreme Court approved
this article will be to the U.S.C. sections. See also Beyond Consumer Protection: The
Application of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act to Condominium Sales,
37 U. FLA. L. REv. 945 (1985); R. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS §
2.08 (1959).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (1982).
20. Id. at 99 1703(a)(1)(A), 1704-1706.
21. Id. at §9 1703(a)(1)(B), 1707.
22. Id. at § 1709(a). Furthermore, the recovery may include "interest, court
costs, and reasonable amounts for attorneys' fees, independent appraisers' fees, and
travel to and from the lot." Id. at § 1709(c).
23. It is not clear how the seller defaulted from either the supreme court's deci-
sion or from the district court's decision in Marlow v. Samara Development Corp., 528
So. 2d 420 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
24. Section 1702 provides:
(a) Unless the method of disposition is adopted for the purpose of evasion
of this chapter, the provisions of this chapter shall not apply to-
(2) the sale or lease of any improved land on which there is a residential,
commercial, condominium, or industrial building,or the sale or lease under
a contract obligating the seller or lessor to erect such a building thereon
within a period of two years.
15 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(2) (1982).
25. Marlow, 528 So. 2d 540.
1991] 1231
305
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
of that conclusion.26
The basis of the holding was that because the buyer could not re-
cover damages if the seller defaulted, this contract essentially gave the
seller the choice of returning the buyer's money rather than completing
the project." Thus, the contract did not really obligate the seller to
erect a building within two years, and so it did not fall within the statu-
tory exception.
The seller had argued that the HUD guidelines 2s provided other-
wise and that the courts should defer to the judgment of the agency
empowered to interpret and enforce the act. While the district court
had recognized that principle, it had simply followed its own prece-
dent2" in rejecting the exemption claim, but it felt constrained to certify
the question,3 0 implicitly acknowledging the conflict between its holding
and the HUD guidelines.
That was the point of Justice Overton's dissent."' He stated: "If I
26. Marlow, 556 So. 2d at 1099.
27. Id. at 1098.
28. Guidelines for Exemptions under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 24,010, 24,012 (1979) [referred to as the "1979 HUD Guidelines"],
and Guidelines for Exemptions under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 49
Fed. Reg. 31375, 31376 [referred to as the "1984 HUD Guidelines"].
29. See Berzon v. Oriole Homes Corp., 497 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1986).
30. The question certified was as follows:
IS A CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF A CONDOMINIUM IN
FLORIDA EXEMPT FROM THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTER-
STATE LAND SALES FULL DISCLOSURE ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1710,
WHERE IT PROVIDES FOR COMPLETION WITHIN TWO YEARS
BUT RESTRICTS THE BUYER'S REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF
THE CONTRACT BY THE SELLERS TO A RETURN OF THE DE-
POSIT OR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, OR MUST THE CON-
TRACT ALSO AFFORD THE BUYER THE ALTERNATE REMEDY
OF A SUIT FOR DAMAGES?
Marlow, 528 So. 2d at 422; Marlow, 556 So. 2d at 1098. The reference to section 1710
is rather odd. That section deals the relief available to a person aggrieved by an order
or determination of the Secretary of HUD. In all probability, this is merely a typo-
graphical error in the district court's opinion which was inadvertently repeated by the
supreme court. It should have been 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1982).
31. After establishing the authority of HUD under 15 U.S.C. § 1715 (1982), he
examined the 1979 HUD Guidelines, the 1984 HUD Guidelines, and pointed out "nu-
merous [Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration] advisory opinions which state
that exemptions will be granted to complete the building within two years and the
purchaser is not restricted from seeking specific performance." Marlow, 556 So. 2d at
1102 (Overton, J., dissenting).
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were writing on a clean slate, I would have no problems reaching the
conclusion of the majority." 32 But, he concluded, "I find that we must
defer to the authorized federal agency's interpretation of the federal
statute unless it is shown to be clearly erroneous."33 The majority, how-
ever, found no conflict.
In examining the 1979 and 1984 HUD Guidelines, it found that
the examples were to be merely illustrative, not exhaustive. The exam-
ple of a non-exempt sale provided in the 1979 Guidelines was a con-
tract which limited the buyer's right to seek specific performance. The
example of a non-exempt sale provided in the 1984 Guidelines was a
contract which provided that the breaching seller would be liable only
for the return of the buyer's deposit. But these were not intended to
establish the only types of non-exempt sales contracts. "The position
indicated by these guidelines is clearly that the obligation to complete
construction within two years must not be illusory."3 4
Furthermore, the court invoked two well established canons of
statutory interpretation. First, a statute intended to protect the public
should be liberally construed in favor of the public. Second, exceptions
should be narrowly and strictly construed. It used these, apparently, as
the basis for adopting a liberal definition of "illusory."3 5
Whether a contract is illusory is a matter of state contract law on
which the Florida Supreme Court is the highest authority. The court
concluded that under Florida law, "without the availability of at least
both specific performance and damages the obligation to complete con-
struction within two years is illusory. '3 6 Therefore, this contract did
not fit within the statutory exemption, and the buyer was entitled to the
statutory remedy.
The majority, however, pointed out that the dissent relied on advisory opinions
issued during a six month period during 1982 and that there were earlier and later
advisory opinions which were contradictory. More importantly, the advisory opinions
may have been based upon counsel's representation of state law. Id. at 1100 n.2.
32. Marlow, 556 So. 2d at 1102.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1099-1100.
35. Id. at 1101. The author suggests that the conclusion of the court that this
obligation is illusory is only for the purposes of deciding whether this sale is exempt
from the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act and is not to suggest that such a
contract is illusory for any or all other purposes.
36. Id. at 1101.
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B. Closing Practices
Warren Finance, Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville37
This case does not deal directly with real property. It deals with
cashier's checks. However, it is included in this survey because it re-
flects upon a common practice at real estate closings. 8 Real estate
purchase contracts frequently provide that the buyer will pay the
purchase price, above new or existing mortgages, by cashier's check.
The buyer has the cashier's check made out to himself or herself, and
then at the closing, endorses the cashier's check over to the seller. Buy-
ers follow this practice so that if the closing is aborted, it will be easy
for them to deposit the check into their own accounts. This practice
raises several questions for the seller and his or her attorney. Does the
contract require the seller to accept that endorsed cashier's check? Is
the seller taking any additional risks by accepting that check?
In Warren Finance, the supreme court was presented with the fol-
lowing certified question: "MAY THE ISSUING BANK ASSERT
THE DEFENSES OF A PAYEE OR ENDORSEE AGAINST THE
RIGHT OF A SUBSEQUENT ENDORSEE TO RECEIVE PAY-
MENT ON A CASHIER'S CHECK? '3 9 If the issuing bank could re-
fuse to pay the check and escape liability by asserting the defenses of
the payee or endorsee,40 then the seller taking the endorsed cashier's
check would have an instrument which might not be paid for a greater
number of reasons than if the seller had received a cashier's check
made out to him or her directly. By accepting the endorsed check, the
seller might be taking additional risks thereby losing some of the pro-
tection sought by having the contract provide for payment by cashier's
check. Of course, whether the seller would be required to accept that
check would depend on the terms of the particular contract, so in-
formed parties should consider this case carefully before drafting a
contract and negotiating its terms.
37. 552 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1990). Justice McDonald wrote the cpinion in which
Justices Overton, Barkett, Grimes and Kogan and Chief Justice Ehrlich joined. Justice
Shaw wrote a special concurrence.
38. The common practice referred to is namely, the closing of the sales transac-
tion when the buyer pays the price and the seller delivers the deed.
39. Id.
40. See infra text and accompanying notes 50-60. Defenses of the payee and
endorsee include fraud in the underlying transaction between the payee or endorser and
the endorsee who is presenting the cashier's check for payment.
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In this case, Barnett Bank issued three cashier's checks naming
Redan as payee and Blossam and Butler as purchasers. The payee en-
dorsed the cashier's checks to Warren who deposited them in its ac-
count at another bank. Having a change of heart,41 the payee and one
of the purchasers convinced Barnett Bank to refuse payment based
upon allegations that the endorsee had committed fraud. The endorsee
brought this suit against the bank for the wrongful dishonor of the
checks. The district court remanded the case to determine if Warren
was a holder in due course,42 but this court quashed that decision, or-
dering the reinstatement of the trial court's judgment that the bank
pay daniages to the endorsee. 43
Two theories are currently in vogue regarding cashier's checks.
One is the cash equivalent theory, which analogizes the cashier's check
to a certified check. Under U.C.C. section 4-303, 4 because a certified
check has already been accepted by the certifying bank, it may not be
dishonored "based either on its own defenses or the defenses of another
party to the check" 45 and so neither may the cashier's check. The court
rejected this analysis.
The other approach is the note theory. Characterizing a cashier's
check as a draft drawn by the bank upon itself, this theory relies upon
U.C.C. section 3-118, which provides that such a draft is "effective as a
note. ' " Under the U.C.C., the defenses available against one present-,
ing a note would depend on whether the person was a holder in due
course.47 The court rejected this analysis too.
Rather than adopt either of these theories, 8 the court pointed out
41. The payee sought to stop payment because Warren had allegedly breached
other terms of their agreement by refusing to advance funds to Redan. Warren Fi-
nance, 552 So. 2d at 195.
42. Barnett Bank v. Warren Finance., Inc., 532 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1988).
43. Warren Finance, 552 So. 2d at 201.
44. U.C.C. § 4-303 (1987). The court prefers to refer to the Uniform Commer-
cial Code sections rather than to the statutory counterpart, chapters 671-680 of the
Florida Statutes. See Warren Finance, 552 So. 2d at 196 n.2. This discussion will fol-
low the same format.
45. Id. at 197.
46. Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 3-118 (1987)).
47. See U.C.C. § 3-305 (1987).
48. It may also be possible to analogize a cashier's check to a letter of credit,
which under U.C.C. § 5-114(2), a customer may enjoin the issuing bank from honoring
due to fraud in the transaction if the presenter is not a holder in due course. However,
further analysis of these three theories is beyond the scope of this article, which is to
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that the U.C.C. lacks any provisions which govern the problem49 and
that: "When used in place of a personal check or other negotiable in-
strument, the parties' expectation is that the cashier's check will re-
move all doubt as to whether the instrument will be returned to the
holder unpaid due to insufficient funds in the account, a stop payment
order or insolvency."5 Therefore, the court invoked U.C.C. section 1-
10351 and U.C.C. section 1-102(1)52 as the basis for giving prime im-
portance to the commercial use of cashier's checks and expectations of
people using cashier's checks.
It concluded that the issuing bank must not be placed in the mid-
dle of disputes about underlying transactions and that payees and en-
dorsees must be able to rely upon the cash-like quality of cashier's
checks, 53 but, "[a] rule that would absolutely forbid a bank's refusing
to pay the holder of a cashier's check . . . would be inordinate. ' 54 It
adopted the rule that "upon presentment for payment by a holder, a
bank may only assert its real and personal defenses in order to refuse
payment on a cashier's check issued by the bank, ' 55 and it went on to
state that:
The only inquiry a bank may make upon the presentment of a
cashier's check is whether or not the payee or endorsee is in fact a
legitimate holder, i.e., whether the cashier's check is being
presented by a thief or one who simply found a lost check, or
whether the check has been materially altered.5 1
It seems that the court is, in this dicta, narrowing the scope of "real
focus on the effect of the case upon real property law and practice.
49. Of course, a contrary argument can be made. The U.C.C. clearly provides
the rules which apply to checks and, by not treating a cashier's check any differently,
the drafters and the adopting legislatures have indicated an intent that these rules ap-
ply the same way to cashier's checks as they do to checks drawn by others.
50. Warren Finance, 552 So. 2d at 196.
51. This section provides that "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of
this Act, the principles of law and equity . . . shall supplement its provisions." U.C.C.
§ 1-103 (1987).
52. This section provides that "[tihis Act shall be liberally construed and applied
to promote its underlying purposes and policies," noting that one of these is "to permit
the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement
of the parties." UCC § 1-102(2)(b) (1987).
53. Warren Finance, 552 So. 2d at 201.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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and personal defenses" available to the issuing bank and thereby elimi-
nating some, such as the failure of consideration in the purchase of the
cashier's check. 7 Whether the court really intended to go so far and
whether subsequent courts will feel bound by this language is
uncertain.
The language quoted above would seem to eliminate any reason
for a seller to hesitate in accepting a properly endorsed cashier's check
at a real estate closing. If only the court had stopped there. Unfortu-
nately, the court created some uncertainty when it chastised the district
court for its mistaken reliance on an Ohio case. 8 In that case, one
person was both the purchaser and payee of a cashier's check. He had
purchased a car, paying for it with a cashier's check that he endorsed
over to the car's seller. Upon discovering the condition of the car had
been misrepresented, the purchaser/payee convinced the issuing bank
to refuse payment. The Ohio court had held that the issuing bank
could, in its discretion, refuse payment at the request of the purchaser/
payee without incurring liability.
The Florida Supreme Court emphasized that the Ohio case was
distinguishable, correctly stressing that the case before the court did
not deal with a purchaser/payee as did the Ohio case.59 What follows
begins - "[m]oreover, banks cannot be permitted .... -60 "More-
over" means "in addition to what has been said."' 61 The problem is that
the opinion did not clarify to what the addition applied. Is it in addition
to what had already been said about the reasons the Ohio case should
not have been followed, i.e., does it mean that, in addition to being
factually distinguishable, the Ohio case is also badly reasoned and
would not have been followed even if not distinguishable? Or was the
court simply reiterating the reasons for its holding without considering
the persuasive value of the Ohio case?
This author would suggest that the former is more likely the cor-
rect interpretation. The reasons that followed the "moreover" were that
banks should not be allowed the discretion to refuse to pay cashier's
57. See U.C.C. § 3-408 (1987), entitled "Consideration." This section states that
"[w]ant of failure of consideration is a defense as against any person not having the
rights of a holder in due course (Section 3-305) . .. ."
58. Leo Syntax Auto Sales, Inc. v. Peoples Bank & Say. Co., 6 Ohio Misc. 226,
35 Ohio Op. 2d 330, 215 N.E.2d 68 (1965).
59. Warren Finance, 552 So. 2d at 200.
60. Id.
61. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 957
(College ed. 1964).
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checks and that banks should not arbitrate disputes over the payment
of cashier's checks. Both would occur if banks could refuse to pay the
endorsee/holder of a cashier's check based upon another's defenses re-
gardless of whether that third party was both the purchaser and the
payee. Thus, it would seem what followed the "moreover" were addi-
tional reasons why the Ohio case should not have been followed even if
it had not been factually distinguishable.
Such an interpretation would help eliminate some -doubts which
sellers of land may have about accepting an endorsed cashier's check as
payment, and this author would certainly endorse such an interpreta-
tion. Unfortunately, it is merely dicta and unclear dicta at that.6 2
While judicial conservatives will fault the court for going beyond the
facts of this case, many members of the practicing bar will lament that
the court did not go far enough. The rights of an endorsee/holder of a
cashier's check which was purchased by the named payee/endorser
have yet to be made clear and certain.
The uncertainty results, in part, from the existence of another pos-
sible interpretation of this case; the court may have been exercising
judicial restraint and, therefore, the reasons after the "moreover" were
simply a reiteration of the reasons, already expressed, for the holding.
Why, one may ask, did the court go to the trouble of factually .distin-
guishing that case if it intended to indicate that the reasoning of the
Ohio court was erroneous? Why make a big deal out of the distinguish-
ing facts if those facts were not significant enough to have produced a
different outcome? But if the court did not disapprove of the Ohio case,
it might be followed in the future in a case that is not factually distin-
guishable. That should concern real estate lawyers because the distin-
guishable facts in the Ohio case, which involved a purchaser/payee, 3
are exactly what would be encountered in a typical real estate closing.
If the supreme court did not intend to disapprove of the Ohio case,
then why was it even raised?64 The court might have simply been tak-
ing the district court to task for what it considered sloppy workman-
ship65 in hopes of getting a better quality product in the future, but
62. If only a phrase of clarification had been added. For example, "moreover,
even if not distinguishable, this case is not persuasive because . or "moreover, reit-
erating the reasons for-our decision ...."
63. The purchaser of the cashier's check is also the purchaser of the real estate.
64. Of course, that is an excellent argument for the proponents of the first inter-
pretation, i.e., that the court intended to express its disapproval of its reasoning.
65. The impression the court is complaining of (sloppy workmanship) may be
based upon the court's language that "[t]he district court's reliance [on the Ohio case]
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that hardly seems warranted by this district court decision. Rather, the
court might have been leaving open the possibility that it might, at
some time in the future, allow a bank to escape liability for wrongful
dishonor, where a real estate buyer purchased a cashier's check, used it
at closing to pay the purchase price by endorsing it over to the seller,
and subsequently convinced the issuing bank not to honor it based upon
a claim that the condition of the property had been misrepresented.
That possibility, however remote it may seem, might encourage a dis-
gruntled or unscrupulous buyer to try it, might encourage the bank to
agree,66 " and should concern sellers and their lawyers. Because of the
language in this case, the real estate seller who accepts the endorsed
cashier's check does so with the risk that the buyer might try to have
the cashier's check dishonored and possibly succeed.67 Nor is it entirely
clear, that the seller would be in any better position with a cashier's
check made out directly to him or her.
This author doubts that the Florida Supreme Court, particularly
in light of its recognition of the importance of facilitating commercial
practices, intended to create this uncertainty or intended to discourage
this use of cashier's checks. Under the current state of the law, sellers
might be well advised to negotiate for a contract term which requires
that the deed be held in escrow until the buyer's check has cleared. A
land seller who accepts an endorsed cashier's check at closing should
realize the risk, but if the contract merely provides for payment by
cashier's check, he or she may have little choice but to take it and hold
his or her breath until the check clears.
It may be advisable to do everything possible to minimize that
time between accepting the check and its being paid by the issuing
bank. The seller might bargain for a term in the contract which re-
quires the cashier's check to be drawn on a local bank. The land seller/
endorsee could immediately present the cashier's check at that bank for
is untenable." Warren Finance, 552 So. 2d at 200. Untenable seems an extreme word if
the court was merely substituting its judgment for that of the lower court.
66. It is far beyond the scope of this article to suggest whether the lawyer for an
issuing bank should consider dishonoring a cashier's check or whether it might incur
liability by doing so. The point here is that a bank might actually do it and that could
cause considerable harm to a real estate seller even if the bank is subsequently held
liable or, as is more likely, the matter is subsequently settled.
67. It may certainly be argued that there is no legitimate reason to mention the
Ohio case other than to leave the door open for a subsequent case to follow it without
being inconsistent with this decision.
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payment.6 8 Even if deposited at another bank, a local check would clear
more quickly than an out-of-state check, and, therefore, be more likely
to clear before there was time for the buyer to make a protest to the
issuing bank. At the very least, the real estate seller should try to
schedule the closing so as to minimize the time between the closing and
the time when the check would normally be expected to clear.6 9
Justice Shaw concurred specially in Warren, noting that he would
have preferred to adopt the cash equivalent theory, and he would have
preferred that the court go no further than was necessary to decide this
case. Since the bank in this case did not assert any real or personal
defenses, it was, he stated, inappropriate to speculate upon the question
of whether they could be asserted against the presentment of an en-
dorsed cashier's check.70
The uncertainty in the use of cashier's checks is a problem which
could be quickly and easily solved by the legislature. It has not, thus
far, been hesitant to modify the terms of the U.C.C., and, solving this
problem would not require elaborate statutory surgery. Until that hap-
pens, or the supreme court has the opportunity to clarify this holding,
the current practice of a seller accepting an endorsed cashier's check is
under an unfortunate, and probably inadvertent, cloud.
III. RECORDING
A. Title Search
Erskine Florida Properties, Inc. v. First American Title Insurance,
Inc.71
The court state the issue in this case as: "WHEN A PARTY
CONDUCTS A TITLE SEARCH OF A PIECE OF PROPERTY
AND SEARCHES ONLY THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT AL-
PHABETICAL INDEXES, CAN IT BE HELD LIABLE FOR
FAILING TO DISCOVER AN IMPROPERLY INDEXED
68. Perhaps the land seller might present it to the issuing bank and obtain, in
exchange, a cashier's check in which he is the named payee and the purchaser. Asking
for cash will probably result in a ridiculous delay, possibly refusal for lack of sufficient
cash, and the unpleasant attention of both the D.E.A. and the I.R.S.
69. For example, the closing should be scheduled so there is no weekend between
the closing and the anticipated payment of the check by the issuing bank.
70. 552 So. 2d at 201 (Shaw, J., concurring specially).
71. 557 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1989). Justice Shaw wrote the opinion for an unani-
mous court.
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CLAIM?" 72 The question could probably be better stated by asking if
an abstractor could be held liable for failing to discover an outstanding
interest which was not properly indexed in the official grantor-grantee
indexes but was discoverable in another index. Both questions are an-
swered by the word "yes."
Erskine contracted for First American to provide a title search.
First American searched only the "alphabetical indexes maintained in
the county clerk's office,"'73 but failed to discover a third party's supe-
rior interest because evidence of that had not been properly indexed. 4
The interest could, however, have been discovered by reference to a
computerized index system which identified the parcels by numbers. 5
The court reasoned that an abstractor has contracted to determine
what is in the public record. 76 Therefore, the abstractor may be held
liable for breaching that contract 77 if the search is not conducted "skill-
fully and diligently. 78 The problem in this case is that the plaintiff had
not introduced any expert evidence that the search failed to meet this
standard.79 The evidence did show, however, that an index organized
by parcel numbers existed which the abstractor admitted was relied
upon "as a security check," although "her office caution[ed] abstract-
ers not to rely solely on [it] . . , ."80 The supreme court found that
this was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that
the abstractor had failed to perform its contractual duty.a"
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. A more complete explanation of the facts may be discovered in the district
court's opinion, but it is not necessary for the discussion here. See First Am. Title Ins.
Co. v. Erskine Florida Properties, Inc., 528 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
75. The abstractor testified that parcels of land are assigned an identification
number and that number is used when the information is entered into the computer.
Erskine, 557 So. 2d at 860.
76. Id. (quoting with approval Williams v. Polgar, 391 Mich. 6, 20, 215 N.W.2d
149, 157 (1974)).
77. See, e.g., First Am. Title Insurance Co. v. First Title Serv. Co., 457 So. 2d
467 (Fla. 1984); Stickler v. Indian River Abstract & Guar. Co., 142 Fla. 528, 195 So.
195 (1940). Note that this impliedly, though not expressly, overrules the holding in
Kovaleski v. Tallahassee Title Co., 363 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
78. Erskine, 557 So. 2d at 860 (quoting First Am. Title Insurance Co., 457 So.
2d at 472).
79. This was the point on which the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff had
been reversed by the district court. See First Am. Title Insurance Co. v. Erskine Flor-
ida Properties, Inc., 528 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
80. Erskine, 557 So. 2d at 860.
81. Id. More informative is the dissent of Judge Letts in the district court's opin-
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The court may seem to be adopting a rule that an abstractor must
examine any secondary indexes whi "h are available, but the court did
not necessarily go so far. It only found that the evidence here was suffi-
cient to uphold the trial court's decision. Thus, the holding is merely
that an abstractor can be found liable, without the introduction of ex-
pert testimony on the level of care and skill required, for failing to find
a misindexed encumbrance which could not have been found in public
records but could have been found in a secondary index."' The court
pointed out that "First American was free to introduce its own experts
to show that it conducted a skillful and diligent search." 3 The outcome
of this case might have been different if the abstractor had introduced
expert evidence to show that the standard in that county did not re-
quire searching both indexes.
Furthermore, confusion is created by the fact that the court never
stated whether the second index involved was an official index or a pri-
vately owned index. 4 Nor is there anything in the district court's opin-
ion to clarify that point. It seems possible that the parcel identification
index here was an official index,85 but even so, this case may be opening
the door to a future holding that an abstractor cannot rely solely upon
the official index if a highly regarded private index exists. Abstractors
and title searchers should be concerned.
B. Lis Pendens
American Legion Community Club v. Diamond 6
Under the doctrine of lis pendens, once litigation has commenced
ion. Judge Letts, an admitted "former abstract-thumber," pointed out that "[in the
instant case, the trial court held 'from its own experience' that a 'title searcher reviews
the records via legal description' and, in effect, took judicial notice of that fact. I see no
room for an argument about such a basic tenet of abstracting." Erskine, 528 So. 2d at
1231 (Letts, J., dissenting).
82. Erskine, 557 So. 2d at 860.
83. Id.
84. For example, an index based upon a privately owned title plant.
85. The case notes that the parcel identification index was organized by numbers
assigned by the tax assessor's office. Further, the quote used by the court regarding the
abstractor's contractual obligation was that "an abstracter is hired to determine what is
in the public record. . . ." Id. (quoting Williams v. Polgar, 391 Mich. 6, 20, 215.
N.W.2d 149, 157 (1974)).
86. 561 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1990). Justice Overton wrote the opinion for an unani-
mous court.
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regarding title to land, any subsequent purchaser is bound by the out-
come of that litigation. By statute, Florida has modified that doctrine
by requiring the recording of a notice of lis pendens 7 in the office of
the clerk of the circuit court in the county where the property is lo-
cated. Under the statute, the filing of the notice acts as a bar to all
subsequent claims and also to any prior unrecorded claims unless the
claimant intervenes in the proceedings within twenty days."8 The notice
is only effective for one year "unless the relief sought is disclosed by
the initial pleading to be founded on a duly recorded instrument
. . ," The district courts had produced inconsistent interpretations
of that phrase.90 In Diamond, the Florida Supreme Court eliminated
the conflict by providing the authoritative interpretation.
In the first suit, the American Legion Community Club (hereinaf-
ter "Club") had sued-to cancel a lease to Murray Diamond. 91 Diamond
counterclaimed and also filed a third party complaint against Del Rossi
Enterprises, Inc.92 The trial court held that the lease was valid and
awarded Diamond damages on its third party complaint. 93 On the day
of the trial court's decision, the Club conveyed the land to Del Rossi.
Three years later, on November 19, 1987, Diamond sought the forced
sale of the property to satisfy his judgment against Del Rossi. Unfortu-
nately, in the interim, the property had already been the subject of a
settlement agreement in another suit.
In the second suit, the American Legion Department of Florida
(hereinafter "Department") had filed suit alleging, inter alia, that the
87. FLA. STAT. § 48.23 (1985). Although the statute has not been modified since
its 1985 enactment, this discussion will refer to the 1985 codification which was the
topic of this case.
88. Id. at § 48.23(l)(b).
89. Id. at § 48.23(2).
90. See Diamond v. American Legion Community Club, 544 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (the case which the Florida Supreme Court was reviewing); Al-
bega Corp. v. Manning, 468 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Berkley Multi-
Units, Inc. v. Linder, 464 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Mohican Valley,
Inc. v. MacDonald, 443 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Chapman v. L & N
Grovel, Inc., 244 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
91. The basis for this suit was the claim that the corporate officers who made the
lease lacked the necessary authority.
92. The basis for the third party complaint was that Del Rossi had "intentionally
and maliciously interfered with the lease agreement between American Legion Com-
munity Club and Diamond." 561 So. 2d at 270.
93. That decision was affirmed. See American Legion Community Club v. Dia-
mond, 461 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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deed to Del Rossi should be declared void. It filed a notice of lis
pendens on June 27, 1985. In a settlement agreement, entered as a
judgment on December 29, 1987, Del Rossi agreed to reconvey the
property to the Department.
If the notice of lis pendens filed in the second suit was still effec-
tive when Diamond sought to execute its judgment from the first suit,
then Diamond's execution sale would fail because the sale would be
subject to the outcome of the first suit, i.e., the agreed reconveyance to
the Department, and Diamond had no basis for executing against the
Department's property.94 In other words, .Diamond would not be able to
force the sale of the property which belonged to the Department to
satisfy his judgment against the Club. However, if the Department's
notice of lis pendens had expired when Diamond sought the execution
sale, that sale would take priority over the agreement to reconvey to
the Department. 5 The sale was more than one year after the filing of
the lis pendens in the second suit, so the notice would no longer be
effective unless "the relief sought [was] disclosed by the initial pleading
to be founded on a duly recorded instrument .. "96
The second suit was based upon the claim that the deed was void
because it was "neither considered nor approved by the requisite num-
ber of members of the Executive Committee, Board of Directors, and
Board of Trustees .. .and there was a total absence of considera-
tion."'97 The court noted that these were circumstances surrounding the
execution of the deed. In pointing out the conflict among the districts,
the court quoted from a Fourth District 8 decision to the effect that the
crucial point should be whether notice of potential litigation was af-
forded by the recorded instrument itself. It contrasted a recorded mort-
gage, which by its nature gives notice to all that there is the potential
for foreclosure, with the recording of a warranty deed, as occurred
here, which does not give any warning that an action may occur to test
its validity. While the court never expressly approved the Fourth Dis-
trict's decision, it did state that it was "better reasoned" 99 than the
other decisions. The court concluded that a notice of lis pendens is
94. Diamond, 561 So. 2d at 271.
95. Id.
96. FLA. STAT. § 48.23(2) (1985).
97. Diamond, 561 So. 2d at 270.
98. Id. at 271-72; see Berkley Multi-Units, Inc. v. Linder, 464 So. 2d 1356,
1357-58 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
99. Diamond, 561 So. 2d at 272.
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founded upon a recorded instrument only when the claim is based upon
the terms and provisions contained in the document.100 To do other-
wise, it stated, would practically eliminate the one year limitation.' 0'
The court further dismissed any claim that Diamond was bound
by the outcome of the second suit because he had constructive notice of
it.102 The court relied upon the plain language of the statute that "[n]o
notice of lis pendens is effectual for any purpose beyond one year
.. .., without further explanation, noting that the Department
could have requested that the trial court extend the period of effective-
ness of the notice. 04 The implication is that any claim to extend the
effectiveness of the recorded notice had been waived.
IV. WILLS - MORTMAIN
Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children v. Zrillic °5
Florida Statute section 732.803 (1985) was a mortmain statute. It
provided that the spouse or lineal descendant could avoid a devise made
to a "benevolent, charitable, educational, literary, scientific, religious,
or missionary institution, corporation, association, or purpose . . . or a
county, city or town . . ." if made within the six months preceeding
the testator's death.106 When her mother left the substantial residue of
100. Id. at 271.
101. Id. at 272.
102. Why he had "constructive notice" of it is not suggested. Probably, the claim
was that the expired notice of lis pendens should have been discovered in the title
search and, consequently, its existence in the record should have put the world on con-
structive notice even though it had expired.
103. Id. at 272 (emphasis supplied by the court).
104. Id. The court can grant an extension on reasonable notice, for good cause
and subject to such terms as the court concludes that justice requires. FLA. STAT. §
48.23(1)(b) (1985).
105. 563 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1990). Justice Barkett wrote the opinion for the court,
joined by Chief Justice Ehrlich and Justices Shaw and Kogan. Justice Grimes wrote an
opinion concurring with the result. Justice McDonald wrote an opinion, joined by Jus-
tice Overton, concurring with the result and dissenting in part.
106. FLA. STAT. § 732.803 (1985). Actually there may be some academic argu-
ment about whether the statute was really a mortmain statute, but that is of no great
importance. Justice McDonald did state in Zrillic: "Our statute is not a mortmain act.
The Legislature never intended by the enactment of the statute to place any restriction
upon the right of benevolent, charitable, educational, or religious institutions to take
and hold property . . . ." Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 72 (McDonald, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 364, 17 So. 2d 615,
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her estate to the Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children, Lorraine E.
Zrillic invoked the statute. The circuit court held that she had standing
to invoke the statute, but that the statute was unconstitutional.', 7 On
the latter point, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed. 10 8
Before it could reach the constitutional issue, the supreme court
had to deal with the standing issue. It had been argued that the daugh-
ter, Lorraine Zrillic, did not have standing to invoke the statute be-
cause she has been expressly disinherited, except for the specific be-
quest of certain antique dishes and figurines. The statute provided that
the devise could be avoided by a spouse or lineal descendant "who
would receive any interest in the devise, if avoided ... ."1011 There was
no doubt that the daughter was testator's lineal descendant, but it was
argued that the testator's clearly expressed intent was that her daugh-
ter receive only that specific property. To give her part of the residue
would violate the testator's intent, and the general rule of will interpre-
tation is that the intent of the testator controls."10
The court rejected the argument. It held that the statute was a
specific statute which would, following the rules of statutory interpreta-
tion, supersede general rules like the rules of will construction."' Fur-
ther, the plain meaning of the statute did not deny standing to any
lineal descendant simply because that descendant would otherwise be
limited to a specific devise. More importantly, the purpose of the stat-
ute would be undermined if the only ones to have standing would be
those that the testator intended to receive the devise because the point
of the statute is to deprive an intended beneficiary of the property
which the testator expressly intended it to have." 12
The court, however, found that the statute was unconstitutional on
618, appeal dismissed, 323 U.S. 666 (1944)).
107. Id. at 66.
108. Zrillic v. Estate of Romans, 535 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
had held the statute constitutional. Consequently, the daughter could invoke it to avoid
the residuary devise to the hospital and the residue would then pass to her by intestate
succession. Plaintiff, the testator's daughter, would be entitled to an intestate share.
109. FLA. STAT. § 732.803(c) (1985).
110. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 66. There is no mention of an alternate residuary
legatee, so Lorraine E. Zrillic would apparently inherit all or part of the residue under
the laws of intestate succession.
111. Id.
112. Possibly the Shriner's argument was that the statute could only be invoked
by a lineal descendant who was a residuary legatee, but even that makes little sense.
Moreover, the point seems moot since the statute was held unconstitutional.
1246 [Vol. 15
320
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/18
Brown
two grounds. 113 First, it violated article I, section 2 of the Florida Con-
stitution. Second, it violated the equal protection clause of both the
Florida Constitution" 4 and the United States Constitution"'.
The Florida Constitution provides that all natural persons have the
right to "acquire, possess and protect property" subject only to the ex-
ception that "ownership, inheritance, dispossession and possession of
real property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regulated or
prohibited by law.""' 6 The court relied upon "a common sense reading
of the plain and ordinary meaning of the language to carry out the
intent of the framers as applied to the context of our times." 117 The
court concluded that the historical treatment of devise as a statutory
right, rather than a common law property right, is an anachronism to
be discarded, and as a property right, it would be protected by this
provision." 8
Since the right to devise property is protected by the constitution,
a statute which interfered with that right would be constitutional only
if it was "reasonably necessary."'"19 The court concluded that this stat-
ute was not. 20 The historical justification of mortmain statutes was "to
restrict the church's ability to acquire property" and there is no compa-
rable need today.' 21 Nor did the statute protect the testator's dependent
or needy family from disinheritance. Family members were already ad-
equately protected by other Florida laws,' 22 so this statute merely pro-
vided windfalls to some relatives, contrary to the wishes of the testator.
It is important to note that the "reasonably necessary" standard may
now be used as the test of any statute, i.e., probate statutes, which in
any way may interfere with this newly recognized constitutional right
113. Id. at 68-69.
114. FLA. CONsT. art 1, § 2.
115. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
116. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
117. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 67.
118. Id. at 68-69.
119. Id. at 68.
120. Id. at 69.
121. Id. at 68.
122. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 (homestead exemptions for real and per-
sonal property); FLA. STAT. §§ 732.401-.4015 (1985); FLA. CONST. art. X, § 5 (a cover-
ture restriction); FLA. STAT. § 731.111 (1985); FLA. STAT. §§ 732.201-.215 (1985) (an
elective share as provided by the Uniform Probate Code); FLA. STAT. § 732.402 (1985)
(personal property exemptions); FLA. STAT. § 732.403 (1985) (family allowance); FLA.
STAT. § 732.5165 (1985) (protection against fraud, duress, mistake, and undue
influence).
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to devise property.
The court also found that the statute violated the equal protection
guarantees of the Florida and United States Constitutions by creating
a class of testators whose final wishes would be ignored without ra-
tional justification. 23 The court found the statute to be both underin-
clusive and overinclusive. 124 It was underinclusive in that it did not pro-
tect against the evils of gifts being made without proper deliberation or
as a result of undue influence if the testator happened to live more than
six months after the will was executed. Furthermore, it only protected
against the possible overreaching by a narrow group of beneficiaries,
while failing to protect against the dangers posed by "unscrupulous and
greedy relatives, friends, or acquaintances."'1 25 Conversely, it was over-
inclusive because it would allow avoidance of a charitable devise or be-
quest even though none of the evils feared had occurred simply because
the testator died within six months after the will was executed. Conse-
quently, the use of the six month dividing line was irrational and the
statute was unconstitutional.
Justice Grimes concurred with the result. He expressed agreement
with the court's conclusion that the statute violated the equal protec-
tion clauses of both constitutions, but disagreed with the court's conclu-
sion that the right to leave property in a will was a constitutional right
under the Florida Constitution. He emphasized that the mortmain stat-
ute had been upheld in 1944 despite similar language in the version of
the Florida Constitution then in effect 1 6 and "[n]othing has occurred
since that date to suggest that this analysis was wrong."' 2 7 The major-
ity, however, had pointed to that very case as an example of "unques-
tioned allegiance to an antiquated way of thinking," i.e., that case was
overruled, not because of subsequent events, but due to the precedent's
failure to properly analyze the matter.2 8
Justice McDonald concurred with the result, but dissented in part.
123. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 70. The court acknowledged that recognition as a
property right of the testator's right to leave property in a will may possibly indicate
that a heightened level of scrutiny would be appropriate, but it did not address that
issue because it concluded that this statute would not even survive the minimal scrutiny
of the rational basis test. Id. at 70 n.6.
124. Id. at 70.
125. Id.
126. See Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615, appeal dismissed, 323
U.S. 666 (1944).
127. 563 So. 2d at 71.
128. Id. at 68.
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He would have upheld the constitutionality of the statute because the
right to leave property in a will has continuously been held to be
merely a statutory right in Florida and because it is a rational way to
protect testators' families from the danger that a testator will exercise
poor judgment in the face of impending death.'29 However, he would
never have reached that issue. He had concluded that the plaintiff in
this case did not have standing to invoke the statute because "[u]nder
these circumstances other lineal descendants would be the residual leg-
atees who would receive any voided bequests, not Mrs. Zrillic.' °3 0
This statement leaves the reader with some confusion over the
facts of the case which, unfortunately, cannot be not cleared up by
reading the district court's opinion. Were there, as Justice McDonald
suggests, other legatees named in the will who would divide the residue
including the hospital's interest if its devise was eliminated by the stat-
ute? If so, then it makes little sense to hold that Mrs. Zrillic had stand-
ing because she would not have benefitted by invoking the statute, and
the only possible reason for her invoking it would have been to spite the
intended beneficiary, the hospital.
If, as may have been the case, there was no other residuary lega-
tee, the residue property would have been divided between those enti-
tled to an intestate share. As the deceased's daughter, Mrs. Zrillic
should have taken the property, or at least a share in it, and so she
should have standing to invoke the statute because it would have pro-
duced a benefit for her, unless the statute provided otherwise. Unfortu-
nately, the statute was less than clear on this point and this opinion
does not eliminate the confusion about the standing issue.
The statute provided that the devise could be avoided by a spouse
or lineal descendant "who would receive any interest in the devise
.. .. Was Mrs. Zrillic given standing because invoking the statute
would result in her taking more of her mother's estate, or did she have
standing because she had received a specific devise under the will, even
though that interest would not be enlarged by invoking the statute?
This author would be shocked to learn that it was the latter, but it is
certainly possible to interpret this decision as indicating that.
The focus on standing under the statute may seem pointless since
the statute was held unconstitutional. However, it is worth considering
because the legislature might attempt to enact a replacement statute.
129. Id. at 71.
130. Id.
131. FLA. STAT. § 732.803(c) (1985) (emphasis added).
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Hopefully, the legislature would avoid creating a statute with similar
shortcomings. Moreover, this case may be applied by analogy to other
statutes and any precedent which creates confusion about standing may
cause unforseen problems in the future.
V. CONCLUSION
The year has not produced any particularly noteworthy develop-
ments in real estate law from the Florida Supreme Court or, for that
matter, from the legislature 32 or elsewhere.133 These decisions do not
132. Some may disagree and the author acknowledges that the legislature did
significantly amend Florida Statute chapter 713, Part I, the mechanics' lien laws, even
transforming "mechanics' liens" into "construction liens." 1990 Fla. Laws 109. In ad-
dition, it did: create section 695.26, Florida Statutes, which provides that no instrument
affecting title to real property executed after July 1, 1991 may be recorded unless
certain formal requirements are satisfied (e.g., names must be typed, printed or
stamped legibly beneath each signature and a one and one half inch square at the top
right hand corner must be left empty for the clerk's use), 1990 Fla. Laws 183; enact a
statute providing immunity from civil suit by a trespasser under the influence of drugs
or alcohol, 1990 Fla. Laws 140; enact the Mortgage Lending Act which requires the
licensing of certain mortgage lenders, 1990 Fla. Laws 353; enact 1990 Fla. Laws 149
regarding mortgage insurance; amend Florida Statute ch. 723, the Florida Mobile
Home Act, 1990 Fla. Laws 198; repeal section 421.102, Florida Statutes, which pro-
vided that a tenant of public housing could be evicted for certain drug offenses, but
only the guilty person could be evicted and not the other members of the household,
1990 Fla. Laws 137; and amend the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act by requiring
smoke detectors in single-famil and duplex homes and by allowing the landlord and
tenant to enter a separate agreement absolving the landlord of liability or responsibility
for storage of tenant's personal property after surrender or abandonment by the tenant,
1990 Fla. Laws 133.
133. There are, of course, a plethora of cases and some are interesting. See
Gerber v. Longboat Harbor North Condo., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 884 (M.D. Fla. 1989)
(concerning the constitutionality of a condominium's rule prohibiting a member from
flying the United States flag); Fish v. Post of Amvets #85, 560 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (regarding sufficiency of a complaint in a quiet title suit); Whitice
Bonding Agency, Inc. v. Levitz, 559 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (regard-
ing the priority of a corrective mortgage); Hopkins-Easton & Assoc., Inc. v. Santana
Properties, Inc., 557 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (clarifying the broker's
right to both part of the forfeited deposit of a defaulting buyer and a commission on
the subsequent sale to another buyer); Hall v. City of Orlando, 555 So. 2d 963 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (regarding the appropriateness of granting an injunction
against over-use of a drainage easement); Pelican Island Property Owners Assoc., Inc.
v. Murphy, 554 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (regarding waiver or estop-
pel and the violation of deed restrictions by the building of a carport without the asso-
ciation's approval).
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break any new ground or depart from established trends. Some of these
opinions should be viewed with caution because of the uncertainties
which they create.
Like last year,' no discernable voting or decision patterns have
emerged. Of the six opinions, Justice Overton wrote two and Justices
Barkett, Ehrlich, McDonald and Shaw each wrote one. Justice Grimes,
who wrote more real property decisions last year than any other Jus-
tice, did not write any this year, but he did write a concurrence. Only
Justice Kogan seems to be uninvolved in real property,13 5 but that may
simply be a product of the small sampling available.136
134. See Brown, The 1989 Survey of Florida Law, Real Property, 14 NOVA
L.REv. 939 (1990).
135. Justice Kogan did not write any opinion, simply joining with the majority
opinion in each of the cases.
136. Last year Justice Kogan wrote the opinion in Gibson v. Courtois, 539 So.
2d 459 (Fla. 1989) (holding that a buyer could not recover attorney's fees provided for
by a contract which the buyer had successfully argued had never come into existence
because the offer had never been accepted before it was revoked).
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Scientific Evidence: 1990 Survey of Florida Law
Carol Henderson Garcia*
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, science and the law are intersecting. Today, most sci-
entific or professional disciplines provide expert testimony in courts.
Product liability cases may involve engineering testimony and personal
injury cases may involve medical testimony. Some criminal cases can-
not be tried without the assistance of experts, e.g., a homicide in which
the cause of death is testified to by forensic pathologists. With the ad-
vent of even more advanced scientific techniques such as DNA testing'
of blood, semen and tissue and increased reliance on science, there has
been a corresponding proliferation of court decisions involving scientific
evidence and expert testimony. This survey collects and discusses sig-
nificant Florida opinions on scientific evidence and expert testimony re-
ported in Florida between October 1, 1988 and January 1, 1991.
II. LAY WITNESS OPINION
Black's Law Dictionary defines opinion evidence as "evidence of
what the witness thinks, believes or infers in regard to facts in dispute,
as distinguished from his personal knowledge of the facts themselves."12
Opinion testimony as to matters readily perceptible by the jury, within
their common knowledge, is inadmissible.
However, a lay witness may testify under certain circumstances in
the form of an opinion. The Florida Evidence Code section 90.701 per-
mits opinion testimony by lay witnesses when: (1) the witness cannot
readily, and with equal accuracy, communicate what he has perceived
* Associate Professor of Law, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center;
B.A., 1976, University of Florida; J.D., 1980, George Washington University. The au-
thor thanks Ian Berkowitz for his assistance in the research of this article.
1. DNA testing identifies individuals by their patterns of deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) contained in their cells. Every individual, except an identical twin, possesses a
unique genetic "blueprint" in his DNA. The first appellate court ruling on the admissi-
bility of DNA evidence was in Florida. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1093 (6th ed. 1990).
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without resort to opinion; (2) the witness' use of opinion will not mis-
lead the trier of fact; and (3) the witness'opinion does not require spe-
cial knowledge, skill, experience or training.3 Therefore, under this rule
lay witnesses typically are permitted to testify to matters such as
height, a person's emotional state, etc. (i.e., those things perceptible by
the senses) because such matters do not require specialized education,
training or skill to render an opinion.
Historically, Florida law has permitted lay witness identification of
an individual, including identification by voice.' In State v. Cordia,
5
the defendant, a police officer, was charged with making a false report
of a bomb. The caller's voice was recorded on tape. The state sought to
call as witnesses two police officers who had spoken to the defendant
over the telephone but were not the individuals who had received the
phone call. The tape was "routinely destroyed." Cordia moved in
limine to exclude testimony regarding the officers' opinion as to the
identity of the voice. The trial court granted the motion and the state
appealed. The Second District Court of Appeal held that the officers'
testimony would not constitute an impermissible opinion as to the guilt
of the accused. 6
The court found the facts in Cordia not unlike those in Hardie v.
State, 7 in which a store theft was recorded by a surveillance camera.
The views afforded by the pictures were limited so the state brought in
police officers who knew Hardie to identify him as one of the thieves.'
The appellate court approved the identification procedure.
The court in Cordia distinguished this case from Ruffin v. State,"
in which three officers testified at trial, over objection of defense coun-
sel, that in their opinion the defendant was the man in a videotaped
transaction between himself and a plainclothes police officer who was
purchasing two pieces of a rock-like substance reputed to have been
cocaine. The court held that this identification was an invasion of the
province of the jury, and that these factual determinations were within
3. FLA. STAT. § 90.701 (1989).
4. State v. Cordia, 564 So. 2d 601-02 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam)
(citing Weinshenker v. State, 223 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 225
So. 2d 918, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 973 (1969)).
5. 564 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam).
6. Id. at 602.
7. 513 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987), rev. denied, 520 So. 2d 586
(Fla. 1988).
8. Cordia, 564 So. 2d at 602.
9. 549 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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the realm of an ordinary juror's knowledge and experience.'" Therefore,
in order for lay witnesses' opinions regarding identification to be admis-
sible the witnesses should either be eyewitnesses, or witnesses capable
of independently making an identification from photographs, tape re-
cordings or similar evidence." This was the case in Cordia, where the
witnesses claimed to possess special knowledge of Cordia's voice char-
acteristics beyond what a jury could conclude on its own.' 2
Even lay opinions must meet certain predicates before they will be
admitted. In Lawlor v. State," a manslaughter case, the lay witness
resided approximately 100 feet from the highway where the collision
occurred and testified that he was inside his house and heard a car pass
at very high speed. He stated that the car was traveling so fast he did
not hear it approach, and about two seconds after it passed, he heard
the impact of the collision. The court found the testimony improperly
admitted because of the absence of a sufficient predicate. The court
stated that an "opinion as to the speed of the vehicle should be predi-
cated upon certain identifying factors such as the weight of the respec-
tive vehicles involved, road conditions, and the coefficient of friction."' 4
However, the court held that because the speed of the vehicle was not
an essential element of the offense of manslaughter by intoxication,' 5
the error was harmless.' 6
III. EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY
When scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will be
helpful to the trier of fact in understanding the evidence, the tradi-
tional method of supplying such information is through an expert wit-
ness' opinion. Section 90.702 of the Florida Evidence Code allows ex-
pert witness testimony if the court determines the information will
assist the trier of fact.'" As part of this inquiry the court may be re-
10. Id. at 251.
11. Cordia, 564 So. 2d at 602.
12. Id.
13. 538 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
14. Id. at 88 (citing Brown v. State, 477 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985)).
15. See FLA. STAT. § 316.1931(2)(c) (1985) (repealed 1986).
16. Lawlor, 538 So. 2d at 88.
17. FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (1989) provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in is-
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quired to determine if a reliable body of scientific, technical or special-
ized knowledge has been developed. The second aspect of the court's
inquiry is to determine whether the witness proffered is qualified to give
the testimony sought. A witness may be qualified as an expert on the
basis of either knowledge, skill, experience, training, education, or a
combination thereof.18
Expert opinion testimony is only admissible when it assists the
trier of fact and does not invade its province. In Vega v. City of Pom-
pano Beach, 9 the court held that the trial court did not err in exclud-
ing the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witnesses who were to testify
as experts in aquatic safety sports and recreational facilities.2 0 The trial
court refused to allow the proffered testimony because it was within the
common knowledge of the jury. The appellate court held that expert
testimony, while desirable, was not essential because the facts did not
require any special knowledge or experience in order for the jury to
form its conclusion.2 The court noted that "Florida courts have held
that the question of whether expert testimony is essential in proving a
particular issue is determined by the issue involved."22 The issue in this
case was within the ordinary understanding of the jury.2 3
A. Qualifications of an Expert
In Cheshire v. State,24 the appellant appealed from an order im-
posing a death sentence. He was found guilty of killing his estranged
wife. Among other issues on appeal, Cheshire alleged that the trial
court improperly qualified a person as an expert on blood-spattered evi-
dence. The expert's qualifications consisted of a forty-hour course,
three prior qualifications as an expert, and his own field experience.
The court, while agreeing that these qualifications were open to reason-
able question on cross-examination, held that the trial court did not
sue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education may testify about it in the form of an opinion; however,
the opinion is admissible only if it can be applied to evidence at trial.
18. Id.
19. 551 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
20. Id. at 596.
21. Id.
22. Id. (citing Alten Box Board Co. v. Pantya, 236 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1970)).
23. Id.
24. 568 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1990).
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abuse its discretion by admitting his expert testimony, since a reasona-
ble basis existed to qualify the expert.25 In Williams v. State,26 the
court also held that the trial court did not err in permitting the state to
introduce the testimony of an officer with specialized knowledge on
drug transactions. The court found that a reasonable basis existed to
qualify his opinion as expert on the relationship between a large
amount of cash and drug transactions in a prosecution for possession of
cocaine with intent to sell.27
However, not all experience qualifies one to provide an expert
opinion. In Adamson v. State,8 the appellate court held that the trial
court acted within its bounds of discretion in ruling that a police officer
was not qualified to testify as an expert regarding the effects of
cocaine.
In Tarin v. City National Bank,2" the court held that the trial
court did not commit reversible error by excluding the investigating
police officer's opinions regarding whether a parking lot created an illu-
sion that both vehicles in the accident had the right-of-way.30 The of-
ficer was not qualified as an expert in traffic accident reconstruction.
The officer's only training was acquired through employment with the
Florida Highway Patrol for six years prior to the accident. Although he
was involved in trooper and homicide investigations, he could not even
describe what it entailed. He testified that he attended the Florida
Highway Patrol Academy and received a certificate representing forty
hours of training in traffic homicide and forty hours of training in acci-
dent reconstruction with a professor from the University of Miami. He
was unable to provide a description of the training received. He testi-
fied that he had handled accidents, but did not state how many or over
what period of time. The court held that the showing was too sketchy
to qualify the officer as an expert in accident investigation or
reconstruction. 3'
In Mathieu v. Schnitzer,32 the appellant attempted to have an ac-
cident investigator declared an expert in accident reconstruction. Upon
25. Id. at 913.
26. 538 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
27. Id.; cf. Hosbein v. Silverstein, 358 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 365 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1978).
28. 569 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam).
29. 557 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
30. Id. at 633.
31. Id.
32. 559 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
1991] 1257
330
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/18
Nova Law Review
defense objection the court recognized the witness only as an expert in
accident investigation, concluding that her qualifications were inade-
quate for her to testify as an accident reconstructionist.13 The appellate
court, while conceding that a trial court's decision on the qualifications
of an expert is ordinarily conclusive and entitled to great weight on
appeal, ruled that the trial court applied erroneous legal principles in
arriving at its decision. 4 The appellate court concluded that the wit-
ness' experience in investigating the cause of accidents, and her years
of work experience were sufficient to qualify her as an expert in acci-
dent reconstruction. The court reasoned that because there was no evi-
dence of skid marks, debris, or point of impact, an accident reconstruc-
tionist's expert opinion would not be necessary.3 5 The appellate court
found, based on the evidence, that expert testimony concerning the cor-
relation between the bumper of appellee's car and appellant's injury
was already within her expertise as an accident investigator."
Thus, although a trial court's decision on the qualifications of an
expert witness ordinarily will not be overturned on appeal unless it is
determined the trial court abused its discretion,37 such an abuse of dis-
cretion may be found when the court excludes proffered experts whose
specialized training or experience established a prima facie case of
their expertise.38
33. Id. at 1245.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Lewis v. State, 592 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam). The Florida
Supreme Court held it was not error to exclude a psychiatrist's opinion regarding the
eyewitness identification process, the effects of drugs on memory, and the unwarranted
reliance of jurors on eyewitness testimony. Id. at 911. The court found no abuse of
discretion, especially in light of the psychiatrist's admission that he could not testify
regarding the reliability of any specific witness, but could only offer general comments
as to how a witness would arrive at such conclusions. Id.; see also Johnson v. State, 393
So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1980).
38. See Lake Hosp. & Clinic, Inc. v. Silversmith, 551 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1989) (the appellate court held the trial court erred by excluding the appel-
lant's expert witnesses because they were not qualified to testify to Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) standards. The appellate court noted that both
experts were experienced in hospital administration and had special training or experi-
ence with JCAH standards); see also, Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center,
Inc. v. Meeks, 543 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989). Appellants argued that
the trial court erred in admitting the pathologist's testimony concerning the decedent's
pre-death symptoms. Appellants argued the pathologist was not qualified to express an
opinion because he had no personal knowledge of the pre-death symptoms, for the de-
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In the case of Laffman v. Sherrod,3 9 the court reversed a ruling by
the trial court permitting a police officer, who was not an eyewitness, to
testify on the basis of field examination that the head lamp on a moped
involved in a collision was not on at the time of the accident. In fact,
the officer arrived on the scene several minutes after the collision. Since
the officer was not qualified as an expert, the trial court ruled that
there could be no cross-examination as to the basis of his opinion.40 On
appeal the court found that the officer was not competent to render
such an opinion. 41 The trial court's denial of cross-examination was il-
logical because the basis of a lay witness' opinion is no less important
than that of an expert.
In the same case, an expert in accident reconstruction and metal-
lurgy was permitted to render an opinion based on an examination of
orthopedic x-rays as to the cause of Laffman's injuries. Such examina-
tion required knowledge or training in radiology or orthopedic
medicine, which the expert lacked.42 However, the trial court, inconsis-
tently, permitted the expert to render his opinion on causation, which
was based upon the same study which was excluded as evidence. The
appellate court held that this constituted substantial prejudicial error
and reversed and remanded the case.43
cedent was dead on arrival. The court held his statements on direct examination clari-
fied that he, as a medical examiner, did not consider pre-death symptoms when per-
forming an autopsy. Id. at 772. The court agreed that the trial judge correctly
determined that the testimony objected to by the appellants was not beyond the exper-
tise of the medical examiner who is a pathologist. Id. As a result, the testimony was
admissible.
The court stated that the rule in Florida, as in'most jurisdictions, is that absent a
clear showing of error, a trial judge's determination of admissibility will not be dis-
turbed upon review. It concluded that the two criteria determining admissibility were
met in this case: (1) the subject must be beyond the common understanding of the
average layman; and (2) the witness must have such knowledge as will probably aid the
trier of fact. Id. The court reasoned that if a pathologist was qualified to testify to more
than what he directly observed from an autopsy, he could render an opinion regarding
events preceding death. Id.
39. 565 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
40. Id. at 761.
41. id.
42. Id. at 762.
43. Id.
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B. Scope and Basis of Expert Opinion Testimony
Under Florida law, it is fundamental error for an expert to testify
beyond his qualifications. 4 Such error is not harmless when the ex-
pert's testimony is the only testimony in the record supporting the find-
ings of the trial court. Section 90.704 of the Florida Statutes also does
not permit an expert witness in one field to testify about the expert
opinion given to him by another expert.45 In Harrison v. Savers Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Association,4" an appraiser's expert opinion on
the value of a shopping center was based upon the opinion of an archi-
tect who was not called to testify. The court held the appraiser incom-
petent to testify on the location and design of the shopping center.4 7
The only other evidence in the case regarding the design issue was the
court's sua sponte view of the site, which was not found sufficient to
serve as an independent basis for judgment.4 8 Thus, in order to avoid a
new trial, a competent predicate must be laid for the expert's opinion. 9
In Newell v. Best Security Systems, Inc.,50 the trial court excluded
a sheriff's deputy's testimony regarding prior criminal incidents in the
area of a condominium, and also excluded a security expert's testimony
regarding whether or not the security measures at the condominium
were adequate in light of the criminal activity in the area. The appel-
late court upheld the trial court's exclusion of the expert testimony.
The security expert did not consult the police records of the reported
incidents but had relied solely on a police grid breakout. As such, he
could not testify that the burglaries he reported were residential bur-
44. Wright v. State, 348 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 353 So.
2d 679 (Fla. 1977).
45. FLA. STAT. § 90.704 (1989); see also Bunyak v. Clyde J. Yancey & Sons
Dairy, 438 So. 2d 891, 893 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983), rev. denied, 447 So. 2d 885
(Fla. 1984). Section 90.704 provides:
The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may
be those perceived by, or made known to, him at or before the trial. If the
facts or data are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the subject
or support the opinion expressed, the facts or data need not be admissible
in evidence.
FLA. STAT. § 90.704.
46. 549 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
47. Id. at 713.
48. Id. at 714.
49. See Urling v. Helms Exterminators, Inc., 468 So. 2d 451, 456 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) (on rehearing).
50. 560 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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glaries. Because the expert's opinion was based on unconfirmed data
and the appellant failed to establish the underlying facts on which it
was based, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to
admit the testimony.5 1
While section 90.704 of the Florida Statutes allows the expert to
rely on facts or data of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the field to support the opinion expressed, the expert may not introduce
inadmissible matters in the course of his direct examination. 2 In
Smithson v. V.M.S. Realty Inc.,53 a wrongful death action, appellant
argued that the trial court erred in permitting the defendant to use an
expert witness on security, where he served as a conduit for the intro-
duction of inadmissible and prejudicial hearsay.
The individuals who robbed and murdered the appellant's husband
while he was attempting to make a deposit at a night depository at the
mall were interviewed by V.M.S.'s expert witness. Upon direct exami-
nation, when questioned about the adequacy of V.M.S.'s security, the
expert recited the murderers' out-of-court explanations about their plan
and motive for committing the crime. The court stated that the witness
was qualified to render an opinion on security matters and on the de-
fendant's alleged negligence in security procedures, but not on the mur-
derers' motives for choosing the decedent as their target. 4
The same issue was raised in Kurynka v. Tamarac Hospital
Corp., Inc." A 31-year old woman was being treated for asthma in a
hospital emergency room when she went into cardiac arrest. The labo-
ratory report reflected a urinalysis which found cocaine metabolite. The
tests had been performed by an independent laboratory and had been
placed in the hospital records. The defense sought to admit the report
to support its position that cocaine withdrawal, not medical malprac-
tice, was the cause of death. The defense argued that the results of the
tests were admissible under the business records exception to the hear-
say rule. It also argued that the evidence would be admissible since the
report was used by the defense experts as a basis for their opinions.
The appellate court concluded that medical records, just as any other
type of business record, cannot be admitted without a predicate demon-
51. Id. at 397.
52. FLA. STAT. § 90.704 (1989).
53. 536 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
54. Id. at 262.
55. 542 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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strating the authenticity of the records. 6 The appellate court pointed
out that an expert's testimony may not be used merely to serve as a
conduit to place otherwise inadmissable evidence before a jury.57 Here,
there was no independent testimony regarding how the tests were con-
ducted, or who performed them or even whether the samples used were
those of the decedent. Considering the totality of the evidence, the ap-
pellate court concluded that the trial court's error in admitting the lab-
oratory report required reversal and remand for a new trial.58
Another case which held that expert testimony may not be used as
a conduit to put inadmissible evidence before a jury is Riggins v. Mari-
ner Boatworks, Inc . 5 There, Riggins was struck and killed by defend-
ants' automobile as he entered a crosswalk in an intersection patrolled
by a traffic light. The defendants attempted to establish that the acci-
dent was caused in whole or in part by Riggins' intoxication. A police
officer at the scene of the accident testified that Riggins had an odor of
alcohol about him; however, neither the emergency medical technician
who performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation upon Riggins, nor the
medical technician who examined the body detected an odor of alcohol.
There were no hospital records indicating Riggins was intoxicated at
the time of the accident. During the autopsy the medical examiner took
a sample of Riggins' ocular vitreous fluid6" and sent the material to the
laboratory to determine its alcohol content. A sample of the fluid was
utilized because there was not enough blood remaining in the body to
obtain a blood sample. Neither the medical examiner nor the labora-
tory technician who performed the test was available to testify at trial.
The trial court ruled that the laboratory report was inadmissible
hearsay. While it may have been a business record, the defendants did
not present sufficient evidence to establish the foundation required by
section 90.803(6) of the Florida Statutes.6 After the laboratory report
56. Id. at 413.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 545 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
60. This is the fluid contained in the vitreous body. The vitreous body forms
four-fifths of the entire globe of the eye. It fills the concavity of the retina for the
reception of the lens. It is transparent, the consistence of thin jelly, and is composed of
an albuminous fluid enclosed in a delicate transparent membrane. H GRAY, GRAY'S
ANATOMY 839 (1974).
61. Riggins, 545 So. 2d at 431. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6) (1989) provides:
(a) A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of
acts, events, conditions, opinion, or diagnosis, made at or near the time by,
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was excluded, the defendants called a chemical toxicologist. Over plain-
tiff's objection, the trial court permitted this expert to testify that the
blood alcohol level was .11 % at the time the ocular vitreous fluid sam-
ple was taken. The trial court permitted this testimony pursuant to sec-
tion 90.704 of the Florida Statutes, which permits an expert to base his
opinion upon inadmissible facts or data so long as "the facts or data
are of the type reasonably relied upon by experts on the subject to sup-
port the opinion expressed. ' 2 The appellate court reversed. While rec-
ognizing that experts are permitted to express opinions based partially
upon inadmissible information, the court pointed out that the use of
expert testimony merely to serve as a conduit to place otherwise inad-
missible evidence before a jury is prohibited.63 The expert relied exclu-
sively upon information that was not in evidence at trial. The expert
opinion only helped the jury understand the inadmissible evidence
rather than any evidence admitted at trial.64
Additionally, the court concluded that section 90.704 does not per-
mit an expert to render an opinion exclusively upon inadmissible facts
or data.65 The court opined that even if the opinion was relevant it was
unfairly prejudicial to the plaintiff and misled the jury by emphasizing
otherwise inadmissible evidence and placing "an aura of scientific truth
upon a document which is legally unreliable. Thus its probative value is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect."6 The court also
noted that while an expert's testimony may not be used as a conduit for
or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in
the course of a regularly conducted business activity and if it was the regu-
lar practice of that business activity to make such memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian
or other qualified witness, unless the sources of information or other cir-
cumstances show lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in
this paragraph includes a business, institution, association, profession, oc-
cupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
(b) No evidence in the form of an opinion or diagnosis is admissible under
paragraph (a) unless such opinion or diagnosis would be admissible under
ss. 90.701-90.705 if the person whose opinion is recorded were to testify to
the opinion directly.
62. FLA. STAT. § 90.704 (1987). The chemist testified that expert toxicologists
rely on such reports.
63. Riggins, 545 So. 2d at 431-32.
64. Id at 432.
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 90.704 (1987)).
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the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence6 7 the party against
whom the expert opinion is offered may require the expert to reveal the
content of the hearsay information on which the expert relied.6 8
C. Evaluation of Expert Testimony
It is the general rule that the weight accorded expert testimony is
properly a function of the trier of fact. A pretrial ruling by the court
rejecting proffered testimony based on its weight as opposed to its ad-
missibility usurps the jury function. Whether there was usurpation of
the jury function was the issue in Lombard v. Executive Elevator Ser-
vice, Inc.69 The trial court held a pretrial conference and instructed the
plaintiff's counsel to make a proffer of the evidence he intended to pro-
duce to prove negligence on the part of the defendant. In the course of
the involuntary proffer, counsel. was cross-examined at length by the
court because it was not satisfied with counsel's grasp of the expert
evidence. The court then requested that the plaintiff's expert witness be
produced the following week for a live proffer. The expert witness made
a brief presentation and was cross-examined by the trial court for over
an hour. The trial court, on its own motion, entered a summary judg-
ment for the defendant.
On appeal the court stated its disapproval of the use of a pretrial
conference to take testimony for the purpose of disposing of a case on
the court's unnoticed summary judgment motion."0 The court further
stated that summary judgment procedures should be applied with spe-
cial caution in negligence actions where the showing of negligence is
determined on expert testimony which should be evaluated by the jury
and not by the court."
D. Psychiatric and Psychological Expert Opinion Testimony
The introduction of psychiatric and psychological expert testimony
poses particular evidentiary problems. In Florida, a court-appointed
psychiatrist may be offered as a witness in the State's case but may not
testify directly about the facts surrounding the crime, when such facts
67. Id.
68. Department of Corrections v. Williams, 549 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
69. 545 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
70. Id. at 455.
71. Id.
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have been elicited from the defendant during his compulsory medical
examination.7 2
In Ericson v. State,73 the court found that a court-appointed psy-
chiatrist may testify regarding his opinion of the defendant's mental
condition, but may not disclose incriminating statements made to him
by other defendants, or disclose the facts surrounding the crime elicited
from the defendant during the course of the examination.74 However,
there is an exception when the defendant .first opens the door to such
inquiry by his own presentation of evidence. 75 If on cross examination
the defendant's counsel opens the inquiry to collateral issues, such as
admissions or guilt, the state may inquire into those areas on redirect
examination. Or if the defendant offered psychiatric testimony during
his case and the defendant elicited testimony from his own expert
about the offense which the defendant provided during the interview,
then the defendant has opened the door and the state may explore the
areas on cross.76 In either instance the jury must be given a cautionary
instruction that these statements can be used as evidence of mental
condition only and not as evidence of the truth contained in them.
Where the defense is voluntary intoxication, Florida courts have
held that the defendant can be said to be testifying vicariously through
the expert if the expert bases his testimony on the defendant's self-
serving statement that he was intoxicated at the time of the offense.77
Thus, in those cases, the defendant is subject to impeachment by the
state even though the defendant does not take the stand.7 1
E. The Use of Expert Testimony in Child Abuse Cases
Increased prosecutions for child abuse and sex offenses raise the
problem of integrating experts and their opinions into a justice system
in which lay juries are the ultimate fact finders. Expert testimony is
sometimes used in child abuse cases to determine the competency of
the child witness to testify truthfully and accurately, but care must be
72. Id. (citing Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817, 820 (Fla. 1970)).
73. 565 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
74. Id. at 331.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Cirack v. State, 201 So. 2d 706, 709 (Fla. 1967) (holding that a psychia-
trist could not provide an expert opinion where the basis of the testimony was the self-
serving statements of the defendant).
78. Id.
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taken to avoid invading the province of the jury to weigh and assess the
testimony. Such cases also raise constitutional concerns about the use
of victim hearsay. Several recent Florida cases illustrate this point.
Tingle v. State7 9 concerned an appeal from a conviction for sexual
battery of a minor. Tingle was convicted of the sexual battery of his
daughter. The state offered the expert testimony of an HRS intake
counselor and a social worker with the University of Florida's Depart-
ment of Pediatrics Child Protection Team.8 0 On direct examination,
both witnesses were asked whether they believed the child was telling
the truth. The court agreed that it was error to have allowed the two
witnesses to vouch for the victim's credibility.8' The court stated that it
is generally accepted that expert testimony may not be offered to di-
rectly vouch for the credibility of a witness.82 The court adopted the
position taken by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States
v. Azure,83 that "some expert testimony may be helpful in cases such as
this, but putting an impressively qualified expert stamp of truthfulness
on a witness' story goes too far." '84 Therefore, an expert may aid a jury
in assessing the truthfulness of a child sexual abuse victim by generally
testifying about a child's ability to separate truth from fantasy; by
summarizing the medical evidence and by expressing his cr her opinion
as to whether it was consistent with the victim's story; or by discussing
various patterns of consistency in the stories of child sexual abuse vic-
tims and comparing those patterns with patterns in the victim's story.8 5
However, the ultimate conclusion as to the victim's credibility must al-
ways rest with the jury.88
A further issue of concern in the use of expert witnesses in child
abuse cases is the extent to which witnesses are permitted to conclude
not only that the child had been abused but that a particular person
was the perpetrator. This issue was addressed in Glendening v. State."7
There, an expert in the area of child abuse testified that in her opinion
the child had been sexually abused by her father. The Florida Supreme
Court concluded that it was proper for an expert to express an opinion
79. 536 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1988).
80. Id. at 204-05.
81. Id. at 205.
82. See Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
83. 801 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1986).
84. Tingle, 536 So. 2d at 205 (quoting Azure, 801 F.2d at 340).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988).
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as to whether a child had been the victim of sexual abuse, but "it was
improper for the expert witness to testify that it was her opinion that
the child's father was the person who committed this actual offense."88
The error did -not require reversal because the defense counsel had
'neither objected to the answer, nor moved to strike it. Therefore, the
issue was not properly preserved for appeal.8" Moreover, according to
the court, the error was not of a fundamental nature.
In Page v. Zordan,9 ° an action for damages was brought by a mi-
nor through her parents on her behalf and by her parents individually.
-Plaintiffs alleged that when Page was married to the minor's maternal
grandmother, he had on several occasions handled, fondled and touched
the minor in a lewd, lascivious and indecent manner. The plaintiffs
presented the testimony of five expert witnesses. The court was per-
suaded that the purpose of this expert testimony was to attest to the
credibility of the minor. However, much of the expert testimony was
inadmissible as being entirely irrelevant to the issues and highly preju-
dicial to the defendants. While the victim's counsel never directly asked
any of the expert witnesses whether they had an opinion as to whether
or not the defendant was guilty of the alleged act of child molestation,
the court explained that it was not necessary for such questions to be
asked directly to run afoul of the Tingle and Glendening rules.9 1 The
court held that the appellees' expert witnesses impermissibly intruded
into the function of the jury to determine such credibility questions.92
Another issue raised by the appellant in Page was the admissibility
of testimony of a clinical psychologist regarding a "sexual abuse legiti-
macy scale" which he used to evaluate the credibility of the minor's
statement that she had been sexually molested. 3 The expert was al-
lowed to testify about the minor's score on this test even though no
predicate had been established by the appellees regarding the accept-
ance of the test in the scientific community. The appellate court ruled
that in the absence of such supporting evidence, the trial court had
abused its discretion in admitting the testimony.94 The court relied on
Fay v. Mincey,95 where it was held that the admissibility of evidence
88. Id. at 220-21.
89. Id. at 221.
90. 564 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
91. Id. at 502.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 454 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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relating to a relatively new scientific medical test, experiment, or proce-
dure lies largely within the discretion of the trial court. 96 However,
before such a new procedure and its results are admissible the court
must determine that the new test has some reasonable degree of recog-
nition and acceptability among the experts who studied, diagnosed,
tested and dealt with the particular subject to be examined and diag-
nosed by*the test.9 7
Weatherford v. State98 concerned an appeal from a conviction for
committing a lewd act upon a child in violation of section 800.04 of the
Florida Statutes.99 During trial, a member of the Child Protection
Team, an affiliate of the Department of Pediatrics of the University of
Florida, was qualified as an expert in the field of investigating and in-
terviewing children with regard to alleged sexual abuse. The expert, as
well as other witnesses, testified to the child's out-of-court statements.
The court did not comply with the requirement set forth in section
90.803 (23)(C) of the Florida Statutes, requiring the court to make
specific findings of fact on the record setting forth the reasons the court
determined the out-of-court statements to be reliable.1 0' The appellate
96. Page, 564 So. 2d at 502 (citing Fay, 454 So. 2d 587).
97. See Fay, 454 So. 2d at 593-94.
98. 561 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
99. FLA. STAT. § 800.04 (1990) provides that any person who:
(1) Handles, fondles or makes an assault upon any child under the age of
16 years in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner;
(2) Commits actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual inter-
course, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sadomasochistic abuse, actual lewd
exhibition of the genitals, or any act or conduct which simulates that sex-
ual battery is being or will be committed upon any child under the age of
16 years or forces or entices the child to commit any such act:
(3) Commits an act defined as sexual battery under s. 794.011 (l)(h) upon
any child under the age of 16 years; or
(4) Knowingly commits any lewd or lascivious act in the presence of any
child under the age of 16 years,
without committing the crime of sexual battery, commits a felony of the
second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s.
775.084. Neither the victim's lack of chastity nor the victim's consent is a
defense to the crime proscribed by this section.
100. Weatherford, 561 So. 2d at 633; see FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23), which
provides:
(a) Unless the source of information or the method or circumstances by
which the statement is reported indicates a lack of trustworthiness, an out-
of-court statement made by a child victim with a physical, mental, emo-
tional, or developmental age of I 1 or less describing any act of child abuse
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court found that this was clear error. 10 1 The court relied on Fricke v.
State,02 where it was held such error violates the defendant's sixth
amendment right of confrontation. The appellate court also concluded
that the trial court erred in admitting the expert's testimony that she
used a number of techniques to determine whether the child's state-
ments were reliable and that she was satisfied these statements were
truthful.0 3 The expert was not introduced as an expert in determining
whether a child exhibited symptoms consistent with those of sexually
abused children. She was tendered as an expert in the so-called field of
"investigating and interviewing children involved in alleged sexual
abuse." 0 4 Therefore, her qualifications were limited to investigating in-
cidents and interviewing children. The court stated that it could not
or neglect, any act of sexual abuse against a child, the offense of child
abuse, the offense of aggravated child abuse, or any offense involving an
unlawful sexual act, contact, intrusion, or penetration performed in the
presence of, with, by, or on the declarant child, not otherwise admissible, is
admissible in evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding if:
1. The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury
that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide suffi-
cient safeguards of reliability. In making its determination, the court may
consider the mental and physical age and maturity of the child, the nature
and duration of the abuse or offense, the relationship of the child to the
offender, the reliability of the assertion, the reliability of the child victim,
and any other factor deemed appropriate and
2. The child either:
a. Testifies, or
b. Is unavailable as a witness, provided that there is other corrobora-
tive evidence of the abuse or offense. Unavailability shall include a finding
by the court that the child's participation in the trial or proceeding would
result in a substantial likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm, in
addition to findings pursuant to s. 90.804(1).
(b) In a criminal action, the defendant shall be notified no later than
10 days before trial that a statement which qualifies as a hearsay excep-
tion pursuant to this subsection will be offered as evidence at trial. The
notice shall include a written statement of the content of the child's state-
ment, the time at which the statement was made, the circumstances sur-
rounding the statement which indicate its reliability, and such other partic-
ulars as necessary to provide full disclosure of the statement.
(c) The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record, as to
the basis for its ruling under this subsection.
101. Weatherford, 561 So. 2d at 633.
102. 561 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
103. Weatherford, 561 So. 2d at 634.
104. Id.
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treat this error as harmless because the testimony vouching for the
child's credibility was provided by an expert witness. Allowing such tes-
timony would be putting an impressively qualified expert's stamp of
truthfulness on the witness' story.10 5
F. Hypnosis
"Hypnosis is a state of heightened concentration with diminished
awareness of peripheral events."106 The use of hypnosis in crime inves-
tigation has increased in the past twenty years. Its increased use has
caused the courts to examine its admissibility. The principle issues con-
cerning the admissibility of hypnotic evidence involve: (1) statements
made by a person while under hypnosis; and (2) the testimony of a
witness whose memory has been "refreshed" by hypnosis. Florida
courts have recently had occasion to address such issues.
In Morgan v. State,10 the appellant was convicted of first degree
murder and sentenced to death for brutally murdering an elderly wo-
man. The appellant was at the deceased's home to mow her yard. He
entered the house presumably to telephone his father, then killed the
woman by crushing her skull with a crescent wrench and stabbing her
face, neck and hands numerous times. He also bit her breast and trau-
matized her genital area. There was no dispute that appellant commit-
ted the homicide. The single issue was his sanity at the time of the
offense.10 8 The court held that the trial court erroneously excluded
medical expert opinion testimony based on a diagnosis derived from
Morgan during hypnosis.' 09
Morgan was hypnotized by a psychologist in a psychiatrist's pres-
ence. Both experts concluded from their examination of Morgan, his
history, and the hypnotic session that he was insane at the time of the
105. Id.
106. State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 90 (N.J. 1981).
107. 537 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1989).
108. This was the third time the case was before the Florida Supreme Court. In
the initial Morgan v. State, the court remanded the case because the bifurcated in-
sanity procedure had been held unconstitutional. In the second proceeding, the Florida
Supreme Court remanded the case because the trial court denied Morgan an opportu-
nity to present an insanity defense.
109. Morgan, 537 So. 2d at 975. Prior to the trial, a psychologist met with Mor-
gan on three occasions. After his second session, he decided to hypnotize Morgan with
a psychiatrist's assistance, to obtain further details concerning the incident.
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offense under the M'Naghten Test."' Both doctors testified at trial that
"hypnosis is a medically-accepted diagnostic technique used by mental
health professionals.""' Additionally, both experts testified at trial that
they were not able to assess the defendant's sanity without using the
information from the hypnotic session. The trial court excluded the ex-
pert witnesses' testimony during the trial on the ground that their opin-
ions were partially based on statements made while Morgan was under
hypnosis." 2 The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the United
States Supreme Court decision in Rock v. Arkansas"3  was
controlling.' 4
In Rock, the defendant was charged with the manslaughter of her
husband. Since she could not remember the details surrounding the in-
cident, she was hypnotized by a licensed neuropsychologist to refresh
her memory. After the hypnosis, she was able to recall that she did not
have her finger on the trigger at the time of the shooting; the gun had
discharged when her husband grabbed her arm during a fight. At trial,
the court limited the defendant's testimony to only those matters
remembered and stated prior to being placed under hypnosis. On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas rejected the appellant's claim
that the limitations on her testimony violated her right to present her
defense.."5 The U.S. Supreme Court held that a state may not apply
rules of evidence that permit a witness to take the stand but arbitrarily
exclude material portions of his testimony. 1 6 Therefore, when it is the
defendant who submits to pretrial hypnosis, and not merely a defense
witness, the experience of being hypnotized will not render his testi-
mony inadmissible if he elects to take the stand.
The Florida Supreme Court stated that even without reliance upon
Rock, it would conclude that expert testimony in this case must be
allowed. It found the issue was not whether the hypnotic statements
110. Id. In a majority of jurisdictions, the M'Naghten test is used to determine
insanity. The test is derived from M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843) and
provides that an accused is not criminally responsible if, at the time of committing the
act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it that he did
not know what he was doing was wrong.
111. Morgan, 537 So. 2d at 975.
112. Id.
113. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
114. Morgan, 537 So. 2d at 975.
115. Rock, 483 U.S. at 56.
116. Id.
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were reliable, but rather, whether mental health experts could testify
about Morgan's sanity if their opinion was based in part on information
received from hypnotic statements obtained through medically ap-
proved diagnostic techniques.117
The court in Morgan noted that because the use of hypnosis is an
evolving issue, safeguards are necessary to assure its reliability." 8 Safe-
guards should include recording the hypnosis session to ensure compli-
ance with proper procedures and practices. When hypnosis is used to
refresh a defendant's memory or to facilitate a medical diagnosis, rea-
sonable notice should be given to the opposing party." 9
The Supreme Court of Florida has had several occasions to ex-
amine the reliability and practical application of post-hypnotic testi-
mony. In Bundy v. State,'20 the Supreme Court of Florida held that
hypnotically refreshed testimony is per se inadmissible in a criminal
trial. 21 However, it found that a witness who has been hypnotized is
still competent to testify to those facts recalled prior to hypnosis.'22 In
a subsequent case, Stokes v. State,'2s the Supreme Court of Florida
again reviewed the problems raised by the use of hypnosis in court.
Based on previous studies, the court recognized three major concerns:
heightened suggestibility; the tendency of the hypnotized subject to
"confabulate," a phenomenon of inventing details that the subject has
not actually recalled, i.e., a tendency to "fill in the blanks" of the sub-
ject's memory; and the phenomenon known as "memory hardening." '124
Basically, one who has been hypnotized becomes more certain of his
117. Morgan, 537 So. 2d at 976.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 894 (1986) (known as
Bundy II).
121. Id. at 18. Even though Bundy II prohibited the offering of the hypnotically-
refreshed testimony as direct evidence, it did not preclude all use of lypnosis.
122. Id.
123. 548 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1989). Stokes moved in limine to exclude the eyewit-
ness' post-hypnotic description, the identification of his brother's car, and the hypnotic
session in its entirety from the trial testimony. The trial court excluded the session but
ruled that because the post-hypnotic statements were substantially similar to the pre-
hypnotic statements, the descriptions and the identification were admissible. Id. at 196.
124. Id. at 190-91 (citing Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial
Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 313 (1980)). "Memory harden-
ing" affects one's ability to resolve doubts and uncertainties, resulting in the subject
becoming more certain of his or her memories regardless of the accuracy of those mem-
ories. Id.
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recollection of the events. 25
The court in Stokes reasoned that the practical effect of these con-
cerns is that the hypnotized witness is extremely difficult to cross-ex-
amine on any subject raised in the hypnosis session. Cross-examining a
hypnotized witness becomes futile because previously hypnotized wit-
nesses develop an unshakable certitude about their memories that ordi-
nary witnesses seldom exhibit.126 This effect in turn can be viewed as
an infringement, if not a denial, of the defendant's sixth amendment
right to confront witnesses against him. Thus, the court reviewed four
approaches to the admissibility of hypnotically-refreshed testimony in
light of these evidentiary concerns: 1) per se inadmissibility; 2) condi-
tional admissibility provided the federal procedural safeguards have
been fulfilled; 3) per se admissibility; and 4) a balancing approach in
accordance with Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 127
Upon consideration of the four approaches to this problem, the Su-
preme Court of Florida, in Stokes, decided that the Frye test was the
appropriate test of admissibility for post-hypnotic testimony. 128 There-
fore, the court found that it was required to examine the research and
literature to determine if hypnosis is generally accepted in the scientific
community. Its examination of the available literature revealed that the
scientific community was divided or leaned towards disapproval of hyp-
nosis as a reliable means of accurately enhancing memory. 12 9 The court
adopted this view, finding the procedural safeguards insufficient to pro-
tect against the inherent unreliability of hypnotically-refreshed testi-
mony.130 Thus, the testimony of a witness who has undergone hypnosis
for the purpose of refreshing his memory of the event at issue is inad-
missible as to all additional facts relating to those events from the time
of the hypnotic session forward.' 3' The witness who has been hypno-
tized may testify to the statements made before the hypnotic session if
they are properly recorded, which means that the statement must be
taken down on paper, recorded on video or audio tape, or reduced to
writing in a police officer's notes or report.132 Consequently, the court
found that under these rules, a hypnotic session activates a time bar-
125. Id. at 191.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 195 (see infra note 189 for an explanation of the Frye test).
129. Stokes, 548 So. 2d at 195.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 196.
132. Id.
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rier, after which no identifications or statements may be admitted.'33
G. Compelled Mental Examinations
In Florida v. Rhone,34 the First District Court of Appeal held
that a mental examination of a victim should be ordered only under the
most compelling circumstances where it is necessary to ensure a just
and orderly disposition of the case, even in a sexual battery and kidnap-
ping case. However, at the same time, the court did not expressly reject
the concept of the trial court possessing inherent power to compel a
mental examination of a victim. The court stated that it would discour-
age the practice in all but the most extreme instances.3 5 The court
reached this conclusion by relying on Dinkins v. State.13
In Dinkins, the defense moved for psychiatric examination of a
victim to furnish possible basis for impeachment. The Fourth District
Court of Appeal refused to order the examination. 37 The Rhone Court
also discussed State v. Coe,"8" in which the defense moved for the psy-
chiatric examination of a rape victim. The Second District Court of
Appeal quashed the trial court's order, following the Dinkins rationale
that strong and compelling reasons must exist to warrant such an ex-
amination.'39 Unlike Rhone, in neither Dinkins nor Coe was the state
introducing psychological testimony as part of its case-in-chief.
In Rhone, the defense moved for an order requiring the sexual bat-
terer to submit to an independent psychological examination contend-
ing an examination was essential to refute the state's case. The state
sought to introduce evidence from a psychological expert on the "bat-
tered woman syndrome"' 40 to bolster its case regarding the element of
lack of consent.
133. Id.
134. 566 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
135. Id. at 1369.
136. 244 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
137. Id. at 150.
138. 521 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
139. Id. at 376.
140. The battered woman syndrome is described as when "a man physically and
psychologically abuses a wife or loved one, gains her forgiveness, seeks her love and
reconciliation and then repeats the cycle over and over so many times that the woman,
at all times hoping the relationship will last, is reduced to a state of learned helpless-
ness." See L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979); Note, A Trend Emerges: A
State Survey on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning the Battered Wo-
man Syndrome, 25 J. FAM. L. 373 (1986-87).
1274 [Vol. 15
347
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Garcia
The victim accompanied the defendant (apparently voluntarily) to
his home or his relatives' home and remained there for a twelve to
twenty-four hour period during which the alleged sexual battery oc-
curred. The victim did not immediately attempt to escape and re-
mained at the house with the defendant and his relatives - even eating
breakfast together, without making the relatives aware that anything
was wrong."4
In Rhone, the court held that there were strong and compelling
reasons for the examination. 42 The court distinguished State v. Le-
blanc,'43 in which the Third District Court of Appeal quashed an order
compelling a psychological examination by defense doctors of three
children regarding whether the children manifested symptoms of sexual
abuse.4 That examination was intended to counter the testimony of
another expert which the state intended to call. In the Leblanc case, the
state's expert was appointed as an independent examiner by another
trial court and other evidence was available to evaluate the children. 45
Neither of these two situations existed in Rhone.146
H. Insanity Defense
In Hall v. State, 47 the Florida Supreme Court addressed the issue
of expert testimony in an insanity defense context. In 1987, Hall and
three acquaintances planned to travel to Virginia to work with a carni-
val. Because they had no money or means of transportation, they
planned to stop a car on the road, rob whomever had stopped, and steal
the person's car. Two of the individuals posed as hitchhikers with Hall,
while another co-defendant hid nearby. After the victim stopped, they
overpowered him, bound his ankles, wrists, mouth, and head with tape;
placed him in the car trunk; and drove north from Orlando. They re-
moved the victim from the trunk in Volusia County and dragged him
into a wooded area where one of the defendants, an alleged satanist,
carved an inverted cross on his chest and abdomen. Hall and a co-
141. Rhone, 566 So. 2d at 1367.
142. Id. at 1369.
143. 558 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
144. Id. at 510.
145. The expert was provided with psychologist's reports, reports of the inter-
viewer of the victims at the Children's Center, and video-taped interviews of the chil-
dren. Id. at 508-09.
146. 566 So. 2d 1367.
147. 568 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1990).
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defendant shot the victim seven times.148
The trial judge refused to allow Hall to present expert testimony
during the guilt phase of the trial to support his insanity defense.149
The Supreme Court of Florida held this was reversible error. 50 At the
end of Hall's case in chief and after Hall had testified in his own de-
fense, Hall's counsel proffered the written reports of a Professor of Re-
ligion, and a Clinical Psychiatrist, as expert testimony. In his Notice of
Insanity Defense, counsel proffered that both experts could testify that
"the nature of the temporary insanity at the time of the offense is that
the defendant acted under the influence of Satan and/or Bernie Dixon,
his co-defendant," and therefore was robbed of his free will; he did not
know right from wrong under the M'Naghten Rule 5' at the time of the
offense.' 52 The trial court refused to admit the expert testimony, stating
"there is no defense in Florida ... that says the Devil made me do
it.'' 53 On appeal the court held that the trial court erred by refusing to
allow the experts to testify. The experts were found to b- qualified to
provide expert testimony on Hall's sanity or lack of sanity and their
testimony was found to be relevant to that issue. 54 The expert was a
clinical psychologist with experience in evaluating the mental health of
patients and had examined the defendant. The expert doctor did not
base his opinion on the defendant's inability to distinguish right from
wrong solely on his alleged influence of Satan. Instead, the doctor ex-
plained that the defendant displayed characteristics of individuals with
schizophrenic disorders, and on the day of the shooting, defendant was
in a state of altered consciousness brought on by extreme stress. 55
Therefore, according to the doctor, Hall was unable to distinguish right
from wrong at the time of the offense. The court found that such evi-
dence met the requirement of the M'Naghten Rule 56 and clearly was
relevant to Hall's defense of insanity.' 57
The trial court's ruling effectively prevented Hall from presenting
148. Id. at 883.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 886.
151. Id. at 884.
152. Hall, 568 So. 2d at 884.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 885-86.
155. Id. at 885.
156. See supra note 110.
157. Hall, 568 So. 2d at 885.
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his insanity defense to the jury.68 On this basis, reversal was required.
On the other hand, the Florida Supreme Court found no error in the
trial court's refusal to allow the religion professor to testify as to Hall's
alleged insanity. The court noted that the professor freely admitted in
his written report that he was not qualified to testify to the sanity or
insanity of an individual. The court conceded that although the profes-
sor may be qualified to offer expert testimony on religious subjects such
as satanism, defense counsel did not proffer his report for that
purpose.'6 9
I. Psychological Autopsy
A psychological autopsy is a retrospective look at an individual's
suicide to try to determine what led the subject to choose suicide. The
defendant in Jackson v. State16 0 was convicted in Broward County of
child abuse arising out of the suicide death of her daughter, a nude
dancer. The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the state
presented sufficient evidence establishing that a psychological autopsy
is accepted in the field of psychiatry as a method of evaluation in cases
involving suicide, and that the judge acted within his discretion in ad-
mitting this evidence at trial.' 6' The expert witness reviewed the rele-
vant data which included the child's school records, police records, all
the state's evidence, the defendant's statements and medical records, a
report regarding the child's earlier suicide attempt and witnesses testi-
mony from the trial.'62 The expert's opinion was that the nature of the
relationship between the defendant and her daughter was the substan-
tial contributing factor in the daughter's decision to commit suicide. 63
J. Tool Marks
There are three basic types of tool marks: (1) an impression,
which is a negative reproduction of a portion of the tool which con-
tacted the marked surface; (2) an abrasion, friction, or scrape mark-
ing;"6 and (3) a combination of an abrasion or an impression in the
158. Id. at 886.
159. Id. at 884.
160. 553 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam).
161. Id. at 720.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Such marks are caused by the pushing, pulling or sliding of a tool across an
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same mark." 5 When identifying a tool mark, one must look at both
class and individual characteristics in the mark and on the tool
surfaces.
Class characteristics include such things as size and general config-
uration of tools. Individual characteristics, on the other hand, in-
clude structure or combinations of structure which are unique and
distinctive of just one specific implement. Such individual charac-
teristics are random in nature and normally result from wear, from
devices used in the manufacturing process, and from grinding or
other finishing procedures. They are also produced by wear and
breakage occurring through use of tools after manufacture.168
There is a sizable body of case law which provides precedent for
the admission of a vast array of tools and tool markings. 67 Tools
matched with markings made by them include drills, screw drivers,
crow bars, tire irons, hammers, paper punches, bolt cutters and
pliers e168
In Ramirez v. State,16 9 the Supreme Court of Florida dealt with
the admissibility of tool mark evidence discovered on the decedent's
cartilage. Mr. Ramirez was convicted of first degree murder and sen-
tenced to death for the homicide of a 27-year-old woman who was a
night courier at the Federal Express office in Miami. The cause of
death was multiple stab wounds to her body and blunt trauma to her
head. A bloody fingerprint was recovered on a door jamb near the vic-
tim's body. The fingerprint technician positively identified the finger-
print as belonging to Mr. Ramirez, an employee of the janitorial com-
pany which serviced the Federal Express offices. Mr. Ramirez was
arrested and charged with first degree murder based upon the finger-
object upon which a recorded mark is produced by the surface of the tool. Cut marks
are also of this type.
165. These usually consist of an abrasion mark at the end of which is an impres-
sion of at least part of the end of the tool. See Burd & Greene, Tool Mark Examina-
tion Techniques, 2 J. FORENSIC Sci. 297-98 (1957).
166. Burd & Gilmore, Individual and Class Characteristics of Tools, 13 J. Fo-
RENSIC Sci. 390 (1968).
167. See A. MOENSSENS. F. INBAJ & J. STARRS, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMI-
NAL CASES 259-61 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
CASES] (discussing the precedent for the admission of tools and tool markings).
168. Id.
169. 542 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1989).
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print identification.?T0
During the autopsy, the assistant medical examiner noticed a
mark made on the cartilage in the victim's chest. An evidence techni-
cian who had qualified as an expert in tool marks and ballistics was
asked to examine the marks and compare them with a knife found in
the defendant's girlfriend's car. At trial, the defendant's girlfriend tes-
tified that she usually kept the knife in her car for protection. After the
incident, she found the knife in her kitchen sink and washed it. When
the knife was examined by the laboratory, traces of blood were de-
tected on it but in insufficient amounts to determine their origin.'7'
At a hearing prior to trial and at trial, the evidence technician was
qualified as a tool mark expert and testified that the knife found in the
car was the specific knife which produced the victim's chest wound. On
appeal, Mr. Ramirez argued that his conviction should be set aside be-
cause the trial court erroneously allowed a ballistics and tool mark ex-
pert to identify the knife as the murder weapon." 2
The Florida Supreme Court stated that no scientific predicate was
established from independent evidence to show that a specific knife can
be identified from the marks made on the cartilage. According to the
court, "the only evidence received was the expert's self-serving state-
ment supporting this procedure."' 73 The court conceded that the quali-
fication of the witness was not the primary issue in the case, rather, it
was the reliability of testing the testing methods which formed the ba-
sis of the witness' conclusion. 74
The Florida Supreme Court ruled that new scientific methods of
establishing evidence will be accepted only after a proper predicate has
established the reliability of the new scientific method. 75 The court re-
lied upon Ramos v. State, 76 where it was held that there was no
proper predicate to establish the reliability of dog scent discrimination
line-ups. In Ramos, the only evidence concerning the scent discrimina-
170. Id. at 353.
171. Id. at354.
172. Id. Ramirez also argued that portions of his sworn statement in the motion
to suppress were improperly introduced at trial by the state; the state attorney failed to
supply the defense with the name of the cellmate to whom Ramirez allegedly con-
fessed; there was insufficient circumstantial evidence to support a finding of guilt; and
the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress physical evidence.
173. Id. at 355.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 496 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1986).
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tion line-up's reliability was the testimony of the dog handler. The
court also compared Ramirez to Bundy v. State,17 7 in which the court
rejected hypnotically refreshed testimony because of an improper predi-
cate of scientific reliability, and to Delap v. State,178 in which the ad-
missibility of polygraph tests was addressed. 17 9
Since the statements made by the tool mark expert which linked
the murder weapon to the defendant possibly could have influenced the
jury verdict, the court held that such testimony could not be viewed as
harmless error. There was some limited evidence from which the jury
could infer Ramirez did not commit the offense.'8 The court stated
that it would have held that the knife itself could have been properly
admitted as relevant evidence because it was an instrument which
could have caused the victim's wounds based on the medical examiner's
testimony and other evidence linking the knife to Ramirez. In light of
the fundamental error though, the conviction was reversed and the case
remanded for a new trial.18'
Unfortunately, the court seemed to ignore significant testimony
which would serve as a predicate for the admission of this evidence.'82
Technician Hart testified about the general study of tool marks and
their identification as a recognized field of scientific endeavor. In addi-
tion, during the motion hearing and trial the state also referred to
State v. Churchill,'i 3 a Supreme Court of Kansas case which approved
the admissibility of similar evidence. At trial, the medical examiner,
Dr. Rao, testified that "cartilage can sometimes retain shapes of partic-
ular injuries, a particular instrument or weapon."184 Mr. Hart testified
that the procedures he used were the standard procedures applicable to
striation tool marks which are accepted within the field of tool mark
identification by experts throughout the country.185 He also testified to
his qualifications' 86 and stated that he had co-authored a scholarly arti-
177. 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 894 (1986).
178. 440 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1264 (1984).
179. Ramirez, 542 So. 2d at 355.
180. Id. at 356.
181. Id. Ramirez is presently being retried before Judge Sepe in Dade County
Circuit Court.
182. Id. at 354-55.
183. 231 Kan. 408, 646 P.2d 1049 (1982).
184. Trial Transcript at 1029, State v. Ramirez, 542 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1989)
(No. 83-29429).
185. Id. at 1549.
186. Id. at 1598-99.
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cle which positively identified a knife as the tool that caused a particu-
lar stab wound to human cartilage in another case. 187 The expert
presented the paper prior to its publication at the 35th Annual Meeting
of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS) in Cincinnati,
Ohio in February, 1983.188 Clearly, if there were any objections by the
scientific community to this method of identification of knives, it would
have been made known at the AAFS presentation, or in letters to the
editor after the article was published. Because there were no negative
comments, one could conclude this. evidence not only met the reliability
test, but also met the Frye test.189
K. Trace Evidence
Crime scenes often yield physical evidence that can be compared
with known materials to determine the origin of the evidence. This evi-
dence is often termed trace evidence. It includes such items as hair,
fibers, wood, paint chips, soil and glass. Because of the minute size of
the particles involved and the necessity of examining the microscopic
characteristics of the evidence to make a comparison, the science of
187. Rao & Hart, Toolmark Determination in Cartilage of Stabbing Victim, 29
J. FORENSIC Sci. 794-99 (1983).
188. The American Academy of Forensic Sciences is a professional society dedi-
cated to the application of science to the law. It includes in its membership approxi-
mately 3700 physicians, criminalists, toxicologists, attorneys, dentists, physical anthro-
pologists, document examiners, engineers, educators and others who practice and
perform research in the many diverse fields of forensic science. The members of the
Academy reside in all 50 states and possessions, in Canada, and in over 30 other coun-
tries. The Academy is committed to the promotion of education and the elevation of'
accuracy, precision, and specificity in the forensic sciences. It does so via the Journal of
Forensic Sciences, newsletters and the conduct of seminars and meetings. It conducts
an annual scientific meeting wherein hundreds of scientific papers are presented and
workshops are held.
189. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye "general
acceptance" test for admissibility of novel scientific evidence is drawn from the oft-
quoted language of the case:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id. at 1014.
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analyzing trace evidence is called microanalysis. A recent Florida case
discusses one type of trace evidence, hair.
In State v. Sawyer,' the court held that hair evidence was inad-
missible where the evidence could have seriously prejudiced the defend-
ant. In this case the trial court granted the defendant's motion in
limine to exclude hair as evidence in a first degree murder case. The
victim was discovered beaten, tortured and murdered in her apartment.
During the course of the investigation several unknown hairs were
found on or around the victim's body in her upstairs bedroom, and one
unknown hair was found beneath the kitchen window. During the mo-
tion hearing, a hair and fiber expert from the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation testified the one unknown pubic hair found under the kitchen
window had not been forcibly removed and did not match the other
unknown hairs found in the victim's apartment. 191 The hair matched
Sawyer's pubic hair sample in twenty observable characteristics. 92 The
expert testified that this did not mean the hair was absolutely identified
as belonging to Sawyer but rather the hair came from someone within
a class of individuals having the same hair characteristics as the
defendant. 3
The expert also testified that the hair could have been transferred
by other means. Numerous people walked in and out of the crime scene
where evidence was being collected, violating the concept of preserving
the crime scene, may have contaminated the scene. The agent could not
testify as to how a given hair could get to a particular location, espe-
cially in light of extensive contamination. Because the hair could not be
positively identified as being from Sawyer and was not probative in
proving that Sawyer was in the victim's apartment at the time of the
murder, the appellate court held that the trial judge properly ruled the
evidence to be inadmissible.9 4
L. Blood Alcohol Tests
In State v. Miller,'95 the court held that the State is not necessa-
rily required to prove an accused's blood alcohol level was greater than
190. 561 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
191. Id. at 283.
192. Id.; see also SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES, supra note 168, at
475-95 (discussing the identification characteristics of hair).
193. Sawyer, 561 So. 2d at 283.
194. Id at 284.
195. 555 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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.1 % at the time of driving in order to convict him of driving under the
influence of alcohol. The State need only prove that based on the total-
ity of admissible evidence, the defendant's normal faculties were im-
paired. The question of timeliness is for the trier of fact in each case,
although the timing of the blood alcohol level test may affect accu-
racy.'96 The court held that based upon the statute and the weight of
authority, the result of a properly administered test measuring the ac-
cused's blood alcohol level is relevant evidence, and any failure of the
State to extrapolate the result back to the time of driving goes to the
weight of the evidence rather then to its admissibility. 197
IV. IMPROPER USE OF THE MEDICAL TREATISE
In Chorzelewski v. Drucker,198 the appellate court held that the
trial court erred in permitting the plaintiff's attorney to read text from
the medical treatise to the plaintiff's expert witness, and in permitting
the expert witness to bolster his own opinion testimony by using the
medical treatise during his direct examination. 99 Section 90.706 of the
Florida Statutes permits introduction of a medical treatise only in the
cross-examination of an expert witness.2 00
V. CONCLUSION
From 1988 to 1991 the supreme court and district courts of appeal
in Florida have rendered significant and interesting decisions regarding
scientific evidence and expert witness testimony. In fact, some of the
decisions such as Ramirez have been unique among all scientific evi-
196. Id. at 393. The court found that any time lapse in the test administration or
failure to extrapolate the result back to the time of the driving goes to the weight of the
evidence, not its admissibility.
197. Id. at 393-94.
198. 546 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
199. Id. at 1118.
200. FLA. STAT. § 90.706 (1989) provides:
Statements of facts or opinions on a subject of science, art, or specialized
knowledge contained in a published treatise, periodical, book, dissertation,
pamphlet, or other writing may be used in cross-examination of an expert
witness if the expert witness recognizes the author or the treatise, periodi-
cal, book, dissertation, pamphlet or other writing to be authoritative, or,
notwithstanding nonrecognition by the expert witness, if the trial court
finds the author or the treatise, periodical, book, dissertation, pamphlet, or
other writing to be authoritative and relevant to the subject matter.
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dence decisions in the country. 0 1 Florida courts also seem to continue
the trend toward acceptance of novel scientific evidence begun by An-
drews v. State,02 provided the evidence is reliable, not prejudicial, and
a proper predicate has been laid for its admissibility. What remains to
be seen is whether the Florida Supreme Court will soon provide a de-
finitive statement regarding the test for the admissibility of scientific
evidence in Florida since recent decisions have discussed both the Frye
test2°0 and the test under section 90.702 of the Florida Statutes,0 4
without stating which is the better or correct view.
201. See supra notes 169-189 and accompanying text.
202. 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
203. See supra note 189..
204. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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Michael L. Richmond*
I. INTRODUCTION
Florida courts experienced an unusually active period during the
last survey year, handing down a large number of significant opinions
in the area of torts. Of these, the Florida Supreme Court's doctrinally
sound and well-reasoned opinion in First Florida Bank, N.A. v. Max
Mitchell & Co.' led the way. Mitchell, an accountant, attempted to
negotiate a loan from the bank on behalf of his client, C.M. Systems
(C.M.). Mitchell showed the bank audited financial statements of
C.M., which he had prepared, indicating that C.M. had no liability to
any bank. Mitchell, in the course of oral negotiations, reaffirmed that
C.M. owed no money to any bank. Ultimately, the bank extended a
$500,000 line of credit to C.M. which C.M. fully utilized and never
repaid. The bank later discovered that at the time Mitchell prepared
the audited statement and made the oral representations, C.M. owed
over $750,000 to a number of banks.2
The bank sued Mitchell, the trial court granted summary judg-
ment to Mitchell, and the Second District Court of Appeal uneasily
affirmed, believing itself bound by precedent to dismiss any claim
against an accountant brought by a person not in privity.' Granting
certiorari to review a question of great public importance, the Florida
Supreme Court reversed:,
Because of the heavy reliance upon audited financial statements in
the contemporary financial world, we believe permitting recovery
only from those in privity or near privity is unduly restrictive. On
the other hand, we are persuaded by the wisdom of the rule which
limits liability to those persons or classes of persons whom an ac-
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center of Nova University. A.B., Ham-
ilton College; J.D., Duke Law School; M.S.L.S., University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill. The author wishes to express his appreciation to his research assistant,
Margaret Hesford, for her work on this article.
1. 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990).
2. Id. at 10-11.
3. First Florida Bank, N.A. v. Max Mitchell & Co., 541 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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countant "knows" will rely on his opinion rather than those he
"should have known" would do so because it takes into account the
fact that an accountant controls neither his client's accounting
records nor the distribution of his reports.4
Particularly impressive in Justice Grimes' literate opinion was his
handling of the formative cases written by Justice Cardozo, then sitting
on the New York Court of Appeals. Most courts focus on the directly
relevant Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven,5 in which an accounting
firm was held not liable for negligently auditing a financial statement
when sued by plaintiffs not in privity. However, Justice Grimes went
further and recognized that any discussion of Ultramares is incomplete
without a collateral consideration of Cardozo's earlier opinion in
Glanzer v. Shepard.6 In that case, a public weigher, hired by the seller
of beans, was contractually bound to transmit the weight of the beans
not only to the seller, but to the buyer as well. When the beans arrived
weighing less than the certificate indicated, the buyer sued the weigher
even though no privity of contract existed between the two. As the
weigher actually knew of the buyer's existence, he incurred liability for
his misstatement despite the lack of privity.1
Justice Grimes correctly noted that privity of contract between a
professional and one injured by that professional's malpractice nor-
mally forms an integral part of the plaintiffs cause of action.8 How-
ever, Justice Grimes added that the plaintiff can also satisfy the duty
proven by privity through a showing that the defendant knew his or her
acts would necessarily affect the plaintiff as well as persons in privity
with the professional.9 Stressing the uniqueness of the facts in the in-
stant case, Justice Grimes concluded that "Mitchell vouched for the
integrity of the audits and that his conduct in dealing with the bank
sufficed to meet the requirements of the rule which we have adopted in
this opinion."' 10
4. First Florida Bank, 558 So. 2d at 15.
5. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
6. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
7. Id. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275.
8. First Florida Bank, 558 So. 2d at 16.
9. Id.
10. Id. A lower court, however, noted that privity would bar a suit by a member
of the public at large against a physician who approved of a psychotic patient's return
to work as a member of the police force. See Joseph v. Shafey, 15 Fla. L. Weekly
D2343 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 1990).
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The Florida Supreme Court also decided Upjohn Co. v.
MacMurdo,"1 which clarified the often difficult task of determining the
adequacy of warnings in cases involving products liability. Upjohn
manufactured the contraceptive pharmaceutical, Depo-Provera, with
which MacMurdo was injected by her physician. The insert in the
Depo-Provera package warned that the drug might cause vaginal
bleeding. 12 MacMurdo, after a second injection of Depo-Provera, ex-
perienced continual vaginal bleeding which ultimately resulted in her
doctor performing a hysterectomy. MacMurdo sued Upjohn, and at
trial the judge permitted the issue of the adequacy of the warning to go
to the jury. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed, 13 but on
conflict certiorari the Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
warnings were so "accurate, clear, and unambiguous" the judge should
have found them adequate as a matter of law.14
The plaintiff's experts failed to demonstrate "that the package in-
sert was insufficient to put a doctor on notice that the symptoms...
could result from the use of Depo-Provera."' 5 Although MacMurdo's
bleeding was more than the breakthrough bleeding or spotting men-
tioned in the package insert, the company did not have the duty to
warn specifically of the degree of blood flow the product might in-
duce.' 6 Thus, the test for adequacy of warnings after Upjohn Co. seems
to be whether the warning would adequately convey the danger to the
person the warning was designed to reach. As Upjohn Co. dealt with
warnings to a learned intermediary, the warnings needed to convey the
danger to that intermediary. In cases of direct consumer warnings, a
judge can take the issue of warnings from the jury if the warnings
11. 562 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1990).
12. The package insert specifically warned of vaginal bleeding in several sections,
with the clearest statement coming in the "Adverse Reactions" portion, which noted:
"The following adverse reactions have been observed in women taking progestin includ-
ing Depo-Provera: breakthrough bleeding[,] spotting[, and] change in menstrual flow
." Id. at 682.
13. Upjohn Co. v. MacMurdo, 536 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
14. Upjohn Co., 562 So. 2d at 683 (quoting Felix v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 540
So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1989)).
15. Id.
16. "It would be unreasonable to hold Upjohn liable for not characterizing the
bleeding as excessive, continuous, or prolonged." Id. In dissent, Justice Shaw argued
that because Upjohn knew prolonged bleeding had resulted from Depo-Provera and
because the physician anticipated lack of bleeding rather than increased bleeding, the
package insert should have been more specific and the jury could have found it was
inadequate. Id. at 684 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
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clearly conveyed the danger to the person purchasing the product. 17
In 1987, in Bankston v. Brennan,8 the court determined that a
social host could not be liable to a third party injured by a minor guest
who had become intoxicated at the host's home. This year, in Dowell v.
Gracewood Fruit Co.,19 it faced the issue of damages caused by an
inebriated guest served alcoholic beverages by a host who knew the
guest was a chronic alcoholic. Gracewood Fruit employed Abbey, and
knew that he suffered from alcoholism. At a company outing, Abbey
drank alcoholic beverages and later caused an automobile accident in-
juring Dowell. Dowell sued Gracewood, the trial court entered sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant, and the Fourth District
Court of Appeal affirmed.20 Dowell then obtained certiorari from the
Florida Supreme Court based on a question of great public interest.
The court clarified its 1987 opinion in Bankston, stating that
"[w]hile Dowell attempts to characterize Bankston as only deciding the
liability for serving alcoholic beverages to a minor, the opinion unmis-
takably rejected the contention that section 768.125 created a cause of
action against a social host."'" The court continued to stress that in
matters where the legislature has spoken, any variation from the lan-
guage of the statute must rest with the legislature itself.22 Again the
court demonstrates that while it might willingly change judge-made
law, it will continue to defer to the legislature in any ca;e where the
legislature has not specifically covered a situation within the bounds of
an existing general statute.23
These three cases, although coming from different fields of tort
17. See 5 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.7 at 378
nn.27-30 (2d ed. 1986).
18. 507 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1987).
19. 559 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1990). Florida statutes impose liability on a "person
who willfully and unlawfully sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person who is
not of lawful drinking age or who knowingly serves a person habitually addicted to the
use of any or all alcoholic beverages .... " FLA. STAT. § 768.125 (1989) (emphasis
supplied). Bankston dealt with the first clause of the statute; Dowell addressed the
second.
20. Dowell v. Gracewood Fruit Co., 544 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
21. Dowell, 559 So. 2d at 218.
22. As the legislature had not addressed the subject since the court decided
Bankston, the court concluded that "the legislature is content with our interpretation of
the statute." Id.
23. See generally Richmond, 1988 Survey of Florida Law (Torts), 13 NOVA L.
REV. 1245, 1247-48 (1989) [hereinafter 1988 Tort Survey].
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law, seem to signal a resurgence of concentration by the Florida Su-
preme Court on the duty element of tort law. First Florida Bank cer-
tainly stresses the requirement that the defendants must owe a duty to
the plaintiffs who sue them. The entire concept of privity arose as an
alternative means of expressing the necessity for a prior, litigatable re-
lationship between two parties in order for one to successfully pursue a
tort action against the other.24 Upjohn Co., in permitting the judge -
instead of the jury - to decide clear-cut matters, treats the question of
warnings in a duty-oriented manner instead of a causation-oriented
one.2 5 Finally, Dowell stresses that in the absence of common-law du-
ties and a clearly defined legislatively created duty, the court will take
no steps to enlarge on a highly specific, limited duty the legislature
may have enacted. The concentration on the necessity for plaintiffs to
demonstrate duty reaffirms Florida's continuing approval of the princi-
ples espoused by Justice Cardozo in the misrepresentation cases and
embodied in the famous Palsgraf opinion. 6
II. NEGLIGENCE
A. Negligence Per Se
Courts confronted with plaintiffs attempting to prove negligence
through violation of a statute occasionally must cope with the effect a
violation of an administrative regulation will have in a civil suit. This
has proven a knotty issue, particularly when the regulating agency is
not of the same state as the court hearing the issue. Courts have split
on the dignity to accord the regulation.27 Dicta in the recent Fifth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal decision in Murray v. Briggs28 indicates that
Florida courts will not accord federal regulations the same status as
Florida statutes and ordinances. Briggs ran his pick-up truck into the
rear of a parked flat bed truck owned by Hughes Supply. Briggs' pas-
senger, Murray, sued Hughes, arguing that the truck was used in inter-
state commerce and its violation of a safety regulation promulgated by
24. See generally Richmond, The Development of Duty: Langridge to Palsgraf,
31 ST. Louis U. L.J. 903, 940-43 (1987).
25. The judge decides questions of duty; the jury decides questions of causation.
See generally 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS ch. 16 (2d ed.
1986).
26. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
27. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
28. 569 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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the Interstate Commerce Commission (I.C.C.) proximately caused his
injuries.29 At trial, the court refused to instruct the jury on Hughes'
failure to have a rear bumper which met the I.C.C. regulation. The
jury found for Hughes, and Murray appealed to the Fifth District
Court of Appeal, which affirmed.30
Judge Griffin's opinion actually turns on the determination that
Hughes was not engaged in interstate commerce and that the regula-
tion did not apply to its trucks.3 1 However, Judge Griffin went on to
note that even had the regulation applied to Hughes, the trial judge
correctly refused to give the requested instruction: "[A]lthough several
courts seem comfortable with the concept, we are not satisfied that a
federal regulation should necessarily control state law questions of neg-
ligence by enlarging common law duties or creating new duties. '3 2 Ac-
cording to the court, the regulation itself fails to provide definite stan-
dards for the design of the bumper, and in fact does not even specify
the proper location of the bumper. Furthermore, a court cannot permit
such a vague regulation to supplant traditional common law notions of
reasonable prudence. 33
B. Vicarious Liability
1. Respondeat Superior
Two significant opinions from the Third District Court of Appeal
solidified the rule that employers will not incur vicarious liability for
the acts of their employees in driving to and from work, even though
those same acts might entitle the employees to workers' compensation
benefits. In the first opinion, the wife of the president of a corporation
also served as a part-time employee of the corporation.3 4 The corpora-
29. See Rear End Protection, 49 C.F.R. § 393.86 (1989). This regulation pro-
vides that vehicles engaged in interstate commerce must have rear bumpers meeting
certain specifications designed for the protection of other vehicles in rear-end collisions.
Murray alleged that Hughes' bumper failed to meet the specific requirements of the
regulation. Murray, 569 So. 2d at 478.
30. Id. at 481.
31. Although Hughes engaged in interstate trading, it had two fleets of trucks.
The truck in question was used exclusively in intrastate transactions within Florida. Id.
at 479-80.
32. Id. at 480.
33. Id. at 481.
34. Robelo v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 555 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1989).
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tion was a franchise of United Comsumers Club (UCC), and admit-
tedly the agent of UCC. The corporation provided its president with a
van, which his family was entitled to use. One day, the president called
his wife to request that. she come in to work. While driving the corpora-
tion's van, she caused an accident which injured Robelo. Robelo sued
UCC, arguing that the wife's actions caused UCC to incur vicarious
liability.35
The trial court granted UCC's motion for summary judgment, and
the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed.3 6 Robelo attempted to use
two theories of liability, both of which the court rejected. He first ar-
gued that the wife's travel subjected UCC to liability either because it
was in the nature of a special errand or because she was an "on call"
employee. The court rejected the first prong of the argument simply
because the facts demonstrated that she "was merely traveling to the
office," 37 and the second because even though she did not work unless
needed, her employment relationship did not require her to come in
each time she was summoned. As to the second theory, even though the
corporation provided the van which she drove, since she was allowed to
drive it for other purposes than business the simple use of the van with-
out a specific employment connection would not subject the employer
to liability. 38
In the second opinion, the Third District Court joined with the
Fourth District Court of Appeal in noting the difference between the
workers' compensation test for "course of employment" and the respon-
deat superior test for "scope of employment." 39 In Sussman v. Florida
East Coast Properties, Inc.,4 the manager of a health spa called
Paraiso, one of his fitness instructors, and asked her to stop on her way
to work and pick up a birthday cake for another employee. She bought
the cake, testifying later that she did so without regard to her man-
ager's instructions.4 As she drove from the supermarket, the cake be-
35. Id. at 396.
36. Id. at 397.
37. Id. at 396.
38. Id. at 397.
39. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Akin, 533 So. 2d 829, 831 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1988) (Anstead, J., concurring specially); see also 1988 Tort Survey, supra note 23, at
1255-56.
40. 557 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
41. "[W] e were friends, like aerobics teachers and fitness instructors and we just
decided to give him a cake because it was his birthday .... I didn't do it because it
was my boss. I didn't do it because my boss said so . . . ." Id. at 76 n..
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gan to slip from the seat next to her. She reached for the cake and lost
control of the car, which careened into Sussman as he sat on a bus
bench. Sussman sued Paraiso's employer and appealed to the Third
District Court of Appeal when the trial court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment. 2
On appeal, Sussman argued that Paraiso's unquestioned entitle-
ment to workers' compensation benefits also demonstrated that she ac-
ted within the scope of her employment for purposes of vicarious liabil-
ity.4" The appellate court disagreed. According to the court, different
policy considerations govern workers' compensation qualification than
govern vicarious liability. Respondeat superior demands a "narrower
analysis.""' Thus, even though Paraiso "was enroute to her place of
employment . . . she was outside the scope of the employer's business
as a matter of law."' 5 As noted in an earlier survey of tort law, the
reasoning adopted by the these two district courts of appeal has the
firmest base in logic, and the rule they have stated should take prece-
dence over conflicting cases from other districts. 6
2. Borrowed Servants
Two cases during the last survey year cast new light on the inter-
face between workers' compensation immunity and suits by borrowed
servants. The Florida Supreme Court determined conclusively that the
lending employer of a negligent worker can block a suit by the em-
ployee of the borrowing employer, based on workers' compensation im-
munity. In Halifax Paving, Inc. v. Scott & Jobalia Construction Co.,"7
Halifax gratuitously loaned a crane and operator to the Scott &
Jobalia Construction Co. (S & J). Obeying hand signals from S & J's
employees, the Halifax operator attempted to move pipe by using a
sling attached to the crane. The pipe slipped from the sling and injured
Grier, an employee of S & J. Grier collected workers' compensation
benefits from S & J, and then sued Halifax, seeking damages on a
respondeat superior theory. After a jury found that the operator was a
42. Id. at 75.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. The court relied on the nature of the errand - purchasiIg refreshments
for a social occasion - as well as Paraiso's statement that the purchase was not work-
related to determine that the trip was outside the scope of her employment. Id.
46. See 1988 Tort Survey, supra note 23, at 1256.
47. 565 So. 2d 1346 (Fla. 1990).
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borrowed servant and held in favor of Grier, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal reversed, finding the lending employer was entitled to the work-
ers' compensation immunity accorded to the borrowing employer.48 The
Florida Supreme Court granted conflict certiorari4 9 and approved the
Fifth District Court's opinion.
The crane operator, working under the specific control of S & J's
employee, was a borrowed servant. Since prior opinions establish that
leased equipment becomes "the working tool of the employer,' 50 inju-
ries caused by use of the equipment are exclusively remedied through
the workers' compensation process. The court reasoned that if the
owner of leased dangerous equipment can claim workers' compensation
immunity, it seems only logical that the owner of loaned dangerous
equipment can claim the immunity as well.51 Although the owner of
the crane "certainly had no duty to provide worker's compensation to
the injured party, neither did the third party [owner] in any logical
sense contribute to the work-place injury that actually occurred. '52
In Maxson v. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc.,53 the First District
Court of Appeal considered the obverse side of the borrowed servant
coin - whether an injured employee can successfully sue a borrowing
employer in negligence, or is limited to workers' compensation reme-
dies. Project Construction furnished manpower to Air Products under
an agreement providing that Project would pay the workers and Air
Products would reimburse Project. Maxson worked under this agree-
ment for a period of time, but then requested a transfer to a different
job, supervised exclusively by Air Products' personnel, and which of-
fered him a significantly higher chance of promotion. Maxson was in-
jured on the job, and sued Air Products in negligence. The trial court
reserved ruling on Air Products' motion to dismiss and, after a jury
verdict for Maxson, set aside the verdict. The First District Court of
48. Scott & Jobalia Constr. Co. v. Halifax Paving, Inc., 538 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
49. The First District Court of Appeal had reached a contrary result in Mann v.
Pensacola Concrete Constr. Co., 448 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 461 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1984).
50. See Smith v. Ryder Truck Rentals, Inc., 182 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1966).
51. Halifax Paving, 565 So. 2d at 1347.
52. Id. at 1348. The court also discussed the function of the workers' compensa-
tion remedy: "[T]he central policies of worker's compensation are to provide employees
with a swift and adequate means of compensation for injury, and to insulate employers
from potentially bankrupting tort liability for work-place accidents." Id. at 1347.
53. 554 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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Appeal affirmed.54
The testimony at trial conclusively demonstrated that Maxson was
doing work exclusively to benefit Air Products, and performing his du-
ties exclusively under the control of Air Products' employees. Regard-
less of the contractual relationship between the two employers, the
court had to look at the actual employment relationship governing the
employee. Even though there was no specific contract between Maxson
and Air Products, the facts clearly demonstrated that the "work being
done ...was essentially that of the special employer, and ... that
the special employer had the right to control the details of the work."55
Thus, Air Products was the de facto special employer of Maxson, and
entitled to raise workers' compensation immunity as a defense to the
suit.516
C. Defenses
The Florida Supreme Court decided two significant cases dealing
with different defenses to actions in negligence. In one, the court re-
fused to permit workers' compensation immunity to block a suit alleg-
ing sexual harassment. 57 In the other, the court attempted to further
define the distinction between express assumption of risk and implied
assumption of risk.58 The assumption of risk case did little more than
further cement the Blackburn v. Dorta59 fallacious treatment of as-
sumption of risk into Florida law. The sexuil harassment case, how-
ever, may have paved the way for substantial inroads into workers'
compensation immunity in the limited case of intentional torts.
A number of Richardson-Greenfields' female employees exper-
ienced frequent sexual advances, both verbal and physical, from male
employees. They sued the company, claiming various intentional torts
and sought damages for the emotional distress and humiliation occa-
sioned by the sexual harassment. The company moved to dismiss the
suit, arguing that the plaintiffs' sole remedy lay in workers' compensa-
tion. The trial court granted the motion and the Second District Court
54. Id. at 1213-14.
55. Id. at 1213 (citing Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co.. 246 So. 2d 98,
101 (Fla. 1971)).
56. Id. at 1214.
57. Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Securities, Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla.
1989).
58. Mazzeo v. City of Sebastian, 550 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1989).
59. 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977).
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* of Appeal affirmed." The Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the issue as one of great public interest.6 '
The workers' compensation statute provides an exclusive remedy
for any "injury or death" arising in the course of employment, but per-
mits tort suits against employers for damages other than those arising
from injury or death. 2 Thus, the Florida Supreme Court first had to
determine whether the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiffs in
Byrd constituted an injury within the meaning of the statute. The
workers' compensation statute has been liberally construed in the past,
and courts have read the definitional sections to include damage-caus-
ing occurrences so that workers would not go without a remedy for
their harm. 3 However, the inclusion of sexual harrasment claims in
workers' compensation actions would work to frustrate legislative in-
tent. As the Byrd court noted, "both the state of Florida and the fed-
eral government have committed themselves strongly to outlawing and
eliminating sexual discrimination in the workplace, including the re-
lated evil of sexual harassment."6 4 An examination of the various stat-
utes enacted by the Florida legislature supports the conclusion that the
courts should read statutes to effectuate this policy of doing away with
sexual harassment in employment. To permit an employer the shield of
workers' compensation immunity would run contrary to all existing
Florida law.6 5 Thus, the complaint alleged an injury not protected by
the workers' compensation statute - one "to intangible personal
rights. 66
The Florida Supreme Court has yet to determine whether the ex-
clusivity of the workers' compensation remedy will bar suits based on
intentional torts. Byrd will give no guidance in those instances where
60. Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Securities, Inc., 527 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
61. The certified question read: "Whether the workers' compensation statute pro-
vides the exclusive remedy for a claim based on sexual harassment in the workplace."
Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1100.
62. See FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (1987).
63. See, e.g., W.T. Edwards Hosp. v. Rakestraw, 114 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1959) (worker injured by co-worker in brawl over a love affair entitled to
compensation).
64. Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1102.
65. "Public policy now requires that employers be held accountable in tort for
the sexually harassing environments they permit to exist, whether the tort claim is
premised on a remedial statute or on the common law." Id. at 1104.
66. Id.
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plaintiffs claim damages for physical injury or death.6 7 However, where
a plaintiff claims emotional damages or nominal damages due to an
intentional tort, it would seem that the plaintiff seeks to remedy harm
to the very intangible rights of which the Florida Supreme Court spoke.
Thus, Byrd should open the door to substantial claims involving puni-
tive damages against employers, but only for intentional torts not in-
volving personal injury.
With Blackburn v. Dorta68 in 1977, the Florida Supreme Court
drew the distinction between "strict assumption of the risk" and "quali-
fied assumption of the risk." The court reiterated this reasoning in
Mazzeo v. City of Sebastian,9 stating again the hypothetical situation
it used in Blackburn:
The tenant returns from work to find the premises on fire with his
infant child trapped inside. He rushes in to save the child and is
burned in the fire. Under the pure or strict doctrine of assumption
of risk, the tenant is precluded from recovery because he volunta-
rily exposed himself to a known risk even though his conduct was
reasonable under the circumstances.70
Unfortunately, the very example given by the court demonstrates the
lack of distinction the court seeks to draw. Can we truly say the act of
saving one's own child from a burning building is voluntary in nature?
One commentator argues that
[w]here the defendant puts [the plaintiff] to a choice of evils, there
is a species of duress, which destroys the idea of freedom of elec-
tion .. . .Those who dash in to save their own property, or the
lives or property of others, from a peril created by the defendant's
negligence, do not assume the risk where the alternative is to allow
the threatened harm to occur.
7 1
67. In Fisher v. Shenandoah General Construction Co., 498 So. 2d 882 (Fla.
1986), the Florida Supreme Court procedurally declined to consider the effect of work-
ers' compensation on intentional tort claims. However, in Fisher the plaintiff died as
the result of an intentional industrial accident. Byrd would have no effect on a case of
this nature. See generally Richmond, 1986 Survey of Florida Law (Torts), 11 NOVA L.
REV. 1519, 1535-37 (1987).
68. 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977).
69. 550 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1989).
70. Id. at 1115 (emphasis supplied).
71. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TH LAW OF TORTS
490-91 (5th ed. 1984).
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Thus, there is no true distinction between the two types of assumption
of risk perceived by the Florida Supreme Court. Carrying the logic fur-
ther, with the breakdown of the logic underlying Blackburn v. Dorta,
the Florida Supreme Court's decision to merge assumption of the risk
in with comparative negligence also fails.
Mazzeo presents a clear example of the evils of the rule espoused
in Blackburn. An experienced swimmer, after standing in the shallow
water at the base of a platform at a municipal lake, and after hearing
the warnings of her boyfriend that the water was too shallow to permit
diving, dove headfirst off the platform.72 She broke her neck and sued
the city which maintained the park. There were no signs warning swim-
mers not to dive, but there was a faded statement reading "no diving"
painted on the dock itself. The trial court permitted the jury to con-
sider whether Mazzeo had assumed the risk. The jury found the city
negligent, but also found that Mazzeo knew perfectly well the risk in
diving from the platform "and having had a reasonable opportunity to
avoid it, voluntarily and deliberately exposed herself to the danger by
diving into the water."" On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal affirmed.74 The Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari, as the
case involved a matter of great public iriterest, and reversed.
The court first reviewed Blackburn, and then discussed the ex-
tremely limited exception it had carved out for cases involving assump-
tion of the risks for participation in contact sports. 5 It then refused to
extend the exception to the instant case: "To expand this exception to
include aberrant conduct in noncontact sports collides with the merger
of assumption of risk into comparative negligence . . -76 Yet the
court willingly characterized Mazzeo's behavior as "foolhardy con-
duct. ' 77 To permit a jury to award damages in such a situation, partic-
ularly where the plaintiff's conduct rises to the level of recklessness in
comparison with the defendant's mere negligence, seems contrary to
the concepts of fault which underlie our system of tort law. Justice
McDonald, joined by Justice Overton, also found problems with the
majority's opinion. They, however, would have avoided the Blackburn
72. Although conflicting evidence existed, these are the facts taken in the light
most favorable to the losing party - the defendant. Mazzeo, 550 So. 2d at 1114.
73. Id.
74. Mazzeo v. City of Sebastian, 526 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
75. See, e.g., Kuehner v. Green, 436 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1983).
76. Mazzeo, 550 So. 2d at 1116.
77. Id. at 1117.
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problem by holding that the city's failure to post signs (lid not cause
Mazzeo's harm since her deliberate and intentional conduct would have
broken any claimed causal nexus.7 8
D. Causation
1. Generally
An interesting and troubling case from the Second District Court
of Appeal presented the question of the adequacy of a plaintiff's proof
on the issue of foreseeability. In Florida Power Corp. v. McCain,7" the
blade of a mechanical trencher severed a subsurface power line, injur-
ing the trencher's operator. He sued the power company, and testimony
at trial demonstrated that the company had designed the power line to
deenergize the moment it was severed. A power company employee also
testified that he knew of no instance in an eight year period when the
person who severed a power cable received an electric shock. The plain-
tiff presented no other evidence on the issue. The defendant moved for
a directed verdict, but the court denied the motion and the jury found
for the plaintiff. The Second District Court of Appeal .reversed.s0
In order to recover, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defend-
ant could have foreseen the harm which occurred. A judge may prop-
erly determine the issue of foreseeability, or causation, although nor-
mally the court should submit it to the jury. The court found that if a
plaintiff fails to produce evidence that the defendant could have antici-
pated the type of harm which the plaintiff suffered, the court should
take the issue of foreseeability from the jury.81 From the limited proof
adduced by the plaintiff at trial, he failed to demonstrate "that Florida
Power reasonably could have foreseen any injury -resulting from a
trencher severing this type of power cable."8 2
Judge Threadgill, in dissent, would have left the issue of foresee-
ability in the case to the jury. Quoting from the trial court's opinion
denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Threadgill noted that a jury
should have determined whether "Florida Power could not foresee that
if an insulated electrical line carrying 7,200 volts of electrcity were cut
by a mechanical device the operator of the device might receive an
78. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting).
79. 555 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
80. Id. at 1269-70.
81. Id. at 1271.
82. Id. at 1270.
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electrical shock and an accompanying injury.""3 Indeed, the majority's
opinion leaves behind a nagging doubt. If Florida Power had designed
the power line to deenergize upon being severed, it must have had some
concern that severing the line would cause a shock to the person caus-
ing the break were the line not deenergized. In other words, Florida
Power's own actions demonstrated it actually foresaw the possibility of
this type of harm occurring. If the "fail-safe" mechanism failed to dee-
nergize the line, then the electric shock could have readily resulted.
The fact that the employee knew of no instances of electrocution does
not mean that Florida Power could not have foreseen the type of harm,
but it might permit a jury to find Florida Power had taken reasonable
care to prevent the harm.
2. Superseding Intervening Causes
In the last year, courts have begun to deal with questions involving
the conduct of plaintiffs not as a defense, but as a superseding interven-
ing cause which will destroy the causal nexus between the act of the
defendant and the injury to the plaintiff. The dissent in Mazzeo sug-
gested this approach with a plaintiff who had acted intentionally. s4 Dis-
trict courts of appeal have also determined that a plaintiffs negligence
might supersede that of the defendant. Although one cannot at this
early point identify these cases as creating a trend, they do tend to
show the germ of a dissatisfaction by intermediate Florida courts with
the merger of assumption of risk into comparative negligence.
For example, in Garcia v. Metropolitan Dade County, 5 a mother
was walking to school with her child. When they came upon an inter-
section, the child walked out into the street without his mother's per-
mission. The county had not maintained a crosswalk at the intersection
even though it had suggested the intersection as a safe one for children
going to school. The child stopped in the middle of the intersection, and
a car struck and injured him. He and his parents sued the county. The
trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant, and the Third
District Court of Appeal affirmed.86
The court emphasized that had the county maintained traffic sig-
nals, the boy still would have been injured:
83. Id. at 1272 (Threadgill, J., dissenting).
84. See supra text accompanying note 78.
85. 561 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
86. Id. at 1195.
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No number of traffic signals, traffic control devices, or safe route to
school maps can provide any greater protection for a child than the
attendant supervision of his parent. . . .The sole proximate cause
of George's injuries was his act of stepping into the street without
keeping a proper lookout, while under his mother's control.87
Thus, the negligence of the parent and child combined to supercede
any possible negligence of the county in failing to provide proper safety
precautions at the intersection.
A later panel of the Third District Court of Appeal, however,
reached a contrary result where the child's parent did not accompany
the child.88 An additional distinction lay in the special instructions
given to that plaintiff regarding the route to school, and in the plain-
tiff's special status. Lagarian Brunson needed a speech therapist, and
the Dade School Board transferred him to a school some distance from
his home. The school board failed to provide a school bus for Lagarian,
and his father took him to school via public transportation by a route
designated by the school board. The route involved crossing a danger-
ous city intersection. After two weeks, the nine-year old boy's father
ceased to accompany him. As Lagarian crossed the intersection, a car
struck and killed him.89
In the ensuing action by Lagarian's estate, the school board ac-
knowledged that it had breached a duty to provide transportation to the
new school. However, it moved for and was granted summary judgment
on the theory that the father's intervening negligent act of failing to
accompany his son on the dangerous trip superseded any breach of
duty in failing to provide the school bus. On appeal, the Third District
Court of Appeal reversed. 90
Were it not for the failure to provide transportation, the father
would not have had the opportunity to act negligently. Since his "alleg-
edly deficient conduct 'was set in motion by the original wrongful act'
[it was] not such a new and independent cause as to create an interven-
ing cause."91 Yet the question remains open whether, had the father
accompanied the child to the intersection and negligently permitted
him to attempt to cross the street, the second panel from the Third
87. Id.
88. See Brunson v. Dade County School Board, 559 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
89. Id. at 647.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 648 (citations omitted).
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District would have found the father's negligence superseded that of
the school board.
Later in the year, the First District Court of Appeal found that
the act of a man in attempting to board a moving freight train consti-
tuted a superseding intervening cause, relieving the railroad company
of any liability for his injuries. 2 Pickard, a man who traveled from
place to place by hitchhiking or hopping a moving freight train and
subsisted by working odd jobs, asked two men he believed to be rail-
road company employees where he could hop a train. They directed
him to a bridge over the tracks. After some equivocating, and having
left the premises of the railroad and then returning, Pickard made up
his mind to jump a train. As he approached the tracks in the rain, a
train came towards him at about 30 miles per hour. He tried to hop the
train, but was instead thrown from it when it suddenly lurched. Pickard
sustained severe injuries. He sued the railroad company and success-
fully won a jury verdict after the trial court denied the company's mo-
tion to dismiss. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal
reversed.9"
After a lengthy discussion of Pickard's status as trespasser or li-
censee, the court considered whether the acts of the railroad company
employees caused Pickard's injuries at law.94 Although the employees
may have been the cause in fact of the injuries in directing Pickard to
the bridge crossing, their acts were not the cause at law of the injuries.
"[T]he inquiry becomes whether the negligence of FEC's employees set
in motion the chain of events leading to Pickard's injuries or simply
provided the occasion for Pickard's own gross negligence. '"" Stressing
Pickard's own lack of resolve and the extreme danger of his attempt to
board the fast freight in bad weather, the court held his actions consti-
tuted "an active, independent and efficient intervening cause that sev-
ered the tenuous chain of causation between the negligence of FEC's
employees and Pickard's injuries."9
The utilization of proximate causation to limit the liability of de-
fendants to plaintiffs who take unusual risks, or whose injuries come
92. Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Pickard, 573 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
93. Id. at 852-53.
94. The court seems to have assumed that Pickard's identification of the two men
as employees of the railroad sufficed to send that issue to the jury, which found in
Pickard's favor.
95. Id. at 858.
96. Id. at 859.
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about due to negligence occurring subsequent to that of the named de-
fendant, seems a natural development. Intentional torts have always su-
perseded negligence, although when the intentional act was that of the
plaintiff courts have spoken of it in terms of assumptior of the risk.
The rationale of both doctrines is the same: a defendant incurs liability
only for those injuries which one can anticipate at the time of the negli-
gent conduct. At law, one cannot anticipate an intervening intentional
harmful act - whether the act jeopardizes third parties or the plain-
tiffs themselves.
E. Premises Liability
1. Dangerous Interior Conditions
The nature of proof required of the plaintiff in a slip and fall case
provided the basis for two district court of appeal opinions this past
year. In the first, the plaintiff slipped on a foreign substance on the
floor of a grocery store. 7 At trial, she introduced no evidence that the
store's employees caused the material to fall to the floor, and also pro-
duced nothing to demonstrate that they knew the material was there.
Additionally, she produced nothing indicating the length of time the
substance had been on the floor before she slipped on it. Despite her
lack of evidence, the trial court denied defendants' motion to dismiss at
the close of the plaintiff's case and sent the case to the jury. The jury
found for the plaintiff, but on appeal, the Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal reversed.98
The court explained that a plaintiff in a slip and fall case can re-
cover from the owner of the premises by demonstrating that the owner
failed to use due care, either in keeping foreign materials from the floor
or in removing them within a reasonable period of time.9 As to the
second alternative, the plaintiff can show either that the owner knew of
the dangerous condition and failed to remedy it, or that the owner
should have known of the dangerous condition because, in the exercise
of due care, the owner would have discovered it within the period of
time it had existed. Where the plaintiff fails to introduce evidence dem-
onstrating any of these three ways the owner failed to exercise reasona-
97. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Marcotte, 553 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 214-15.
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ble care, the plaintiff cannot reach the jury. Any jury determination in
the absence of this evidence would be mere speculation. 100
The second case, from the Second District Court of Appeal, ac-
corded with the first.'01 Wilson, shopping in a supermarket, returned to
an aisle he had visited shortly before. He slipped on some liquid deter-
gent on the floor, which had spilled from a tipped-over bottle on the top
shelf, and injured himself. On his earlier trip down the aisle, he had not
seen any detergent on the floor. Wilson sued the supermarket. At trial,
the store manager testified that he had inspected the aisle no more than
fifteen minutes prior to the accident and had not noticed any spill. The
case went to the jury, and after it rendered a verdict in Wilson's favor,
the trial judge granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which
the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed: "Appellants' case fails in
its required burden of proof for lack of any evidence that appellee had
actual knowledge of a dangerous condition prior to Mr. Wilson's injury.
There is likewise no evidence as to the length of time a dangerous con-
dition existed prior to Mr. Wilson's fall."'0 2
In Fitzgerald v. Cestari,0 3 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
determined that a homeowner has no duty to discover whether a sliding
glass door contains safety or plate glass, and the Supreme Court of
Florida later affirmed. 0 4 Brandi Fitzgerald, visiting a house owned by
the Cestaris, walked through a plate glass door and suffered severe in-
juries. When she sued the Cestaris, the trial judge granted their motion
100. Id. at 215. The court continued:
Where, as here, there is no evidence the premises possessor had actual
knowledge of the dangerous condition prior to the injury, and there is no
evidence as to the length of time the dangerous condition existed prior to
the injury, the premises possessor is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law and a jury is not authorized to speculate or arbitrarily impose strict
liability based on the mere contention or general assertiorl that the prem-
ises possessor "should have known of" the dangerous condition.
Id.
101. Wilson v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 559 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
102. Id. at 263-64.
103. 553 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
104. Fitzgerald v. Cestari, 569 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1990). The Florida Supreme
Court echoed the rationale of the Fourth District. This case presents the difficulty the
author of a survey faces when a case during the survey year is considered by a superior
tribunal in an opinion which appears subsequent to the survey year. The author of this
survey has elected to preserve the integrity of the survey year, but notes the later af-
firmance for those seeking precedential guidance.
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for summary judgment and the appellate court affirmed. The Cestaris
had submitted to the trial court an affidavit demonstrating they had no
knowledge that the glass door, which was the same one installed by the
builders of the house, contained plate glass rather than safety glass.
The affidavit also noted that a reasonable inspection would not have
disclosed the type of glass in the door. The court held that under these
circumstances, the owner of the house had no duty to go beyond a rea-
sonable inspection to determine the nature of the glass. Although the
plaintiff had a cause of action against the original builder of the
house, 105 she had no cause of action against the owners. 10 6
The First District Court of Appeal had occasion to consider the
duty owed by the owner of a building to those individuals working to
correct a dangerous condition within the building.10 7 Champion owned
a pre-world war II building and hired Brown & Root to demolish it.
Brown & Root subcontracted the removal of asbestos to A & A Insula-
tion, and Mozee worked for A & A. During the course of removal, A
& A's superintendent asked Champion to turn off the electricity to the
building, but Champion's contact person could not comply with this
request. He told the superintendent that there were no schematics for
much of the old wiring, and A & A should assume the wiring was still
hot. Mozee was working in a part of the building with charged wires,
grasped a wire, and was electrocuted. His estate sued Champion, which
recovered a summary final judgment from the trial court, and the
plaintiff appealed to the First District Court of Appeal." 8
The owner of property incurs liability to independent contractors
working on the property only if the owner intermeddles with the work,
or if the owner creates or approves of a dangerous condition on the
property. Even though Champion did not attempt to take control of the
work performed by A & A, Mozee's estate argued that Champion ap-
proved of the dangerous condition in failing to give adequate warning.
However, the district court agreed with the trial judge, who concluded
that "under the circumstances Champion adequately informed the con-
tractor of the existence of electrical lines in the building and to assume
105. See, e.g., Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966).
106. Fitzgerald, 553 So. 2d at 709. Florida law seems to run contrary to that of
some other jurisdictions, noted by Judge Dell in his exhaustively researched dissent. Id.
at 709-12 (Dell, J., dissenting).
107. Mozee v. Champion Int'l Corp., 554 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
108. Id. at 596-97.
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that they were hot, and the contractor's supervisor knew of the exis-
tence of hot lines in the building and especially those lines [in the area
of the accident]. '"109 The appellate court affirmed the summary judg-
ment in favor of Champion.
2. Dangerous Exterior Conditions
I
In Sullivan v. Silver Palm Prop., Inc.," 0 the Florida Supreme
Court determined that the owner of property from which subterranean
roots protrude will incur no liability for damages from those roots. An
automobile went out of control on a bumpy road. Roots from Austra-
lian pine trees on Silver Palm's property caused the bumps in the road,
and a passenger in the car, Sullivan, sued Silver Palm for her injuries.
The trial court allowed the case against Silver Palm to reach the jury.
The Third District Court reversed, and the Florida Supreme Court,
hearing the case as a matter of great public interest, affirmed."' It
quoted extensively from the lower court's opinion, stressing the distinc-
tion between unobservable root growth and obvious danger from over-
hanging limbs and vision-obstructing shrubbery. The court noted that
Florida has now adopted a rule of law consistent with that of several
sister states.""
Unlike Sullivan, Dawson v. Ridgley"' presented the case of a
landowner maintaining an entrance to a public road in such a way that
a telephone pole partially obstructed the view of the road by exiting
motorists. In leaving the defendant's shopping center, motorists would
have their view of the street partially blocked by a concrete telephone
pole which did not lie on the property. Dawson, a passenger on a mo-
torcycle travelling on a public road adjacent to the shopping center,
suffered injuries in an accident caused by a car leaving the shopping
109. Id. at 598. Judge Smith, in dissent, felt the warning inadequate under the
circumstances, particularly because Champion's contact person "did not know the loca-
tion of the proper switch and ... made no effort to seek the assistance of other Cham-
pion personnel who did know." Id. at 599 (Smith, J., dissenting).
110. 558 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1990), aftg Silver Palm Prop., Inc. v. Sullivan, 541
So. 2d 624 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); see also Richmond, 1988 Tort Survey, supra
note 23, at 1270-71.
111. Sullivan, 558 So. 2d at 410. The question certified read as follows: "Does a
landowner have a duty to retard the subterranean root growth of trees which are lo-
cated adjacent to a public right of way?" Id.
112. See id. at 411.
113. 554 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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center and striking the motorcycle. The trial court granted the defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment, and the Third District Court of
Appeal affirmed." 4 Although the landowner might owe a duty of rea-
sonable care to business invitees, the duty does not extend to those
travelling along an adjacent public road. 115
In Aventura Mall Venture v. Olson,"' the Third District Court of
Appeal held that maintaining a normal sidewalk curb without painting
it to distinguish it from the adjacent roadway does not constitute an act
of negligence which would subject a landowner to liability to a business
invitee. Olson fell when stepping off a sidewalk curb adjacent to the
Aventura Mall. The mall had not painted the curb, and at trial Olson
introduced evidence that other malls in the same county with similar
curbs had painted the curbs yellow to warn of the difference in levels.
The jury found for Olson, but on appeal the Third District reversed." 7
Undeniably, a landowner owes a duty to business invitees to warn
them of latent or concealed dangers. On the other hand, a landowner
owes no duty to warn of an overt danger. Since nothing obstructed Ol-
son's view, the normal curb presented nothing more than a danger she
could have easily observed. As one early Florida case held, raised curbs
adjacent to sidewalks are a common instance of life in the United
States, and people should not need warning of their location.",8 The
Aventura Mall court reasoned that "[t]o hold that an ordinary side-
walk curb, without more, is inherently dangerous would make every
municipality and business establishment the virtual insurer of the
safety of every pedestrian. ' 19
As noted earlier,12 0 Florida courts have begun to hold that the act
of the plaintiff, while perhaps not serving as a defense to a cause of
action in negligence, will act as a superseding intervening cause to cut
off liability stemming from the defendant's negligence. This concept
also found its way into the jurisprudence of premises liability. In Ruiz
114. The court, however, reversed the summary judgment ir a suit brought
against Ridgley by the driver of the car which was leaving his property. The driver
"was, without dispute, a business invitee of the defendant landowner at the time of the
subject accident . . . ." Id. at 625.
115. Id. at 624-25.
116. 561 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
117. Id. at 319-20.
118. See Bowles v. Elkes Pontiac Co., 63 So. 2d 769, 772 (Fla. 1952).
119. Aventura Mall, 561 So. 2d at 321.
120. See supra text accompanying note 96.
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v. Westbrooke Lake T-Iomes, Inc.,121 a young boy, playing tag on a set
of monkey bars, jumped from one bar to another and broke his collar-
bone when he failed to catch the second bar. He sued the owner of the
property on which the monkey bars were situated, arguing negligence
in ma.intenance of the apparatus. The trial court granted the defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment, and the Third District Court of
Appeal affirmed. 22
The Ruiz court pointed out that cases from Florida and other ju-
risdictions consistently hold that where children suffer injuries from ob-
jects on real property, and they have acted in a way to misuse the ob-
jects, the owner of the property will incur no liability to them.
In other words, whatever negligence there may have been on the
part of the landowner, the negligence of the child superseded it and
became, as a matter of law, the proximate cause of the child's in-
jury. Applying this to Ruiz, although faulty maintenance was al-
leged, this is of no consequence, as the proximate cause of Dennis'
injuries was that of his own careless attempt to jump from the
monkey bar to the slide.123
Indeed, the court specifically points out that it adopts the causation
analysis to avoid the removal of the strict bar to recovery created by
Blackburn v. Dorta's abrogation of the defense of implied assumption
of risk.124
III. PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE
A. Medical Malpractice
Florida courts this past term turned their attention to when the
statute of limitations should begin to run in medical malpractice ac-
tions. The Florida Supreme Court noted that the statutory period com-
121. 559 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
122. Id. at 1173.
123. Id. at 1174. Of particular interest is the court's dicta indicating that "liabil-
ity will not lie where the child's own act, rather than an alleged insufficiency of super-
vision, is the sole cause of the injury." Id. (emphasis supplied). The court thus suggests
that the case may be taken from the jury even when the plaintiff might argue that, but
for the negligent supervision, the child would not have been allowed to act negligently.
124. Id. at 1174 n.1. Judge Jorgenson's dissent notes his belief that the causation
analysis is inappropriate in light of Blackburn v. Dorta. See id. at 1174 (Jorgenson, J.,
dissenting).
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mences when the plaintiff first knows either of the negligence of the
defendant or of the injury itself.125 Subsequent to an operation to re-
move polyps in his colon, Shapiro began to lose his eyesight. Less than
three months after the operation, in December of 1979, doctors diag-
nosed Shapiro as blind. In January, 1982, Shapiro received the opinion
of another physician that Dr. Barron, who removed the polyps, had
caused Shapiro's blindness when he neglected to give Shapiro antibiot-
ics prior to the operation. In late January of 1982, Shapiro sued Bar-
ron, who moved for summary judgment, arguing that Shapiro insti-
tuted the suit more than two years after the cause of action accrued.
1 26
The trial court granted the motion but the Fourth District Court of
Appeal reversed. 127 Accepting the case on conflict certiorari with its
earlier decision in Nardone v. Reynolds,'28 the Florida Supreme Court
reversed.
Nardone concerned an earlier, four-year, statute of limitations.
After a series of operations, a young boy left the hospital comatose,
blind, and with irreversible brain damage. More than four years later,
his parents sued for medical malpractice. The Florida Supreme Court
held the case time-barred. The plaintiff in Shapiro argued that the new
statute of limitations meant Nardone no longer governed. The court
disagreed. The consequences of surgery were immediately apparent,
and the plaintiff had constant and total access to all medical records.
As to the argument that the legislature's enactment of a new statute
meant Nardone was no longer good precedent, the court concluded:
While the current statute does not say that the cause of action oc-
curs at the time of the injury, neither did the statute under consid-
eration in Nardone. In fact, it could be argued that by using the
word "incident" the legislature envisioned that there would be
some factual circumstances in which the statute would begin to run
before either the negligence or the injury became known.129
125. Barron v. Shapiro, 565 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1990).
126. The statute in effect read: "An action for medical malpractice shall be com-
menced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or
within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered
with the exercise of due diligence. . . ." FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1979).
127. Shapiro v. Barron, 538 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
128. 333 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1976).
129. Barron, 565 So. 2d at 1321. Accord, Jackson v. Georgeopolous, 552 So. 2d
215 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989). Justice Shaw, however, dissented in Barron, as he
believed the term "incident" applied only to the negligent act and not to its conse-
quences as well. Barron, 565 So. 2d at 1322 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
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However, a First District Court of Appeal opinion pointed out that
regardless of when the statute should begin to run, the start can be
delayed if the physician in some way prevents the plaintiff from discov-
ering either the injury or its cause. 130 Dr. Drylie performed a surgical
procedure in October of 1982 to relieve Martin's urological problems.
Unfortunately, Martin had difficulty walking, which Drylie told her
was due to positioning of her body during surgery. Drylie assured her
the problems with her leg were temporary and she should suffer no
permanent injury as a result. In December of 1982, Martin's family
doctor told her Drylie was at fault for the problems With her leg, but
Martin continued to see Drylie until August of 1983, when a colleague
of Drylie's told her nothing further could be done for her leg. In March
of 1985, Martin sued Drylie for malpractice. Drylie moved for sum-
mary judgment, which the trial court granted. On appeal, the district
court reversed: "[A] fact issue was created when Dr. Drylie continued
to treat her and assure her that the condition of her leg was only tem-
porary and would presumably clear up with the passage of time."13'
B. Other Professions
As it did with medical malpractice, the Florida Supreme Court
considered a case involving the statute of limitations applicable to pro-
fessional negligence generally. 132 In an action for negligent preparation
of and advice regarding a tax return by an accountant, the plaintiff
brought suit more than two years from the date the Internal Revenue
Service issued a Notice of Deficiency, but less than two years from the
date of an order by the United States Tax Court determining the mat-
ter."' Believing that the statute of limitations began to run on the
same date as the Notice of Deficiency, the trial court granted the ac-
countant's motion for summary judgment. The Third District Court of
Appeal disagreed and reversed.13 4 On conflict certiorari, the Florida
130. Martin v. Drylie, 560 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
131. Id. at 1288. The court also disagreed with Drylie's contention that he
should have been granted summary judgment as an employee of the state at the time of
treating Martin. The court held that the case presented the factual issue of whether
Drylie was wearing two hats - state employee as a teaching physician and private
treating physician - and that the jury must determine which of the hats Drylie was
wearing when treating Martin.
132. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(a) (1983).
133. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane, 565 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1990).
134. Lane v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
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Supreme Court agreed that the statute did not begin to run until the
final order by the Tax Court.
Undeniably, the Lanes had reason to know of the malpractice by
their accountants at the time they received the I.R.S. notice. However,
in contesting the assessment of deficiency, the Lanes had to adopt the
position that the return in question was correct. If the statute of limita-
tions began to run when they received the notice, they would then have
to pursue their malpractice action at the same time they contested the
I.R.S. deficiency assessment. According to the Florida Supreme Court,
Such a course would have placed them in the wholly untenable po-
sition of having to take directly contrary positions in these two ac-
tions. In the tax court, the Lanes would be asserting that the de-
duction Peat Marwick advised them to take was proper, while they
would simultaneously argue in a circuit court malpractice action
that the deduction was unlawful and that Peat Marwick's advice
was malpractice. To require a party to dssert these two legally in-
consistent positions in order to maintain a cause of action for pro-
fessional malpractice is illogical and unjustified.135
The court seems to have created a conflict with its medical mal-
practice determination that the statute started running for medical
malpractice when the plaintiff knew either of the injury or of the negli-
gence. 13 6 However, the court adroitly avoided this conflict by noting
that the Lanes' action in prosecuting the appeal from the I.R.S. deter-
mination of deficiency meant they did not have notice of the negligence
of Peat, Marwick: "Until the tax court determination, both the Lanes
and Peat Marwick believed the accounting advice was correct; conse-
quently, there was no injury."'13 7
Like the Florida Supreme Court in First Florida Bank, 38 lower
Florida courts turned their attention to questions of privity in cases in-
volving professionals. The first of these, decided without the benefit of
the First Florida Bank decision, reached the same conclusion. Athans'
daughter, Nickitas, sought assistance of counsel to sell a parcel of land
App. 1989). The Third District Court of Appeal certified conflict with the Second Dis-
trict's opinion in Sawyer v. Earle, 541 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), cause
dismissed, 545 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1989).
135. Peat, Marwick, 565 So. 2d at 1326.
136. See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text.
137. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, & Co., 565 So. 2d at 1326.
138. 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990). See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
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which Athans owned.13 9 She retained James Soble, and Soble dealt ex-
clusively with her, although he knew that Athans owned the property.
Having found a buyer, Soble drafted a contract for sale of the prop-
erty, providing that notice to seller go to "Nicholas Athans c/o Irene J.
Nickitas," and providing for a deposit which Soble would retain as es-
crow agent. The buyer paid the deposit, but the sale fell through and
Soble lost the deposit. Athans sued Soble in a malpractice action to
recover the amount of the deposit, and Soble moved to dismiss the ac-
tion based on lack of privity. The trial court granted the motion, but
the Second District Court of Appeal reversed.
In his deposition, Soble admitted knowing Athans was the true
owner of the property. In any event, ample documentary evidence bol-
sters the conclusion that Soble knew Nickitas was acting for Athans.
Accordingly, "the legal services . . . rendered were on [Athans'] be-
half."' 40 The Second District Court thus seems to have avoided the is-
sue of privity by looking to traditional agency principles, although it
stops short of fully discussing the issue. Nickitas acted on Athans' be-
half in engaging Soble, and thus acted as Athans' agent. Since Soble
knew of Athans' true ownership of the property, and knew of the
agency between Nickitas and Athans, Athans as a disclosed principal
of Nickitas had every right to sue on the contract. 4'
The same concept that knowledge of the affected party will defeat
privity supports the Fourth District Court of Appeal per curiam opin-
ion in a legal malpractice case.' 42 Satchell prepared Rosenstone's will,
which allegedly did not adequately convey Rosenstone's wishes as to
the disposition of his property. Rosenstone's wife sued Satchell, claim-
ing alternatively that she was a client as well as her husband or that
Satchell knew that Rosenstone intended for her to benefit from the will.
The appellate court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the com-
plaint, noting that established law holds that "an attorney may be held
liable for breach of his duties to one who engages his services or to one
who he knows is the intended beneficiary.''143
139. Athans v. Soble, 553 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1-989).
140. Id. at 1362.
141. Id.
142. Rosenstone v. Satchell, 560 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
143. Id. at 1229-30 (emphasis supplied).
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IV. STRICT LIABILITY
A. Dangerous Activities and Instrumentalities
Florida courts have consistently adhered to the traditional rule of
Rylands v. Fletcher 14  and held owners of property strictly liable for
harm to adjacent property from non-normal usage of their own land.145
However, Florida courts have rarely received the opportunity to define
what will constitute a non-normal usage. In Midyette v. Madison,146
the Florida Supreme Court considered damage caused by smoke from a
deliberately-set brush fire which obscured vision on an adjacent public
highway. The trial court had granted the motion for summary judg-
ment of the landowner, Midyette, on the grounds that lie could not
incur vicarious liability for the acts of the independent contractor he
hired to clear his land. The First District Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that the independent contractor exception would not apply
where the principal hired the agent to perform an inherently dangerous
activity, and that burning brush was such an activity. 47 Granting cer-
tiorari to review a question of great public interest, the Supreme Court
of Florida affirmed.
The court initially determined that an activity is one of inherent
danger when, "[a]s is self-evident, all parties . . . are on notice as to its
dangerous propensities.' 48 Setting a fire constitutes a dangerous activ-
ity, and just as fire creates a danger from burning, so does it create a
danger from the smoke it engenders. Accordingly, Midyette had con-
tracted for an activity involving inherent danger, and was vicariously
liable for the automobile accident caused by the blowing smoke.'49
However, the court refused to hold that Midyette would have been
strictly liable for the burning. It needed to go no farther to impose
vicarious liability than to find that the smoke from the fire constituted
an inherent danger, much as an automobile is a dangerous instrumen-
tality. "[A] danger that is merely 'inherent' does not give rise to strict
144. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), 1861-1873 All E.R. 1.
145. See, e.g., Bunyak v. Yancey & Sons Dairy, Inc., 438 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1983). The Second District Court of Appeal held a dairy strictly liable
when a liquified manure pond overflowed to adjacent property, damaging existing crops
and future arability of the soil, in addition to causing other unpleasant results.
146. 559 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1990).
147. Madison v. Midyette, 541 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
148. Midyette, 559 So. 2d at 1128.
149. Id.
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liability."150 The court merely sent the case back to the trial court for a
determination of whether the person burning brush acted negligently.
If he did not, Midyette would not incur liability for his acts.15 1
Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court has again refused an op-
portunity to clarify what acts will expose a person to strict liability for
their consequences. It continues to elaborate on the middle ground of
"inherent" danger, however, and this may well lead to semantic confu-
sion. Acts of inherent danger expose the person instigating them to vi-
carious liability for the negligence of the actor, as the negligence of the
user of a dangerous instrumentality exposes the owner 152 to vicarious
liability to injured third parties.5 3
B. Animals
Floridians owning dogs may avoid statutorily-imposed liability for
harm their pets might cause by posting "bad dog" signs on their prop-
erty.154 Porter owned a junkyard, on which he maintained guard
dogs. 5 On the fence surrounding the yard he had posted four "Bad
Dog" signs immediately adjacent to the entrance gate. Registe, a Hai-
tian immigrant, could neither read nor speak English. He claims he
went to the junkyard, did not see the signs, and entered the yard. 56
Even if he had seen the signs, he would not have understood them.
Porter's dogs attacked and injured Registe, and he sued Porter. The
trial court grant Porter's motion for summary judgment. Registe ap-
150. Id. at 1128 n.2 (emphasis in original).
151. Id. at 1128 n.3.
152. The owner of a vehicle leased on a long-term basis, however, will not be
vicariously liable for the negligence of the user. See Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Almon,
559 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1990); Kottmeier v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 561 So.
2d 1366 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Folmar v. Young, 560 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Raynor v. De La Nuez, 558 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1990); Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 558 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1990).
153. The lower Florida courts were not silent in this area during the past year.
The Second District Court of Appeal added forklifts driven on a public highway to the
growing list of "dangerous instrumentalities," noting that if a golf cart belongs on the
list, so does "this larger, four-wheel vehicle with protruding steel tusks ... " Harding
v. Allen-Laux, Inc., 559 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
154. FLA. STAT. § 764.04 (1989).
155. Registe v. Porter, 557 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
156. The court noted that Porter's witnesses conclusively established "existence
of the visible, conspicuous signs surrounding [Porter's] junkyard." Id.
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pealed, and the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed.
The court held that where a sign clearly and prominently displays
the warning of the presence of a dog on premises, it satisfies the statu-
tory demands. 157 Although the Supreme Court of Florida has noted in
dicta that in a given case the plaintiff had actual notice of the presence
of a dog on property,158 the court has never actually held. the statute
demands the visitor to the property receive actual notice. According to
the court, the statute itself merely demands that the words posted be
"easily readable," and this means "[c]apable of being read easily; legi-
ble.' 1 59 Accordingly, the statute requires "a sign that is capable of be-
ing read and is not a requirement that any possible victim of a dog-bite
be 'capable of reading' the sign."' 60
The court did note the Fifth District Court of Appeal's earlier de-
cision in Flick v. Malino,'6' which held that a sign would not protect a
dog owner from a suit by a young child incapable of reading its lan-
guage. However, the court held the inability of a child to read the
words not analagous to the inability of an adult to comprehend the
words when conspicuously posted in English:
If that were the case . . it would force a return to the common
law to determine the respective rights and duties of the parties be-
cause no dog owner could be expected to post a sign in the particu-
lar language of every conceivable victim. We do not believe that to
have been the legislative intent.162
C. Products Liability
The Third District Court of Appeal determined that the manufac-
turer of a product does not incur strict liability for injuries to a worker
dismantling the product after its useful life has passed, even when the
product contains highly toxic materials.6 3 Westinghouse manufactured
transformers, using valuable metals as well as PCB's.6 4 Florida Power
157. Registe, 557 So. 2d at 215.
158. Belcher Yacht, Inc. v. Stickney, 450 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 1984).
159. Registe, 557 So. 2d at 216 (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New College Ed. 1979)).
160. Id. (emphasis in original).
161. 374 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
162. Registe, 557 So. 2d at 215-16.
163. High v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 559 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
164. PCB's, or "polychlorinated biphenyls," are highly toxic materials contained
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& Light purchased the transformers and at the end of their useful life
sold them to a scrap metal salvage dealer. His employee, High, disman-
tled the transformers, seeking to salvage the metals used by Westing-
house to make the transformers. In the course of dismantling, High
poured the liquid containing the PCB's on the ground and received in-
juries when the liquid came in contact with his body. High sued West-
inghouse, and the trial court granted Westinghouse's motion for sum-
mary judgment. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed.165
The court held that "[w]hile the transformers were sealed and in-
tact there was no harm. . . .Westinghouse's product as it had origi-
nally been sold to FP&L, for practical purposes, had ceased to exist at
the time the alleged injuries occurred. ' 166 Although the court might
have based its decision on the termination of the useful life of the prod-
uct, instead it chose to affirm the summary judgment "based upon a
substantial change in the product from the time it left the manufac-
turer's control .... ,,167 The defect accordingly stemmed from the
transformation of the product, rather than from its manufacture. In
resting its decision on these grounds, the court paid lip service to cases
from federal district courts holding that manufacturers could not fore-
see salvage operations which involved the dismantling of their prod-
ucts. 6 ' However, the court elected not to adopt foreseeability as its
ratio decidendi.
In Knox v. Delta International Machinery Corp.,' the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, in a per curiam decision, reiterated the rule that
manufacturers who supply their products with safety devices incur no
liability to those injured by the product after the device has been re-
moved, even though the manufacturer may not have warned against its
removal. Delta manufactured a jointer machine with a safety guard,
but the guard could be easily removed. It did not warn against removal
of the guard, and Knox used the machine after the guard had been
removed. Knox lost two fingers, and sued Delta. The trial court granted
Delta's motion for summary judgment, and the appellate court af-
firmed: "[A] manufacturer is, as a matter of law, under no duty to
within electrolytic fluids in the transformer. Id. at 229.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 228.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Kalik v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 658 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Pa. 1987);
Johnson v. Murph Metals, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 246 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
169. 554 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
1991] 1315
388
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/18
Nova Law Review
produce a fail-safe product, so long as the product poses no unreasona-
ble dangers for consumer use."' 170 The jointer machine, when it left
Delta's factory, was perfectly safe. Delta had no duty to prevent users
from removing those design elements which contributed to its safety.
V. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Over the years, Florida's protective attitude regarding causes of
action for emotional distress has consistently withstood numerous chal-
lenges. Most recently, with its decision in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v.
King,'' the Florida Supreme Court reiterated its commitment to al-
lowing damages for emotional distress not stemming from physical in-
jury only in restricted circumstances. Improper inspection and mainte-
nance caused engine failure on an Eastern flight on which King was a
passenger. Although at one point all three engines failed to operate and
the passengers prepared to ditch, the crew managed to restart one en-
gine and the plane limped to a safe landing. King sued Eastern, alleg-
ing reckless or intentional infliction of emotional distress and after
judgment for Eastern on the pleadings, the Third District 'Court of Ap-
peal reversed. 1 2 Accepting the case on conflict certiorari,7 3 the Florida
Supreme Court reversed.
Florida recognizes the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress as expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which re-
quires the defendant act in an "extreme and outrageous" manner
before liability will attach. 4 King's pleadings alleged Eastern's
mechanics had failed to discover a missing O-ring in the engines, which
caused them to fail. Additionally, King alleged that Eastern mechanics
had failed to discover missing O-rings on at least a dozen prior occa-
sions. However, as the court noted, these allegations at best amount to
claims of mere negligence. The court found that Eastern's conduct did
not rise to the level of outrageousness needed to support the tort
170. Id.
171. 557 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1990).
172. King v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 536 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1987).
173. The court noted conflict with Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467
So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1985), and Brown v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 468 So. 2d 903 (Fla.
1985).
174. "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional
distress .... " RSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
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claimed by King.'7 5
Chief Justice Ehrlich, in his concurring opinion, noted that King's
complaint did not even allege adequate facts to support a cause of ac-
tion for negligent infliction of emotional distress.1 76 Although Florida
no longer limits recovery for the tort to those instances in which the
distress accompanies physical impact, the plaintiff seeking to recover
must still demonstrate "a clearly demonstrable physical impairment
[accompanies] or occur[s] within a short time after the negligently in-
flicted psychic injury.' 7 7 King failed to demonstrate either impact or
resulting physical harm.
Also noteworthy is Justice Barkett's brief concurrence:
I concur in the Court's judgment that prior decisions would bar
relief for the intentional infliction of mental distress in this case. I
believe, however, that persons who have suffered great mental
anguish through the extreme negligence of a tortfeasor, such as
Eastern's in this case, should be permitted a remedy. 1 8
VI. CONCLUSION
As noted last year,7 9 the Florida Supreme Court continues on a
relatively even keel, favoring on an overall basis neither defendants nor
plaintiffs. During the past year, however, Florida judges have shown an
increasing distaste for awarding damages to litigants who, having vol-
untarily placed themselves in existing positions of danger, seek to re-
cover damages from those who created the danger. Blocked by prece-
dent from dismissing these claims based on the defense of assumption
of risk, Florida courts at all levels have instead viewed the actions of
the plaintiffs as the single effective cause of their harm. Accordingly,
they have found as a matter of law that the negligence of the defendant
did not cause the injuries of which the plaintiff complains.
In this instance, what seems an end run around an unworkable
rule instead mirrors the philosophy underlying tort law. Plaintiffs re-
cover from others for their injuries only because the others have acted
175. King, 557 So. 2d at 578.
176. Id. at 579 (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring).
177. Id. (citations omitted).
178. Id. at 580 (Barkett, J., concurring).
179. Richmond, 1989 Survey of Florida Law: Torts, 14 NOVA L. REV. 965, 992-
93 (1990).
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in a socially irresponsible manner, and because the irresponsibility has
led directly to the harm the plaintiffs have suffered. Danger caused by
irresponsibility does not produce harm to people when they have recog-
nized the danger and, confronting it without compulsion, suffered the
type of harm they could have anticipated the danger would produce.
The irresponsibility has done no more than give people the potential for
harming themselves, and in this light, courts cannot fairly expect one
who merely establishes a potential for voluntary injury to recompense
those who willingly take the risk of harm on themselves.
The stand of Florida courts on this issue underlies a more signifi-
cant truth about the development of Florida tort law. Although at
times courts in our state may seek to bend the fabric of the law in an
effort to award damages to an injured person,8 0 the law will ultimately
spring back to comport with its underlying theory. This resilience
shows that Florida courts have maintained a keen sense of the theory of
law, even when the equities of the case might seem to militate other-
wise. Unfortunately, as an English jurist noted years ago, "[h]ard
cases, it has been frequently observed, are apt to introduce bad law."''
Fortunately, Florida's courts have continued to resist the temptation to
alter the law to permit unjustified recovery in the isolated case.
180. See, e.g., King, 557 So. 2d at 580 (Barkett, J., concurring), discussed supra
note 178 and accompanying text.
181. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
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The Financial Provisions of Florida's New Business
Corporation Act-The Model Act with Anti-Takeover
Twists
David S. Felman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Effective July 1, 1990, the Florida Legislature revamped Florida's
corporate law by enacting the Florida Business Corporation Act.' Ex-
cept for provisions concerning foreign corporations doing business in
Florida, the Act generally applies only to corporations incorporated in
Florida.2 The Act repeals the Florida General Corporation Act,3 and
with significant exceptions, adopts the Revised Model Business Corpo-
ration Act.4 This article addresses the financial provisions in chapter VI
* B.A., Wake Forest University, 1979; J.D., Duke University School of Law,
1982; partner, Glenn, Rasmussen, Fogarty, Merryday & Russo, Tampa, Florida. The
author co-chaired the committee of The Florida Bar responsible for drafting proposed
technical amendments to the Business Corporations Act that are now pending in the
Florida Legislature.
The author gratefully acknowledges the suggestions and assistance of Bob Ras-
mussen, Sharon Docherty, and Betty Atkins of his firm, and Professors Stuart Cohn of
the University of Florida School of Law and Marleen O'Connor of the Stetson Univer-
sity School of Law. He appreciates the encouragement of Professor Marilyn Cane of
the Nova University, Shepard Broad Law Center, who was the moving force behind
this article.
1. Florida General Corporation Act, 1991 Fla. Laws 154, (codified as amended
at FLA. STAT. § 607 (1990)) [hereinafter the Act]. The Act arose from a proposal
prepared by a subcommittee of the Corporations and Securities Committee of The
Florida Bar chaired by Thomas R. McGuigan of Steel, Hector & Davis and Stuart D.
Ames of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, which was enacted with few modifications. In 1990,
before it became effective, the Act was amended for technical corrections. See 1990
Fla. Laws 179.
2. One exception to this general rule is section 607.0902, the control shares ac-
quisitions statute, which covers some corporations that have their principal office or
place of business in Florida but are not necessarily incorporated in Florida. See FLA.
STAT. § 607.0902 (1990).
3. FLA. STAT. § 607 (1989) (repealed 1990) (generally referred to as the "prior"
or "former" law).
4. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT (1984) [hereinafter RMBCA]. The
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of the Act-those governing capital structure, issuances of equity se-
curities, and distributions.5
The Act's financial provisions principally are set forth in sections
607.0601 through 607.06401.8 These provisions are a credit to the
Act's drafters and the drafters of sections 6.01 through 6.40 of the
RMBCA, on which they are based, because they are more simple, logi-
cal, and flexible, and better attuned to commercial and economic real-
ity than the former law.7 The Act scraps complex, cumbersome, and
unnecessary concepts and limitations of the former law, adopts current
scholarly thoughts on corporate capital structure, and brings Florida
the benefits of conforming to the RMBCA, which is likely to be widely
adopted among the states. One commentator notes the benefits of
adopting the RMBCA as follows:
The advantages of following the national model are obvious. The
provisions have been thoroughly considered by a number of very
prominent practitioners and scholars. The Official Comments to
each section of the Model Act should serve as a guide to the inter-
RMBCA reflects a complete revision of the Model Business Corporation Act developed
over a five-year period by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corpora-
tion, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association and completed in
1984. The RMBCA is "designed to be a convenient guide for revision of state business
corporation statutes, reflecting current views as to the appropriate accommodation of
various commercial and societal interests involved in modern business corporations."
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. xxiii (1990) [hereinafter MBCAA].
This article occasionally refers to the official comment that accompanies the
RMBCA (the "official comment") and to the commentary to the Act that was pre-
pared by its drafters. The official comment is set forth in the MBCAA, supra, and the
drafters' commentary on the Act are compiled in T. O'BRIEN, FLORIDA LAW OF COR-
PORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (1990).
5. To limit its scope and length, this article does not address in detail the follow-
ing matters that the author considered more or less peripheral to the principal subjects:
fractional shares, subscriptions for shares, shareholders' preemptive rights, restrictions
on transfers of shares, form and content of certificates, share voting rights (including
voting groups), and directors' fiduciary duties in connection with the cerporation's issu-
ance and its repurchase of shares. This article also generally does not address other
state and federal laws that apply to these matters, such as the laws governing the sale
of securities and the corporation's repurchase of its securities.
6. FLA. STAT. § 607.0601-.06401 (1990).
7. Persons following the federal tax "simplification" efforts of the 1980's might
be skeptical, but please continue reading. Except for section 6.22, which is based on the
former law and concerns shareholders' liability for shares issued before payment, the
Act generally adopts the RMBCA, supra note 4. As discussed in this article, the Act
modifies those provisions in some respects.
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pretation of the Revised Statute's provisions. The evolving case law
from jurisdictions having substantially the same provisions can be
persuasive authority in the interpretation and application of the
Revised Statute."
The Act also facilitates the adoption of anti-takeover measures by Flor-
ida corporations. Corporations considering Florida incorporation should
evaluate the Act favorably.
The changes affecting the financial provisions that are discussed in
this article were part of revolutionary amendments to the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act made in 1980 and 1984.1 In particular, these
amendments: (a) eliminated the established concepts of par value,
stated capital, and treasury shares; (b) eliminated limitations on ac-
ceptable consideration for sales of shares; (c) eliminated specific refer-
ences to "common" and "preferred" shares in recognition of the blur-
ring between those types of shares that has occurred in the market
place; and (d) adopted uniform rules governing all transactions in
which consideration is paid to shareholders with respect to their shares,
called distributions. The objectives of most of the changes were to elim-
inate obsolete and ineffective restrictions, and to allow the corporation,
its creditors, and shareholders to freely determine their relationship
through negotiation and contract. This article analyzes these and other
more subtle changes, their policy underpinnings and practical implica-
tions, and several omissions and inconsistencies in the financial provi-
sions of the Act that are proposed for revision in a bill pending before
the Florida Legislature.
Although the Act's financial provisions are derived from the
RMBCA, the provisions actually enacted by the Florida Legislature in
the Act vary in significant respects from the RMBCA. The most im-
portant substantive variances are in section 607.0601(1) and section
607.0624(2). Section 607.0601(1) omits a sentence requiring that all
shares of a class be granted equal rights, limitations, and preferences,
except for variations caused by series. 10 Section 607.0624(2) confirms
8. Murphy, The New Virginia Stock Corporation Act: A Primer, 20 U. RICH. L.
REV. 67 (1985).
9. The premier authority on the legal guidelines governing corporate capital
structures observes that following these changes, the new law "is substantially at vari-
ance with the learning that today's judges and practitioners gained when they were in
law school." Manning, Assets In and Assets Out: Chapter VI of the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1527 (1985).
10. FLA. STAT. § 607.0601(l) (1990).
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the validity of poison pill devices involving rights that discriminate
against persons acquiring more than a certain number of shares."1 Both
modifications facilitate use of anti-takeover defenses.
II. WHAT'S AVAILABLE ON THE SHELF-AUTHORIZED SHARES
AND BLANK CHECK AUTHORIZATION (SECTION 607.0601 AND
SECTION 607.0602)
Authorized shares are the shares of all classes that the corporation
is authorized to issue as set forth in its articles of incorporation. 2 The
Act generally requires that shareholders approve amendments to the
articles of incorporation that increase the number of authorized shares
or change the terms of any shares that have been issued. 13 Conse-
quently, authorized shares are the limit of what is available "on the
shelf" for directors to issue to raise capital for the corporation.' 4 The
number and terms of authorized shares vitally concern shareholders be-
cause each authorized share represents potential dilution of their inter-
ests in the corporation (voting, dividends, liquidation rights) and will
reduce their share value if earnings from the capital raised do not offset
the increase in the number of shares.
Section 607.0601 prescribes what may be in the articles of incor-
poration concerning authorized shares.' 5 Section 607.0602 permits a
corporation to delegate to the board of directors authority to establish
the terms of classes and series of shares before they are issued.' 6
A. Authorized Shares (Section 607.0601)
Following the precepts of the RMBCA, the Act does not limit
rights, preferences, and limitations that the corporation may specify for
its shares, except in the one respect discussed below, and except for
11. Id. at § 607.0624(2).
12. Id. at § 607.0601(2).
13. See id. at § 607.1004(1).
14. See id. at §§ 607.0601, .0621. The one exception to this rule is an amend-
ment to increase the corporation's authorized shares to accommodate a stock split or
stock dividend if the corporation has only one class of stock outstanding. Id. at §
607.1002(5).
15. FLA. STAT. § 607.0601 (1990). Section 607.0202 generally specifies all mat-
ters to be covered by the articles, including authorized shares while section 607.0601
concerns only authorized shares. See id. at §§ 607.0202, .0601.
16. Id. at § 607.0602.
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provisions that are inconsistent with other provisions of the Act.I" Sec-
tion 607.0601 allows the corporation and its shareholders to freely
* agree on all the terms of the corporation's capital stock.' 8 These terms
include voting fights, redemption and conversion rights (at any person's
option), shareholder distributions, and relative preferences among clas-
ses with respect to distributions." The official comment calls the terms
on this list the "principal features that are customarily incorporated
into classes of shares."20 The official comment also sets forth illustra-
tive examples of "innovative" classes of shares that are permitted by
the RMBCA, including classes authorized to elect a specified number
of directors, classes entitled to vote as a separate voting group on'cer-
tain transactions, variations of voting rights among shares (including
nonvoting, fractional, and multiple votes per share), and variations
among classes in dividend rights and rights on dissolution. 21 To cover
terms that they might have missed and to encourage market innova-
tion, the drafters add for good measure in subsection four that this list
"is not exhaustive. '22 The Act specifically does not limit a corporation's
ability to differentiate among classes with respect to voting rights,
clearly authorizing nonvoting shares and shares with fractional or mul-
tiple voting rights.23 However, other regulations, such as stock ex-
change requirements, might restrict a corporation's discretion in this
respect.24
17. An example of a provision that would be inconsistent with other provisions of
the Act is the elimination of the voting protections to which all shares are entitled
pursuant to Florida Statutes section 607.1004 (1990).
18. Id. at § 607.0601.
19. Id. at § 607.0601(1), (3).
20. MBCAA, supra note 4, at 357.
21. Id. at 360.
22. Id.
23. FLA. STAT. § 607.0601 (1990). Section 607.0601(3)(a), concerning voting
rights provisions, states that the articles of incorporation may authorize shares that
"[h]ave special, conditional, or limited voting rights, or no rights, or'no right to vote,
except to the extent prohibited by this act . . . ." Id. at § 607.0601(3)(a) (emphasis
added). The emphasized language was added in error to text taken from section
6.01(c) of the RMBCA, supra note 4, and is proposed for deletion pursuant to the
Second Corrections Bill, because shares with "no rights" are worthless. Authorization
to issue shares with no voting rights is covered by the next clause, "or no right to vote."
Id.
24. See, e.g., NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §
313.00 (1990) (generally requiring that an exchange listed issuer not have a class of
shares with voting rights not in proportion to the class equity interests).
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Section 607.0601 is basically enabling rather than restrictive.25
The Act recognizes that each corporation and its shareholders face
their own unique financial and control circumstances and should be
permitted to structure the corporation's capital structure 'to accommo-
date those particular circumstances. Implicitly, the Act completes the
shift in emphasis away from restrictive and protective corporate stat-
utes to reliance on the following elements:
(a)the interest and sophistication of informed parties to the secur-
ity purchase transaction in vigorously defending their own interests;
(b)full disclosure requirements and anti-fraud rules mandated by
the state and federal securities laws, to ensure that the buyer is com-
pletely and accurately informed before it makes the purchase and that
the transaction itself is not subject to manipulation by the issuer; and
(c)fiduciary duties of directors that require them to act reasonably
and in good faith, especially in transactions in which they are inter-
ested, which involve the greatest potential for abuse.
The Act completes the deregulation of corporate law governing the
specifications of capital stock.
Practically, this new law concerning authorized shares is not revo-
lutionary, because the former law permitted most types of equity secur-
ities, either expressly or implicitly. The Act more clearly welcomes in-
novation, and permits some kinds of equity and hybrid securities which
had unclear status under the former law.2" Section 607.0601(2) im-
25. See FLA. STAT. § 607.0601 (1990) (emphasis added).
26. By implication, the former law provided broad authorization to the corpora-
tion to issue shares with a wide range of attributes. Under this former law, FLA. STAT.
§ 607.044(1) (1989) (repealed 1990) provided that "shares may be divided into one or
more classes, any or all of which may consist of shares . . . with such designations,
preferences, limitations, and relative rights as shall be stated in the articles of incorpo-
ration." Subsection two of this section listed permitted terms for "special and pre-
ferred" classes of shares, but prefaced the list by stating that it did not limit the fore-
going general authority of section 607.044(1). Id. at § 607.044(2). By implication,
section 607.044(1) granted the corporation broad plenary authority to create a wide
range of equity securities. The corporation's plenary authority under the Act is con-
firmed more clearly, however, with the "not exhaustive" provision in section
607.0601(4). See FLA. STAT. § 607.0601(4) (1990).
The former law listed specifically permitted terms for "special and preferred
shares" but left unclear whether common shares could be subject to those terms. FLA.
STAT. § 607.044(2) (1989) (repealed 1990). Whether the term "special" classes in-
cluded common shares was unclear, because that term was not defined. The former law
did not expressly address whether common shares could be redeemed by the corpora-
tion. Also, unlike the Act, the former law did not expressly permit (a) shares converti-
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poses a blanket limitation that was not expressly established under the
former law.17 The corporation must authorize one or more classes of
shares that together have unlimited voting rights and one or more
shares that together have rights to the net assets of the corporation
upon dissolution. These attributes are associated with traditional com-
mon stock.
Unlike corporate law in many states, the Act does not restrict the
corporation from: (a) creating shares that are convertible at the share-
holder's option into cash (shares with a "put option"), into other classes
of shares that have preferential financial rights, or into debt securities
of a corporation (shares with "upstream" conversion privileges); or (b)
creating a class of voting shares without preferential financial rights
that is callable by the corporation (redeemable common shares) 28 The
official comment to section 6.01 of the RMBCA reasons that this
change has little practical effect because the corporation and its share-
holders generally could agree separately in a buy-sell agreement to re-
demption of the shares at either person's option.2
An upstream conversion feature eliminates the permanence associ-
ated with common shares that favors the corporation. Because the
ble into debt or debt convertible into shares, or (b) shares subject to conversion or
redemption at the option of a third person or on the occurrence of a designated event.
Finally, the blank check provision of the former law, section 607.047, limited to a list
the particular terms that could be the subject of variations between series, but its coun-
terpart in the Act, section 607.0602(1), refers back to the relatively unlimited provi-
sions of section 607.0601 of the Act.
27. FLA. STAT. § 607.0601(2) (1990).
28. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.01 (official comment). The former law ex-
pressly permitted conversions of "preferred or special classes" to any other class of
shares and redemption of "preferred or special classes" at the shareholder or corpora-
tion's option, but did not expressly address redeemable or puttable common stock. See
FLA. STAT. § 607.044(2).
29. The comment states: "If it is possible to create what is essentially a callable
voting share by agreement, there is no reason why such provisions should not be built
directly and publicly into the capital structure of the corporation if that is desired."
RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.01 (official comment). In Florida, this statement might
understate the practical effect of the change, because nothing in the former law ex-
pressly addressed the enforceability of an agreement granting the corporation a right to
call its common stock in the absence of a proposed transfer by the shareholder. Even
section 607.0627, which was added by the Act and governs agreements restricting a
shareholder's right to transfer his shares, does not expressly state that an agreement
between the corporation and its shareholder may authorize the corporation to simply
call its common shares, even if the shareholder does not initiate a transfer. See FLA.
STAT. § 607.0627 (1990).
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holder might cash out or convert to a relatively more senior security
when the corporation's prospects dim and the corporation most needs
cash or equity. Conversely, by agreeing to redemption at the corpora-
tion's option, the common shareholder forfeits the relatively permanent
nature of his interest in the corporation and the prospect of benefitting
to an unlimited extent from future value appreciation. Even without
redemption provisions, the shareholder might be squeezed out by a
merger, reverse stock split or similar event, but these are extraordinary
events and typically invoke dissenters' rights. The Act permits the com-
mon shareholder to agree in advance to redemption of his shares pre-
cisely when the corporation's prospects become favorable, although the
corporation's exercise of power to redeem common stock might be re-
stricted by securities laws or fiduciary duty principles.3 0
The Act permits creation of "hybrid securities" that have mixed
debt and equity attributes, for example, convertible debt (debt to eq-
uity or equity to debt) and debt that is entitled to participate in earn-
ings or dividends. 3 1 However, the official comment to section 6.01 of
the RMBCA states that only securities characterized as "shares" may
be given the right to vote.32 Therefore, a corporation could not issue a
debt security that entitles the holder to vote on a default, although a
debt security that is convertible into an equity security on default is
permitted.
The RMBCA does not generally define or use the terms "com-
mon" and "preferred" stock. The official comment explains this policy
decision:
Traditional corporation statutes work from a perceived inheritance
of concepts of "common shares" and "preferred shares" that at one
time may have had considerable meaning but that today often do
not involve significant distinctions. It is possible under modern cor-
30. See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947) (control-
ling shareholder breached fiduciary duty by causing directors to redeem minority
shareholders' stock following a rise in the market value of raw materials manufactured
by the corporation); Green v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 437 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(redemption constitutes "purchase" for purposes of section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 thereunder); Tillis v. United Parts, Inc., 395 So.
2d 618 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (majority shareholder and corporation breached
fiduciary duty to minority shareholders by purchasing majority shareholders' shares at
a premium); see generally Note, Partial and Selective Reacquisitions of Corporate
Securities, 15 CAL. W.L. REv. 264 (1979).
31. FLA. STAT. § 607.0601(3)(b) (1990).
32. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.01.
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poration statutes to create classes of "common" shares that have
important preferential rights and classes of "preferred" shares that
are subordinate in all important economic aspects or that are indis-
tinguishable from common shares in either voting rights or entitle-
ment to participate in the assets of the corporation upon dissolu-
tion. The [RMBCA] breaks away from the inherited concepts of
"common" and "preferred" shares and develops more general lan-
guage to reflect the actual flexibility in the creation of classes of
shares that exists in modern corporate practice.33
The former law did not define those terms or expressly refer to common
and preferred shares in describing share attributes, so this change is
not revolutionary in Florida. 4 In a slight variance from the RMBCA,
the Act still uses these terms in one confusing reference in section
607.0202, discussed below,35 and in the following sentence of section
607.0601(5): "Shares which are entitled to preference in the distribu-
tion of dividends or assets shall not be designated as common shares,
shares which are not entitled to preference in the distribution of divi-
dends or assets shall be common shares and shall not be designated as
preferred shares."36 This text was derived from the former law, section
607.044(4)," not from the RMBCA. Apparently, the Act's drafters
were not willing to rely on federal and state securities laws to deter
misleading characterizations of common and preferred stock.
The elimination of statutory definitions of share rights causes the
share descriptions in the articles of incorporation to assume great im-
portance. These descriptions constitute the shareholders' "contract"
with respect to their shares.3 " The official comment states that in some
limited circumstances, shares still may be described simply.3 9 A capital
structure consisting of only a single class of "common shares" may be
described as such; all voting and residual equity financial interests will
vest in that class, without further delineation. Additionally, for a capi-
tal structure consisting of two classes, one with a liquidation prefer-
ence, "it is necessary to specify only the preferential liquidation rights
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 607.097, .137 (1989) (repealed 1990) (voting and
dividends, respectively).
35. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
36. FLA. STAT. § 607.0601(5) (1990).
37. FLA. STAT. § 607.044(4) (1989) (repealed 1990).
38. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.01 (official comment).
39. Id.
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of that class; in the absence of a contrary provision in the articles, the
remaining class would be entitled to receive the net assets remaining
after the liquidation preference has been satisfied. 4 ° Otherwise, all
preferences and special rights of shares should be well described, be-
cause those rights are not spelled out in the Act and exist only to the
extent specifically stated in the articles of incorporation. 41 Each class
must be given a "distinguishing designation," for example, "nonvoting
common shares" or "class A preferred shares."
In section 607.0601, the Act varies from the RMBCA by omitting
the following sentence: "All shares of a class must have preferences,
limitations, and relative rights identical with those of other shares of
the same class except to the extent otherwise permitted by section
6.02. "142 The purpose of omitting this sentence was to facilitate anti-
takeover measures that involve securities discriminating against hostile
bidders, but its omission leaves a gap. Generally, the RM BCA contem-
plates uniformity of share attributes within the class except for varia-
tions between series within the class. The omission of the sentence,
however, permits the corporation to vary the rights, preferences, and
limitations of shares within a class, even if the corporation does not use
series. The Act does provide in section 607.0602(3) that each share of
a series be identical and that it be identical with the other shares of the
class, except to the extent distinguished by the terms of the series.
However, this provision would not apply if the corporation does not
have series.
The omission of the foregoing sentence supports the conclusion
that corporations may vary share attributes within classes without us-
ing series. This raises several issues. Did the drafters of the Act con-
template that a corporation might issue numerous shares within a sin-
gle class, each share with different rights, preferences, and limitations?
Why should a corporation use series at all, if it can otherwise establish
shares with variable rights within the class? Does not the RMBCA's
scheme contemplate that variations within a class will take the form of
series? What unintended results might follow from tinkering with this
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Judah v. Delaware Trust Co., 378 A.2d 624 (Del. 1977) (the provi-
sions of the articles of incorporation control the rights of preferred shareholders, and
those shares have only those rights granted or provided in the articles); see generally
Buxbaum, Preferred Stock-Law and Draftsmanship, 42 CAL. L. REx'. 243 (1954) (an
excellent discussion of drafting points for preparation of preferred stock provisions).
42. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.01.
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traditional scheme of classes with uniform share attributes? Might the
new scheme facilitate new, as yet unseen, versions of the poison pill?
For example, a corporation seemingly may provide in its articles that
any shareholder owning more than a certain number of shares auto-
matically loses the benefits of its share ownership, including voting
rights, dividends, and liquidation rights. This discrimination among the
holders of shares (not just rights or options as contemplated by section
607.0624(2)) of a single class might be considered authorized by the
Act.43
B. Blank Check Authority (Section 607.0602)
Section 607.0602 confirms that the articles of incorporation may
give "blank check" authority to the board of directors to determine the
preferences, limitations, and relative rights of any class or series of
shares before the shares are issued.44 The Act provides for extension of
blank check authority to common shares as well as preferred. The for-
mer law referred only to designations of "preferred" and "special"
shares, and left unclear whether "special" classes included common
shares.4 5 The Act also permits extension of blank check authority to
43. The drafters' commentary to section 607.0601 does not address these issues.
See FLA. STAT. § 607.0601 (1990). The commentary states, briefly and incorrectly, that
the proposed provision does not differ materially from the former law. The former law
provided for equality among the shares of a class, as follows: "[A]lI shares of the same
class shall be identical except as to the following relative rights and preferences, as to
which there may be variations between different series. . . ." FLA. STAT. § 607.047(1)
(1989) (repealed 1990). Professor Stuart Cohn, a member of the drafting committee,
told the author that the modification omitting the share equality sentence occurred
after preparation of the commentary.
Other states adopting the RMBCA have not adopted this modification. See, e.g.,
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-27-601A (1989); CAL. CORP. CODE § 400(b) (1989); GA. CODE
ANN. § 14-2-601(a) (1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-25-1(a) (1989); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 271B.6-010(l) (1989); MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-6.01(a) (1972); OR. REV.
STAT. § 60.131(1) (1989); S.C. CODE § 33-6-101(a) (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-
16-101(a) (1989); VA. CODE § 13.1-638A (1950).
44. FLA. STAT. § 607.0602 (1990). Before issuing blank check shares, the corpo-
ration must deliver to the Department of State "articles of amendment" to the articles
of incorporation that set forth the terms of the class or series of shares and become part
of the corporation's articles of incorporation. Once shares of the class or series are
issued, the terms can be changed only with shareholder approval. Id. at §
607.1004(1)(d). Conversely, the terms may be changed without shareholder approval
before the shares are issued. Id. at § 607.0602(1).
45. FLA. STAT. § 607.047.
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classes. Prior law permitted authorization of the directors to establish
the terms of series only. The Act's intent on these matters is clear,
although the Act mistakenly retains vestiges of the former law in sec-
tion 607.0202(1)(d) and (e) that seem to contemplate limiting blank
check authority to series and to "preferred" and "special" shares.46
46. FLA. STAT. § 607.0202(1)(d), (e) (1990). The drafters added potentially con-
fusing language in section 607.0202(1), which provides in part:
"The articles of incorporation must set forth: . . .
(d) If the shares are to be divided into classes, the designation of each
class and the statement of the preferences, limitations, and relative rights
in respect of the shares of each class; . . . [and]
(e) If the corporation is to issue the shares of any preferred or special class
in series, the designation of each series and a statement of the variations in
the relative rights and preferences as between series insofar as the same
are to be fixed in the articles of incorporation and a statement of any au-
thority to be vested in the board of directors to establish series and fix and
determine the variations in the relative rights and preferences between se-
ries ....
Id. at § 607.0202(1) (Section 607.0202 is derived from section 2.02 of the RMBCA,
supra note 4, except for these subsections, and section 607.0202(0), concerning preemp-
tive rights, which were added by the Act.). The quoted text is confusing because it is
derived from the former law, which allowed blank check provisions for series, but not
classes. Part (d) does not clarify that in some cases terms of classes might not be
established when the articles are initially filed. This language might confuse, because it
seems to require that the articles initially spell out the terms of each class, rather than
leaving them for future determination by the board of directors. Compare section
607.0601(1) (derived from the RMBCA) which states as follows: "If more than one
class of shares is authorized, the articles of incorporation must prescribe a distinguish-
ing designation for each class, and prior to the issuance of shares of a class, the pref-
erences, limitations and relative rights of that class must be described in the articles of
incorporation. Id. at § 607.0601(1) (emphasis added). This language clarifies that only
the class designation initially must be stated in the articles and that specification of the
terms of each class can be reserved for later determination pursuant to blank check
power, to be evidenced by articles of amendment filed before issuance. Section
607.0202(1)(d) also does not refer to any requirement that the terms of series must be
described in the articles of incorporation, even though similar to classes, their terms
eventually must be described in an amendment to the articles. Id. at § 607.0202(l)(d).
Part (e) furthers this confusion by referring to the delegation to the board of au-
thority to "establish series and fix and determine the variations in the relative rights
and preferences between series." Id. at § 607.0202(1)(e). This subsection does not refer
to blank check authority for classes, again inconsistently with section 607.0602, which
grants authority to directors to establish the terms of not only series but also of classes.
Also, subsection (e) refers to blank check provisions for "preferred and special series,"
reintroducing language of the former law that left unclear whether blank check author-
ity could be extended to common shares. The Second Corrections Bill proposes deletion
of parts (d) and (e), which would eliminate the inconsistencies and make section
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This change probably will have little practical significance because
classes and series are not inherently different, and the board of direc-
tors may do little more with blank check classes than with blank check
series.47 A series is simply a subset of a class, but with the same poten-
tial attributes. An exception is the requirement in Florida that shares
of the same series be identical, but apparently not shares of the same
class.
Blank check authority historically has served two important pur-
poses: to enhance capital-raising efforts; and to facilitate adoption of
anti-takeover measures. For its capital-raising efforts, the board of di-
rectors receives- broad and instant flexibility to determine share attrib-
utes without prior shareholder approval. This flexibility facilitates
transactions that involve last-minute negotiations between the issuer
and share purchasers concerning the securities' attributes.
Blank check authority enables the issuer to quickly take advantage
of favorable changes in market variables such as stock prices, interest
rates, and currency trading rates. Typically, the class of shares is de-
scribed in the articles with key market-dependant economic terms left
open. The terms of each series within the class are determined accord-
ing to market conditions when shares of the series are issued. For ex-
ample, the market-dependant terms of a series of preferred stock might
include the dividend rate (variable or fixed-if variable, the formula
for determination), timing for payment of dividends, conversion and re-
demption rights, and special voting rights. Generally, all shares of the
series are issued concurrently, because changes in market conditions
quickly make the these market-dependant terms obsolete.
Existing shareholders might be concerned with the potential dilu-
tive effect of blank check shares on their shares. Each existing share-
holder must rely on the good business judgment of the corporation's
directors not to issue shares on more favorable terms, and then only to
suit real capital needs. In normal circumstances (no self dealing or in-
terest in the transaction), the business judgment rule will insulate di-
rectors from shareholder challenges to their actions in issuing blank
check shares. Therefore, shareholders might desire to restrict directors'
607.0202(1) basically consistent with the RMBCA, supra note 4.
47. Manning, supra note 9, at 1532. The official comment to section 6.02 of the
RMBCA states: "This section recognizes that in some contexts there is no substantive
difference between a 'class' and a 'series within a class', and that the labels are often a
matter of convenience." RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.02 (official comment).
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blank check authority by negotiating restrictions on that authority as
part of their purchase of shares.
III. SHARE OPTIONS (SECTION 607.0624)
Section 607.0624(1) of the Act conforms to section 6.24 of the
RMBCA, and confirms that, unless otherwise provided in its articles of
incorporation, the corporation may issue rights, options, and warrants
for the purchase of its shares.4 The directors establish the terms of
these securities and the consideration for which the underlying shares
are issued. Generally, shareholder approval is not required.4 9
Section 607.0624(2) expressly permits a corporation to impose
conditions or restrictions that deprive specified persons of the options'
benefit, including "persons owning or offering to acquire a specified
number or percentage of the outstanding common shares or other se-
curities of the corporation . . ."I' This provision carries over the pro-
visions of former law, section 607.058, 51 authorizing poison pill rights
plans that discriminate against persons acquiring or threatening to ac-
quire the corporation's shares.
IV. A SPECIAL APPLICATION-POISON PILL PLANS
In recent years, statutes similar to section 607.0602 (blank check
authorization) and section 607.0624 (share options) have been used by
corporations to implement "poison pill" or "shareholder rights" plans
without prior shareholder approval, to the dismay of many institutional
investors.52 The Act includes provisions that are designed to facilitate
these plans and to avoid challenges based on grounds that have been
48. FLA. STAT. § 607.0624(l) (1990).
49. Shareholder approval may be obtained as a discretionary matter, to comply
with listing requirements, see NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MAN-
UAL § 309.00 (1990), or to obtain the benefits of federal law conditioned on share-
holder approval, see S.E.C. Rule 16b-3(a).
50. FLA. STAT. § 607.0624(2) (1990).
51. FLA. STAT. § 607.058 (1989) (repealed 1990).
52. See, e.g., "K-mart Won't Oppose Holder's Bid for Vote on Foison-Pill Plan,"
Wall Street J., Dec. 7, 1990, at A4 ("The Wisconsin board ...has campaigned for
years against what it sees as the improperly unilateral means by which poison-pill mea-
sures are put in place by a simple vote of the board. Implementing other anti-takeover
defenses, such as staggered terms for directors, typically requires Drior holder ap-
proval."). Institutional holders have proposed that the federal proxy rales be amended
to require a shareholder vote for adoption of poison pills.
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successful in other states.
"Poison pill" or "shareholder rights" plans come in many forms,
but generally involve distribution by the corporation of rights or securi-
ties that have redemption or conversion provisions. Once triggered by a
hostile takeover attempt or a party acquiring a specified percentage of
a class of the issuer's securities, the plans make the securities exces-
sively or prohibitively expensive to buy.53 The principal poison pill pro-
visions are as follows: (a) a "flip-in provision" that grants each share-
holder (other than the bidder) an option to purchase the issuer's
securities at a substantial discount on the occurrence of the triggering
event (usually acquisition or tender for a certain amount of shares,
such as 20 %); (b) a "flip-over provision" that permits each shareholder
to purchase the acquiring corporation's securities at a discount follow-
ing a merger or consolidation; and (c) a "back-end" provision that per-
mits each shareholder (other than the bidder) to exchange its shares
for a package of the issuer's securities following completion of a hostile
takeover.54
Reduced to their simplest forms, the flip-in provision grants a
shareholder an option to purchase the issuer's shares at a discount, a
flip-over provision grants a shareholder an option to purchase the ac-
quiror's shares at a discount in a manner similar to anti-dilution provi-
sions, and a back-end provision grants the shareholder the right to
force redemption of his shares on favorable terms. Many plans include
combinations of these provisions. The key element of the flip-in and
back-end plans is discrimination against the person making the acquisi-
tion or takeover attempt. That person is denied the opportunity to exer-
cise option or redemption rights on the same favorable, often financially
ruinous to the issuer, terms as other security holders. The practical ef-
fect of the poison pill plan is to preclude a hostile tender offer until the
plan is canceled by the directors or declared void by a court. Its osten-
sible purpose is to give directors leverage to negotiate a favorable
purchase price with a hostile bidder.55
53. See generally C. SIMON & Co., CORPORATE ANTI-TAKEOVER DEFENSES: THE
POISON PILL DEVICE (1989); Note, Delaware's Attempt to Swallow a New Takeover
Defense: The Poison Pill Preferred Stock, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 569 (1985).
54. For an example of a flip-over plan, see Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500
A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
55. This article does not address the thorny question of whether poison pill plans
really benefit shareholders. Compare City Capital Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco,
Inc., [1988-89] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,084 (Del. Ch. 1988) stating:
Even where an offer is noncoercive, it may represent a 'threat' to share-
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Most poison pill litigation concerns the directors' proper exercise
of their fiduciary duties in adopting and implementing poison pill
plans. 56 Underlying this issue, however, is the question whether direc-
tors have corporate authority to issue the securities that constitute the
poison pill. In Delaware, this issue has been settled in favor of direc-
tors.57 The drafters of the Act evidently were concerned with contrary
decisions of courts in other states. For example, in Amalgamated
Sugar Co. v. NL Industries, a federal district court applying New
Jersey law held that a flip-in provision was ultra vires and void because
it "effects a discrimination among shareholders of the same class or
holder interests in the special sense that an active negotiator with power
[conveyed by a poison pill], in effect, to refuse the proposal may be able to
extract a higher or otherwise more valuable proposal, or may be able to
arrange an alternative transaction or a modified business plan that will
present a more valuable option to shareholders.
with Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 255 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.)
("Personally we are rather skeptical about the arguments for defensive measures ....
We are especially skeptical about the arguments used to defend poison pills.").
56. See, e.g., Interco, Inc., [1988-89] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 94,034; CRTF Corp.
v. Federated Dep't Stores, 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re J.P. Stevens &
Co., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988).
57. In Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985), the Delaware
Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a plan based on allegations that the directors
lacked authority to implement the plan under the Delaware General Corporation Law.
The court accepted the directors' position that they had the requisite authority under
section 157 and section 151 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which are
roughly the same as Florida Statutes section 607.0624(1) (1990) (share options) and
section 607.0602 (1990) (blank check authority). Moran, 500 A.2d at 1346. The court
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that those provisions were not intended to be the basis
of anti-takeover measures, but rather were limited to corporate financing and other
conventional uses. Id. at 1352.
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del.
1986), the Delaware court upheld the directors' authority to implement a back-end
poison pill that discriminated against the bidder. The court reached this conclusion
even though Delaware did not have a counterpart to section 607.0624(2) of the Act,
which authorizes discrimination among shareholders with respect to the exercise rights
of options. Courts construing Delaware law also have upheld the authority of directors
to implement flip-in provisions that discriminate against the bidder, based on Moran.
See, e.g., BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 474 (D. Del. 1988) (the plain-
tiffs conceded that the board was authorized to implement the plan); see also Dynam-
ics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Ill.), aft'd, 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.
1986) (Indiana law); but see Unilever Acquisition v. Richardson-Vicks Inc., 618 F.
Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (federal court construing Delaware law before Moran, 500
A.2d 1346, invalidated plan because of discrimination effects among shareholders of a
series).
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series."58 Under the plan, the voting rights and equity of the acquiring
shareholder are diluted upon the triggering event.59 The court invali-
dated the flip-in poison pill despite the existence of blank check and
share option provisions under New Jersey law comparable to sections
151 and 157 of the Delaware Code, which were the basis for validating
poison pills in that state.60
Florida courts have not addressed the authority of a board of di-
rectors to establish a poison pill or shareholder rights plan. To preclude
future judicial invalidity, the Act addresses these potential challenges
to a poison pill plan. Section 607.0624(2) expressly permits issuance of
options or rights that discriminate against persons acquiring or offering
to acquire more than a certain percentage of shares, validating flip-in
plans that involve the issuance of rights. Further, section 607.0601
omits the sentence from section 6.01 of the RMBCA providing that all
shares of a class must have identical preferences, limitations, and rela-
tive rights."' This omission sanctions discrimination among sharehold-
ers within a class with respect to share terms, such as plans involving
preferred stock with a discriminatory conversion or redemption right.
For example, the corporation might distribute to its shareholders a divi-
dend consisting of preferred shares convertible, by all shareholders ex-
cept the bidder into common shares on favorable terms, based on the
occurrence of a triggering stock event.62 The Act allows discriminatory
limitations denying the conversion right to persons holding more than a
certain number of shares, which otherwise might run afoul of share
equality precepts.
58. 644 F. Supp. 1224, 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
59. Id. at 1299. The court reasoned that the plan in substance constituted a re-
structuring of voting and equity rights within the class, which could not be effected
without a shareholder vote. Id. at 1234-35. The court also found that the plan had a
preclusive effect on prospective tender offers. Id. at 1239.
60. Id. at 1234-35; see also Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp.
1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (rights plan that discriminated between shareholders based on
date of share acquisition held void under New Jersey law); Asarco Inc. v. M.R.H.
Holmes A Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1985).
61. FLA. STAT. § 607.0601 (1990).
62. This type of security, commonly known as "poison pill preferred stock," is
discussed at length in Comment, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-
Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1964 (1984).
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V. FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES TO THE FLORIDA CORPORATION'S
CAPITAL STRUCTURE
The Act generally eliminates par value, stated capita], capital sur-
plus, and treasury shares. Par value was an arbitrary amount assigned
to each share (e.g., $1.00 per share), below which the corporation was
prohibited from selling its shares.63 Stated capital was generally the
sum of the par value of all outstanding shares with par value and the
amount assigned by directors to stated capital with respect to no-par
shares.64
Par value and stated capital were eliminated for well-recognized
reasons. Generally, they added complexity without any offsetting bene-
fit.6 5 Par value was an arbitrary dollar amount. The former law did not
require directors to establish a par value having any particular relation
to the shares' actual market value, and par value did not fluctuate with
changes in share market value. For this reason, par value misled inves-
tors who equated par value and actual share market value or net asset
value. Further, the sole restrictive effect of par value-to place a floor
on the purchase price of shares-was rendered meaningless by wide-
spread use of nominal par value amounts (e.g., $.01 per share) that
were far below the shares' actual value.66 Par value did nothing to stop
the corporation from selling at a price less than fair value.
Further, the amount of stated capital bore no relationship to the
63. FLA. STAT. § 607.054 (1989) (repealed 1990).
64. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.004(15), .061 (1990). This article does not discuss in de-
tail the provisions of prior law concerning par value, no-par shares, stated capital, and
related concepts, because the Act repealed them. For a detailed explanation of these
provisions and their history, purpose, and operation, see B. MANNING & J. HANKS.
LEGAL CAPITAL (3d ed. 1990).
65. See RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.21 (official comment and historical back-
ground). Par value and stated capital have been cannon fodder for scholars for many
years. See, e.g., B. MANNING & J. HANKS, supra note 64, at 91-97 ("The legal capital
schemes embedded in the nation's state corporation acts are inherently doomed to a low
level of effectiveness (perhaps even zero)."); Cohn, Capital Structure. Dividends and
Redemption-Time for a Change to Florida's Corporate Code, 56 FLA.. B.J. 574 (June
1982) (the Act grants Professor Cohn his fervent wish for change); Hackney, The Fi-
nancial Provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1357
(1957) (describing the difficulties of accurately calculating surplus); Note, The Inade-
quacy of Stated Capital Requirements, 40 CINN. L. REV. 823 (1971).
66. As discussed below, Florida's documentary stamp tax on the par value of
shares virtually compels the Florida corporation to set a very low par value such as
$0.01 per share, because it is assessed on the shares' par value rather than their market
value. See FLA. STAT. § 201.05(1) (1990).
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actual amount of capital necessary for the corporation's business opera-
tions. Stated capital did not protect creditors by providing an "equity
cushion," because nothing required that the amount be sufficient to
provide a cushion against operating losses and because the amount
could be changed at the shareholders' option, after credit had been ex-
tended. 67 Creditors today rely on other mechanisms for credit protec-
tion, such as financial covenants in their loan documents, close monitor-
ing of the corporation's financial condition, and legal restrictions
(retained by the Act) that limit transfers and distributions if the corpo-
ration is insolvent. 68
Par value and the related concepts of stated capital, capital sur-
plus, and other similar provisions added great complexity to the corpo-
ration's capital structure. For example, a stock split required an
amendment to the articles of incorporation to change the corporation's
par value. The par value and stated capital concepts required three dif-
ferent definitions of surplus-surplus, earned surplus, and capital sur-
plus.69 Consider the following language of the former law that governed
the conversion of a share without par value into a share with par value:
[S]hares without par value shall not be converted into shares with
par value unless that part of the stated capital of the corporation
represented by such shares without par value is, at the time of con-
version, at least equal to the aggregate par value of the shares into
which the shares without par value are to be converted, or the
amount of any such deficiency is transferred from surplus to stated
capital.70
The official comment to the Act in the RMBCA clarifies that fol-
lowing this change, a corporation need not differentiate on its balance
sheet between stated capital and surplus accounts, even if it elects to
67. For example, a corporation with the common par value of $.01 per share and
1,000,000 outstanding shares would have stated capital of only $10,000, which is insuf-
ficient for a corporation with operations of any substance.
68. FLA. STAT. § 607.06401 (1990). With respect to fraudulent transfers, see,
e.g., FLA. STAT. § 726.101 (1988) (the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act); 11 U.S.C.
99 546, 548 (1986) (United States Bankruptcy Code).
69. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.004(4), (6), (17) (1989) (repealed 1990). A treatise is
devoted to explaining these subjects. See B. MANNING & J. HANKS, supra note 64.
Significantly, in the 1990 edition, the authors required 176 pages to explain the "laby-
rinth" of legal capital doctrine and critique its failures, but only 15 pages to explain its
repeal and the current provisions of the RMBCA, supra note 4.
70. FLA. STAT. § 607.044.
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retain par value." The corporation may use a single simple entry,
"paid-in capital," to reflect the amounts received for its shares.7 2 A
corporation may retain the historic classifications of stated capital and
capital surplus if it so desires.73
Corporations still should consider using a nominal par value (such
as $.01 per share) even though it lacks any legal significance under the
Act, because of the Florida documentary stamp tax on shares. This tax
is assessed on the shares' par value or, if the share is without par value,
on its actual market value.74 Accordingly, the use of nominal par value
will avoid taxation based on the shares' market value. The Second Cor-
rections Bill would amend the documentary stamp tax law to provide
that each share without par value will be taxed based on a par value of
$.01 per share. Enactment of this amendment to the documentary
stamp tax law should eliminate the last reason for a Florida corpora-
tion to use par value.
VI. THE CORPORATION'S ISSUANCE OF SHARES (SECTIONS
607.0603 AND 607.0621)
According to section 607.0603(3), a corporation must have at all
times one or more outstanding classes of shares that together have the
attributes associated with common shares-unlimited voting rights and
entitlement to receive the net assets of the corporation on dissolution. 5
This provision is the counterpart to section 607.0601(2), which requires
that the corporation authorize shares with these attributes.7 6 Generally,
following the elimination of par value, except for fiduciary duty stan-
dards, 77 the only limitations imposed by the Act on a corporation's issu-
ance of shares and the make-up of its capital are that the shares be
authorized, that the directors determine that the consideration to be
received for the shares is adequate, that the consideration established
71. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.21 (official comment).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. FLA. STAT. § 201.05(1) (1990). The tax is 32 cents per $100 of value.
75. Id. at § 607.0603(3). Section 607.0603 was adopted verbatim from section
6.03 of the RMBCA, supra note 4. In other words, some person must own the residual
interests of the corporation.
76. FLA. STAT. § 607.0601(2).
77. The fiduciary standards governing directors' actions are set forth in section
607.0830. Id. at § 607.0830.
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for the shares be paid, and that one or more classes of outstanding
shares together have the traditional attributes of common stock de-
scribed above.
Section 607.0621 sets forth the terms on which a corporation may
sell its shares.78 Shareholders must rely on the directors' honest and
fair judgment to determine (a) the number Of shares to be issued and
the amount of capital to be raised from time to time, (b) an appropri-
ate price for any additional shares that are issued, and (c) the ade-
quacy of consideration, if non-cash consideration is received. By so pro-
viding in the articles of incorporation, shaTeholders may reserve these
rights to themselves7 9 or, more practically, limit the board's discretion
with respect to these matters. Again, the Act leaves the capital struc-
ture to the dynamics of negotiation among the corporation, its share-
holders, and its creditors, rather than mandating restrictions or limita-
tions on that structure.
A corporation may issue shares in exchange for "any tangible or
intangible property or benefit to the corporation." 80 The official com-
ment to section 6.21 of the RMBCA clarifies that "[tihe term 'benefit'
should be broadly construed to include, for example, a reduction of a
liability, a release of a claim, or benefits obtained by a corporation by
contribution of its shares to a charitable organization or as a prize in a
promotion." '81 Significantly, the Act departs from the former law by
expressly permitting shares to be issued in consideration of a promis-
sory note and future services, if evidenced by a written contract. 82 The
requirement that the contract be written departs from the RMBCA.
Although both of these forms of consideration involve future perform-
ance, the Act treats the shares as "paid" when the commitment is
given, rather than when it is fulfilled (the note is paid or the services
78. Id. at § 607.0621. A separate section, section 607.0623, covers share divi-
dends. Id. at § 607.0623.
79. Id. at § 607.0621(1).
80. Id. at § 607.0621(2).
81. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.21 (official comment).
82. FLA. STAT. § 607.0621(2) (1990). Former section 607.054(6) stated: "Future
services shall not constitute payment or part payment for the issuance of shares of a
corporation." FLA. STAT. § 607.054(6) (1989) (repealed 1990); see also Lewis v.
Compton, 416 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 1982). Although not authorized by the statute, a
promissory note was acceptable consideration under the former law. Lundquist v. Gulf-
shore Television Corp., 328 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). The commentary
to section 607.0621 states that the former law was unclear on this point.
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rendered) ."
The official comment to section 6.21 of the RMBCA, on which
section 607.0621 is based, notes the real concerns of the former law:
The issuance of some shares for cash and other shares for promis-
sory notes, contracts for past or future services, or for tangible or
intangible property or benefits, like the issuance of shares for an
inadequate consideration, opens the possibility of dilution of the in-
terests of other shareholders. For example, persons acquiring shares
for cash may be unfairly treated if optimistic values are placed on
past or future services or intangible benefits being provided by
other persons. The problem is particularly acute if the persons pro-
viding services, promissory notes or benefits of debatable value are
themselves connected with the promoters of the corporation or with
its directors.8 4
The RMBCA allows these forms of consideration anyway because:
commitments for future performance or payment often have substantial
present value; 5 consistently with other provisions, the RMBCA's draft-
ers were prepared to rely on the standards governing directors' actions
that are intended to protect against abuses; and the practical problems
associated with these forms of consideration can be resolved through
skillful structuring of the share sale transaction."6 Once again, the
RMBCA eliminates an "artificial" or "arbitrary" rule in favor of rely-
ing on the directors' business judgment. The official comment might
have added that the practice of offering incentive stock to employees as
consideration for future services is widespread and generally recognized
as effective in aligning employees' interests with shareholders' interests.
The Act requires that a corporation issuing shares for future services
inform its shareholders of the issuance before the corporation's next
83. Compare FLA. STAT. § 607.0621(4) with RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.21.
84. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.21 (official comment).
85. One author hypothesizes a contract with Barbara Streisand, Doug Flutie, or
a promissory note of Morgan Guaranty. Manning, supra note 9, at 1533. Of course,
that article was written before Flutie retired from football and before the financial
institution crisis.
86. The comment to the Act adds another reason-easy avoidance of the prohibi-
tion: "[T]he express prohibition in [section] 607.054(6) (1989) against future services
as consideration is easily avoided by an advance bonus (immediately repaid to the cor-
poration for the shares), the issuance of a separate class of low or no-par value stock,
forgivable loans, or other means limited only by the ingenuity of the parties." RMBCA.
supra note 4, at § 6.21 (official comment).
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annual meeting. 7
Because the shares will be fully paid when issued, the corporation
should assure that the shares do not freely vest before the note is paid
or services rendered, to protect against a purchaser default. Section
607.0621(5) provides a mechanism to assure receipt of consideration
for the shares through escrow or restriction methods. 88 The shares are
issued to the shareholder in escrow or subject to restriction, but if the
relevant payments or services are not received, the shares may be can-
celed. The Act leaves unclear whether an escrow arrangement must be
with an independent third party. The Act seems to expressly permit an
arrangement in which all escrowed or restricted shares are canceled
without any compensation, even though the shareholder partially pays
or performs before reneging: "[I]f the services are not performed, the
shares escrowed or restricted and the distributions credited may be
canceled in whole or part."'89 Nothing in the former law expressly pro-
vided for a corporation to cancel shares if future payments or services
due for them were not received. Indeed, the shares could not be issued
at all without up-front payment of all consideration.9 °
The Act subtly changes the former law with respect to the direc-
tors' determinations regarding value and adequacy of consideration,
which are important to legal opinions regarding the status of shares as
fully paid and nonassessable. The Act provides for directors to use their
business judgment to establish adequate consideration for shares, with-
out any floor or other limitation. That adequacy determination is con-
clusive for purposes of the determination whether shares are fully paid
and nonassessable. The former law also provided that the directors
must value non-cash consideration received and provided that this de-
87. FLA. STAT. § 607.1621(2) (1990). Presumably, shareholders then may chal-
lenge the issuance as a breach of the directors' standard of care, if the transaction was
abusive.
88. Id. at § 607.0621(5).
89. Id. These escrow or restriction arrangements should be part of the subscrip-
tion agreement or other document evidencing the purchase terms. That agreement
should clearly provide the extent to which consideration received thus far is refundable
on cancellation. Of course, the corporation must carefully note the restriction on the
certificate or take care that possession of escrowed shares does not pass to the share-
holders to avoid transfer to bona fide purchasers free of the restriction. See id. at §
607.0627 (regarding restrictions on transfer); § 607.0622 (regarding the respective lia-
bilities of the transferee and transferor of shares for which full consideration lhas not
been paid (the transferee is not liable if a bona fide purchaser).
90. FLA. STAT. § 607.054(5) ("Shares may not be issued until the full amount of
the consideration therefore has been paid.").
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termination regarding valuation of consideration was "conclusive" in
the absence of fraud.9' However, the Act does not require this value
determination at all.92 The directors' adequacy determination need not
be set forth in a resolution-that conclusion may be inferred from the
decision to issue shares for the designated consideration. Following
the Act's elimination of par value and definitive resolution against ap-
plying any hindsight evaluation to the directors' business judgment in
establishing appropriate consideration, the lawyer may opine that
shares of a Florida corporation are fully paid and nonassessable by con-
firming that the consideration for the shares established by the board
was actually paid.9 4 The Act makes the adequacy determination con-
clusive, eliminating the possibility of hindsight judicial review of that
matter.
The conclusive presumption concerning the adequacy of considera-
tion received for shares does not extend to challenges based on self-
dealing and other fiduciary duty grounds or fraud of the person receiv-
ing the shares. 95 However, directors are entitled to the presumption of-
fered by the business judgment rule with respect to decisions to offer
shares in transactions in which they are not interested.96
Consistently with the former law, section 607.0622 confirms that a
shareholder who pays the consideration due for purchased shares gen-
erally has no further liability to the corporation, its creditors, and other
91. Id. at § 607.054(7). In some early cases, at creditors' request, courts objec-
tively appraised the value of consideration paid to determine whether the consideration
was worth the value attributed to it by the corporation and adequate given the par
value of the shares. Shareholders might be found liable for any deficiency. See, e.g.,
See v. Heppenheimer, 69 N.J. Eq. 36, 61 A. 843 (1905); Van Cleve v. Berkey, 143 Mo.
109, 44 S.W. 743 (1898); see generally RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.21 (historical
background). This "true value" rule was reversed by the former law which presumed
the directors' judgment of value to be correct. FLA. STAT. § 607.054(7).
92. See RMBCA. supra note 4, at § 6.21 (official comment) ("Of course, a spe-
cific value must be placed on the consideration received for the shares for bookkeeping
purposes, but bookkeeping details are not the statutory responsibility of the board of
directors.").
93. Id.
94. FLA. STAT. § 607.0621(3), (4) ("When the corporation receives the consider-
ation for which the board of directors authorized the issuance of shares, the shares
issued therefor are fully paid and nonassessable.").
95. See, e.g., Biltmore Motor Corp. v. Roque, 291 So. 2d 114, 115-16 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (ordering directors to revoke and rescind recapitalization plan
that involved sale of new stock at considerably less than market value because the
transaction lacked any business purpose and violated the directors' fiduciary duties).
96. FLA. STAT. § 607.0831(1) (1990).
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shareholders with respect to those shares.9 7 With the elimination of the
legal significance of par value, shareholders are no longer subject to
alleged liability for the difference between the par value and the con-
sideration that they actually paid for their shares, or "watered stock
liability." This is true even if the corporation elects to retain par value,
because the statutory connection between par value and the amount
due for shares is eliminated.
In a departure from the RMBCA, Florida rejected the RMBCA's
section 6.22, and instead adopted verbatim, as section 607.0622, the
provisions of the former law, section 607.074, except for the addition of
a five-year limitation period on actions to collect consideration due for
shares.9" Section 607.0622(1) retains provisions spelling out who may
sue a shareholder who fails to pay full consideration (the corporation,
another shareholder, and creditors). Section 607.0622(2), (3), and (4)
clarify transferor, transferee, pledgor, and pledgee liability for consid-
eration due for unpaid shares (transferor and pledgor liable; pledgee
not liable; transferee not liable if bona fide purchaser of the shares).
Presumably, despite the broad statutory language of section
607.0622(1)," 9 the shareholder remains potentially liable for the corpo-
ration's actions pursuant to equitable theories such as piercing the cor-
porate veil, even though the Act in section 607.0622 rejects, as to open
ended, the language of section 6.22(b) of the RMBCA confirming the
validity of such actions.100 In cases decided before the Act, Florida
courts have upheld actions based on veil-piercing theories notwithstand-
ing this statutory language.' 0' These decisions were probably based on
reasoning that the action is not "with respect to the . . . shares," but
rather based on the shareholder's conduct.10
2
97. Id. at § 607.0622(a).
98. Id. at § 607.0622(5). The limitations period is measured from the earlier of
the date of stock issuance or the date of the subscription on which the assessment is
sought.
99. Id. at § 607.0622(1) ("A holder of. . . shares. . . shall be under no obliga-
tion to . . . creditors with respect to such shares . . . other than to pay the full
consideration.").
100. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.22(b) provides as follows: "Unless otherwise
provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not person-
ally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become person-
ally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct."
101. See, e.g., Vantage View v. Bali East Dev. Corp., 421 So. 2d' 728, 235 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
102. Id.
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VII. SHARE DIVIDENDS (SECTION 607.0623)
Share dividends are governed by section 607.0623, which adopts
the text of section 6.23 of the RMBCA. 10 3 The Act simplifies the law
governing share dividends and stock splits: all distributions of the cor-
poration's shares are treated as share dividends; share dividends are not
subject to restrictions on ordinary dividends and share repurchases; and
with the elimination of par value, stated capital, and capital surplus, no
reallocations among various capital accounts need follow a share divi-
dend and no adjustments to par value amounts need follow a stock
split.104
The principal distinction between a stock split and a share divi-
dend under the former law was that a share dividend involved a book
transfer from capital surplus to stated capital, and a stock split re-
quired a change to the corporation's par value per share.10 5 A share
dividend was treated similarly to a cash dividend, and subject to the
restriction that the corporation have adequate surplus to cover the ag-
gregate par value of distributed shares.106 The current modifications
recognize that share dividends differ fundamentally from cash divi-
dends and the transactions characterized as "distributions" under the
Act. A share dividend is a paper transaction without economic effect on
the corporation, its shareholders, or its creditors.101 Nothing happens to
the corporation's assets and the shareholders' interests in the corpora-
tion remain the same, only evidenced by more shares.'0 8
The Act does recognize the dilutive impact on a class or series of
shares when shares of its class or series are distributed as a share divi-
dend to shareholders of another class or series. 109 The Act permits
those transactions only if the articles of incorporation authorize them, a
majority of the relevant class or series approves the transaction, or no
shares of the relevant class or series are outstanding."10
103. See FLA. STAT. § 607.01401(8) (1990) (expressly excluding share dividends
from the definition of "distributions" to shareholders).
104. Id. at § 607.0623.
105. FLA. STAT. § 607.137(4), (6) (1989) (repealed 1990).
106. Id. at § 607.137(4).
107. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.23 (official comment).
108. Id.
109. FLA. STAT. § 607.0623 (1990).
110. Id. at § 607.0623(2).
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VIII. THE CORPORATION'S DISTRIBUTIONS TO ITS
SHAREHOLDERS (SECTION 607.06401)
Many commentators call the distribution provisions the most sig-
nificant of the extensive amendments to the Model Act's financial pro-
visions that were effected in the 1980s. 111 In a significant departure
from the former law, the Act adopts a uniform definition for distribu-
tions and modifies the restrictions on distributions so that they do not
consider the corporation's relative amounts of surplus and stated capi-
tal following the distribution." 2
Instead of a single definition and standard for distributions, the
former law provided different standards for redemptions, consensual re-
purchases, and ordinary dividends." 3 Redemptions were subject only to
the limitation that they not render the corporation insolvent in the eq-
uity sense (unable to pay its debts as they became due in the ordinary
course of business)."' Dividends and consensual repurchases were sub-
ject to this equity insolvency limitation and also to the limitation that
they could be made only from unreserved and unrestricted surplus (the
portion of the corporation's capital other than stated capital)." 5 Gener-
ally, the Act modifies this surplus-based limitation (assets must equal
the sum of liabilities, stated capital, and reserved or restricted surplus)
to a net worth limitation (assets must equal liabilities plus liquidation
preferences), because the surplus-based limitation was complex and in-
effective in protecting creditors." 6 The Act applies this net worth limi-
tation and the equity insolvency limitation to all shareholder "distribu-
tions," including dividends, redemptions, and consensual
111. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 9, at 1534 ("Section 6.40 is the centerpiece
that controls asset distributions to shareholders."); Murphy, supra note 8, at 82 ("[Sec-
tion 6.40] is probably the capstone of the financial provisions in the Revised Statute.").
112. FLA. STAT. § 607.06401. This discussion focuses on the tests adopted for
distributions. Full treatment of the subject should consider fraudulent transfer law and
the fiduciary duties of directors. See id. at §§ 607.0834, .0830 (each of which is dis-
cussed cursorily here).
113. For a thorough explanation of the scheme governing distributions under the
former law, see B. MANNING & J. HANKS, supra note 64, at 63-90.
114. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.004(9), .017(3)(d) (1989) (repealed 1990).
115. Id. at §§ 607.017(1), .137; see also Baxter v. Lancer Indus., Inc., 213 F.
Supp. 92, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); Coast Cities Coaches, Inc. v. Whyte, 102 So. 2d 848
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1958) ("Obviously, corporate funds other than those lawfully
allocable to dividends could not be used to pay for the purchase of the stock from
Whyte and Hickling.").
116. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.40 (official comment).
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repurchases.117
The purpose of the law governing distributions is to protect the
relative priority status of creditors and senior equity holders. Share-
holders are subordinate to these persons with respect to their claim to
the corporation's assets in liquidation." 8 Assets are supposed to be
available to fund the payment of liabilities and liquidation preferences,
if necessary. As stated by one commentator:
If the hierarchical relationship of creditor to shareholder is to have
any meaning at all, then the management must not be left free to
shovel all the assets in the corporate treasury out to the sharehold-
ers when the corporation has insufficient assets to pay its creditors
or when the shareholder distribution itself renders the corporation
unable to pay its creditors. The central point is to avoid
insolvency. 119
The Act is carefully structured to achieve this purpose, but no more.
The Act abandons the concept of mandating an asset cushion over and
above the amount of liabilities to be available if assets prove insufficient
to pay them.
The principal significance of these provisions governing distribu-
tions is the directors' potential liability "to the corporation" for distri-
butions made improperly pursuant to section 607.0834 of the Act. Gen-
erally, a director is potentially liable for an improper distribution only
if he voted for or assented to the action and the director need only
comply with the usual standard of conduct for his actions, which is
described in section 607.0830.120 The director has available all defenses
typically associated with his actions, including the common law busi-
ness judgment rule.' 2 ' The statute and case law leave unclear whether
and how this liability "to the corporation" may be enforced by credi-
tors, directly or derivatively by shareholders, or by a bankruptcy trus-
tee succeeding to the corporation's rights.' 22
This new standard governing distributions varies from the stan-
117. FLA. STAT. § 607.06401 (1990).
118. Id.
119. B. MANNING & J. HANKS, supra note 64, at 63.
120. FLA. STAT. § 607.0830 (1990).
121. Id. at § 607.0834; RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 8.33 (official comment).
122. See B. MANNING & J. HANKS, supra note 64, at 88-90 (noting "the almost
complete absence of cases imposing liability on directors or shareholders").
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dards governing fraudulent transfers in Florida. 23 For example, one of
the standards for a fraudulent transfer focuses on the intent of the
transferor,1 24 which is irrelevant under section 607.0834.125 The official
comment to section 6.40 of the RMBCA acknowledges the difference
and justifies it based on the different purposes for which the various
statutes are intended . 26 The fraudulent transfer statute is designed to
permit the trustee to recover for the benefit of creditors transfers made
to others (such as shareholders), but section 6.40 was intended to deter-
mine the potential liability of directors to the corporation for improper
distributions. x27 The laws governing fraudulent transfers apply to the
corporation's distributions to its shareholders and must be reviewed by
the corporation planning an unusual distribution.
The Act conveniently defines "distribution" to include any transfer
of money or other property or incurrence of indebtedness by the corpo-
ration to or for the benefit of its shares. 128 Only the corporation's distri-
butions of its own shares (stock dividends) are excluded and treated in
a separate section, because those transfers do not cause any real change
in the corporation's capital structure from the creditors' standpoint. 129
For this reason, a conversion of an outstanding security into an equity
security typically would not be considered a distribution, because the
issued security constitutes a share of the corporation. Examples of dis-
tributions include cash dividends, special dividends of property (includ-
ing stock of other companies or subsidiaries), liquidating distributions,
repurchases and redemptions of the corporation's shares, and distribu-
tions of indebtedness. 3
The Act relies on a deceptively simple two-pronged test to deter-
mine whether a distribution is permitted:
No distribution may be made if, after giving it effect: (a) The cor-
poration would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in
the usual course of business; or (b) the corporation's total assets
would be less than the sum of its total liabilities plus (unless the
123. See FLA. STAT. §§ 726.101-.201 (1989).
124. Id. at § 726.105(1)(a), (2); see also 11 'U.S.C. § 548 (1986) (concerning
fraudulent transfers under the Bankruptcy Code).
125. FLA. STAT. § 607.0834 (1990).
126. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.40 (official comment).
127. Id.
128. FLA. STAT. § 607.01401(8) (1990).
129. Id. at § 607.0623.
130. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.40 (official comment).
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articles of incorporation permit otherwise) the amount that would
be needed, if the corporation were to be dissolved at the time of the
distribution, to satisfy the preferential rights upon dissolution of
shareholders whose preferential rights are superior to those receiv-
ing the distribution. 13 1
The first prong of the test carries over from the former law the "equity
insolvency" test. The second prong adopts what is commonly referred
to as a "balance sheet" or "net worth" insolvency test.
The equity insolvency test requires that following the distribution,
the corporation must be able to pay its debts as they become due in the
usual course of business.3 2 Older versions of the comment to section
6.40 of the RMBCA stated that the equity insolvency test was the
"4most important and fundamental test for the permissibility of distri-
butions."'13 3 This prong of the test is unfortunately subjective and if not
applied carefully, might subject the director to hindsight judicial re-
evaluation of his actions if the corporation soon fails. The official com-
ment to section 6.40 of the RMBCA provides some comfort and clarifi-
cation.13 1 It states that the existence of significant shareholder equity
and continuation of normal operations typically will be sufficient to es-
tablish that the equity insolvency test is satisfied.' 3 5 The absence of a
going concern qualification in the company's financial statements is
called "normally decisive.1"136
131. FLA. STAT. § 607.06401(3).
132. "Insolvent" is generally defined in the definitions section of the Act to mean
inability of a corporation to pay debts as they become due in the usual course of its
business. Id. at § 607.01401(15). The Act inadvertently uses this full statement, rather
than using the defined term and simply stating that the distribution must not render
the corporation "insolvent."
133. Changes to the Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments to Finan-
cial Provisions, 34 Bus. LAW. 1867, 1881 (1979).
134. RMBCA. supra note 4, at § 6.40 (official comment).
135. Id.
136. Id. The official comment states that: "Indeed, in the case of a corporation
having regularly audited financial statements, the absence of any qualification in the
most recent auditor's opinion as to the corporation's status as a 'going concern,' coupled
with a lack of subsequent adverse events, would normally be decisive." This issue cer-
tainly will not arise unless subsequent adverse events occur-the author assumes that
the drafters meant a lack of subsequent adverse events before the measuring date of
the distribution, because the directors should not be accountable for unforeseeable
events subsequent to that date. See also Current Issues on the Legality of Dividends
from a Law and Accounting Perspective: A Task Force Report, 39 Bus. LAW. 289, 306
(1983) (suggesting a presumption against insolvency if the corporation receives an au-
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If the corporation is "encountering difficulties, or is in an uncer-
tain position concerning its liquidity and operations," the directors
should carefully document the basis for their decision as they would
other potentially controversial actions.137 The comment emphasizes
that, consistent with the standard for their actions in section 8.30 of the
RMBCA (section 607.0830), directors may rely on reports from man-
agement, accountants, and other persons and may make judgments or
assumptions regarding the corporation's future that are "customarily
justified, absent clear evidence to the contrary."' 38 The comment states
that having made these judgments and relied on information made
available to them, directors "should not, of course, be held responsible
as a matter of hindsight for unforeseen developments.' 3 9
The comment contains somewhat helpful examples of assumptions
regarding product demand, short-term indebtedness, and contingent li-
abilities that may be made by directors in evaluating whether a distri-
bution will render the corporation insolvent and that should be re-
viewed carefully by counsel advising the corporation on this issue.'
40
For example, with respect to contingent liabilities, it states: "[t]o the
extent that the corporation may be subject to asserted or unasserted
contingent liabilities, reasonable judgments as to the likelihood,
amount, and time of any recovery against the corporation, after giving
consideration to the extent to which the corporation is insured or other-
wise protected from loss, may be utilized."'' The obvious problem,
notwithstanding the comment, is that directors' judgments might look
unreasonable to a trier of fact if the contingent liabilities that were
thought unlikely to result in liability become real liabilities.
The second prong is a balance sheet test, a limitation based on a
comparison following the transfer of the corporation's assets to its lia-
bilities plus the amount of any liquidation preference of senior equity
holders.' 42 Simply stated, the corporation may make distributions to its
shareholders only to the extent of its net worth, plus the liquidation
preferences. For distributions payable to any but the most senior class
of stock, the preferential amount payable to relatively more senior clas-
ditor's opinion not subject to a going concern opinion).
137. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.40 (official comment).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. FLA. STAT. § 607.06401(3)(b).
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ses of preferred stock must be added to liabilities to determine whether
the distribution is permitted. 143 In comparison, the former law com-
pared liabilities to assets plus stated capital and reserved and restricted
surplus. The Act eliminates the amount of stated capital, and reserved
and restricted surplus from the formulation, and adds the liquidation
preference. The Act accords flexibility; the balance sheet may be "pre-
pared on the basis of accounting practices and principles that are rea-
sonable in the circumstances or on a fair valuation or other method
that is reasonable in the circumstances."' 44 The Act does not mandate
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and continues to al-
low a fair market valuation. 145
Again, the official comment to section 6.40 of the RMBCA clari-
fies that directors may rely on opinions, reports, or statements, includ-
ing audited financial statements and other financial data in making this
prong of the determination. 46 The comment introduces a safe harbor
to assure those troubled by the uncertainty of the "reasonableness"
standard-use of GAAP is always reasonable under the circum-
stances.' 47 Also, the corporation may rely on its last balance sheet "un-
less the board is then aware that it would be unreasonable to rely on
the financial statements because of newly-discovered or subsequently
arising facts or circumstances.' 48
The comment recognizes that use of GAAP, or other accounting
principles, might result in an overstatement of assets' value:' 49
Accordingly, the revised Model Business Corporation Act contem-
plates that generally accepted accounting principles arc: always
'reasonable in the circumstances' and that other accounting princi-
ples may be perfectly acceptable, under a general standard of rea-
143. Id. at § 607.06401.
144. Id. at § 607.06401(4).
145. The former law also allowed a fair market valuation. FLA. STAT. §
607.137(7) (1989) (repealed 1990).
146. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.40 (official comments 2, 4).
147. Id. (official comments 3, 4).
148. Id.; see also Baxter v. Lancer Indus., Inc., 213 F. Supp. 92 (E.D.N.Y.
1963). The Baxter court considered the former law and held that a corporation could
not base the balance sheet determination whether dividends were permitted solely on its
financial statements. The court stated that "[w]hat little authority there is suggests
that actual values, albeit conservatively applied, rather than book values, are determi-
native of the existence of surplus." Baxter, 213 F. Supp. at 95. Certainly, this holding
is no longer good law.
149. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.40 (official comments 2, 3, 4).
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sonableness, even if they do not involve the fair value' or current
value concepts that are contemplated by section [607.06401(4)].150
The RMBCA thereby avoids forcing directors to evaluate whether the
financial statements were overstating value at the time of each distribu-
tion and inserting judicial oversight into accounting practice.151 Even
though the comment seems to sanction systems that overvalue assets
based on a cost rather than fair value system, directors of corporations
with financial statements not within the GAAP safe harbor might be
wise to confirm that the fair value of assets roughly approximates book
value, to avoid a charge that the accounting method was not reasonable
under the circumstances. Although ordinarily not a concern, this point
might be especially relevant in this time of declining asset prices.
The official comment also confirms that asset valuations may be
made using a going concern valuation rather than a liquidation valua-
tion, unless the corporation is selling its assets.1 52 This conclusion might
not follow from a reasoned assessment. Typically, going concern values
will be difficult to attain if the corporation's financial condition is seri-
ously troubled and it needs to sell assets quickly. Yet, this point is the
only one at which creditors will look to asset values for recovery of.
amounts due them. The going concern valuation test virtually assures
that actual asset recoveries will be insufficient, unless the going concern
valuations substantially exceed liabilities. To the extent that a distribu-
tion is based on a current asset valuation, this fact must be specifically
identified and the amount per share paid on the basis of the valuation
disclosed to shareholders when the distribution is made.153
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. See Current Issues on the Legality of Dividends from a Law and Account-
ing Perspective: A Task Force Report, 39 Bus. LAW. 289 (1983). The article recom-
mended creation of the safe harbor for GAAP principles:
It appears to the task force that when it comes to applying statutory finan-
cial tests to dividend declarations, corporate directors are in the same posi-
tion as the courts: they are generally not trained or competent to be re-
sponsible for accounting standards that represent extremely complex
assumptions and judgments .... [W]e question whether it is reasonable
for the statute to require a director to make a judgment among accounting
principles.
Id. at 300.
152. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.40 (official comments 2, 3, 4).
153. FLA. STAT. § 607.06401(4). This identification language was added to the
Act based on language from the former law. FLA. STAT. § 607.137 (1989) (repealed
1990).
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Section 607.06401(6) and (8) sets forth straightforward rules for
determining the dates on which the effect of a distribution should be
measured."" These dates depend on the nature of the distribution (divi-
dend or repurchase) and the consideration paid (cash/property or
debt) .1 5 In the case of stock repurchases for debt, the effect of the
transaction generally will be measured when the transaction occurs
(the earlier of the date the debt is incurred or the date the shareholder
ceases to be a shareholder) and not when the debt is paid." '6 This result
reverses Florida precedent that precluded a corporation from paying
debt incurred in connection with a share purchase if the corporation
was insolvent when payment of the debt was due. 151 Section
607.06401(8) provides that indebtedness may be disregarded for pur-
poses of determining whether a distribution is permitted, if expressly
made payable only to the extent that its payment at that time would be
a permitted distribution. In that instance only, each payment of princi-
pal and interest of the indebtedness will be considered a separate distri-
bution, the effect of which is measured on the date that it is made. This
provision facilitates an agreement to repurchase significant blocks of
shares with deferred payments at a price that exceeds the corporation's
net worth, without violating the balance sheet restriction. However, the
corporation must be able to comply with both elements of the restric-
tions on distributions when the payments are actually made.
154. FLA. STAT. § 607.06401(6), (8) (1990).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. One court has held:
Promises to repurchase, such as that involved in the instant case, must be
viewed as conditioned by the requirement that, at the time the corporation
is called on to perform, it must have sufficient funds so that disbursement
for the repurchase will not involve the use of funds not authorized to be so
used by the applicable state law.
Baxter, 213 F. Supp. at 96 (applying Florida law); see also In re Charter Co., 68
Bankr. 225 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986) (applying Florida law); In re Charter Co., 63
Bankr. 680 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986) (applying Florida law). The court essentially held
in the two Charter Co. cases that the corporation must be solvent both when the debt is
incurred and when it is paid. Cf. Williams v. Nevelow, 513 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1974)
(payment considered made when note delivered; secured note enforceable even though
corporation insolvent when note payment due).
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IX. SHARE ACQUISITIONS AND TREASURY SHARES (SECTIONS
607.0603 AND 607.0631)
Section 607.0631, concerning share reacquisitions, departs from
the former law in two significant respects: it revises the rules governing
the corporation's repurchases of its own shares; and it generally elimi-
nates "treasury shares" and characterizes reacquired shares as author-
ized but unissued shares.15 8 Share repurchases are now governed by the
general rules set forth in section 607.06401 applicable to all share-
holder distributions, which scrap limitations based on the preservation
of stated capital in favor of the much simpler equity insolvency and net
worth insolvency tests.' 59
Shares that are reacquired or redeemed generally will be simply
designated as authorized but unissued shares, with no distinction from
shares that have never been issued. 16 0 The Act also adds clarifying lan-
guage from the Virginia corporate statute providing that acquired
shares constitute authorized but unissued shares of the same class, but
undesignated as to series.' 6 ' This rule makes sense; the shares should
not be designated as part of the same series, because series terms are
usually established when shares of the series were initially issued, based
on market conditions at that time. Treasury shares were generally elim-
inated under the RMBCA because the drafters perceived no substan-
tive difference between reacquired shares and shares that had never
been issued. 162
158. FLA. STAT. § 607.0631 (1990).
159. Id. at § 607.06401. The restrictions on share repurchases and redemptions
under the former law were set forth in section 607.017. See FLA. STAT. § 607.017
(1989) (repealed 1990). Generally, the corporation's right to repurchase its own shares
is subject to restrictions imposed by federal and state securities laws and fiduciary duty
obligations.
160. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.0603(1), .0631(1).
161. VA. CODE. ANN. § 13.1-652.A (1950).
162. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.03 (official comment). Under the former law,
"treasury shares" were issued and outstanding shares that the corporation reacquired,
but did not cancel and restore to the status of authorized but unissued shares. FLA.
STAT. § 607.004(18) (1989) (repealed 1990). Until canceled, the shares were consid-
ered issued (but not outstanding) and their aggregate par value included in stated capi-
tal. See B. MANNING & J. HANKS, supra note 64, at 84-86 (briefly discussing the
complexities and problems caused by reacquired shares before the RMBCA, note 4.
"The entire topic of share reacquisition, treasury shares, resale, retirement and the like
is technical and sorely vexed under the legal capital statutes and under accounting
practice and generalization is not reliable.").
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The historical notes accompanying section 6.03 observe that the
concept of treasury shares initially arose as a mechanism -to evade re-
strictions on share issuance, such as those associated with par value and
preemptive rights. With the elimination of the legal significance of par
value and the general decline in the use of preemptive rights, treasury
shares no longer serve these purposes. This change eliminates an entry
on the corporation's balance sheet for "treasury shares," unless use of
treasliry shares is retained.
In section 607.0631, the Act adds to the core text of section 6.31
of the RMBCA provisions that the corporation may retain treasury
shares in two instances: through an express provision to that effect in
its articles of incorporation; or by not canceling or disposing of shares
that constituted treasury shares before July 1, 1990, the effective date
of the Act.16 3 A corporation might elect to retain the status of acquired
shares as treasury shares to avoid paying listing fees again when it reis-
sues them.16 4
In one instance, the corporation's authorized shares are reduced by
the number of repurchased shares - if the corporation's articles of
incorporation prohibit reissue of acquired shares. This reduction be-
comes effective when an amendment to the articles of incorporation is
filed with the Department of State. According to the comment to 6.31
of the RMBCA, during the interim period before this amendment is
filed, the shares may be issued and if issued will constitute valid shares
in the hands of purchasing shareholders.' 65However, any such issuance
would violate the prohibition on reissue in the articles of incorporation
and probably constitute an improper action by the board of directors. 6
X. CONCLUSION
Chapter VI of the Act simplifies and clarifies Florida law gov-
163. FLA. STAT. § 607.0631(1), (4).
164. Id. at § 607.0603(1). This section concerns the same matter, and was de-
rived without modification from § 6.03 of the RMBCA. It states, inconsistently with
section 607.0631, that without any exception, issued shares are "outstanding shares
until they are reacquired, redeemed, converted, or canceled." Id. A proposal to amend
this section to clarify that this general rule is subject to the exceptions for treasury
shares in section 607.0631(1) and (4) is pending as part of the Second Corrections Bill.
165. RMBCA, supra note 4, at § 6.31 (official comment).
166. Id. at § 6.31 (official comment 2) (The author wolld not render an opinion
concerning the "validly issued" status of shares issued in violation of the prohibition on
reissue.).
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erning capital structure, share issuances, and distributions. The Act
adopts the RMBCA, except for several instances in which it diverges
from the uniform provisions, principally to facilitate anti-takeover mea-
sures. The result-a much improved law that should make Florida an
attractive place of incorporation.
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Indemnification of Corporate Officers and Directors
Robert L. Jennings*
Kenneth A. Horky**
I. INTRODUCTION
Doing business through the legal fiction' of a corporate entity
dates back to the Middle Ages.2 The primary purpose for the creation
of corporations is to insulate the principals from personal liability,3
which tends to encourage new enterprise. However, there are many cir-
cumstances under which officers and directors may be personally liable
as a result of their acts or status in connection with the affairs of a
* Robert L. Jennings is a partner with the law firm of Holland & Knight. He
received an A.B. from Harvard University with honors in 1979 and a J.D. from the
University of Florida with honors in 1982. He concentrates his practice in commercial
litigation and trial practice.
** Kenneth A. Horky is a litigation associate with the law firm of Holland &
Knight. He received his J.D. with honors from the Florida State University College of
Law in 1986, and served as senior judicial clerk to Judge Anne C. Booth of the First
District Court of Appeal from 1987 to 1990. He concentrates his practice in commer-
cial litigation, with particular emphasis on representation of financial institutions.
1. The corporation is an "artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only
in contemplation of law." Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). Apart from the persons through whom it acts, "a corporation
is a mere incorporeal legal entity created by government." Smetal Corp. v. West Lake
Inv. Co., 126 Fla. 595, 626, 172 So. 58, 71 (1936).
2. Many towns and guilds sought protection for their business ventures by royal
charter from the eleventh century onward. B. TIERNEY & S. PAINTER, WESTERN Eu-
ROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 240 (2d ed. 1970). Joint stock companies became prevalent
as a means for funding and promoting overseas commerce in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries. R. K. WEBB, MODERN ENGLAND 17 (1968). The right to form joint
stock companies was severely limited in England after the disastrous collapse of specu-
lative stocks in the "South Sea Bubble" of 1720. Id. at 24-25 (1968). The original
purpose of joint stock companies was simply to spread the risk of an enterprise by
increasing the number of investors, as the investors were individually liable for the
company's obligations. Limited liability companies were not generally recognized until
the mid-nineteenth century. See id. at 17; LANDES, THE UNBOUND PROMETHEUS 198
(1969).
3. State ex rel. Continental Distilling Sales Co. v. Vocelle, 158 Fla. 100, 102, 27
So. 2d 728, 729 (1946). It is not considered fraudulent or contrary to public policy to
limit liability through use of the corporate form. Miller v. Honda Motor Co., 779 F.2d
769, 773 (lst Cir. 1985).
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corporation.' Even if ultimately exonerated from personal liability, cor-
porate officers and directors may be subjected to substantial expense
and anxiety in defending claims asserted against them.
In recent years, the exposure of officers and directors has greatly
expanded, 5 as new theories of liability are developed by plaintiffs in
search of a deep pocket. While a certain amount of personal accounta-
bility may be desirable,6 this trend may discourage qualified persons
from serving as officers and directors.'
Corporations have attempted to mitigate the risk to their officers
and directors by providing for their indemnification. The right to in-
demnification by an insolvent corporation may be of dubious value.
Nevertheless, the law governing corporate indemnification is of critical
concern where creditors are competing to recover against scarce corpo-
4. E.g., United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962)(corporate officer criminally
liable under Sherman Act, even though acts were committed in representative capacity
on behalf of corporation); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d. Cir.
1985) (corporate officer liable as "operator" for cleanup of toxic waste site under CER-
CLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607); Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d 902,
907 (1st Cir. 1980)(corporate officer liable for active direction or participation in tor-
tious conduct); Higbie v. Kopy-Kat, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 808, 810 (E.D. Pa. 1975)("well
established" that corporate officers and directors can be personally liable for antitrust
damages for participating in or ratifying unlawful acts); Shultz v. Chalk-Fitzgerald
Constr. Co., 309 F. Supp. 1255 (D. Mass. 1970) (corporate officers can be liable as
"employers" for unpaid overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), 216(b) (1988)); see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(i), 1813(u)(1)
(1988)("institution-affiliated party," which includes officers and directors, subject to
civil penalties for misconduct in the affairs of a federally insured financial institution);
26 U.S.C. §§ 3401(3), 3401(d) (1988)("employer," defined as person having control
over payment of wages, liable for unpaid withholding taxes). But see Joslyn Corp. v.
T.L. James Co., 696 F. Supp. 222 (W.D. La. 1988).
5. N. FEUER, PERSONAL LIABILITIES OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 9
(1974).
6. Formation of a corporation is not a matter of right, but a privilege granted by
the state. Cook v. J.T. Case Plow Works Co., 88 Fla. 421, 426-27, 96 So. 292, 294
(1923)(Whitfield, J., concurring). It therefore follows that the privilege should not be
abused by individuals seeking to avoid the consequences of their own wrongdoing.
7. See, e.g., 1987 Fla. Laws ch. 245, § 1(2)("The Legislature further finds that
the service of qualified persons on the governing boards of corporations. . .is in the
public interest and that. . .such persons should be permitted to perform without undue
concern for the possibility of litigation arising from the discharge of their duties as
policy makers. . . .")(preamble to enactment of legislation precluding corporate direc-
tors from suffering personal liability for money judgments for litigatior stemming from
corporate acts, subject to exceptions); M. SHAEFTLER, THE LIABILITIES OF OFFICE: IN-
DEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 2 (1976).
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rate assets, particularly where a victim of fraud or mismanagement
may be subordinated to the individual who caused his loss.
In the wake of the troubles in the savings and loan and banking
industry, and the failure of other businesses in the present economic
downturn, there will be increasing pressure to identify responsible par--
ties and hold them accountable. Conversely, corporate officers and di-
rectors will look to their indemnification rights, not only for actual re-
imbursement, but as a deterrent to potential plaintiffs.
This article will discuss the history of corporate indemnification,
its present status, and offer comment on how the law may be improved
to strike a better balance between the competing policies of promoting
business interests and encouraging responsible corporate conduct.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Prior to the enactment of statutory indemnification provisions, cor-
porate indemnification was a matter of contract and the common law.
If corporate articles and by-laws failed to provide for it, officers and
directors were generally not entitled to indemnification. 8 Like most
states, Florida developed little law on the topic. Some jurisdictions
evolved conflicting principles that failed to satisfy the corporate need
for certainty.9
Within the context of shareholders' derivative suits,'0 officers and
directors who did not prevail could rarely obtain indemnification, and
8. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIREC-
TORS § 20.01 (4th ed. 1988).
9. G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, JR., INDEMNIFYING THE CORPORATE EXECU-
TWIVE 79-82 (1963).
10. Shareholders' derivative suits are brought by plaintiffs purporting to act by
or in the right of the corporation, and usually challenge some aspect of management's
past or current actions. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1419 (6th ed. 1990) defines a
"stockholder's derivative action," as
[a]n action by a stockholder for purpose of sustaining in his own name a
right of action existing in the corporation itself, where corporation would
be an appropriate plaintiff. It is based upon two distinct wrongs: the act
whereby corporation was caused to suffer damage, and the act of corpora-
tion itself in refusing to redress such act.
These types of suits are entirely distinct from a shareholder's direct action, which is "a
suit by a stockholder to enforce a right of action existing in him." Wolfe v. American
Say. & Loan Assoc., 539 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989). Of course,
third parties may also assert claims against the corporation, its officers, and directors.
See e.g., cases cited supra note 4.
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could be held liable for misappropriation of corporate assets if they in-
demnified themselves over objection. 1 Distinctions eventually arose be-
tween officers and directors who acted in good faith in legitimate inter-
nal policy disputes, and those who were defeated in suits stemming
from purely personal power contests.' 2 The problem with this approach
was that power struggles are usually couched in the language of policy
disputes, and it became difficult to intelligently distinguish between
"personal" and "policy" disputes.13
The law was little clearer in cases involving officers and directors
who successfully defended derivative suits. Although some early deci-
sions assumed it was appropriate to indemnify successful officers and
directors, 4 subsequent cases distinguished situations where they were
successful, yet were sued on causes of action arising from personal
dealings only indirectly involving their corporate responsibilities. 15
Some states refined the standard by requiring successful officers
and directors seeking indemnification to demonstrate some direct bene-
fit to the corporation. However, the "direct benefit" requirement was
also unsatisfactory. Entirely blameless officers and directors were some-
times forced to bear the expense *of defending acts taken in their corpo-
rate capacities, due to failure to demonstrate that the litigation had
directly benefitted the corporation. In the landmark case of New York
Dock Co. v. McCollum, 6 a corporation and its directors were denied
indemnification despite their having successfully defended a derivative
suit seeking appointment of a receiver. After incurring substantial ex-
pense, the directors sought a declaration from the court that they were
entitled to indemnification. Although the court concluded that the cor-
poration had benefitted by avoiding appointment of the receiver, it de-
nied indemnification after finding that the successful defense was the
result of corporate counsel's efforts, rather than those of the defend-
ants. McCollum was widely criticized,' 7 and resulted in the 1941 en-
actment of the nation's first corporate indemnification statute.',
Direct benefit cases were based on the concept that, absent the
11. E.g., Wickersham v. Crittenden, 106 Cal. 329, 39 P. 603 (1895); Persey v.
Millaudon, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 68 (Orleans 1829).
12. G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, JR., supra note 9, at 79-82.
13. Id. at 81.
14. Id. at 83.
15. Id. at 84.
16. 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939).
17. See G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP JR., supra note 9, at 87-90.
18. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra note 8, at § 20.04.
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benefit, the corporation was without the power to indemnify.19 Some
jurisdictions rejected the direct benefit requirement, and reasoned that
successful officers and directors should be indemnified because they
should have no lesser rights than would a trustee at common law.20
These courts concluded that indirect benefits, such as demonstrating
corporate management's honesty, were of value to the corporation."'
Still other courts allowed indemnification following successful defense
upon the broader public policy grounds that without indemnification, it
might be difficult to induce responsible persons to accept corporate
office.
22
The law was also unclear in non-derivative actions such as suits
brought by third parties or criminal prosecutions. Some courts permit-
ted indemnification under an agency theory, and required a cause or
link between the action taken as an agent and the subsequent litigation.
In Hoch v. Duluth Brewing and Malting Co., 23 a corporate director
had briefly held title to a parcel of land as security for a debt to the
corporation. Many years after the debt was paid, the federal govern-
ment brought a civil fraud and conspiracy action against Hoch and
various others in the chain of title charging that they had conspired to
defraud the government of its land. Although the director defended
successfully, the court refused to allow indemnification. The court rea-
soned that the director's loss was caused by entirely unpredictable gov-
ernment misconduct, for which the corporation was in no way responsi-
ble.24 Other courts used the corporate benefit standard to find corporate
power to voluntarily indemnify unsuccessful directors who had benefit-
ted the corporation in the process of being defeated. 5
19. Frampton, Indemnification of Insiders' Litigation Expenses, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 325, 327 (1958).
20. Solimine v. Hollander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (1941)(trustees at
common law enjoyed right to indemnification, and corporate directors should enjoy the
same right, based on their similar responsibilities). Officers and directors occupy a fidu-
ciary or quasi fiduciary position, and though not technically trustees, occupy positions
of trust and have analogous duties. Etheredge v. Barrow, 102 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1958).
21. Solomine, 129 N.J. Eq. at 273, 19 A.2d at 348.
22. E.g., In re E.C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W. 2d 388 (1950).
23. 173 Minn. 374, 217 N.W. 503 (1928).
24. Id. at 375, 217 N.W. at 504.
25. See, e.g., Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1942), afl'd mem. 267 A.D. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (N.Y. App. Div.
1944)(director's plea of nolo contendere facilitated settlement of separate criminal an-
titrust charges against the corporation).
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Florida courts did not address these particular issues, however,
Florida common law did require corporations to reimburse expenses
necessarily incurred by corporate officers in the performance of their
corporate duties, where the performance of those duties conferred a
benefit on the corporation.2" The obligation was based on an implied
contract theory.
III. FLORIDA STATUTORY HISTORY
After the McCollum case, nearly all jurisdictions adopted statutes
permitting officer and director indemnification in various circum-
stances.28 Florida's first statutes on the subject were former sections
608.13 and 608.131, enacted in 1963.29
Under section 608.13(14), corporations had the power to indem-
nify officers and directors in suits by or in the right of the corporation
for reasonable fees and expenses "actually and necessarily incurred" in
defense or settlement, except where the officers or directors were ad-
judged guilty of negligence or misconduct in the performance of their
corporate duties.30 Under subsection (15), applicable to third party ac-
tions including criminal proceedings, corporations were authorized to
indemnify officers and directors for reasonable expenses "actually and
necessarily incurred as a result" of the proceeding. This included
amounts paid in settlement, to satisfy judgments, or in paying fines.
The indemnification for defensive actions under subsection (15) was
considerably broader than for suits as plaintiff under subsection (14),
which did not provide for indemnification of amounts paid in
settlement. 3
However, persons seeking indemnification in third party actions
were required to demonstrate a good faith reasonable belief that their
actions were taken "in the best interests of the corporation. 32 In crimi-
nal proceedings, the officer or director was also required to prove that
he had no reasonable ground for belief that his actions were unlawful.
The statute further provided that termination of civil or criminal ac-
26. Flight Equip. and Eng'g Corp. v. Shelton, 103 So. 2d 615, 1525 (Fla. 1958).
27. Id.
28. N. FEUER, supra note 5, at 205.
29. 1963 Fla. Laws ch. 286; § 1, ch. 304, § 1.
30. FLA. STAT. § 608.13(14) (1963) (repealed 1975).
31. Compare FLA. STAT. § 608.13(14) with FLA. STAT. § 608.13(15) (1963) (re-
pealed 1975).
. 32. § 608.13(15).
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tions by settlement, conviction, judgment or plea of nolo contendere did
not itself create a presumption that the above standards were vio-
lated. 3 The power to indemnify under section 608.13 existed unless
otherwise provided by the corporation's certificate of incorporation.3 4
Section 608.131(5) allowed successful plaintiffs in derivative ac-
tions to obtain the reasonable expenses of maintaining the suit, includ-
ing attorneys' fees. 5 Under subsection (4), plaintiffs holding less than
five percent of the corporation's outstanding shares could be required to
post. security for reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, for
which the corporation might become liable for indemnification under
section 608.13(14). The security provisions were designed to prevent
so-called "strike suits" by shareholders, and did not apply to plaintiffs
owning stock valued in excess of $50,000.00.7
The 1963 indemnification statutes remained unchanged until 1970
and 1971, when they were substantially expanded. Under the 1971
statute, not only parties, but those threatened to be made parties, could
be indemnified.38 Additionally,, the expenses to be indemnified did not
have to be incurred in an action, but could also be incurred in a
"threatened, pending or completed action, suit or proceeding." 39 Under
subsection 14(a), applicable to non-derivative actions, the class of per-
sons eligible for indemnification was expanded from officers and direc-
tors to include employees and agents.4 0 Additionally, indemnification
was made available to those affiliated with partnerships, joint ventures,
trusts or other enterprises.4 1 These expansions also applied to derivative
actions. 2
The 1971 statute also significantly changed the provisions applica-
ble to derivative actions. Indemnification was only available upon meet-
33. Id.
34. FLA. STAT. § 608.13 (1963) (repealed 1975).
35. FLA. STAT. § 608.131(5) (1963) (repealed 1975).
36. FLA. STAT. § 608.131(4) (1963) (repealed 1975).
37. See Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Peters, 175 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1965); "Strike suits" are defined as derivative actions brought by shareholders with the
ulterior purpose of inducing the defendants to buy the plaintiff's shares. Leppert v.
Lakebreeze Homeowners Assoc., Inc., 500 So. 2d 250, 252 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1987).
38. FLA. STAT. § 608.13(14) (1971).
39. Id.
40. § 608.13(14)(a).
41. Id.
42. § 608.13(14)(b).
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ing the good faith and reasonable belief standards already applicable to
third party actions.4" However, the former statute's automatic exclu-
sion from indemnification of those adjudged guilty of negligence or
misconduct was relaxed to allow indemnification, if the court approved
in view of all the circumstances."
In addition to altering the requirements for permissive indemnifi-
cation in derivative and third party actions, the 1971 statute also incor-
porated the first mandatory indemnification provision. Under subsec-
tion 14(c), indemnification of expenses "actually and necessarily
incurred" was available to those found "successful on the merits or oth-
erwise in defense of any action, suit or [other] proceeding . . . or in
defense of any claim, issue or matter therein."' 5
The statute also provided mechanisms for approval of permissive
indemnification, and broadened its availability. Subsection 14(d) estab-
lished a requirement that permissive indemnification be approved by a
majority vote of a quorum of disinterested members of the board of
directors, or by non-party shareholders.46 Under subsection (15), corpo-
rations were also empowered to advance expenses prior to the conclu-
sion of the suit. This also required a majority vote of a quorum of disin-
terested directors or a majority vote of disinterested shareholders, and
required that the person to be indemnified, or someone on his behalf,
undertake to repay the advancement if it was not ultimately deter-
mined that indemnification was appropriate. 7 Subsection (16) created
a non-exclusivity provision expressly recognizing that statutory indem-
nification under subsections (14) and (15) did not preclude other in-
demnification rights created under "by-law, agreement, vote of share-
holders or disinterested directors, or otherwise."48 Additionally,
indemnification under subsections (14) and (15) was available for ac-
tions taken in an official capacity, or taken in another capacity while
holding office. 49 Moreover, such indemnification was required to con-
tinue after the official's position terminated, and to inure to the benefit
of the indemnitee's heirs, executors, and administrators."°
Finally, under subsection (17), Florida adopted its first provision
43. Id.; cf. FLA. STAT. § 608.13(15).
44. Id.
45. FLA. STAT. § 608.13(14)(c) (1971) (repealed 1975).
46. § 608.13(14)(d).
47. § 608.13(15).
48. § 608.13(16).
49. Id.
50. Id.
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allowing corporations to purchase and maintain directors' and officers'
insurance. Such insurance could cover any liability asserted based upon
acts in an official corporate capacity, or upon official status, and was
not limited by the constraints of subsection (14).51
These statutes remained unchanged until 1975, when they were
automatically repealed.52 Following repeal, the Legislature enacted a
substantially revised statutory scheme based on the 1969 Model Corpo-
ration Business Act.53 These revisions were part of the first comprehen-
sive overhaul of Florida's corporation act since 1953,5" but the new
statute did not enact the Model Act verbatim.55 The principal purpose
of the revisions was described as clarification." However, review of the
1975 statute demonstrates that a number of substantive changes were
implemented.
The new statute, section 607.014, relaxed the permissive indemni-
fication requirement from good faith and a reasonable belief that the
acts taken were in the best interest of the corporation, to good faith
belief that the acts taken were "not opposed to" the best interests of
the corporation.5 7 The statute also permitted indemnification of ex-
penses "actually and reasonably incurred,"58 although the prior statute
required that the expenses be "actually and necessarily incurred." Sec-
tion 607.014(5), providing for advancement of expenses, was clarified
to require a finding that the subsection (1) or subsection (2) "good
faith" and "reasonable belief' standards had been met.51 Under sub-
51. § 608.13(17). The statute was also designed to facilitate the speedy provision
of a defense during litigation. See SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT
STATEMENT, S.B. 1096, 10th Leg. (April 23, 1987) ("[s]ince the section permits insur-
ance coverage in areas not clearly indemnifiable by the corporation, directors and
others were able to arrange with an insurance carrier for the funding of legal fees
associated with the defense of a claim without having a preliminary determination by
• . .procedures defined in the statute").
52. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 250, § 139.
53. SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, S.B. 1096,
10th Leg. (April 23, 1987).
54. SENATE JUDICIARY-CIVIL COMMITTEE, STAFF ANALYSIS, S.B. 520, 4th Leg.
(May 23, 1975).
55. Id.
56. Letter from C. McFerrin Smith, III, Executive Director to the Law Revision
Council, to the Office of the Governor (June 9, 1975).
57. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(1)(2) (1975) (repealed 1989); STAFF ANALYSIS, H.B.
1395, 4th Leg. (1975).
58. § 607.014(1)(2).
59. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(5) (1975) (repealed 1989).
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section (6), the non-exclusivity provision was also clarified and set new
limits. Under the new non-exclusivity provision, applicable to permis-
sive indemnification by the corporation but not to court-approved in-
demnification as otherwise provided, indemnification was not allowed
for acts involving gross negligence or willful misconduct.60 Addition-
ally, under subsection (9), corporations were required to provide notice
to shareholders of indemnifications not authorized by a court, by the
shareholders themselves, or paid for by insurance.6'
Section 608.131 was also renumbered to 607.147 and revised.6 2 In
addition, the Legislature enlarged the potential class of derivative
plaintiffs by including those who were stockholders at the time of suit,
although not necessarily at the time a cause of action accrued.6 3 The
Legislature also enacted the first provision authorizing co3urts to order
unsuccessful plaintiffs to pay the defendants' reasonable expenses, in-
cluding attorneys' fees, where the action was brought "without reasona-
ble cause." 64
The 1975 version remained virtually unchanged until 1980, when
the Legislature created a new alternative to approval of indemnification
by disinterested directors or shareholder vote. Section 607.014(4)(b)
permitted approval of indemnification by written opinion of indepen-
dent legal counsel, in the absence of a quorum of disinterested direc-
tors, or if directed by such a quorum. 5 Additionally, section
607.014(5) was amended to provide that only the board of directors
could authorize advance indemnification.66 A 1981 amendment made
clear that the Legislature intended the subsection (6) non-exclusivity
provisions to apply equally to officers, directors, employees and
agents.67
IV. THE CURRENT STATUTE
The statute was substantially revised in 1987, and again in 1989.
60. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(6) (1975 (repealed 1989).
61. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(9) (1975) (repealed 1989).
62. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 80-349, § 50.
63. FLA. STAT. § 607.147(1) (1975) (repealed 1989).
64. FLA. STAT. § 607.147(4) (1975) (repealed 1989). However, the possibility of
an unsuccessful plaintiff having to pay fees was apparently contemplated under former
section 608.131(4).
65. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 349, § 1.
66. Id.
67. 1981 Fla. Laws ch. 155, § 2.
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The 1989 revisions updated the entire Corporation Act to more closely
follow the Revised Model Business Corporation Act adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1984.8 The statute was further reorga-
nized in 1990, but the present indemnification provisions are substan-
tially unchanged from the 1987 version.69
In 1987, section 607.014(2), which applies to derivative suits, was
amended to permit indemnification of amounts paid in settlement
which did not exceed the board of directors' estimate of the expense
necessary to litigate the proceeding to a conclusion. 0 Previously, only
amounts paid in settlement of third patty actions could be indemnified.
The purpose of the amendment was to encourage settlement of deriva-
tive actions.7 1 Additionally, the previous restrictions on permissive in-
demnification of those found liable for negligence or misconduct were
broadened to include all those found liable in a proceeding. The more
liberal restriction, however, did not apply to court-ordered indemnifica-
tion.72 The Legislature also provided that any court of competent juris-
diction, not only the one where the proceeding was brought, could order
indemnification.7 3
Subsection (4) was also expanded in 1987 to allow indemnification
approval by a committee designated by the board of directors. 74 Inter-
ested directors could participate in selecting the committee.7 5 Addition-
ally, if independent legal counsel was utilized, the means of selecting
that counsel was expanded to permit selection by a disinterested board
committee.7 6 Subsection (5) was amended to provide that independent
legal counsel could determine whether permissive indemnification con-
68. SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, S.B. 1460,
1 lth Leg. (March 9, 1990); SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATE-
MENT, S.B. 0851, 1lth Leg. (May 9, 1989).
69. The text of the pertinent provisions of the current statute is set out in the
Appendix, infra.
70. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(2) (1987) (repealed 1989).
71. SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, S.B. 1096,
10th Leg. (April 23, 1987). The apparent rationale was that there was no prejudice to
the corporation in paying monies which would otherwise be spent in litigation. How-
ever, projecting litigation expenses is such a subjective exercise that management could
conceivably justify almost any settlement.
72. § 607.014(2).
73. Id.
74. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(4)(b) (1987) (repealed 1989).
75. Id.
76. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(4)(c)(1)(2) (1987) (repealed 1989); SENATE STAFF
ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, S.B. 1096, 10th Leg. (April 23, 1987).
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duct standards were met, but could not authorize the indemnification."
Subsection (6) was amended to make advancement of expenses
virtually automatic upon a promise to repay, and to put the burden on
the corporation to determine whether the party receiving advancement
was not ultimately entitled and should repay after the conclusion of the
action.78 For employees and agents, even a promise to repay was unnec-
essary for advancement.7 9 Under subsection (7), the non-exclusivity
provision was clarified to demonstrate that it applied to advancement.8"
However, it was limited because it provided that indemnification was
not allowed where a person's acts were material to a cause of action
and (1) violated the criminal law without reasonable cause to believe
that the conduct was lawful, (2) resulted in an officer receiving an im-
proper personal benefit, (3) involved an improper dividend distribution,
or (4) in derivative actions, involved willful misconduct or conscious
disregard for the best interests of the corporation. 8' The effect of these
amendments was to sharply curtail the statute's non-exclusivity provi-
sions for permissive indemnification. However, in the case of corporate
directors, this was offset by the 1987 enactment of new liability limita-
tions precluding a director's personal liability for monetary damages
unless serious misconduct was demonstrated. 82
The continuing indemnification provisions of subsection (8) were
amended to clarify their application to advancement, as well as indem-
nification. They were also amended to allow corporations, at the time
they initially authorized indemnification or advancement, to limit its
extent for persons no longer officers, directors, employees or agents, or
their heirs.83 Subsection (9) was also amended. The new version pro-
vided that unless a corporation's articles of incorporation stated other-
wise, persons seeking indemnification or advancement could apply di-
rectly to a court.84 Subsections (10) and (11) defined terms under the
statute, and expanded the term "agent" to include volunteers.85 Addi-
tionally, the "not opposed to the best interests of the corporation" stan-
77. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(5) (1987) (repealed 1989).
78. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(6) (1987) (repealed 1989); SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS
AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, S.B. 1096, 10th Leg. (April 23, 1987).
79. § 607.014(6).
80. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(7) (1987) (repealed (1989).
81. Id.
82. See 1989 Fla. Laws ch. 154, § 85.
83. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(8) (1987) (repealed 1989).
84. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(9)(a)(b)(c) (1987) (repealed 1989).
85. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(11)(e) (1987) (repealed 1989).
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dard was defined to include consideration of the best interests of the
participants and beneficiaries of employee benefit plans."'
The 1987 Legislature also supplemented the indemnification provi-
sions with new sections 607.1645 and 607.165, limiting corporate direc-
tors' personal liability for money judgments stemming from acts or fail-
ures to act concerning corporate management or policy decisions.8 7
Under the new sections, directors were exempted from personal liability
to the corporation, or any other persons, for acts or omissions regarding
corporate management or policy, unless the director breached or other-
wise failed to perform his duties and (1) violated the criminal law with-
out reasonable cause to believe his conduct was lawful, (2) was en-
gaged in a transaction from which he derived an improper personal
benefit, (3) made an improper distribution, (4) engaged in willful mis-
conduct or consciously disregarded the best interests of the corporation
in a shareholders' derivative proceeding, or (5) in a non-derivative pro-
ceeding, committed reckless, bad faith, or malicious acts exhibiting
willful and wanton disregard of human rights, safety or property. 8
"Recklessness" was defined as a director's conscious disregard of a risk
known, or so obvious that it should have been known, and from which
harm was "highly probable" to follow.89
Certain limitations precluded a finding of improper personal bene-
fit where the benefit and underlying transaction were not prohibited by
state or federal authorities.90 In non-derivative actions, a finding of im-
proper personal benefit is precluded where the benefit was disclosed,
approved by the directors or shareholders, and is fair and reasonable.9 1
Although a judgment or "other final adjudication" against a director in
a criminal proceeding estopped him from contesting that his acts were
a violation of the criminal law,92 the director was still entitled to at-
tempt to prove that he had reasonable cause to believe his conduct was
lawful, or no reasonable cause to believe it was unlawful.9 3
Although this provision might appear to sharply curtail the need
for director indemnification, it applies only to judgments, and has no
86. FLA. STAT. § 607.014(11)(g) (1987) (repealed 1989).
87. 1987 Fla. Laws. ch. 245, § 5, 6; FLA. STAT. §§ 607.1645, 607.165 (1987)
(repealed 1989).
88. § 607.1645(1).
89. § 607.1645(2).
90. § 607.165(1).
91. § 607.165(1)(a)(b)(c).
92. § 607.1645(1)(b).
93. Id.
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effect on a director's potential liability for attorneys! fees and other
expenses of defense, or monies paid in settlement. To date, no judicial
decisions have interpreted the statute.
In 1989, no significant amendments were made to Section 607.014
pertaining to indemnification in general. 94 However, in 1990, the Legis-
lature renumbered the statute as section 607.0850.95 As part of its stat-
utory reorganization, the Legislature separated subsection (13) indem-
nification notice requirements from the rest of the indemnification
statute. The new notice provisions are found at newly created section
607.1621.96 The Legislature also reenacted former section 607.147,
pertaining to derivative actions, which had been automatically repealed
in 1989,11 as new section 607.07401. 91 Under the current version, a
court may no longer require shareholders' derivative suit plaintiffs to
post security for the reasonable costs and expenses of the action." The
new director liability limitation provisions were also combined, renum-
bered and transferred to section 607.0831.100
Subsection (1) of section 607.0850 provides for indemnification in
third party actions and continues to employ the "good faith" and "rea-
sonable belief" standards for actions taken in, or not opposed to, the
best interests of the corporation. 10 1 In criminal proceedings, indemnifi-
cation remains available if the person had no reasonable cause to be-
lieve his conduct was unlawful. 10 2 Subsection (2), applicable to actions
by or in the right of the corporation, also continues to utilize the "good
faith" and "reasonable belief" standards. However, it precludes indem-
nification for persons adjudged liable unless the court concludes that
indemnification is "fair and reasonable" under the circumstances. 10 3
No standards are articulated to assist the court in making its
94. See generally SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT,
S.B. 0851, 11th Leg. (May 9, 1989).
95. FLA. STAT. § 607.0850 (1990); SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IM-
PACT STATEMENT, S.B. 1460, 1lth Leg. (March 9, 1990).
96. FLA. STAT. § 607.1621 (1990).
97. 1989 Fla. Laws ch. 154, § 166.
98. 1990 Fla. Laws ch. 179, § 148.
99. Compare FLA. STAT. § 607.147 (1975) (repealed 1989) with FLA. STAT. §
607.07401 (1990).
100. 1989 Fla. Laws ch. 154, § 85.
101. FLA. STAT. § 607.0850(1) (1990).
102. Id.
103. § 607.0850(2).
1370 [Vol. 15
442
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/18
Jennings & Horky
determination.0 4
Subsection (3) continues to provide mandatory indemnification for
officers, directors, agents and employees who are "successful on the
merits or otherwise" in defense of a proceeding.1 0 5 Subsection (4) limits
the corporation to permissively' indemnify only those persons meeting
subsection (1) and (2) standards, and prescribes who may make the
determination."' 8 Subsection (5) provides a method for determining
whether claimed expenses are reasonable, and continues to limit inde-
pendent legal counsel to determining whether indemnification should be
allowed while requiring others to set the amounts.1 7 Advance indemni-
fication remains available under subsection (6),108 and the subsection
(7) non-exclusivity provisions remain intact although subject to excep-
tions.109 Under subsection (8), indemnification and advancement re-
main.110 Under subsection (9), a court of competent jurisdiction re-
mains empowered to order indemnification upon application and proof
of certain standards.1 Subsections (10) and (11) provide various defi-
nitions and subsection (12) allows a corporation to purchase directors'
and officers' insurance." 2 Section 607.1621 continues to require notice
to shareholders for indemnification other than by court order, insur-
ance, or the shareholders themselves.11 3 The notice must be sent prior
to the next shareholders' meeting, and requires specification of the per-
sons paid, amounts paid, and the nature of the litigation involved.11 4
Under section 617.028, section 607.0850 indemnification is also
available to the directors, managers and trustees of non-profit corpora-
tions and rural electric cooperatives. 115 The section 607.0831 director
liability limitation provisions remain unchanged from the 1989 version,
b~ut former section 607.147(4) provisions providing for payment of ex-
penses including attorneys' fees in shareholders' derivative actions
brought without reasonable cause, was rewritten when it was trans-
104. Id.
105. § 607.0850(3).
106. § 607.0850(4).
107. § 607.0850(5).
108. § 607.0850(6).
109. § 607.0850(7).
110. § 607.0850(8).
111. § 607.0850(9)(a)(b)(c).
112. § 607.0850(10)(11)(12).
113. FLA. STAT. § 607.1621(1) (1990).
114. Id.
115. FLA. STAT. § 617.028 (1990).
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ferred to section 607.07401(5).
V. ANALYSIS AND COMMENT
A. Derivative Actions
Although not strictly speaking an indemnification statute, the pro-
visions of current statute section 607.07401(5)(a) effectively supple-
ment Florida's statutory indemnification scheme and provide as follows:
"On termination of the proceeding, the court may require the plaintiff
to pay any defendant's reasonable expenses, including reasonable attor-
neys' fees, incurred in defending the proceeding if it finds that the pro-
ceeding was commenced without reasonable cause.""' 6
Several points concerning section 607.07401(5) merit comment.
First, the claim for fees arises upon "termination of the proceeding."
Former statute section 607.147(4) applied only "upon final judg-
ment,""' 7 apparently barring any claim on a case settled short of
judgment.
Second, the court must find that the proceeding was brought with-
out reasonable cause, which has been interpreted to require that there
be no merit to any of the claims advanced against any of the parties. In
Winner v. Cataldo,"8 the Third District Court of Appeal observed that
to allow a single successful defendant fees against the plaintiff would
have a chilling effect on meritorious derivative claims. Perhaps the
court was concerned that minority shareholders would ordinarily not be
in a position to determine which of the officers or directors were at
fault, and believed it was appropriate to permit the plaintiff to sue
them all and require the defendants to establish among themselves who
was responsible."l 9
However, as the award of fees is purely discretionary, the deter-
rent effect against meritless claims is questionable. The defendant
could establish a stronger claim to fees merely by offering a nominal
settlement under Rule 1.442, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. 20
116. FLA. STAT. § 607.07401(5) (1990).
117. Compare FLA. STAT. § 607.147(4) (1975) (repealed 1989) with FLA. STAT.
§ 607.07401(5) (1990).
118. 559 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
119. See, e.g., Bowman v. Redding & Co., 449 F.2d 956, 967-68 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Vahey v. Sacin, 126 Cal. App. 3d 171, 178 Cal. Rptr. 559 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1981)(burden on defendant to show which of multiple tortfeasors caused the harm).
120. The court may impose sanctions equal to reasonable attorneys' fees and all
1372 [Vol. 15
444
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/18
Jennings & Horky
The absence of reasonable cause is a difficult standard in view of
the modest requirements for bringing a derivative suit. Cases interpret-
ing earlier versions of the statute held that plaintiff stockholders were
not required to have direct knowledge of misconduct in order to bring a
derivative action.12' If the record reflected colorable support for the
claims asserted, the action was considered viable.'22 The current statute
requires a verified complaint alleging with particularity the action
taken to obtain remedial board action, but does not otherwise appear to
require direct knowledge.'2 3 Additionally, the plaintiff need not be a
stockholder at the time the action is brought; it is sufficient if he was a
stockholder at the time the cause of action arose. 124
Finally, as "reasonable cause" is understood to be something less
than "probable cause,' 25 and initiating an action without probable
cause is actionable as malicious prosecution, 26 there appears to be lit-
tle if any benefit to asserting a claim for fees under section
607.07401(5). A successful defendant who could establish the absence
of probable cause in a separate action would be absolutely entitled to
recover. The same defendant claiming fees at the conclusion of a suc-
cessful defense against a derivative action could recover only if he
could satisfy the more stringent absence of reasonable cause standard,
and recovery would still be subject to the virtually unbridled discretion
of the trial court.
Balanced against the defendant's potential indemnification or re-
covery of fees is the successful plaintiff's claim for fees. Section
607.07401(6) permits the court to award the successful plaintiff in a
derivative action his reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees. 27
The court must first find, however, some benefit to the corporation or
reasonable costs of the litigation from the date of an offer of judgment which was
unreasonably rejected, where the damages awarded to the offeree are less than 75 per-
cent of the offer. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(h), superseding in part FLA. STAT. §§ 768.79,
45.061 (1990). See The Florida Bar Re: Amendment to Rules, 550 So. 2d 442 (Fla.
1989).
121. DiGiovanni v. All-Pro Golf, Inc., 332 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1976).
122. Id. at 94.
123. FLA. STAT. § 607.07401(2) (1990).
124. § 607.07401(l).
125. United States v. Hernandez-Salazar, 813 F.2d 1126, 1133 (1lth Cir. 1987).
126. See Burns v. GCC Beverages, 502 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 1986).
127. FLA. STAT. § 607.07401(6) (1990). See infra Appendix.
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the other shareholders. 2 "
The defendants cannot thwart recovery by voluntarily granting the
plaintiff's requested relief before judgment. Where the case is rendered
moot by corporate action, the corporation has the burden of establish-
ing the action was not caused by the lawsuit.' 29 However, although sec-
tion 607.07401(4) requires court approval for settlement of derivative
claims, and subsections (5) and (6) permit the court to award fees, the
court is without authority to require payment of fees as part of a
settlement.' °
B. Other Indemnification
Little case law interprets the permissive indemnification provisions
of section 607.0850 and its predecessor statutory versions. As earlier
outlined, sections 607.0850(1),(2) and (9), Florida Statutes, permit a
corporation to indemnify its officers and directors, and subsection (6)
permits advancement of expenses of defense prior to determination of
the controversy.' These provisions are subject only to the conflict of
interest limitations of section 607.0850(4), which generally require the
interested officer or director to abstain from the corporation's determi-
nation of indemnification.
Although it has been argued that the language of subsection (4)
implies that the court may order indemnification under sections (1) or
(2) if the corporation refuses, the Third District Court of Appeal ruled
in Mosley v. DeMoya 32 that these provisions merely permit the corpo-
ration to indemnify if it sees fit.
The only mandatory indemnification provision is found in
607.0850(3)."33 Subsection (3) mandatory indemnification is self-exe-
cuting, and does not depend on a corporation's enactment of an ena-
128. Id.; see also Lane v. Head, 566 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1990); United Parts, Inc.
v. Tillis, 432 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983)(both interpreting former section
607.147(5), Florida Statutes).
129. Ginsberg v. Keehn, 550 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989)(inter-
preting former section 607.147(5), Florida Statutes).
130. Levenson v. American Laser Corp., 438 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (interpreting former section 607.147(2)(5), Florida Statutes).
131. FLA. STAT. § 607.0850(1),(2) and (9) (1990). See infra Appendix.
132. 497 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986)(interpreting former section
607.014(1)(2)(4), Florida Statutes).
133. See infra Appendix.
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bling provision in its articles of incorporation or elsewhere. 34 The only
apparent limitation on this entitlement to indemnification is that the
conduct giving rise to the claim must not have been ultra vires. 1 5 Al-
though Florida's jurisprudence has not addressed any particularly egre-
gious examples of claims arising from corporate status but based upon
ultra vires acts of corporate officials, the problem has occasionally
arisen in other states with similar statutes. 36
The "successful on the merits or otherwise" language is one of the
statute's more controversial provisions and has not been uniformly
adopted by all Model Act jurisdictions. Under the Model Act and stat-
utes following it, a defense must be "wholly successful on the merits or
otherwise."' 3 Other jurisdictions have adopted the more rigorous stan-
dard of "successful on the merits."' 38 It is difficult to understand why
adding "or otherwise" was deemed necessary. A defendant who
prevails for any reason is absolutely entitled to indemnification, which
is the identical result achieved if the statute simply required indemnifi-
cation for any successful defendant. Equally mysterious is why the
Legislature determined that a corporate defendant who escaped liabil-
ity on a mere technicality should be entitled to indemnification at all.
Although the proponents of the Model Business Corporation Act ex-
plained that it would be "unreasonable to require a defendant with a
valid procedural defense to undergo a possibly prolonged and expensive
trial on the merits in order to establish eligibility for mandatory indem-
134. Penthouse North Ass'n, Inc. v. Lombardi, 436 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App, 1983)(interpreting former section 607.014(3), Florida Statutes).
135. See, State ex rel. Blatt v. Panelfab Int'l Corp., 314 So. 2d. 196 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1975)(mandamus compelling indemnification under former section
607.014(3), Florida Statutes, inappropriate for successful defense of criminal charges
where record disclosed a fact dispute as to whether the underlying conduct resulted in
whole or in part from conduct outside scope of corporate duties).
136. E.g., Kaufman v. CBS, Inc., 135 Misc. 2d 64, 514 N.Y.S.2d 621 (N.Y.
City Civ. Ct. 1987). Kaufman, a former CBS vice president, was sued by a female
employee for a variety of intentional torts after he allegedly "grabbed" a piece of her
clothing and made a lewd remark about her at a business dinner. Interpreting New
York's analogous statute, the court found that the conduct was an "obvious deviation"
from Kaufman's work responsibilities and could not reasonably be construed as an act
within the scope of employment. Id., 514 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
137. Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 1120.1 (3d ed. 1984).
138. See American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Schigur, 148 Cal. Rptr. 116, 83
Cal. App. 3d 799 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)(construing CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(d) (West
1977)).
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nification,"'' 9 this does not explain why the expenses of the litigation
should be shifted from the wrongdoer to the corporation. Officers and
directors who happen to be sued and win should be required to make a
case to the corporation for permissive indemnification, or at very least
be subject to the "good faith" and "reasonable belief" requirements of
section 607.0850(1) and (2).
Moreover, Florida's omission of the Model Act's "wholly success-
ful" standard may make it necessary to indemnify those who are par-
tially successful in defending an action but may be unsuccessful as a
whole. Jurisdictions lacking this language have faced difficult problems
in separating expenses subject to indemnification from those which are
not. In Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 4 " a Delaware
court was forced to determine whether a criminal defendant who had
successfully obtained dismissal of a federal securities fraud element of
a conspiracy count, but was later convicted on the count, was entitled
to mandatory indemnification. Although the court concluded that Dela-
ware's indemnification statute 41 did not allow indemnification for this
type of partial success, another appellate panel subsequently had to re-
solve whether Wolfson was entitled to mandatory indemnification for
dismissal of some counts despite conviction on others. Reasoning that
statutory language did not require success in all aspects of' the suit, and
that in a criminal action, any result other than a conviction was a suc-
cess, the court concluded that Wolfson was entitled to indemnification
for counts dismissed under a plea bargain agreement.1 42
What constitutes "success on the merits or otherwise" has been
heavily litigated. Voluntary dismissals with prejudice,' 43 dismissals for
failure to post security for expenses (even where the suit was subse-
quently refiled),' 44 failure to indict following an investigation, 45 dismis-
sal of some although not all charges, 46 outright acquittal, 41 a plaintiff
139. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra note 8, at § 20.11.
140. 264 A.2d 358 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970)[hereinafter "Wolfson I"].
141. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1969).
142. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A. 2d 138 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1974)[hereinafter "Wolfson Ir'].
143. B&B Inv. Club v. Kleinert's, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
144. Tichner v. Andrews, 193 Misc. 1050, 85 N.Y.S.2d 760 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1949).
145. Stewart v. Continental Copper & Steel Indus., Inc., 67 A.D. 293, 414
N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
146. Wolfson 1, 264 A.2d 358.
147. Green v. Westcap Corp., 492 A.2d 260 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985); PS&S, Inc.
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voluntarily requesting a non-suit,148 and dismissal with prejudice due to
bar by the statute of limitations, 149 have all been found encompassed
within the phrase "or otherwise."
Some courts have found it necessary to draw a line -and refuse
indemnification for technical successes without substantive meaning. In
Galdi v. Berg,5 ' a federal district court construing Delaware's indem-
nification statute refused to permit indemnification for a defendant af-
ter the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its case without prejudice. The
court noted that another suit was currently being litigated which in-
volved exactly the same issues, arid concluded that despite the dismis-
sal, the issue remained unresolved because it survived in the other suit.
Accordingly, the court determined that the defendant had failed to ob-
tain success on the merits or otherwise. In another instance, a court
technically required to acquit a defendant of criminal charges, ex-
pressed its belief that the defendant should or would still be punished
in civil actions."5 Nevertheless, that same defendant subsequently ob-
tained indemnification for his successful defense of the criminal
charges after the court concluded that Delaware's subsection 145(a)
and 145(b) requirements for good faith, were not incorporated by ref-
erence into section 145(c) "successful on the merits or otherwise"
standard. 52
In the context of the current troubles with failed financial institu-
tions, the Office of Thrift Supervision has promulgated regulations al-
lowing administrative authorities to object to indemnification of some
former savings and loan officers and directors under applicable statutes.
Under the federal regulations, the objection will automatically prohibit
indemnification. 5
Eliminating the "or otherwise" language would limit required in-
demnification, to situations where a judicial determination has been
made on the merits. For example, in American National Bank and
v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. App. 3d 354, 94 Cal. Rptr. 738 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist.
1971).
148. Stanley v. Brassfield, Cowan & Howard, 152 Il. App. 378, 504 N.E.2d 542
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
149. Dornan v. Humphrey, 278 A.D. 1010, 106 N.Y.S.2d 142 (N.Y. App. Div.
1951).
150. 359 F. Supp. 698 (D. Del. 1973).
151. Green, 492 A.2d 260.
152. Id. These provisions are analogous to section 607.0850(1)(2)(3), Florida
Statutes. See infra Appendix.
153. 12 C.F.R. § 545.121(c)(2)(iii)(1990).
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Trust Co. v. Schigur,15" a California court refused to allow mandatory
indemnification following a settlement and voluntary dismissal with
prejudice. Contrasting the California provision requiring "success on
the merits"' 155 with the Model Act provision requiring "success on the
merits or otherwise," the court held that because the merits were not
judicially determined, no indemnification was required. 56
Since permissive indemnification is still available under subsec-
tions (1) and (2) of Florida Statutes section 607.0850, elimination of
the "or otherwise" language would still allow indemnification in most
situations where procedural defenses prevailed, should the corporation
decide it was appropriate. If, as suggested by some courts, the purpose
of the mandatory indemnification provision is to prevent vindicated of-
ficers and directors from a corporation's refusal to indemnify after
change in management, this problem could be treated by drafting a
mandatory indemnification provision broad enough to encompass ad-
verse managerial shifts while not requiring mandatory indemnification
of those who escape liability other than on the merits. 57
Further statutory clarification of mandatory indemnification may
also be necessary in other contexts. At least one court has concluded
that the word "successful" requires appellate finality, thereby preclud-
ing mandatory indemnification where a judgment has been rendered in
an officer's or director's favor but an appeal still remains pending. 58
Other courts have wrestled with the necessity of indemnifying former
attorneys for corporations who successfully defend malpractice suits
brought against them by their prior clients. In this context, a California
court concluded in Katayama v. Interpacific Properties, Inc.,59 that
former corporate counsel was clearly "an agent" of the corporation and
was encompassed within the meaning of section 317(d) of California's
Corporation Act'6 0 during the time he represented the corporation and
committed the acts for which he was later sued. The court found the
statute "straightforward and unambiguous" and held that its "literal
terms" required considering attorneys as agents for the corporation
154. 83 Cal. App. 3d 790, 148 Cal. Rptr. 116 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
155. Cal. Corp. Code § 317(d) (West 1988).
156. Schigur, 83 Cal. App. 3d 790, 148 Cal. Rptr. 116.
157. See Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, 789 P.2d 34
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
158. Luessier v. Mau-Van Dev., Inc., 4 Haw. App. 421, 667 P.2d 830 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1983).
159. 190 Cal. App. 3d 1604, 236 Cal. Rptr. 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
160. This section is analogous to section 607.0850(3), Florida Statutes.
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who would therefore be eligible for indemnification upon successfully
defending a legal malpractice action.16 1
However, at least one other court reached precisely the opposite
conclusion. In Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McCorkie & Bush-
nell,162 a Utah court decided that "agent" as defined by section 16-10-
4(2)(c), Utah Statutes,'63 did not include law firms engaged by corpo-
rations to give legal advice. The would-be "agent" seeking indemnifica-
tion in Western Fiberglass was an attorney sued for malpractice after
rendering advice to a corporation. While the jury found for the attor-
ney on one count, it found the attorney and the corporation equally
negligent on another. The Western Fiberglass court used a combination
of policy and statutory analysis to reach its determination, and dis-
missed the Katayarna analysis as "one unpublished decision" without
any further discussion. 64 The court concluded that the statutory defini-
tion of "agent" referred to persons with management discretion and the
ability to bind the corporation. 165
If the statute were truly intended to be limited to managing or
controlling persons, why was the broad language of "agent or em-
ployee" chosen? This reasoning would also preclude mandatory indem-
nification of attorneys who were sued by third parties along with the
corporation and its management, for acts done at the corporation's dis-
cretion. Eliminating attorney entitlement to mandatory indemnification
in all instances could have serious ramifications. Corporations could be
deprived of the full assistance of counsel based upon the chilling effect
of claims either not necessarily covered by malpractice insurance, or
excessive premiums based from loss experience. The court in Western
Fiberglass was obviously reaching for a means to avoid the unconscion-
able indemnification of an attorney found negligent.
Moreover, although the Legislature may never have intended sec-
tion 607.0850(3) to apply to derivative actions, there is nothing in the
statute to dictate otherwise. To the contrary, the Third District Court
of Appeal indicated in dictum contained in Winner'66 that former
607.014(3), now 607.0850(3), would apply to derivative actions.
161. Id. The court also saw no policy reasons why this construction should not be
allowed, as corporations were often subjected to rules not imposed on real persons, and
were likely to be able to pursue expensive litigation more easily than an individual.
162. 789 P. 2d 34 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
163. This section is analogous to section 607.0850, Florida Statutes.
164. 789 P.2d at 36.
165. Id. at 38.
166. Winner v. Cataldo, 559 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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Section 607.07401(5),167 which assumably was supposed to strike
a careful balance between the rights of majority and minority stock-
holders, is undermined. The policy of encouraging meritorious deriva-
tive claims is frustrated by the availability of mandatory indemnifica-
tion under 607.0850(3), which is apparently available to any successful
corporate official defendant, regardless of the culpability of his code-
fendants, or even his own wrongdoing, so long as he prevails. Even
plaintiffs with meritorious claims may be reluctant to sue if they face a
"stonewall" defense, and the prospect of paying not only their own fees,
but funding management's defense indirectly through their investment
in the corporation.
Section 607.0850(3) should either be expressly excepted from ap-
plication to derivative actions, or the Legislature should arrive at a con-
sistent approach to indemnification. We suggest at the very least re-
quiring success on the merits.
Corporate officials who are innocent or merely negligent are enti-
tled to protection. Otherwise, there is little purpose in establishing a
corporation at all. Furthermore, excessive risks to officers and directors
will tend to discourage any responsible individual from serving. What
possible justification can there be, however, for rewarding the inten-
tional wrongdoer?
APPENDIX
Section 607.0850 is entitled: "Indemnification of officers, directors,
employees, and agents" and provides:
(1) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who
was or is a party to any proceeding (other than an action by, or in the
right of, the corporation), by reason of the fact that he is or was a
director, officer, employee, or agent of the corporation or is or was serv-
ing at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee, or
agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust, or other
enterprise against liability incurred in connection with such proceeding,
including any appeal thereof, if he acted in good faith and in a manner
he reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed to, the best interests of
the corporation and, with respect to any criminal action or proceeding,
had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful. The ter-
mination of any proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, or convic-
tion or upon a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent shall not, of
167. See supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
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itself, create a presumption that the person did not act in good faith
and in a manner which he reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed
to, the best interests of the corporation or, with respect to any criminal
action or proceeding, had reasonable cause to believe that his conduct
was unlawful.
(2) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person, who
was or is a party to any proceeding by or in the right of the corporation
to procure a judgment in its favor by reason of the fact that he is or
was a director, officer, employee, or agent of the corporation or is or
was serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, em-
ployee, or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture,
trust, or other enterprise, against expenses and amounts paid in settle-
ment not exceeding, in the judgment of the board of directors, the esti-
mated expense of litigating the proceeding to conclusion, actually and
reasonably incurred in connection with the defense or settlement of
such proceeding, including any appeal thereof. Such indemnification
shall be authorized if such person acted in good faith and in a manner
he reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed to, the best interests of
the corporation, except that no indemnification shall be made under
this subsection in respect of any claim, issue, or matter as to which
such person shall have been adjudged to be liable unless, and only to
the extent that, the court in which such proceeding was brought, or any
other court of competent jurisdiction, shall determine upon application
that, despite the adjudication of liability but in view of all circum-
stances of the case, such person is fairly and reasonably entitled to in-
demnity for such expenses which such court shall deem proper.
(3) To the extent that a director, officer, employee, or agent of a
corporation has been successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of
any proceeding referred to in subsection (1) or subsection (2), or in
defense of any claim, issue, or matter therein, he shall be indemnified
against expenses actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection
therewith.
(4) Any indemnification under subsection (1) or subsection (2),
unless pursuant to a determination by a court, shall be made by the
corporation only as authorized in the specific case upon a determination
that indemnification of the director, officer, employee, or agent is
proper in the circumstances because he has met the applicable standard
of conduct set forth in subsection (1) or subsection (2). Such determi-
nation shall be made:
(a) By the board of directors by a majority vote of a quorum con-
sisting of directors who were not parties to such proceeding;
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(b) If such a quorum is not obtainable or, even if obtainable, by
majority vote of a committee duly designated by the board of directors
(in which directors who are parties may participate) consisting solely of
two or more directors not at the time parties to the proceeding;
(c) By independent legal counsel:
(1) Selected by the board of directors prescribed in paragraph (a)
or the committee prescribed in paragraph (b); or
(2) If a quorum of the directors cannot be obtained for paragraph
(a) and the committee cannot be designated under paragraph (b), se-
lected by majority vote of the full board of directors (in which directors
who are parties may participate); or
(d) By the shareholders by a majority vote of a quorum consisting
of shareholders who were not parties to such proceeding or, if no such
quorum is obtainable, by a majority vote of shareholders who were not
parties to such proceeding.
(5) Evaluation of the reasonableness of expenses and authorization
of indemnification shall be made in the same manner as the determina-
tion that indemnification is permissible. However, if the determination
of permissibility is made by independent legal counsel, persons specified
by paragraph (4)(c) shall evaluate the reasonableness of expenses and
may authorize indemnification.
(6) Expenses incurred by an officer or director in defending a civil
or criminal proceeding may be paid by the corporation in advance of
the final disposition of such proceeding upon receipt of an undertaking
by or on behalf of such director or officer to repay such amount if he is
ultimately found not to be entitled to indemnification by the corpora-
tion pursuant to this section. Expenses incurred by other employees and
agents may be paid in advance upon such terms or conditions that the
board of directors deems appropriate.
(7) The indemnification and advancement of expenses provided
pursuant to this section are not exclusive, and a corporation may make
any other or further indemnification or advancement of expenses of any
of its directors, officers, employees, or agents, under any bylaw, agree-
ment, vote of shareholders or disinterested directors, or otherwise, both
as to action in his official capacity and as to action in another capacity
while holding such office. However, indemnification or advancement of
expenses shall not be made to or on behalf of any director, officer, em-
ployee, or agent if a judgment or other final adjudication establishes
that his actions, or omissions to act, were material to the cause of ac-
tion so adjudicated and constitute:
(a) A violation of the criminal law, unless the director, officer, em-
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ployee, or agent had reasonable cause to believe his conduct was lawful
or had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful;
(b) A transaction from which the director, officer, employee, or
agent derived an improper personal benefit;
(c) In the case of a director, a circumstance under which the lia-
bility provisions of s. 607.0834 are applicable; or
(d) Wilful misconduct or a conscious disregard for the best inter-
ests of the corporation in a proceeding by or in the right of the corpora-
tion to procure a judgment in its favor of in a proceeding by or in the
right of a shareholder.
(8) Indemnification and advancement of expenses as provided in
this section shall continue as, unless otherwise provided when author-
ized or ratified, to a person who has ceased to be a director, officer,
employee, or agent and shall inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors,
and administrators of such a person, unless otherwise provided when
authorized or ratified.
(9) Unless the corporation's articles of incorporation provide oth-
erwise, notwithstanding the failure of a corporation to provide indemni-
fication, and despite any contrary determination of the board or of the
shareholders in the specific case, a director, officer, employee, or agent
of the corporation who is or was a party to a proceeding may apply for
indemnification or advancement of expenses, or both, to the court con-
ducting the proceeding, to the circuit court, or to another court of com-
petent jurisdiction. On receipt of an application, the court, after giving
any notice that it considers necessary, may order indemnification and
advancement of expenses, including expenses incurred in seeking court-
ordered indemnification or advancement of expenses, if it determines
that:
(a) The director, officer, employee, or agent is entitled to
mandatory indemnification under subsection (3), in which case the
court shall also order the corporation to pay the director reasonable
expenses incurred in obtaining court-ordered indemnification or ad-
vancement of expenses;
(b) The director, officer, employee, or agent is entitled to indemni-
fication or advancement of expenses, or both, by virtue of the exercise
by the corporation of its power pursuant to subsection (7); or
(c) The director, officer, employee, or agent is fairly and reasona-
bly entitled to indemnification or advancement of expenses, or both, in
view of all the relevant circumstances, regardless of whether such per-
son met the standard of conduct set forth in subsection (1), subsection
(2), or subsection (7).
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(10) For purposes of this section, the term "corporation" includes,
in addition to the resulting corporation, any constituent corporation (in-
cluding any constituent of a constituent) absorbed in a consolidation or
merger, so that any person who is or was a director, officer, employee,
or agent of a constituent corporation, or is or was serving at the request
of a constituent corporation as a director, officer, employee, or agent of
another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust, or other enter-
prise, is in the same position under this section with respect to the re-
sulting or surviving corporation as he would have with respect to such
constituent corporation if its separate existence had continued.
(11) For purposes of this section:
(a) The term "other enterprises" includes employee benefit plans;
(b) The term "expenses" includes counsel fees, including those for
appeal;
(c) The term "liability" includes obligations to pay a judgment,
settlement, penalty, fine (including an excise tax assessed with respect
to any employee benefit plan), and expenses actually and reasonably
incurred with respect to a proceeding;
(d) The term "proceeding" includes any threatened. pending, or
completed action, suit, or other type of proceeding, whether civil, crimi-
nal, administrative, or investigative and whether formal or informal;
(e) The term "agent" includes a volunteer;
(f) The term "serving at the request of the corporation" includes
any service as a director, officer, employee, or agent of the corporation
that imposes duties on such persons, including duties relating to an em-
ployee benefit plan and its participants or beneficiaries; and
(g) The term "not opposed to the best interest of the corporation"
describes the actions of a person who acts in good faith and in a man-
ner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the participants
and beneficiaries of an employee benefit plan.
(12) A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain in-
surance on behalf of any person who is or was a director, officer, em-
ployee, or agent of the corporation or is or was serving at the request of
the corporation as a director, officer, employee, or agent of another cor-
poration, partnership, joint venture, trust, or other enterprise against
any liability asserted against him and incurred by him in any such ca-
pacity or arising out of his status as such, whether or not the corpora-
tion would have the power to indemnify him against such liability
under the provisions of this section.
Companion section 607.0831, entitled "Liability of directors,"
provides:
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(1) A director is not personally liable for monetary damages to the
corporation or any other person for any statement, vote, decision, or
failure to act, regarding corporate management or policy, by a director,
unless:
(a) The director breached or failed to perform his duties as a di-
rector; and
(b) The director's breach of, or failure to perform, those duties
constitutes:
1. A violation of the criminal law, unless the director had reasona-
ble cause to believe his conduct was lawful or had no reasonable cause
to believe his conduct was unlawful. A judgment or other final adjudi-
cation against a director in any criminal proceeding for a violation of
the criminal law estops that director from contesting the fact that his
breach, or failure to perform, constitutes a violation of the criminal
law; but does not estop the director from establishing that he had rea-
sonable cause to believe that his conduct was lawful or had no reasona-
,ble cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful;
2. A transaction from which the director derived an improper per-
sonal benefit, either directly or indirectly;
3. A circumstance under which the liability provisions of s.
607.0834 are applicable;
4. In a proceeding by or in the right of the corporation to procure
a judgment in its favor or by or in the right of a shareholder, conscious
disregard for the best interest of the corporation, or willful misconduct;
or
5. In a proceeding by or in the right of someone other than the
corporation or a shareholder, recklessness or an act or omission which
was committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner
exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or
property.
(2) For the purposes of this section, the term "recklessness" means
the action, or omission to act, in conscious disregard of a risk:
(a) Known, or so obvious that it should have been known, to the
director; and
(b) Known to the director, or so obvious that it should have been
known, to be so great as to make it highly probable that harm would
follow from such action or omission.
(3) A director is deemed not to have derived an improper personal
benefit from any transaction if the transaction and the nature of any
personal benefit derived by the director are not prohibited by state or
federal law or regulation and, without further limitation:
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(a) In an action other than a derivative suit regarding a decision
by the director to approve, reflect, or otherwise affect the outcome of
an offer to purchase the stock of, or to effect a merger of, the corpora-
tion, the transaction and the nature of any personal benefits derived by
a director are disclosed or known to all directors voting on the matter,
and the transaction was authorized, approved, or ratified by at least
two directors who comprise a majority of the disinterested directors
(whether or not such disinterested directors constitute a quorum);
(b) The transaction and the nature of any personal benefits de-
rived by a director are disclosed or known to the shareholders entitled
to vote, and the transaction was authorized, approved, or ratified by the
affirmative vote or written consent of such shareholders who hold a ma-
jority of the shares, the voting of which is not controlled by directors
who derived a personal benefit from or otherwise had a personal inter-
est in the transaction;
(c) The transaction was fair and reasonable to the corporation at
the time it was authorized by the board, a committee, or the sharehold-
ers, notwithstanding that a director received a personal benefit.
(4) Common or interested directors may be counted in determin-
ing the presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors
which authorizes, approves, or ratifies such a transaction.
(5) The circumstances set forth in subsection (3) are not exclusive
and do not preclude the existence of other circumstances under which a
director will be deemed not to have derived an improper benefit.
(6) The provisions of this section shall also apply to officers of non-
profit organizations as provided in s.617.0285.
Section 607.07401, transferred from section 607.0740 by section
148, Chapter 90-179 Florida Laws, is entitled "Shareholders' derivative
actions," and provides:
(1) A person may not commence a proceeding in the right of a
domestic or foreign corporation unless the person was a shareholder of
the corporation when the transaction complained of occurred or unless
the person became a shareholder through transfer by operation of law
from one who was a shareholder at that time.
(2) A complaint in a proceeding brought in the right of a corpora-
tion must be verified and allege with particularity the demand made to
obtain action by the board of directors and that the demand was re-
fused or ignored. If the corporation commences an investigation of the
charges made in the demand or complaint, the court may stay any pro-
ceeding until the investigation is completed.
(3) The court may dismiss a derivative proceeding if, on motion by
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the corporation, the court finds that one of the groups specified below
has made a determination in good faith after conducting a reasonable
investigation upon which its conclusions are based that the mainte-
nance of the derivative suit is not in the best interests of the corpora-
tion. The corporation shall have the burden of proving the indepen-
dence and good faith of the group making the determination and the
reasonableness of the investigation. The determination shall be made
by:
(a) A majority vote of independent directors present at a meeting
of the board of directors, if the independent directors constitute a
quorum;
(b) A majority vote of a committee consisting of two or more inde-
pendent directors appointed by a majority vote of independent directors
present at a meeting of the board of directors, whether or not such
independent directors constitute a quorum; or
(c) A panel of one or more independent persons appointed by the
court upon motion by the corporation.
(4) A proceeding commenced under this section may not be dis-
continued or settled without the court's approval. If the court deter-
mines that a proposed discontinuance or settlement will substantially
affect the interest of the corporation's shareholders or a class, series, or
voting group of shareholders, the court shall direct that notice be given
to the shareholders affected. The court may determine which party or
parties to the proceeding shall bear the expense of giving the notice.
(5) On termination of the proceeding, the court may require the
plaintiff to pay any defendant's reasonable expenses, including reasona-
ble attorney's fees, incurred in defending the proceeding if it finds that
the proceeding was commenced without reasonable cause.
(6) The court may award reasonable expenses for maintaining the
proceeding, including reasonable attorney's fees, to a successful plain-
tiff or to the person commencing the proceeding who receives any re-
lief, whether by judgment, compromise, or settlement, and require that
the person account for the remainder of any proceeds to the corpora-
tion; however, this subsection does not apply to any relief rendered for
the benefit of injured shareholders only and limited to a recovery of the
loss or damage of the injured shareholders.
(7) For purposes of this section, "shareholder" includes a benefi-
cial owner whose shares are held in a voting trust or held by a nominee
on his behalf.
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Note: The Personal Liability of Directors in Florida:
Whose Corporation is it Anyway?*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1980's a serious crisis developed in the insurance in-
dustry which threatened to expose corporate directors to personal liabil-
ity.1 In addition, in 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court decided in
Smith v. Van Gorkom that directors who failed to adequately inform
themselves of corporate matters were grossly negligent, and therefore
would be held personally liable for their uninformed decisions.' The
decision has been viewed as one of the worst in the history of corporate
law, and one which will adversely affect the quality of directors who
serve on corporate boards.'
In keeping with the flurry in almost every state to amend their
corporate acts in response to the crisis in the Director and Officer in-
surance industry and the Smith v. Van Gorkom decision, in 1987 the
Florida Legislature made sweeping changes to the Florida General
Corporation Act." Specifically, the Legislature added a new statute re-
lating to the personal liability of directors for decisions which they
* The author would like to thank Professor Marilyn Cane for her suggestion of
the title and her assistance generally.
1. A number of commentators have written about the crisis in the director and
officer liability insurance industry. See, e.g., Block, Barton & Garfield, Advising Direc-
tors on the D & 0 Insurance Crisis, 14 SEc. REG. L.J. 130 (1985); Note, New York's
Response to the Director and Officer Liability Crisis: A Need to Reexamine the Im-
portance of D & 0 Insurance, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1305 (1989).
2. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
3. See Radin, The Director's Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 708. After the Van Gorkom decision, numerous com-
mentators have discussed its repercussions. See, e.g., Animashaun, The Business Judg-
ment Rule: Fiduciary Duties and Liabilities of Corporate Directors, 16 S.U.L. REV.
345 (1989); Titus, Limiting Directors' Liability: The Case for a More Balanced Ap-
proach - The Corporate Governance Project Alternative, 11 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 1
(1989); Note, The Limitation of Directors' Liability: A Proposal for Legislative Re-
form, 66 TEX. L. Rav. 411 (1987); Note, Corporate Directors - An Endangered Spe-
cies? A More Reasonable Standard For Director and Officer Liability in Illinois, 1987
U. ILL. L. REV. 495 (1987).
4. FLA. STAT. § 607 (1986)(repealed 1989, and reenacted as Florida Business
Corporation Act FLA. STAT. § 607 (1989 & Supp. 1990)).
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make in their capacity as directors." Rather than follow the lead of the
Delaware Legislature, which allowed corporations to limit or eliminate
liability of directors in their charters,6 the Florida Legislature took a
different approach. The lawmakers decided to grant directors immunity
from personal liability for money damages in respect to "any state-
ment, vote, decision, or failure to act, regarding corporate management
or policy," unless there is a breach of duty by the director and the
breach constitutes one of five circumstances.' Whereas the Delaware
amendment sought to protect informed shareholders by giving them the
choice of deciding whether or not to relieve their directors of liability,
the Florida Legislature took choice out of the hands of the shareholder.
In effect, the Florida statute relieves directors of accountability for
their actions except in the most grievous circumstances, and indeed,
reduces the rights of shareholders.
The 1987 amendment had two stated legislative purposes. The first
was to reduce the concerns of directors to the possibility of being per-
sonally liable for damages arising out of decisions they make in their
capacity as directors.8 The second was to define more clearly the stan-
dard of care owed to the corporation and the shareholders by the direc-
tor.' In order to satisfy the stated legislative purpose of making direc-
tors' jobs less worrisome, and to attract high calibre directors, the
legislature also modified the provisions with regard to indemnification.
These provisions were altered to increase the circumstances in which
directors may be indemnified where they are found liable for acts taken
on behalf of the corporation. 10
The approach of the Florida Legislature in amending its corpora-
tion statute has bqen described as "[t]he most radical legislative ap-
proach to director liability [as it directly alters] the standard of liabil-
ity necessary to recover money damages from directors." ' :, Moreover,
one commentator noted that the 1987 amendment so dilutes a share-
5. FLA. STAT. § 607.0831 (1989). This amendment will be referred to in this
paper as "the 1987 amendment."
6. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(Supp. 1989).
7. § 607.0831; See infra Part II
8. Act approved June 30, 1987 ch. 245 § 1(1), 1987 Fla. Law;; 1685.
9. Id. at § 1(2). Quoted in full infra Part II.
10. The indemnification provisions can be found at § 607.0850. The new provi-
sions are at §§ 607.0850(2) and (7).
11. Changes in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act - Amendment Per-
taining to the Liability of Directors, 45 Bus. LAW. 695, 698 (1990) [hereinafter
Changes].
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holder's right of action against a director for money damages that its
constitutionality may be in doubt.' 2 Whereas some thirty five states
have already amended their corporation acts to provide for a lower
standard of culpability, only five other states have enacted such obvi-
ously pro-director legislation similar to Florida.13
The 1987 amendment has the effect of reducing the concerns
which directors have regarding their personal liability, but other ques-
tions remain. The statute clarifies the appropriate standard of care
owed by the director to the corporation and its shareholders only in so
far as it generally eliminates liability for monetary damages. However,
directors must continue to be concerned with the standard of care since
they may still be restrained from action by injunction or their actions
may be subject to rescission by the court.14 Nevertheless, because the
burden on the shareholder seeking to obtain equitable relief is so great,
directors probably have no real need to be concerned. This Note con-
siders the present state of the law relating to liability of directors in
Florida, and considers whether the new legislative changes can or will
have the intended effect. Part II analyzes the legislative changes, de-
scribes in detail the provisions of section 607.0831 and considers how
the new provisions differ from the state of the law prior to 1987. Part
III examines the policy considerations in determining the parameters of
director liability, and focuses particularly on the part that the director
and officer liability insurance industry played in effecting the legislative
change. Part IV considers what effect, if any, the statutory changes can
or will have on corporations and their directors, and concludes that
thus far, the positive effects anticipated by the legislature have not
occurred.
12. See McGuigan, Legislative Developments in Director's Liability Ch. 87-245,
FLA. B.J. 41, 43 (1987)(discussing the constitutionality of the 1987 amendment and
concluding that it is probably constitutional).
13. The other states adopting Florida's approach are Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. §
23-1-35-1(e) (West Supp. 1990), Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (Supp.
1989), Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(C) (Anderson Supp. 1990), Virginia,
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (Supp. 1990) and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.307
(West Supp. 1989). These states have adopted the approach of setting out the standard
of care required of directors before they may be fixed with liability. See generally
Oesterle, The Effect of Statutes Limiting Directors' Due Care Liability of Hostile
Takeover Defenses, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 31 (1989).
14. McGuigan, supra note 12, at 42.
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II. THE 1987 AMENDMENT
In making the "radical" amendment to the Florida Corporation
Act, the Legislature found
that the service of qualified persons on the governing boards of cor-
porations, . . . is in the public interest and that within reasonable
limitations, such persons should be permitted to perform without
undue concern for the possibility of litigation arising from the dis-
charge of their duties as policy makers. The Legislature further
finds that the case law of the state does not adequately delineate
the liability of those serving on governing boards, and that such
delineations through the clarification of the appropriate standard of
care due an individual and a corporation by a member of a gov-
erning board is essential in encouraging the continued service of
qualified persons on such governing boards. 15
In the Staff Analysis of the House of Representatives, Committee
on the Judiciary, it was noted that Florida case law had not y~t defined
the "parameters of liability of a director of a corporation . . . in this
state."16 The House Analysis went on to find that the state of the law
was such that it was foreseeable that a director could be held person-
ally liable where he failed to take "all reasonable and necessary pre-
cautions to ensure that any action [which] he took as a director would
not result in damage to another." 17 Under these circumstances, the
committee recommended that the law should be changed to define
more clearly the standards to which directors should be held. 8 The
Senate Committee pinpointed two main reasons why the need for the
change arose: the need to make the position of director attractive in
order to encourage corporations to incorporate in Florida; and the diffi-
culty of obtaining director and officer liability insurance.' 9
This part examines the provisions of the 1987 amendment. A dis-
cussion of the state of the law regarding the personal liability of direc-
tors in 1987 puts in context the reason the position of director may
have been unattractive at that time.
15. Act approved June 30, 1987, ch. 245 § 1(2), 1987 Fla. Laws 1685.
16. FLA. H.R., COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STAFF ANALYSIS at I (1987)[hereinaf-
ter HOUSE ANALYSIS].
17. Id.
18. For the proposals of the House Committee see id. at 2-5.
19. See FLA. SENATE, STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT at 7-
8 (1987) [hereinafter SENATE ANALYSIS].
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A. The Provisions of the 1987 Amendment
Section 607.0831 of the Florida Statutes eliminates director liabil-
ity for monetary damages except in five defined circumstances. Rather
than outlining the standards by which directors should be guided, the
statute virtually eliminates director liability for monetary damages, and
restates the law regarding the acts for which director liability may still
attach. Furthermore, the statute requires a two-step test before liability
may be established.2 0 The first and threshold requirement is that the
director must have breached or failed to perform his duties as a direc-
tor.2 1 The second step is that the breach must also constitute: 1) a vio-
lation of criminal law, unless the director had reasonable cause to be-
lieve that his act was lawful or no reasonable cause to believe it was
unlawful; or 2) a transaction from which the director derived a per-
sonal benefit; or 3) the director has voted or assented to an unlawful
distribution and is liable pursuant to section 607.0834; or 4) conscious
disregard for the best interest of the corporation, or wilful misconduct
in any derivative action or other action by or against the corporation;
or 5) recklessness or any act or omission which was committed in bad
faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and
wilful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.22
The first step of the 1987 amendment neither ch nges nor clarifies
the standard of care of directors as it refers to duties which it does not
define. 3 However, the real meat of the statute is the second step, for
even if the court finds a breach of duty, it must still find one of the five
violations for any liability for monetary damages to attach. The five
exceptions encompass such improper conduct, "so clearly without any
societal benefit," that under no circumstances should society validate
it.24
B. The Duties of Directors
Since the 1987 amendment does not define the "duties" which the
director must breach in order to attract liability, the common law du-
ties of care and loyalty, and the standards as previously codified under
20. See McGuigan, supra note 12, at 42.
21. § 607.0831(1)(a).
22. § 607.0831(1).
23. § 607.0830 outlines general standards in codifying the business judgment
rule. See also infra Part II, section C.
24. Changes, supra note 11, at 701.
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sections 607.0830 and 607.0832 must be examined to determine
whether there has been a breach of duty.
Historically, courts have wrestled with the type of duty owed by
directors to the corporations they serve. 5 The Florida Supreme Court
noted in 1932 that "[w]hile directors of a corporation may not be in
the strict sense trustees, it is well established by the decisions that they
occupy a quasi-fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockhold-
ers."2 6 The present state of the law is that directors owe the twin duties
of care and loyalty to the shareholders and the corporation in managing
and administering the corporation's property, assets and affairs.17 Di-
rectors must act with fidelity and in good faith when discharging their
functions.2"
In discharging his duties, a director must act with ordinary care
and skill.29 Even though the director may delegate his authority in the
active management of the business to officers, he must still exercise
reasonable supervision." Directors have a "continuing obligation to
keep informed about the activities of the corporation,"'" and if they do
not, they cannot set up a defense of lack of knowledge needed to exer-
cise the requisite degree of care.32 Indeed, "[a] director is not an orna-
ment, but an essential component of corporate governance. Conse-
quently, a director cannot protect himself behind a paper shield bearing
the motto 'dummy director.' "I' The director owes a duty to the share-
holders to exercise "supervision and control over the policies and prac-
tices of the corporation." 34
The duty of loyalty prohibits faithlessness and self dealing, includ-
25. See, e.g., Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 645 (1742)(the court
found that directors were trustees and required them to act "with fidelity and due
diligence"); see also Note, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, the Duty of
Loyalty, and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 605 (1987)(for a more
detailed discussion of the history of the duty of directors).
26. Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 107 Fla. 304, 313, 144 So. 674, 677
(1932) (quoting 7 R.C.L. 456, 457).
27. Note, Corporate Directors-An Endangered Species?, supra note 3, at 497.
28. Everdell v. Preston, 717 F. Supp. 1498, 1501 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
29. Skinner v. Hulsey, 103 Fla. 713, 720, 138 So. 769, 772 (1931).
30. See id.
31. Francis v. United Jersey Bank 87 N.J. 15, -, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (1981)
(citing Campbell v. Watson, 62 N.J.Eq. 396, 416, 50 A. 120 (Ch. 1901)).
32. Id.
33. Id. at , 432 A.2d at 823 (citing Campbell, 62 N.J.Eq. at 415, 50 A.
120).
34. Id. at , 432 A.2d at 824.
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ing fraud and bad faith. The duty is based on the rationale that the
director, by virtue of his office, owes allegiance to the corporation and
therefore the best interest of the corporation must prevail over his
own.35 However, a director is not absolutely precluded from entering
into transactions in which he may be personally interested and which
arise as a result of his relationship with the corporation. 6 At common
law, transactions between a corporate director and an outsider which
resulted from the director's office were voidable without regard to the
fairness of the transaction.37 The Florida statute now provides that the
transaction is not void or voidable if the relationship is disclosed or is
known to the directors or the shareholders.3 8
C. The Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule is a policy of judicial restraint, which
recognizes that directors are more qualified than judges to make busi-
ness decisions. 39 The rule provides that, for matters that the law vests
in the board, the board has wide discretion and a court will not gener-
ally substitute its judgment for that of the directors.40 Thus, absent any
wrong doing, the court will generally not scrutinize the decisions of a
board to determine the merits of its decision. 4 Traditionally, directors
have always been protected by the "business judgment rule." '42 A direc-
tor who acted with care and loyalty was not subject to any personal
liability.43
The rule is rooted in the notion that in exchange for the confidence
and trust which shareholders place in them, directors must act in good
faith, and "in accepting the office they impliedly undertake to give the
enterprise the benefit of their best care and judgment, and to exercise
35. Animashaun, supra note 3, at 350.
36. See e.g., Procacci v. Soloman 317 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1975)(director who purchased corporation's property from bank, after corporation de-
faulted on promissory note, found not liable for breach of fiduciary duty).
37. See Animashaun, supra note 3, at 350.
38. § 607.0832.
39. See, e.g., International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458 & n.20 (11 th
Cir. 1989) (applying Florida law, and reviewing decisions involving the business judg-
ment rule).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1458-59.
43. Id.
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the powers conferred solely in the interest of the corporation."'44 In-
deed, equity has always held them liable as trustees. 45
However, courts have not allowed directors to shelter behind the
business judgment rule where directors have acted in bad faith, without
due care, abused their discretion, or participated in a transaction in
which they were interested.46 The rule has been characterized as hav-
ing five elements, which courts generally examined before "second
guessing" the decision of the board.47 The decision must be a business
decision, the board should be disinterested, have acted with due care, in
good faith and even if it satisfies all the other elements, must still not
have abused its discretion.48 Courts have been reluctant to find liability
unless the decision could not be attributed to any rational business pur-
pose, or there was abuse of discretion.49
The burden lay on the person alleging breach of duty to overcome
the presumption of due care, good faith and disinterestedness. 50 Only if
he did, then the burden shifted to the director to show the contrary. In
any event, the plaintiff also had to establish causation and damage.5"
In Florida, even prior to the 1987 amendment, the business judg-
ment rule had been codified as the duty of care provision.5 2 An individ-
ual who performs duties as a director, in good faith and in the best
interests of the corporation, with such care as an ordinarily prudent
person in like position would exercise under similar circumstances, is
relieved from liability.53 However, under this general provision, similar
to that in Delaware and many other states, it was left to the court to
define and apply the phrase "such care as an ordinarily prudent person
in like position".
Florida courts have long relied on Delaware corporate law for
guidance in deciding cases involving corporation law, and "to establish
44. Orlando Orange Groves Co.,. 107 Fla. at 314, 144 So. at 677 (quoting 7
R.C.L. 456, 457).
45. Id., 144 So. at 677.
46. See Radin, supra note 3, at 710.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. International Ins. Co., 874 F.2d at 1461.
50. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
51. See, e.g., id. (Delaware Supreme Court remanding the matter to the trial
court for a hearing to determine the damage sustained).
52. § 607.0830. The Legislature did not change this section in any way after the
1987 amendment.
53. Id.
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their own corporate doctrines. ' 54 In Aronson v. Lewis,5 5 the Delaware
Supreme Court decided that in making a business decision, directors
would be protected by the business judgment rule only in so far as the
decision was informed. Furthermore, the standard for determining
whether the decision was informed was one of "gross negligence. 58
Van Gorkom,57 decided by the Delaware Supreme Court one year
later, "shocked the corporate world" by deciding that the directors of
Trans Union Corporation had been "grossly negligent" in approving a
cash-out merger proposal after a short meeting, and would not be pro-
tected by the business judgment rule.5 8
The board's decision was made at a special board meeting called
by Jerome W. Van Gorkom, Trans Union's Chairman and Chief Exec-
utive Officer, who did not inform the directors of the purpose of the
meeting.5 9 In fact, senior management learned of the proposal approxi-
mately one hour before the meeting."° Apart from Van Gorkom's
twenty minute presentation at the meeting, the directors had no other
substantive information about the merger."' It appears that none of the
directors had read the merger agreement prior to signing.62 The court
held that the directors did not adequately inform themselves as to Van
Gorkom's role in the transaction and as to how he arrived at the deci-
sion to force the sale and set the price of the shares."3 In addition, they
were not informed as to the value of the corporation.64 The court found
the directors "grossly negligent in approving the 'sale' of the Company
upon two hours' consideration, without prior notice, and without the
54. International Ins. Co., 874 F.2d at 1459 n.22.
55. 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
56. See, e.g., id. at 812 & n.6; Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873. Indeed, Florida
courts have long held that directors who acted with gross negligence, causing waste to
the corporation's assets, could not seek shelter behind the business judgment rule; see
Skinner, 103 Fla. at 716, 138 So. at 771 (citations omitted). Since 1985, Florida courts
have extended the standard even further. In Cottle v. Storer Comm., Inc., 849 F.2d
570, 577 (1 1th Cir. 1988), the United States Court of Appeals, applying Florida law,
held that the plaintiff must prove gross inadequacy of price in order to overcome the
business judgment rule.
57. 488 A.2d 858.
58. Id. at 874; see also Radin, supra note 3, at 707.
59. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 868-69.
62. See id. at 868 & n.7.
63. Id. at 874.
64. Id.
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exigency of a crisis or an emergency."65
Many viewed the Van Gorkom decision as the courts having
opened the door to exposing directors to personal liability for their ac-
tions. 6  Based on the facts of the case, the view in the insurance indus-
try and within the business community was that the standard of care
required of a director was now much higher, and indeed almost impos-
sible to achieve. 7
In actions involving monetary damages, the 1987 amendment, in
effect requires the courts to apply the business judgment rule only as a
first step to determine whether a duty has been breached.68 For even if
the director breached a duty, he will not be liable for damages unless
the court finds that the breaching act falls into one of the five
exceptions. 9
D. The Five Exceptions
Under the first exception, the director's breach or failure to per-
form his duty must constitute
[a] violation of the-criminal law, unless the director had reasonable
cause to believe his conduct was lawful or had no reasonable cause
to believe his conduct was unlawful. A judgment or other final ad-
judication against a director in any criminal proceeding for a viola-
tion of the criminal law estops the director from contesting the fact
that his breach or failure to perform, constitutes a violation of the
criminal law; but does not estop him from establishing that he had
reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was lawful or had no
reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful. 70
This exception does not create new law, because as part of their
duty of care, directors have traditionally had a duty to act lawfully.
According to the ALI Principles of corporate governance, a director
violates his duty of care and good faith if he "knowingly" causes the
corporation to violate the law. 7' To eliminate problems which have
65. Id.
66. See supra note 3.
67. Id.
68. § 607.0831(1)(a).
69. § 607.0831(1)(b).
70. § 607.0831(1)(b)(1).
71. See Gelb, Director Due Care Liability: An Assessment of the New Statutes,
61 TEMP. L. REv. 13, 36 (1988).
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arisen over the interpretation of the word "knowingly," the Florida
Legislature chose instead to define it as "having reasonable cause to
believe. ' 72 Undoubtedly, litigation will still arise as to the meaning of
"reasonable cause," since inevitably, directors will attempt to further
insulate themselves from liability by claiming that they did not believe
that their actions were criminal.
Under the second exception, the director's breach or failure to per-
form must constitute "[a] transaction from which the director derived
an improper personal benefit, either directly or indirectly. 73 The stat-
ute goes on to define an "improper personal benefit." The director is
deemed not to derive an improper personal benefit if: a) the transaction
and the nature of the benefit were not prohibited by federal or state
law;7 4 b) the transaction was known or disclosed to the all directors and
/or shareholders;75 and c) the transaction was fair and reasonable to
the corporation.76 The statute also does not rule out the possibility of
other circumstances under which the benefit may be deemed to be
improper.7
In this second exception the Legislature addressed the director's
duty of loyalty. The exception must be viewed in conjunction with sec-
tion 607.0832, which outlines the standards for directors in situations
where there may be a conflict of interest.7 8 Although, section 607.0832
deals primarily with the enforceability of the contract, it is interesting
to note that it may be possible for the contract to be unenforceable
because of a conflict of interest under section 607.0832, but for the
director not to be liable under section 607.0831(1)(b)(2).
This second exception only alludes to that aspect of the duty which
requires the director to act in the corporation's best interest and to re-
frain from self-interested behavior. Other aspects of the duty of loyalty
such as fraud or bad faith are not addressed in this exception. In addi-
tion, the definition of "improper" does not include a benefit to the di-
rector's family or financial associates.79 Consequently, although this ex-
72. See § 607.0831(1)(b)(1).
73. § 607.0831(1)(b)(2).
74. § 607.831(3).
75. § 607.831(3)(a),(b).
76. § 607.831(3)(c).
77. § 607.0831(5).
78. § 607.0832 does not address the issue of director liability.
79. See Gelb, supra note 71, at 40, for a discussion of the merits of including
members of the director's family and his associates in determining whether he has an
interest in the transaction.
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ception saves some liability for breach of duty of loyalty, it relieves the
director of much responsibility.
Under the third exception, the director's breach or failure to per-
form must constitute a circumstance whereby the director votes or as-
sents to a distribution of dividends in violation of section 607.06401 or
the articles of incorporation.8 0 The statute merely reiterates the direc-
tor's liability for unlawful distributions which had previously been stat-
utorily established. The intent of the provision is to continue to protect
the creditors of the corporation against directors who may want to re-
ward shareholders for their investments before creditors are satisfied."
1
Under the fourth exception, the director's breach or failure to per-
form must constitute "[i]n a proceeding by or in the right of the corpo-
ration to procure a judgement in its favor or by or in the right of a
shareholder, conscious disregard for the best interest of the corporation,
or wilful misconduct."8 Once more the legislature tried to preserve the
duty of loyalty to some extent. In a-derivative action, this exception
puts the onus on the director to act with good faith. However, the
words "conscious" and "wilful" indicate that the standard of care re-
quired is relatively low and a level of behavior bordering on outra-
geousness is probably what is required for liability to be established.
The fifth and final exception requires that the director's breach or
failure to perform constitute, "in a proceeding by or in the right of
someone other than the corporation or a shareholder, recklessness or an
act or omission which was committed in bad faith or with malicious
purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and wilful disregard of
human rights, safety or property. '8 3 The section goes on to define
"recklessness" as "the action, or omission to act, in conscious disregard
of a risk," and which the director knew or should have known because
it was obvious, would be so great as to probably cause harm. 4 This
exception refers to actions brought by third parties. The standard es-
tablished by the section is even lower than in the previous section.
Criminal intent may have to be established in order to find a director
liable under this exception.
80. § 607.0831(1)(b)(3). § 607.06401 provides the circumstances under which
the board may authorize distributions to shareholders. See FLA. STAT. § 607.0640
(1989) and § 607.08401 (Supp. 1990). The restrictions are mainly out of concern for
creditors. See also Changes, supra note 11, at 702.
81. See Changes, supra note 11, at 702.
82. § 607.0831(1)(b)(4).
83. § 607.0831(1)(b)(5).
84. § 607.0831(2).
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Florida courts have not yet had an opportunity to examine the pro-
visions of the 1987 amendment.85 Indeed, the exceptions require such
exceptional misconduct by directors that it is unlikely that litigation is
forthcoming. However, a re-examination of the Van Gorkom case in
the light of the 1987 amendment is instructive.
Delaware Supreme Court Justice Andrew G.T. Moore, a member
of the Van Gorkom court, stated that the case "doesn't stand for new
law. The court was just applying old law to egregious facts. ' 86 Some
commentators have concluded that "absent egregious conduct," the
court has not changed its traditional application of the business judg-
ment rule's presumption that director's conduct is informed and taken
in good faith." The Delaware court found the board to have been
grossly negligent because it approved a multi-million dollar takeover in
a two hour board meeting without regard to proper reports or investiga-
tion. However, if the action had taken place where current Florida law
was applicable, the directors would have escaped liability because their
actions did not fall into any of the five exceptions.88
The 1987 amendment defines egregious conduct under the five ex-
ceptions, and basically requires the courts to go beyond the business
judgment rule in order to find director liability in circumstances in
which monetary damages are claimed. Apart from these few excep-
tional circumstances, the legislature has limited the power of the courts
to deal with the director who has abused his discretion. The legislature
has also stymied the right of the owners of the corporation to decide
how culpable their directors should be.
III. THE LEGISLATURE'S CONCERNS
In amending the corporation act, the Senate believed that the new
provisions in themselves would give directors an incentive to serve on
boards, since they would serve free from the worry of personal ruin,
85. There are no reported cases which have called upon the courts to determine
whether the action falls within the amendment.
86. Radin, supra note 3, at 719, (citing Victor, Rhetoric is Hot When The Topic
is Takeovers, Legal Times, Dec. 23, 1985, at 7).
87. Id. at 720.
88. In contrast, under present Delaware law, the directors would have escaped
liability only if Trans Union had amended its certificate of incorporation to include a
provision relieving directors of liability. The issue of who controls the votes of share-
holders' which are necessary for an amendment of this nature is beyond the scope of
this article.
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and secure in the knowledge that they would likely be indemnified by
the corporation for any liability which may be determined against
them.89 Further, it anticipated that Florida would benefit as it would
remain an attractive place for corporations to incorporate."
This part reviews the state of the director and officer liability in-
surance industry, particularly from the standpoint of directors. It also
examines whether the indemnification provisions of the corporation act,
together with the 1987 amendment can achieve the legislature's stated
objective.
A. Director and Officer Liability Insurance
It is indisputable that a crisis exists, and has existed since the
early 1980's, in the director and officer insurance industry. 9' The prac-
tice of corporations insuring their directors against personal liability in-
curred for their corporate actions is quickly disappearing.0'2 On the one
hand, premiums have become exorbitant,9 3 and on the other, some in-
surance companies are no longer issuing such policies.94 Corporate di-
rectors must now face the reality of potential personal liability for sim-
ple errors in judgment.
Shareholders derivative claims represent the majority of claims
filed against directors of corporations.95 Indeed there has been an in-
crease in both the number of suits and the severity of such claims.96
Director and officer claims rose at a rate of fifteen to twenty percent
per year over a ten year period from 1977 to 1987."7 Indeed, directors
89. SENATE ANALYSIS, supra note 19, at 7.
90. Id. This prediction has not been borne out since there has been no significant
increase in the number of corporations being registered in Florida annually.
91. See supra note 1.
92. A corporation may purchase and maintain insurance on a director in respect
of any liability incurred by him. § 607.0850(12).
93. Premiums on director and officer liability policies increased by an average of
506 per cent nationwide in 1986 according to a survey of 256 chairmen of Fortune
1,000 companies by Heidrick & Struggles, a Chicago based executive search firm. See
SENATE ANALYSIS, supra note 19, at 7.
94. The Department of Insurance identifies nine companies who have rate filings
with the department for director and officer insurance. Of these, at least two had no
writings in Florida in 1986 and others were very selective in their underwriting. See
SENATE ANALYSIS, supra note 19, at 7-8.
95. Note, Corporate Directors, supra note 3, at 504.
96. Id.
97. Note, New York's Response, supra note 1, at 1307-8.
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of public companies have a one in five chance of being sued.9 8
While ninety percent of the corporations carry director and officer
insurance, one third have seen a rise in premiums of over three hundred
per cent." Premium increases have resulted from large payouts not
only in quantity, but also in size. Over a ten year period, the size of
claims increased, and the percentage of claims with payments of over
one million dollars jumped by seventy three percent.' 00 Insurance carri-
ers are reluctant to provide adequate director and officer liability insur-
ance at any premium. The risk has become too great.10' Policies that
are issued are more restrictive in nature and contain numerous
exclusions.102
Many outside directors0 3 have reevaluated their decisions to serve
on boards, while several have resigned or declined appointment where
the corporation has failed to provide adequate director and officer lia-
bility insurance.10 Three hundred and seventy directors were surveyed
by the National Association of Corporate Directors and their responses
indicated that one in seven would refuse to sit on any board without
insurance protection, and approximately four percent had already re-
signed from boards without director and officer coverage.' 0 5 A 1986
Peat Marwick poll of nearly eight thousand chief executives and direc-
tors in the corporate and not-for-profit sectors showed that the problem
of providing adequate director and officer coverage was damaging the
calibre of management. 06 Six in ten reported that this problem af-
fected the way in which they managed their organizations and forty
three per cent believed that the situation had reached crisis
proportion. 10 7
The corporate legal fiction allows individuals to pool their re-
sources and act as one "person" in conducting commercial activity.
Traditionally management of the corporation rests in a board of direc-
98. SENATE ANALYSIS, supra note 19, at 8.
99. Id. at 9.
100. Note, New York's Response, supra note 1, at 1308.
101. Block, Barton & Garfield, supra note 1, at 131 & nn.5 & 6.
102. Note, New York's Response, supra note 1, at 1314-15 & n.56.
103. An insider director is one who is also an officer or employee of the corpora-
tion. Conversely, an outside director is not an employee.
104. Note, Corporate Directors, supra note 3, at 505 n.73.
105. SENATE ANALYSIS, supra note 19, at 8.
106. PEAT MARWICK, DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY: A CRISIS IN THE
MAKING 4 (1986).
107. Id.
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tors. s08 However, whereas in the earliest small private corporations the
board was usually made up of the shareholders, 10 9 as corporations grew
in size and became more sophisticated, the composition of the board
also changed. In order for the corporation to be managed properly, the
seats on the board of directors had to be filled by people of reputation,
expertise and specialized knowledge. Even so, the modern view is that
the board cannot effectively "manage" a corporation. 10 The board can
only act in meetings"' and since in practice meetings are held only a
few times a year, the modern board must in effect rely oa the officers
and executives of the corporation. 1 2
Today, the wealth of information that is available on any given
topic, and the speed with which it becomes available can make the di-
rector's job even more onerous. Fear of liability for not accessing and
reading all that is available also acts as a deterrent to busy, yet quali-
fied, persons to serve on corporate boards." 3 The problem corporations
face if they are unable to afford or obtain director and officer insurance
is in recruiting and retaining a high calibre of director. Confronted
with the prospect of risking his financial future for token remuneration,
a former or future director prefers to take the safer course of not serv-
ing on a corporate board. Ultimately, the lack of qualified directors
must create a crisis in the business world. Boards will run less effi-
ciently and certainly, those directors who can be inveigled into taking
108. "All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and
the business and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of
directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation." FLA. STAT.
§ 607.0801(2). See generally N. LATTIN, LATTIN ON CORPORATIONS, 239-342 (1971)
(discussion of the development of the role of directors in the management of a
corporation).
109. Florida corporate law still reflects this position, as corporations with 35 or
fewer shareholders may provide for no board of directors or may limit the power of the
board if it has one. § 607.0801(3).
110. See, e.g., Note, The Limitation of Directors' Liability, supra note 3, at 415
n.26.
111. Section 607.0824(3) provides that a vote of the majority taken at a meeting
of directors at which a quorum is present, is the act of the board of directors. Directors
can act without a meeting only if the action is taken by all the directors. § 607.0821.
112. See, e.g., Note, The Limitation of Directors' Liability, supra note 3, at 415
n.26.
113. In discharging his duties, a director may rely on "information, opinions,
reports, or statements, including financial statements" which has been prepared by
competent employees or officers, experts, accountants, legal counsel and/or committees
of the board of which he may not be a member. § 607.0830(2). See also supra Part II.
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the positions will act with extreme caution.114 Directors will be less in-
clined to take business risks if their personal assets are at stake. Indedd,
"the opportunities for 'innovation and creative activities' may be
lost.""1 5
In the light of the foregoing and in order to provide greater protec-
tion for directors than the courts are willing to give, in recent years,
more than thirty-five states have amended their corporation acts.1 6
Most states have taken one of three approaches: 1) the "charter op-
tion" approach 2) the "cap on money damages" approach, and 3) the
"self-executing" approach. 117
Delaware was the first state to enact the "charter option" ap-
proach in 1986. This approach allows the shareholders, with some ex-
ceptions, to decide whether to adopt a provision in the corporation's
charter which eliminates or limits the personal liability of a director for
money damages. 118 Several other states have followed Delaware's lead
in adopting this approach. 9
The "cap on money damages" approach limits, with some excep-
tions, the amount of money damages for which a director may be lia-
ble.120 The statute would provide a maximum figure beyond which lia-
bility could not extend.1 2'
The "self-executing" approach, as the name implies, means that
the standard of liability is determined by the statute itself. 2 2 Share-
holders have no input into whether liability for monetary damages
should attach to their directors in circumstances other than those pre-
scribed by the statute.1 23
The Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Associa-
tion recommends that shareholders should be allowed to decide whether
114. Block, Barton & Garfield, supra note 1, at 131-2.
115. Note, New York's Response, supra note 1, at 1317 (citing Schwartz, In
Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary on the Paper of Professors Fischel and
Bradley, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 322, 323 (1986).
116. See Changes, supra note 11, at 696.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 696-97.
120. Id. at 698; see also Titus, supra note 3, at 4 n.7 for a discussion concerning
the states which followed the Delaware approach.
121. See Titus, supra note 3, at 5. Virginia has placed the cap at $100,000 or the
amount of compensation in cash which the director received in the twelve months im-
mediately preceding the act. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1(2).
122. Changes, supra note 11, at 698.
123. See id.
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to eliminate liability of directors for their conduct, unless "important
societal values are at stake."' 24 The Committee therefore recommends
that the Model Business Act should adopt the charter option
approach.12
5
The Florida Legislature chose the self executing approach. 2 ' Al-
though Florida directors, like directors in every other jurisdiction, owe
the corporations they serve and shareholders the fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty, they are now statutorily protected regarding decisions
they make as directors. As explained in the previous part, a director's
liability for monetary damages is completely eliminated unless the ac-
tion is one which falls into one of the five exceptions. The Florida ap-
proach is by far the most radical approach since it eliminates the tradi-
tional right of shareholders to decide the manner in which the
corporation they own should be run. Taking decision making out of the
hands of the shareholder and into the hands of the state is a dangerous
precedent and violates the very essence of capitalism.
B. Indemnification Provisions
In addition, in keeping with its decision to give directors as much
protection as possible, the Legislature also amended the indemnifica-
tion provisions in 1987 to increase the circumstances under which a
director may be indemnified by the corporation. Three major changes
were effected. The first two concern derivative actions. Directors are
now entitled to be indemnified for expenses incurred in derivative ac-
tions which have been a) settled; and b) in which they have been found
liable, if a court of competent jurisdiction determines that it is fair and
reasonable so to do. 2' The third major change was in determining
under what circumstances and to what extent the corporation will in-
demnify a director. The corporation may not indemnify a director
whose action constituted one of the exceptions under section
607.0831.128
The present position is that indemnification is available under the
statute in four operative categories. 129 The first is that prior to the
124. Id. at 700.
125. Id.
126. See supra note 13, for other states adopting the Florida approach.
127. § 607.0850(2).
128. § 607.0850(7).
129. Fields, Indemnification of Officers and Directors Under Revised Florida
Statute, in RESPONSIBILITIES AND LIABILITIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS, OFFICERS
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event, the corporation may decide in what circumstances indemnifica-
tion is allowed by adopting by-laws and executing agreements.1 30 Sec-
ond, after the event, the corporation may elect to indemnify the direc-
tor, except that it may not indemnify the director in respect of actions
which fall under one of four of the five exceptions under section
607.0831.131 Furthermore, the statute distinguishes between indemnifi-
cation in derivative and non-derivative actions.13 2 Third, a director who
successfully defends a suit is unconditionally entitled to expenses to the
extent of his success.' Finally, a new addition provides that a court of
competent jurisdiction may order indemnification even if the director
has been unsuccessful, but only if it is fair and reasonable in the
circumstances. 3 4
The new additions to the statute provide an incentive to directors
to settle cases without fear of paying their own out of pocket ex-
penses.' 35 However, it is difficult to rationalize why the corporation
should reimburse a director for actions he has taken to hurt the corpo-
ration in an action brought against him on behalf of the corporation. 3 6
The policy reasons for adopting such a provision could be only to make
the position of director more attractive and to insulate directors further
from financial loss as a result of their office.
Viewed in conjunction with the director liability statute, indemnifi-
cation for expenses is not available if the act constitutes four of the five
exceptions. Consequently in an action for money damages which is set-
tled or in which the director is found liable, he may not be reimbursed
unless the act falls into the fifth exception - that the director acted
recklessly, in bad faith or in a manner exhibiting wanton disregard for
life and human safety. 137 In effect the Legislature has made indemnifi-
AND ATTORNEYS, 2.1, 2.4 (1987).
130. § 607.0850(7).
131. Id.
132. A director may be indemnified for liability in respect of actions not brought
on behalf of the corporation (i.e. non-derivative actions) under § 607.0850(1). In re-
spect of derivative actions, the director may be indemnified in respect of expenses and,
as amended in 1987, sums paid in settlement not exceeding what it would have cost to
litigate the action under § 607.0850(2). See Fields, supra note 129, at 2.5-2.6, for a
lengthy discussion.
133. § 607.0850(3).
134. § 607.0850(2).
135. See Fields, supra note 129, at 2.6.
136. Id.
137. § 607.0831(b)(5).
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cation possible in circumstances in which the director should be most
culpable. Such a result defies logic, leaving one to conclude that leaving
out the fifth exception must have been an oversight by the Legislature.
IV. CONCLUSION
Prior to the 1987 amendment, directors in Florida were not ex-
posed to liability for monetary damages unless they breached their du-
ties to the corporation."3 8 Shareholders had some measure of assurance
that the directors would act responsibly in making deci;ions on their
behalf, or at least be legally accountable to shareholders for their ac-
tions. The 1987 amendment in addition to giving little protection to the
shareholder, also does not achieve its stated legislative goal of making
the position of director more attractive.'39
Moreover, the predictions of dire consequences to corporate direc-
tors arising out of Van Gorkom have not materialized, nor have the
fears that the courts would lower the standard of culpability for direc-
tors.14 One author's examination of case law in the three years follow-
ing Van Gorkom has found that "the courts have repeatedly rejected
due care allegations in cases in which the challenged board conduct did
not approach the level of gross negligence present in Van Gorkom. ' "'1
The study concluded that only six courts found violations of due care
within the period, and in all the cases, the conduct approached the level
of conduct in the Van Gorkom case.' 42 The author concluded that the
decisions showed no indication of "a change in the courts' traditional
"1143adherence to the business judgment rule's presumption ....
Of particular interest, and perhaps warning, to Florida directors is
that in all six cases the parties requested and the court granted injunc-
tive relief after having found a lack of due care.14 4 The 1987 amend-
ment did not address the question of injunctive relief, so director liabil-
ity in that arena remains a question to be determined by consideration
of the business judgment rule. However, a plaintiff shareholder will
have to anticipate board action in order to stop it by injunction, and in
138. See supra Part II.
139. Id.
140. Radin, supra note 3, at 720.
141. Id. at 720, 754 & n.359.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 755.
144. Injunctive relief may have been the only relief available because of the leg-
islative responses to the Van Gorkom decision.
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order to get rescission must prove that the action was so grossly unfair
that it should not be allowed to stand. Ultimately, "as a practical mat-
ter the lack of a monetary damage remedy may deprive stockholders or
the corporation of an effective remedy when the stockholder is unaware
of director action until it is completed."14
An important question not considered by the Florida Legislature
was the effect that the amendment had on the rights of shareholders.
Incorporation allows investors to pool their resources into one business
entity which hopefully will result in greater returns for the individual in
the long run. In exchange for limited liability, the shareholder gives up
participation in the everyday running of the business to the board of
directors. The fiduciary duties were imposed by the courts to honor the
trust and confidence placed in the directors by the shareholders. 46 The
1987 amendment effectively says to the shareholder in a Florida corpo-
ration that a director may mismanage the corporation without any fear
of sanction except in the most reprehensible circumstances. Directors
may be encouraged to act negligently or even with gross negligence if
there is no fear of legal penalty. 147 While the 1987 amendment pro-
vides protection for the director, it virtually leaves the shareholder out
in the cold. t48
Prior to the 1987 amendment, approximately 90,000 organizations
were incorporated annually in Florida. 49 The statistics presently avail-
able for 1990 indicate that as of November 1990, less than 80,000 in-
corporations had been filed. 50 Although one may argue that the econ-
omy may have had a negative effect on incorporations in Florida,
undoubtedly the stated goal of making Florida a more attractive place
to incorporate has not come to pass.
An interesting view is that the amendment may affect the cost of
145. Gelb, supra note 71, at 32.
146. See Note, Corporate Directors, supra note 3, at 497 n. 11.
147. See id. at 513 for a discussion regarding the anticipated reaction of direc-
tors when faced with no legal penalty for their actions.
148. It may be argued that if shareholders can act in time and get past the
procedural hurdles, they are not precluded from seeking injunctive relief against a
board's decision; or that the shareholders may replace unsatisfactory directors by initi-
ating proxy contests. See Titus, supra note 3, at 17. However, proxy contests are ex-
ceedingly expensive and there is no evidence that the price of shares has any effect on
the behavior of directors.' See id. at n.52.
149. SENATE ANALYSIS, supra note 19, at 8.
150. Statistics given over the telephone from the Division of Corporations.
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director and officer insurance by causing rates to fall substantially.' 5'
The view is based on the theory that insurance premiums are based on
the degree of risk, and that the degree of risk is significantly lowered
because of the heightened culpability standard. 52 Consequently, it is
argued, once the insurance industry recognizes the reduced risk, premi-
ums should also fall. 53 While it is true that the position of director has
been made more attractive, whether the amendment has a positive ef-
fect on insurance rates will ultimately determine its success viz-a-viz
the stated legislative goal." Furthermore, diluting the voice of share-
holders in organizations in which they place their financial well being,
while at the same time giving directors free reign, may have negative
social and economic effects.
Finally, perhaps if insurance rates fall and the courts interpret the
legislation in a manner which favors directors, the "radical" changes in
the act may eventually have some "positive" effect on the law or the
corporate arena in Florida. However, when weighed against the known
effect of diluting the voice of the shareholder in the corporation in
which he owns and invests his money by reducing the circumstances in
which he may obtain redress for misconduct and mismangement by his
fiduciaries, the net effect cannot be positive. Indeed, the actions of the
legislature prompts one to ask "whose corporation is it anyway?"
Riah Ramlogan Seuradge
151. Note, New York's Response, supra note 1, at 1350 n.275.
152. Id. (citing J. MARKS, SHARING THE RISK 109 (1981)).
153. Id. at 1350 n.275. In Florida, although data is currently unavailable to de-
termine whether premiums have fallen, statistics from the Supervisor of Insurance indi-
cate that the sums paid out in claims for director and officer liability has fallen signifi-
cantly since 1987.
154. Supra Part II.
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Exceptions to Discharge: The Supreme Court Adopts
A Preponderance of the Evidence Standard of Proof
in Section 523 Proceedings
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act' lists ten categories of
debts which are excepted from discharge.2 The standard of proof neces-
sary to establish the nondischargeability3 of debts under this section
was until recently unclear. The problem stemmed from the fact that
neither the Code nor its legislative history directly addressed the issue.
Both the bankruptcy courts and the appellate courts were split on the
appropriate standard to apply. However, the controversy was resolved
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Grogan v.
Garner.4 The question before the Court was whether exceptions to dis-
charge under Bankruptcy Code section 523(a) must be proven by a
'preponderance of the evidence' standard or by a 'clear and convincing
evidence' standard.5 Although the underlying case6 only involved the
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), (codified
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-2075 (1988)) [hereinafter referred to as the Code].
2. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988).
3. The reference to debts excepted from discharge as debts that are "nondis-
chargeable" appears in the legislative history of the Code. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 364, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5963, 6319-20.
4. Grogan v. Garner, 111 S. Ct. 654 (1991) The Court announced its decision on
January 15, 1991.
5. Id. at 656.
6. In re Garner, 881 F.2d 579 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. granted sub nom. Grogan v.
Garner, 110 S. Ct. 1945 (1990). Oral arguments were held on October 29, 1990.
Although the particular facts of Garner are not essential to an understanding of
this article, they may aid the reader in appreciating the context in which the issue of
dischargeability arises and will therefore be briefly summarized. Grogan was awarded
a money judgment against Garner in a civil trial for common law fraud. Garner, 881
F.2d at 580. The jury was instructed on a preponderance of the evidence standard. Id.
Garner filed for relief under the Bankruptcy Code and requested that Grogan's judg-
ment against him be discharged. Id. Garner objected to the discharge based on Bank-
ruptcy Code section 523(a)(2) which denies a debtor a discharge from any debt ob-
tained under false pretenses, through a false representation, or actual fraud. Id. To
prove fraud, Grogan presented the civil court judgment to the bankruptcy court argu-
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fraud exception,1 the Court decided that a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard should be applied to all the exceptions to discharge.8
The Court's decision will obviously have an immediate effect on the
way that cases under this section are decided, however, there may be
broader, and perhaps more important, implications in the Court's deci-
sion. First, the decision will help ease the caseloads of the bankruptcy
courts which in a period of economic recession are seriously
overburdened.' Second, the decision reflects the relative importance
that the Court attaches to the "fresh start" policy embodied in the
Code as compared to the necessity of relitigating issues in the bank-
ruptcy court already decided in a state court.
The first step towards the debtor's "fresh start" is the filing of a
petition in bankruptcy. When an individual debtor' files a petition in
bankruptcy, he does so in hopes of obtaining a discharge." A discharge
relieves the debtor from all debts that arose prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy petition.' 2 The grant of a discharge is intended to give the
debtor a fresh start in life free from the burden of indebtedness.' 3
However, there are certain categories of debts which are nondischarge-
able. Among these are certain tax obligations,' payments of alimony
and child support,'6 repayment of educational loans,' 6 and debts in-
curred as a result of the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle while
ing that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded Garner from relitigating the issue
of fraud in the bankruptcy court. Id. The bankruptcy court agreed and declared the
debt nondischargeable. Id. The district court in an unreported decision affirmed. The
eighth circuit reversed, holding that in exceptions to discharge under section 523(a)(2)
fraud needs to be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and therefore, since the
standard in the civil trial was only a preponderance of the evidence, Garner was not
collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of fraud in the bankruptcy
court. Id. at 581-82.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).
8. Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 661.
9. The caseload will be affected because the bankruptcy courts will be able to
apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to avoid relitigating issues that have been pre-
viously litigated in state court. See infra part VI.
10. Under the Code, the term "bankrupt" is abolished in favor of the term
"debtor". See 11 U.S.C. § 101(12).
11. B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL 1 3.01 (1986)
[hereinafter BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL].
12. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b).
13. BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 11, at 3.01.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1).
15. § 523(a)(5).
16. § 523(a)(8).
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intoxicated. I" Non-compensatory fines and penalties owed to a govern-
mental unit are not dischargeable.18 Also debts not listed on the appro-
priate schedules, 19 or not discharged in a prior bankruptcy 20 are ex-
cepted from discharge. Because they involve intentional conduct on the
part of the debtor, the last exceptions are the most litigated,21 they
include debts incurred through various types of fraud22 or willful and
malicious injury. 3 It is the creditor's obligation to request that a par-
ticular debt owed to him not be discharged in bankruptcy.24 The credi-
tor who wishes to obtain a determination of nondischargeability in a
17. § 523(a)(9).
18. § 523(a)(7).
19. § 523(a)(3).
20. § 523(a)(10).
21. The basis for this statement is a finding during the research for this article
that the majority of cases reported involve the fraud and willful and malicious excep-
tions. The distinguishing factor between the fraud and willful and malicious exceptions
and the other exceptions is that the former involve intentional conduct on the part of
the debtor. Since intent is often difficult to establish, the standard of proof used to
establish this element will often play a decisive role in the outcome of the proceeding.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)-(a)(4). The text of these sections is as follows:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any
debt-
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refi-
nancing of credit, to the extent obtained by-
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than
a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial conditioi;
(B) use of a statement in writing-
(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for such
money, property, services, or credit reasonably relied; and
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to
deceive; or
(4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, em-
bezzlement, or larceny.
23. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The text of this section is as follows:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of
this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-
(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or
to the property of another entity.
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c); BANKR. R. 4007(a).
1991] 1413
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bankruptcy court25 must file a complaint to commence an adversary
proceeding.26
The standard of proof necessary to except a debt from discharge
had been the source of much controversy in the bankruptcy and appel-
late courts. With some courts following a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard and others following a clear and convincing standard,
both creditor and debtor were left in a state of confusion. 7 The issue of
the appropriate standard of proof usually arose in conjunction with ei-
ther the fraud2 8 or the willful and malicious injury 9 exceptions, al-
though there were a few cases involving the exception of debts incurred
through the operation of a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated."0 In
25. The Code requires that a creditor who wishes to have a debt declared nondis-
chargeable as one falling within the second, fourth, or sixth exception must bring the
action in the bankruptcy court within a specified amount of time. There is no time limit
for commencing an action to determine the dischargeability of a debt falling within one
of the other exceptions, and this may, in some instances, be determined by a state
court. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c); BANKR. R. 4007.
26. BANKR. R. 4007(e), 7001(6).
27. The standard of proof utilized in dischargeability proceedings affects the cer-
tainty with which either party can predict the outcome of the proceeding. In deciding
whether to file a petition in bankruptcy, it is important for the debtor to know whether
he will receive a complete discharge. On the other hand, the certainty with which a
creditor feels he can prove the debt is nondischargeable will often determine whether
he files a complaint. If the debt the creditor is seeking to except from discharge is a
consumer debt, the certainty with which he can predict the outcome of the case has
special significance. If a creditor seeks to have a consumer debt declared nondischarge-
able, and such debt is discharged, the court may, at its discretion, award the debtor
costs and attorney's fees. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(d).
28. Fraud cases applying a preponderance of the evidence standard: see, e.g., In
re Glendenning, 107 Bankr. 136 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio. 1989); In re Basham, 106 Bankr.
453 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989); In re Showalter, 86 Bankr. 877 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1988);
In re Walters, 24 Bankr. 649 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. 1982).
Fraud cases applying the clear and convincing evidence standard: see, e.g., In re
King, 96 Bankr. 413 (D. Mass 1989); In re McQueen, 102 Bankr. 120 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1989); In re Zack, 99 Bankr. 717 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989); In re Adleman, 90
Bankr. 1012 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1988).
29. Wilfull and malicious cases applying a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard: see, e.g., In re Martinez, 110 Bankr. 353 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); In re Ziegler,
109 Bankr. 172 (Bankr. W.D. N.C. 1989); In re Meyer, 100 Bankr. 297 (Bankr. D.
S.C. 1988), aJffd 100 Bankr. 301 (D. S.C. 1989).
Wilfull and malicious cases applying a clear and convincing evidence standard:
see, e.g., In re Burke, 83 Bankr. 716 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1988); In re Auto Outlet, Inc.,
71 Bankr. 674 (Bankr. D. Utah 1987); In re Peoni, 67 Bankr. 288 (Bankr. S.D. Ind.
1986).
30. Drunk driving cases holding a preponderance of the evidence standard ap-
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some districts, courts applied different standards of proof depending on
the exception to discharge at issue."
This article, by adopting the reasoning of the Supreme Court and
expanding upon its analysis, explains why the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard of proof is the correct standard to apply in section 523
proceedings. First, the article will describe the use of the different stan-
dards of proof and their origins. Next, it will look at the history of
discharge in bankruptcy and explain why, although discharge is a fun-
damental part of bankruptcy law, it is not so important as to justify the
imposition of a higher standard of proof than the preponderance stan-
dard normally applied in civil proceedings. From that point, the article
will examine the "fresh start" policy of the Code as a reason to con-
strue the Code's provisions against the creditor and in favor of the
debtor. Then, the article will argue that the reasons the courts of equity
required fraud to be proven by clear and convincing evidence are inap-
plicable in dischargeability proceedings. Finally, the benefits of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel will be discussed.
II. THE STANDARD OF PROOF: ITS USE AND ORIGIN
Up until the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Grogan, the
determination of the appropriate standard of proof to apply in proceed-
ings under section 523 was complicated by the fact that many bank-
ruptcy courts found it easier to avoid the issue rather than justify its
use of either standard. 2 In holding in favor of the debtor, some courts
simply stated that the plaintiff failed to prove its case by even a pre-
ponderance of the evidence,33 or did not mention a standard at all.34
plies: see, e.g., In re Middleton, 100 Bankr. 814 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988), affd sub
nom. Whitson v. Middleton, 898 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1990); In re Humphrey, 102
Bankr. 629 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); In re Carney, 68 Bankr. 655 (Bankr. D. N.H.
1986).
Drunk driving cases in which the court utilized a heightened standard of proof:
see, e.g., In re Vorek, 95 Bankr. 599 (Bankr. S.D Ind. 1989) (strict proof); In re
Wright, 66 Bankr. 403 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1986) (clear and convincing evidence); In re
Christianson, 65 Bankr. 157 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (substantial evidence).
31. See, e.g., In re Feldman, 111 Bankr. 481 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); In re Zack,
99 Bankr. 717.
32. See In re Middleton, 100 Bankr. 814. "The burden of proof under section
523(a) is a murky area of bankruptcy law where few clear rules, if any, have been
developed. In fact, many courts fail even to address this issue just as it has not been
addressed by the parties here." Id. at 817.
33. See In re Drake, 5 Bankr. 149, 151 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1980), overruled on
1991] 1415
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Courts deciding in favor of the creditor found that the case was proven
by clear and convincing evidence.3 5 Other courts, without explanation,
simply applied the higher standard. 36 Those courts that did attempt to
select one standard over the other, often confused the reader by utiliz-
ing "loose language" in describing the standard being applied. For in-
stance, courts presumably meaning to apply a preponderance standard
also used the term "fair preponderance"3 while courts applying the
clear and convincing standard used phrases such as "clear, cogent, and
convincing," "clear and conclusive," and "clear, unequivocal, and con-
vincing."38 The differing and varied expressions courts used in applying
the standard of proof made it difficult to establish a uniform rule.
Although at times it may be difficult to distinguish between the
two different standards of proof,3 9 the purpose of establishing different
other grounds, In re Shuler, 21 Bankr. 643 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1982) ("The preponder-
ance of the evidence does not establish . . . ."); In re Walker, 7 Bankr. 216, 219
(Bankr. D. R.I. 1980) ("[T]he plaintiff has proved neither by clear and convincing
evidence, nor a preponderance thereof. . . ."); see also In re Watkins, 90 Bankr. 848,
851, n.7 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988) ("Most courts, I surmise, do what the court in In re
Horldt, 86 Bankr. 823 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) did and 'punt'. They merely avoid the
issue by saying that the plaintiff has failed to meet even the lower standard. Until now
that is precisely what I have been able to do.").
34. See In re Maiolo, 12 Bankr. 114 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
35, See In re Powell, 88 Bankr. 114 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988). "The grounds for
denial of discharge have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, though this
court is not satisfied that such a heightened evidentiary standard is either mandated by
the statute or appropriate to achieve the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code." Id. at 118.
36. In re Brink, 30 Bankr. 28, 30 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983); In re Ashley, 5
Bankr. 262, 264 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980) ("It must be proved by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence.").
37. In re Glendenning, 107 Bankr. 136; In re Dubian, 77 Bankr. 332 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1987); In re Clark, 50 Bankr. 122 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1985); In re Carr, 49 Bankr.
208 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985); In re Stephens, 26 Bankr. 389 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983).
38. See 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 468, p. 645 (1968). There are at
least twenty-five additional varieties of the clear and convincing standard listed in this
section.
39. Whereas the preponderance standard lends itself to a workable definition, the
clear and convincing standard does not. The preponderance standard has been defined
as:
[T]he evidence which, when weighed with that opposed to it as [sic] more
convincing force and is more probably true and accurate. If upon any issue
in the case, the evidence appears to be equally balanced, or if it cannot be
said upon which side it weighs heavier, then plaintiff has not met his or her
burden of proof.
In re Clark, 50 Bankr. at 125-26 (citing Smith v. United States, 726 F.2d 428 (8th
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standards of proof should not be overlooked. "[T]he labels used for al-
ternative standards of proof [may be] vague and not a very sure guide
to decision-making,"40 but they nevertheless, "represent[] an attempt
to instruct the fact-finder concerning the degree of confidence our soci-
ety thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions."41
In this way, "[t]he standard serves to allocate the risk of error between
the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the
ultimate decision." '42 Thus, "when the individual interests at stake...
are both 'particularly important' and 'more substantial than the mere
loss of money,' -43 such as proceedings to terminate parental rights, the
Supreme Court has applied the clear and convincing evidence stan-
Cir. 1984)). There is no comparable definition to utilize in applying the clear and con-
vincing evidence standard. The bankruptcy courts have not come up with a workable
definition. Those that attempt to define it, simply say it requires evidence more convinc-
ing than a mere preponderance, but less convincing than beyond a reasonable doubt.
See In re Bonnett, 72 Bankr. 715, 717 (C.D. Ill. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 895
F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing In re Delano, 50 Bankr. 613, 617 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1985)) ("[T]he clear and convincing burden of proof standard creates a greater burden
of proof than the normal preponderance of the evidence standard.") Other courts have
indicated:
"[T]he term 'clear and convincing' does not lend itself to preciseness in
definition. It is pretty much a relative term. The measure of proof required
by this designation falls somewhere between the rule in ordinary civil cases
and the requirement of our criminal procedure, that is, it must be more
than a preponderance but not beyond a reasonable doubt. It is that mea-
sure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts
a firm belief or conviction as to the allegation sought to be established.
Evidence need not be voluminous or undisputed to accompany this."
Brown v. Warner, 78 S.D. 647, 653, 107 N.W.2d 1, 4 (1961) (citation omitted). At
least one bankruptcy court, in the case of In re Dubian, 77 Bankr. 332, has stated that
"terms such as 'clear and convincing' and 'not of doubtful character' are helpful in
emphasizing a careful approach to the decision of certain important issues, but are too
vague to serve generally as a practical guide in the trial of cases." Id. at 338 (citations
omitted). In holding that a preponderance of the evidence standard applied in proceed-
ings under sections 523(a)(2) and 523(a)(6), the court stated that an application of the
clear and convincing standard would be a pure abstraction and an unwarranted judicial
gloss on the statute." Id. at 339 (In footnote 5 of the court's opinion, it states that
"[t]he origin of a higher standard in dischargeability proceedings seems to be more the
result of some flowery language in the decisions than any sound analysis.").
40. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369-70 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
41. Id.
42. Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (citing Add-
ington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)).
43. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (citing Addington, 441 U.S.
at 424).
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dard."I However, as the Court noted in Grogan, where particularly im-
portant individual rights or interests are not at stake, the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard is presumed to be the standard
applicable in civil actions between private litigants.45 This is "[b]ecause
the preponderance of the evidence standard results in a roughly equal
allocation of the risk of error between the litigants. 46 It was therefore
necessary for the Court in Grogan to consider whether the right to a
discharge in bankruptcy approaches a constitutional level of impor-
tance, making it appropriate to apply a higher standard of proof in
section 523 proceedings than that of a preponderance of the evidence.
In considering this issue, the Court began by stating it had "previously
held that a debtor has no constitutional or 'fundamental' right to a
discharge in bankruptcy. 4 7 The Court then quickly disposed of the is-
sue by stating that "in the context of provisions designed to exempt
certain claims from discharge, [it does not believe] a debtor has an
interest in discharge sufficient to require a heightened standard of
proof." '48 From the Court's opinion, it is not exactly clear why the Jus-
tices do not believe a debtor has an interest in discharge sufficient to
require a heightened standard of proof. However, a closer look at the
history of discharge in bankruptcy and an expansion of the Court's
analysis may aid the reader in an understanding of the Court's position.
III. HISTORY OF DISCHARGE
In order to provide the debtor with a new opportunity in life, the
44. See Santosky, 455 U.S. 745 (proceeding to terminate parental rights); Add-
ington, 441 U.S. 418 (involuntary commitment proceeding); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S.
276 (1966) (deportation); Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990)
(withholding of nutrition and hydration from a person in a persistent vegetative state).
45. Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 659. For cases where the Court has applied a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard, see Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574 (1987) (pater-
nity could be established by a preponderance of the evidence despite "serious economic
consequences" to the defendant); Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (establishment of securi-
ties fraud under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Steadman v.
SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981) (sanctions under the Investment Advisors Act, including per-
manently barring an individual from practicing his profession); SEC v. C.M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (establishment of securities fraad under section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933); United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914)
(proof of acts exposing a party to criminal prosecution).
46. Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 659.
47. Id. (citing United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445-46 (1973)).
48. Id.
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Code grants the debtor a discharge from his pre-petition debts.49 The
discharge of the debtor is the heart of the "fresh start" policy of the
Code.50 In order to appreciate the importance of the discharge in bank-
ruptcy, it is necessary to look back to its origin, its development
throughout the years, and its position today in bankruptcy law.
Bankruptcy law today, and at its inception, appears to have two
main objectives: to provide for an equitable distribution of an insolvent
debtor's property, and to prevent the insolvent debtor from acting in a
manner which is detrimental to the interests of his creditors. Protecting
the honest debtor from his creditors by means of a discharge, although
a fundamental feature in today's bankruptcy law, has not historically
been a feature of bankruptcy law.5 1 Early English bankruptcy law,
which provided the foundation for American bankruptcy law, was insti-
tuted for the benefit of the creditor.5 2 Not only did the early laws fail
to provide the debtor with a discharge from his debts, they allowed
creditors to involuntarily seize and distribute the debtor's property and
place him in prison. 51 Even the first discharge provision, which ap-
peared in an English bankruptcy law in 1705,11 was introduced for the
benefit of creditors; it was a way to induce debtors to disclose and de-
liver all their assets to their creditors.5 5 If the debtor honestly surren-
dered all his assets and cooperated fully with the creditors, he was
granted a discharge of the unpaid balance of his debts.56 A debtor that
failed to make a full disclosure was considered a felon and
imprisoned. 7
The first American bankruptcy laws followed the model of the
English laws. The Bankruptcy Act of 180058 provided for involuntary
49. 11 U.S.C. § 727.
50. See, H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 384, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6340.
51. See Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy law, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 223,
225 (1918).
52. Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor - and a Modest Propo-
sal to Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U.L. REv. 809, 813 (1983).
53. Id. at 811-12.
54. Id. at 812. (citing 4 Anne, Ch. 17 (1705)).
55. J. MAcLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 100 (1956).
56. When the law was first enacted, a discharge was granted only after approval
by all of the creditors. Later, it was amended so as to only require approval of a major-
ity of claims in number and amount. Note, Essentials of Bankruptcy: Prevention of
Fraud, and Control of Debtor, 23 VA. L. REV. 373, 380 (1937).
57. See Countryman, supra note 52, at 812.
58. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, Ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (1800) (repealed 1803).
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proceedings to be initiated on creditors petitions only, and provided the
debtor with a discharge if he made a full disclosure to his creditors.
The discharge was conditioned on the debtor receiving the consent of
two-thirds of the creditors who had claims against two-thirds of the
total value of all outstanding debts.59 A failure to honestly disclose re-
sulted in the debtor's imprisonment for not less than one year, nor more
than ten years. 60 The position of the debtor gradually improved with
the enactment of the latter Bankruptcy Acts of 1841' and 1867.62
Under the 1867 Act, both voluntary and involuntary petitions could be
filed. Along with the discharge a debtor received by cooperating with
his creditors, he was granted certain limited exemptions in clothing,
furniture, and other necessaries.63 Also by this time, imprisonment for
debt was curtailed by many state constitutions and statutes.6 4
Under the 1898 Act," the debtor could file a voluntary petition
and would be granted a discharge, regardless of creditor consent, as
long as he acted in accordance with the Act's provisions. 66 As enacted,
the Act excepted certain debts from discharge. These included, among
others, debts incurred through fraud or for the willful and malicious
injury to the person or property of another.67 By including provisions in
the Act which except certain debts from discharge, it is evident that
Congress concluded the debtor was only entitled to a discharge when
he dealt honestly with his creditors. Although Congress limited the dis-
charge to a certain extent, it improved the debtor's position after bank-
ruptcy by granting debtors liberal exemptions. For the first time, states
were permitted to expand upon the exemptions granted by bankruptcy
law.68
With the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, and the addi-
tional allowances granted to the debtor therein, the original purpose of
the discharge, that of facilitating the liquidation of the debtors assets,
began to give way to the "fresh start" policy currently embodied in the
59. Countryman, supra note 52, at 813.
60. Id.
61. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, Ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (1841) (repealed 1843).
62. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, Ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (1867) (ropealed.1878).
63. Countryman, supra note 52, at 815.
64. Id. at 814.
65. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978)
[hereinafter Bankruptcy Act].
66. Bankruptcy Act, § 14, 30 Stat. at 550.
67. Id. at § 17, 30 Stat. at 550.
68. Bankruptcy Act, § 6, 30 Stat. at 548.
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Code. The bankruptcy laws no longer served the interests of the credi-
tors to the detriment of the debtors.
[The new Act was] designed not only to distribute the property of
the debtor, not by law exempted, fairly and equally among his
creditors, but as a main purpose of the act, intends to aid the un-
fortunate debtor by giving him a fresh start in life, free from debts,
except of a certain character, after .the property which he owned at
the time of bankruptcy has been administered for the benefit of
creditors. Our decisions lay great stress upon this feature of the
law-as one not only of private but of great public interest in that it
secures to the unfortunate debtor, who surrenders his property for
distribution, a new opportunity in life."9
By following the development of discharge, one can see that the dis-
charge has become a fundamental part of bankruptcy law today. How-
ever, one "cannot allow the apparent importance of these rights in the
limited context of this area of the law to skew their opinions concerning
the relative importance of bankruptcy rights within the overall context
of the law.'7° It may be true that the debtor has a important personal
interest in obtaining a discharge,71 but the discharge remains a privi-
lege.72 As the Court noted in United States v. Kras,7 3 and later reiter-
ated in Grogan, there is no constitutional right to be relieved of one's
debts in bankruptcy. 74 In United States v. Kras, the Court denied the
debtor a "fresh start" by refusing to allow him to proceed in forma
pauperis so that he could receive a discharge of his debts. The Court
recognized that a discharge was important, but felt it did not reach the
same constitutional level of particularly important individual rights or
interests involved in other proceedings, which warranted a waiver of
69. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1917) (citations omitted).
70. In re Watkins, 90 Bankr. at 857.
71. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973).
72. See In re Lah, 88 Bankr. 141, 145 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988); Hudson
County Welfare Dep't v. Roedel, 34 Bankr. 689, 694 (D. N.J. 1983), a fd, 734 F.2d 7
(3d Cir 1984).
73. Kras, 409 U.S 434.
74. See id. at 446.
75. Under the Bankruptcy Act, the payment of all bankruptcy fees was required
before a discharge could be granted. The policy is continued under the Code. See 11
U.S.C. § 707(a)(2) (The court may dismiss a case for nonpayment of any fees or
charges under chapter 123 of title 28).
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fees.7" Thus, the Court has found that a "[b]ankruptcy [discharge] is
hardly akin to free speech or marriage . . . which are imbedded in the
[f]irst [a]mendment, [and which] the Court has come to regard as fun-
damental. ' ' 77 Since the right to a discharge is not fundamentally impor-
tant, there is no compelling reason for moving away from the general
rule that in a "typical civil suit for money damages, plaintiffs must
prove their case by a preponderance of evidence."' 78 A proceeding under
section 523 is equivalent to a civil suit for money damages. The credi-
tor is simply trying to collect money he believes is owed to him by the
debtor. By excepting a particular debt from discharge, the court is
merely leaving the debtor "subject to the same risks and burdens of
any other debtor outside of bankruptcy. '79 Since in a discharge pro-
ceeding, the only interest of the debtor which is at stake is that of his
"economic freedom," an interest which is not afforded constitutional
protection, there is no basis for requiring a heightened standard of
proof.
IV. FRESH START POLICY
After deciding that a debtor does not have an interest in discharge
sufficient to require the clear and convincing evidence standard of
proof, the Grogan Court next addressed the "fresh start" policy of the
Code as a reason for applying a heightened standard of proof. One of
the principal reasons many courts held a clear and convincing evidence
standard was required to except a debt from discharge was a belief that
such a standard was necessary to preserve the debtor's "fresh start."
The Court stated that it was "unpersuaded by the argument that the
clear and convincing standard is required to effectuate the 'fresh start'
policy of the Bankruptcy Code."8 The Court does not point out exactly
76. See Kras, 409 U.S. at 444-45, where the Court compared a divorce proceed-
ing in which they allowed the payment of fees to be waived, in Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971), with a bankruptcy discharge. In a divorce proceeding the parties'
inability to dissolve their marriage seriously impairs their "freedom to pursue other
protected associational activities." Id. at 444-45. Whereas in a bankruptcy discharge,
the debtor's interest in eliminating the burden of his debt, and "in obtaining his desired
new start in life, although important and so recognized by the Bankruptcy Act, does
not rise to the same constitutional level." Id. at 445.
77. Id. at 446 (citations omitted).
78. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 387 (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 423).
79. In re Watkins, 90 Bankr. at 856.
80. Grogan, IIl S. Ct. at 659.
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which argument it is referring to, but there is one particular maxim
which the courts frequently used to back up their position:
"[E]xceptions to [discharge] should be strictly construed against the
objecting creditor and liberally in favor of the debtor."81 The maxim,
most likely gained popularity through a remark made by the Supreme
Court in Gleason v. Thaw,82 where the Court stated that "[i]n view of
the well-known purpose of the [b]ankrupt[cy] law, exceptions to the
operation of a discharge ... should be confined to those plainly ex-
pressed. '83 The Court in Gleason indicated that the bankruptcy courts
should not expand on the exceptions listed in the Bankruptcy Act.84 It
was not specifying the standard of proof required to prove an exception.
Thus, the maxim should not be applied to establish a standard of proof,
but rather should be utilized to determine whether the debt is of the
type which falls within the exception.85 The Court in Grogan recog-
81. See In re Foreman, 906 F.2d 123, 127-28 (5th Cir. 1990); see also In re Van
Horne, 823 F.2d 1285, 1287 (8th Cir. 1987); In re Klag, 112 Bankr. 456, 458 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1990); In re Liptack, 89 Bankr. 3, 4 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988); In re Perez,
94 Bankr. 765, 768 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); In re Howard, 73 Bankr. 694, 700
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987).
82. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558 (1915).
83. Id. at 562.
84. The issue before the Court was whether the professional services of an attor-
ney and counselor at law were property within the meaning of paragraph 2, section 17
of the Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 558. This section excepted "from the general release of a
discharge 'liabilities for obtaining property by false pretenses or false representa-
tions.'" Id. The Court concluded that Congress never intended the term property to
include professional services. Id. at 561.
85. See Combs v. Richardson, 838 F.2d 112, 116 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Although the
'fresh start' philosophy of bankruptcy law requires that exceptions to discharge 'be con-
fined to those plainly expressed'(citation omitted), this policy does not justify judicial
imposition of a heavier burden of proof on creditors .... "); see also In re Watkins,
90 Bankr. at 856:
However, I believe that the maxim is applicable only when construing the
breadth of a statutory exception to discharge and not to the quantum of
proof necessary to establish one of the factual elements of the cause of
action. A creditor may, for example, bring an action alleging that a certain
debt is nondischargeable under [section] 523(a)(6) and may prove all the
elements of the cause of action by a preponderance of the evidence, yet
such debt must be held to be dischargeable if the conduct alleged and
proven is not within the exception narrowly construed.
Id.; In re Wellever, 103 Bankr. 856, 861 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1989) ("[P]olicy is best
served by construing the scope of the exceptions narrowly, not by arbitrarily making
their proof more difficult.") (emphasis in original); 3 W. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
523.05A, at 523-16-17. (15th ed. 1979) ("In determining whether a particular debt
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nized that although bankruptcy law generally favors the granting of a
discharge,86 the Code should be construed to protect the debtor only in
those cases where there is no intent to violate its provisions. 87 "The
statutory provisions governing nondischargeability reflect a congres-
sional decision to exclude from the general policy of discharge certain
categories of debts ...Congress evidently concluded that the credi-
tors' interest in recovering full payment of debts in these categories
outweighed the debtors' interest in a complete fresh start."88 In other
words, the exceptions to discharge reflect "Congress' belief that debtors
do not merit a fresh start to the extent that their debts fall within
section 523."89 In a section 523 proceeding it is the debtor's honesty
that is called into question. Requiring a clear and convincing standard
of proof "tends to presume the very issue in question, namely the
debtor's honesty."90 It follows, therefore, that the Court's reasoning is
correct when it states that "[r]equiring the creditor to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that his claim is not dischargeable re-
flects a fair balance between [the] conflicting interests"9' of the debtor
and the creditor. Applying a clear and convincing standard would ex-
press a preference for the debtor, 92 and "it is unlikely that Congress, in
fashioning the standard of proof that governs the applicability of [the
nondischargeability] provisions, would have favored the interest in giv-
ing perpetrators of fraud a fresh start over the interest in protecting
victims of fraud."93
falls within one of the exceptions of section 523, the statute should be strictly con-
strued against the objecting creditor and liberally in favor of the debtor.") (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
86. See Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 659 ("[A] central purpose of the Code is to pro-
vide a procedure by which certain insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, make
peace with their creditors, and enjoy 'a new opportunity in life with a clear field for
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.' ").
87. See id. ("But in the same breath that we have invoked this 'fresh start' pol-
icy, we have been careful to explain that the Act limits the opportunity for a com-
pletely unencumbered new beginning to the 'honest but unfortunate debtor.' ").
88. Id.
89. In re Braen, 900 F.2d 621, 625 (3d Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original) (cita-
tion omitted).
90. In re Powell, 88 Bankr. at 118.
91. Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 659.
92. See Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 390 ("Any other standard expresses a prefer-
ence for one side's interests"). See also Combs, 838 F.2d at 116 (referring to a debt
under section 523(a)(6), but it applies equally to all section 523 proceedings).
93. Huddleston, 459 U.S at 390.
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V. PROOF OF FRAUD
Where the exception to discharge requires proof of fraud, some
courts required clear and convincing evidence because they believed
this was the prevailing standard, for both section 523 and common law
purposes, at the time of the Code's adoption .1 4 The Court rejected this
idea. "Because it seems clear that a preponderance of the evidence is
sufficient to establish [some of] the nondischargeability"'95 exceptions,
the court reasoned that "the structure of section 523(a), which groups
together in the same subsection a variety of exceptions without any in-
dication that any particular exception is subject to a special standard of
proof' 96 supports the conviction that Congress intended the preponder-
ance standard to apply to all the exceptions, including those involving
fraud.
In addition to the reason given by the Supreme Court, there are
other persuasive arguments for not applying a higher standard of proof
to the fraud exceptions. The bankruptcy court case, In re Huff,97 was
frequently cited for the rationale behind making a creditor prove by
"clear and convincing" evidence that a debt falling within the section
523(a)(2) exception is nondischargeable.98 That court ruled that where
dishonesty or fraud is at issue, a higher standard of proof is required to
overcome the presumption that all men are honest and fair dealing.99
The court in Huff, quoting from section 94 of Corpus Juris Secundum,
stated that the higher standard is based on considerations that "fraud
is regarded as criminal in its essence, and involves moral turpitude at
least, while, on the other hand, the presumption is that all men are
honest, that individuals deal fairly and honestly, that private transac-
tions are fair and regular, and that participants act in honesty and good
faith." 100 There are two problems with the court's reliance on section
94. In re Garner, 881 F.2d at 582.
95. Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 660.
96. Id. at 659-660.
97. In re Huff, 1 Bankr. 354 (Bankr. D. Utah 1979).
98. See, e.g., In re Lowther, 32 Bankr. 638, 641 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983); In re
Trewyn, 12 Bankr. 543, 545 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1981).
99. In re Huff, I Bankr. at 357; See In re Garcia, 88 Bankr. 695 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1988) (this case was decided under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2), but referred to section
523(a) proceedings); In re Auto Outlet, Inc., 71 Bankr. 674; In re Lowther, 32 Bankr.
638; In re lannelli, 12 Bankr. 561 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1981); In re Trewyn, 12 Bankr.
543.
100. In re Huff, 1 Bankr. at 357, quoting from 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 94, p. 398 et
seq. (1943) (citations omitted).
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94 to support its proposition. First, the cited section deals with impos-
ing the burden of proof on the one alleging fraud, it mentions nothing
about a "clear and convincing" standard of proof.10 1 Second, the pre-
sumption of fair dealing does not justify the imposition of a higher
standard of proof than that normally applied in civil cases. The pre-
sumption can be overcome "by producing facts and circumstances in
evidence which cannot fairly or reasonably be reconciled with fair deal-
ing and honesty of purpose."102
The original reason for which the clear and convincing evidence
standard was created by the courts of equity is inapplicable to section
523 proceedings. The Supreme Court has recognized that the "clear
and convincing" standard of proof was created by the courts of equity
for a particular class of claims.
A higher standard of proof apparently arose in courts of equity
when the chancellor faced claims that were unenforceable at law
because of the Statute of Wills, the Statute of Frauds, or the parol
evidence rule. Concerned that claims would be fabricated, the
chancery courts imposed a more demanding standard of proof. The
higher standard subsequently received wide acceptance in equity
proceedings to set aside presumptively valid written instruments on
account of fraud.1 0 3
An article cited by the Supreme Court in Huddleston states that "[t]he
101. In fact, a later section of C.J.S. entitled "weight and sufficiency," states
that fraud need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence:
Fraud must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Although a
court or jury should be cautious in arriving at conclusions prejudicial to
character and honesty, a preponderance of evidence such as required in
civil cases generally is ordinarily sufficient to show fraud, provided the
proof is clear and strong enough to preponderate over the general and rea-
sonable presumption that men are honest and do not ordinarily commit
fraud or act in bad faith.
37 C.J.S. Fraud § 114, p.4 2 6-2 7 (1943) (citations omitted).
102. 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 470 p.649 (1968) (citations omitted).
Requiring the "clear and convincing" standard to overcome the presumption of honesty
has also been attacked on another level. In In re Watkins, 90 Bankr. at 852 n.9, Judge
Spector, intrigued with why some courts had such solicitude for the feelings of the
allegedly dishonest, admitted it would hurt to be called a fraud or a cheat; but then
asked whether it was less hurtful to be called a murderer, rapist, or vandal. If not, he
posited, "then there is no good reason to require clear and convincing evidence in cases
of 'dishonesty' but not in cases of other sorts of depravity." Id.
103. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 388 n.27 (citations omitted).
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requirement in civil actions of more than a preponderance of the evi-
dence was first applied in equity to claims which experience had shown
to be inherently subject to fabrication, lapse of memory, or the flexibil-
ity of conscience." 104 The adversary proceedings brought under section
523(a)(2) for debts obtained by false pretenses, false representations,
or actual fraud are not the type of claims which the courts of equity
were concerned about when they developed the clear and convincing
evidence standard. First, since debts have to be confirmed by the bank-
ruptcy court prior to the holding of a hearing to determine their dis-
chargeability, 10 5 the danger that the facts of fraud claims will be
fabricated or subject to a lapse of memory, is minimal. Second, in ap-
plying the clear and convincing evidence standard to actions seeking to
set aside the terms of written instruments, the courts of equity were
concerned with protecting the validity of written instruments and the
reliance placed upon such documents. Since in dischargeability pro-
ceedings, the validity of written agreements is rarely an issue, and since
the claims in these proceedings are no more likely to be fabricated than
in other types of proceedings, the clear and convincing standard is
inappropriate.
VI. CLEAR AND CONVINCING STANDARD APPLIED BY
"ACCIDENT"
One issue which was not addressed by the Grogan Court, but
should not be overlooked, is the manner in which some of the lower
courts came to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard. The
courts which applied a clear and convincing standard did so "almost by
historical accident." 06 The historical accident, according to Judge
Stewart's opinion in In re Curl,107 was the result of courts citing to
cases that did not stand for the proposition stated. For instance, in
Sweet v. Ritter Finance Co., 08 a case which is repeatedly cited on the
elements of fraud and the burden of proof in dischargeability proceed-
ings, the court unequivocally stated that the elements must be proven
104. Note, Appellate Review in the Federal Courts of Findings Requiring More
than a Preponderance of the Evidence, 60 HARV. L. REv. 111, 112 (1946).
105. See I1 U.S.C. § 502.
106. See In re Curl, 49 Bankr. 302, 304 (Bankr. W.D. Miss. 1985).
107. Id.
108. Sweet v. Ritter Fin. Co., 263 F.Supp. 540, 543 (W.D. Va. 1967).
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by a preponderance of evidence. 09 However, numerous cases cited
Sweet for the proposition that the standard of proof is clear and con-
vincing evidence.110 In fact, at least two circuit court opinions, which
are supposed to serve as binding precedent for the bankruptcy courts,
adopted the clear and convincing standard of proof by citing to cases
which relied on Sweet."' Another circuit court opinion, which applied
a clear and convincing standard, cited to a bankruptcy court decision
which did not even mention the standard of proof."12 Perhaps the clear-
est episode of misstating a proposition was done by the court in In re
Pallo."3 In this case, the court stated "[i]t is unquestioned that the
party seeking to have its debt excepted from discharge pursuant to
[s]ection 523 bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evi-
dence.""' 4 To support its statement, the court cited two bankruptcy
court cases which unequivocally held that a fair preponderance of evi-
dence is all that is required to except a debt from discharge." 5 The fact
that these courts applied the clear and convincing standard by "acci-
dent" lends further support to the Supreme Court's adoption of the
preponderance standard.
VII. APPLICATION OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Applying a preponderance of the evidence standard to proceedings
under section 523(a) will allow bankruptcy courts to give prior state
109. Id. at 543 ("In other words, Ritter Finance must show by a preponderance
of the evidence that . . ").
110. In re Aldrich, 16 Bankr. 825, 828 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982); In re Ashley, 5
Bankr. at 266; In re Jones, 3 Bankr. 410, 412 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980).
111. See Kimzey, 761 F.2d at 424 (citing In re Aldrich, 16 B.R. at 828); In re
Martin, 761 F.2d 1163, 1165 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing In re Jones, 3 Bankr. at 412).
112. See Rebhan, 842 F.2d at 1262 (citing In re Wise, 6 Bankr. 867 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1980). The court in Wise simply states that the creditor has the burden of
proof.
113. In re Pallo, 65 Bankr. 101 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986).
114. Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
.115. See In re Carr, 49 Bankr. at 210 (The "party seeking to have its debt ex-
cepted from discharge pursuant to section 523 bears the burden of proof by the fair
preponderance of evidence."); In re Baiata, 12 Bankr. 813, 817 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y.
1981) ("[T]he correct standard of proof in [section] 523 dischargeability proceedings
in this district is a fair preponderance of the evidence.").
In addition to these two cases, the court cited two other cases which do not even
mention the standard of proof. See Hunt, 292 U.S. 234; In re Maiolo, 12 Bankr. 114.
The court also cited In re Martin, 761 F.2d 1163, a case which misapplied Sweet.
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court judgments preclusive effect, thereby avoiding duplicative relitiga-
tion of identical issues. The doctrine of collateral estoppel or "issue pre-
clusion" bars relitigation of issues in a subsequent proceeding which
were actually litigated in a previous adjudication. 116 The application of
collateral estoppel in bankruptcy cases was left open in Brown v. Fel-
sen"1 7 where the court stated that "[i]f in the course of adjudicating a
state-law question, a state court should determine factual issues using
standards identical to those of [section] 17, then collateral estoppel, in
the absence of countervailing statutory policy, would bar relitigation of
those issues in the bankruptcy court." ' There is no countervailing
statutory policy which would preclude the application of collateral es-
toppel in dischargeability proceedings:
The application of a collateral estoppel bar obviously serves impor-
tant interests. These interests do not disappear simply because the
subsequent proceedings are in bankruptcy. Judicial resources are
always conserved by avoiding duplicative relitigation of identical
issues . . . There is also no reason here to prefer the fact-finding of
a bankruptcy judge to that of a jury so long as the same issue was
presented in each proceeding."11 9
In Grogan, the Court clarified any confusion which existed by expressly
stating "that collateral estoppel principles do indeed apply in discharge
exception proceedings."' 20 Although collateral estoppel can properly be
applied in dischargeability proceedings, if the standard of proof used to
establish the requisite elements of the cause of action in state court is
lower than the applicable standard in bankruptcy cases, then the bank-
ruptcy court cannot give the state court judgment preclusive effect.' 2'
116. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94-95 (1980).
117. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
118. Id. at 139 n.10. (the reference to section 17 is to section 17 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898, which is essentially the same as section 523 under the Code). In
Brown, the Court decided that the doctrine of res judicata should not apply in dis-
chargeability proceedings because of the exclusive jurisdiction granted to the bank-
ruptcy courts by the 1970 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act to decide dis-
chargeability issues. Brown, 442 U.S. at 138-39.
119. Combs, 838 F.2d at 115 (citation omitted).
120. Grogan, II S. Ct. at 658 n. 11.
121. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28, p. 27 3 (1982) which
provides:
Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation
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Since in most civil proceedings the standard of proof is a preponder-
ance of the evidence, a state court judgment presented to the bank-
ruptcy court will, more likely than not, have been decided under a pre-
ponderance standard. Although it is true that many states require a
higher standard in cases involving fraud,122 there is still a significant
of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in
the following circumstances:
(4) The party against whom preclusion is sought had a significantly heav-
ier burden of persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial action than
in the subsequent action; the burden has shifted to his adversary; or the
adversary has a significantly heavier burden than he had in the first action.
122. Marcus v. Fox, 150 Ariz. 342, 344, 723 P.2d 691, 693 (1985); Ficor, Inc., v.
McHugh, 639 P.2d 385, 396 (Colo. 1982); Connell v. Colwell, 214 Conn. 242, -, 571
A.2d 116, 121 (1990) (evidence must be clear, precise, and unequivocal); Hercules &
Co., v. Shama Restaurant Corp., 566 A.2d 31, 39 (D.C. App. 1989); Hawaii's Thou-
sand Friends v. Anderson, 70 Haw. 276, -, 768 P.2d 1293, 1295 (1989); Magic Val-
ley Potato Shippers v. Continental Ins., 112 Idaho 1073, 1076, 739 P.2d 372, 375
(1987); Hofmann v. Hofmann, 94 Ill.2d 205, 222, 446 N.E.2d 499, 506 (1983); Stauth
v. Brown, 241 Kan. 1, 9, 734 P.2d 1063, 1064 (1987); Alvey v. Union Inv. Inc., 697
S.W.2d 145, 147 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985); Hall v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 368 So. 2d
984, 992 (La. 1979) (fraud must be established by legal and convincing evidence);
Butler v. Poulin, 500 A.2d 257, 260 n.5 (Me. 1985); Everett v. Baltimore Gas and
Elec. Co., 307 Md. 286, 303, 513 A.2d 882, 891 (1986); Hi-Way Motor Co. v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 398 Mich. 330, 336, 247 N.W.2d 813, 816 (1976); Anderson v.
Burt, 507 So. 2d 32, 37 (Miss. 1987); Gibson v. Smith 422 S.W.2d 321, 327 (Mo.
1968); Fletcher v. Mathew, 233 Neb. 853, 858-59, 448 NW.2d 576, 581 (1989);
Hindenes v. Whitney, 101 Nev. 175, 178, 697 P.2d 932, 933 (1985); Calendonia, Inc.
v. Trainor, 123 N.H. 116, 123, 459 A.2d 613, 617 (1983); Stochastic Decisions, Inc. v.
DiDomenico, 236 N.J. Super. 388, 395, 565 A.2d 1133, 1137 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1989); Treider v. Doherty and Co., 86 N.M. 735, 737, 527 P.2d 498, 500 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied 86 N.M. 730, 527 P.2d 493 (1974); Chopp v. Welbourne
& Purdy Agency, Inc., 135 A.D.2d 958, 959, 522 N.Y.S.2d 367, 363-69 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1987); Porter v. Fridley, 373 N.W.2d 917, 920 (N.D. 1985) (clear, satisfactory,
and convincing); Tice v. Tice, 672 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Okla. 1983); Galego v. Knudsen,
282 Or. 155, 165, 578 P.2d 769, 775-76 (1978) (clear, satisfactory, and convincing);
Snell, D.D.S. v. State Examining Bd., 490 Pa. 277, 281, 416 A.2d 468, 470 (1980)
(clear, precise, and convincing); First State Savings and Loan v. Phelps, 299 S.C. 441,
447, 385 S.E.2d 821, 824 (1989) (clear, cogent, and convincing); Bezner v. Continental
Dry Cleaners, 548 P.2d 898 (Utah 1976); Estate of Raedel, 152 Vt. 478, 485, 568
A.2d 331, 334 (1989); Elliot v. Shore Stop, Inc., 238 Va. 237, 244, 384 S.E.2d. 752,
756 (1989); Adams v. Allen, 56 Wash. App. 383, 393, 783 P.2d 635. 640 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1989) (clear, cogent, and convincing); Tri-State Asphalt Prod. v. McDonough
Co., 391 S.E.2d 907, 912 (W. Va. 1990); Lundin v. Shimanski, 124 \Vis. 2d 175, 184,
368 N.W.2d 676, 680 (1985); Duffy v. Brown, 708 P.2d 433, 437 (Wyo. 1985) (clear,
unequivocal, and convincing).
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number of states that only require a preponderance of the evidence to
prove fraud.'2 To require a higher standard in dischargeability cases
would often require that the holder of a state court judgment retry the
entire case in a bankruptcy court. This would be an "unnecessary exer-
cise in judicial machinery. "124
In addition to state court judgments which would have to be reliti-
gated, a clear and convincing standard of proof would require that
judgments awarded under important federal non-bankruptcy laws,
which only require a preponderance of the evidence to prove fraud, be
relitigated.12 5 For instance, fraud actions brought by the United States
under the False Claims Act 2 6 only require the claim be established by
a preponderance of the evidence. 2 7 Congress also expressly provided
that the preponderance standard applies to civil penalties for fraud in-
volving financial institutions. 128 In addition, courts have judicially
123. Purcell Co. v. Spriggs Enterprises, Inc., 431 So. 2d 515, 519 (Ala. 1983)
(intent to defraud must be clearly proved by a preponderance of the evidence); Saxton
v. Harris, 395 P.2d 71, 72 (1964); Lancaster v. Schilling Motors, Inc., 299 Ark. 365,
367, 772 S.W.2d 349, 350 (1989); Lindoas v. Sahadi, 19 Cal. 3d 278, 289, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 635, 641, 562 P.2d 316, 322 (1977); NYE Odorless Incineration Corp. v. Felton,
35 Del. 236, 252, 162 A. 504, 509 (1931); Wieczoreck v. H & H Builders, 475 So. 2d
227, 228 (Fla. 1985); City Dodge, Inc. v. Gardner, 232 Ga. 766, 770, 208 S.E.2d 794,
798 (1974); Plymale v. Upright, 419 N.E.2d 756, 759 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Robinson
v. Perpetual Serv. Corp., 412 N.W.2d 562, 565 (Iowa 1987) (fraud must be established
by a preponderance of the clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence); Briggs v. Carol
Cars, Inc., 407 Mass. 391, 393, 553 N.E.2d 930, 932 (1989); Sievert v. LaMarca, 367
N.W.2d 580, 589 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Rother v. Hiniker, 208 Minn. 405, 407, 294
N.W. 644, 645 (1940) ("Civil actions require proof of fraud by a fair preponderance of
the evidence."); Batten v. Watts Cycle and Marine, Inc., 240 Mont. 113, 117, 783 P.2d
378, 380 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1826 (1990); Manyard v. Durham and South-
ern Ry. Co., 112 S.E.2d 249, 252 (N.C. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S. 160
(1961) (in an action to set aside a written instrument based on fraud "the burden of
proof to establish such allegation is by the preponderance or greater weight of the
evidence."); Manning v. Len Immke Buick, Inc., 28 Ohio App. 2d 203, 207-08, 276
N.E.2d 253 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971); Ostalkiewicz v. Guardian Alarm, 520 A.2d 563,
568 (R.I. 1987); Wise v. Thompson, 540 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976);
Piccadilly Square v. Intercontinenial Constr. Co., 782 S.W.2d 178, 183-(Tenn. Ct.
App. 1989); Delany v. Delany, 402 N.W.2d 701, 705 (S.D. 1987).
124. In re Daboul, 85 Bankr. 197, 201 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988).
125. See Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 660 ("Unlike a large number, and perhaps the
majority, of the States, Congress has chosen the preponderance standard when it has
created substantive causes of action for fraud.").
126. 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
127. See 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c).
128. See 12 U.S.C.A § 1833a(e) (West 1989).
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adopted the preponderance of the evidence standard for other federal
antifraud statutes. 29
VIII. CONCLUSION
As the nation moves into a period of economic recession and the
number of bankruptcy filings continues to rise, the Court's adoption of
a preponderance of the evidence standard for section 52:3 proceedings
will avoid wasteful litigation. Persons who have successfully litigated
claims under the preponderance standard in state court actions will be
able to utilize the doctrine of collateral estoppel in a bankruptcy court.
Repeated actions will not have to be brought by the government, or
individuals, who have won judgments under a federal antifraud stat-
ute.13 0 Currently, the government, in hopes of recovering large mone-
tary judgments, is filing numerous lawsuits against persons accused of
defrauding federal savings and loan institutions. Should the govern-
ment be successful with these lawsuits, and if any of the "accused"
subsequently file a petition in bankruptcy (a very good possibility due
to the large sums of money involved), the government will be able to
avoid relitigating these cases in bankruptcy court, because the original
judgments, as well as the dischargeability proceeding, will be based
upon the preponderance of the evidence standard. Adoption of a higher
standard would force the government to retry these types of cases and
would result in an extreme waste of the taxpayers' money. This could
not have been what Congress intended in prescribing the preponder-
ance standard for these federal antifraud statutes. The application of a
clear and convincing standard in federal bankruptcy dischargeability
proceedings, While maintaining a preponderance standard for other fed-
eral antifraud laws, would cause a conflict in federal law.131 Adoption
129. See Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 390 (preponderance standard applies in cases
brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Commission Rule 10-
b(5)); Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 731 (2d Cir. 1987) (preponderance standard
applies in civil actions brought under the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act); First Nat'l Monetary Corp. v. Weinberger, 819 F.2d 1334, 1340 (6th Cir.
1987) (preponderance standard applies in actions brought under the fraud provisions of
the Commodity Exchange Act).
130. See supra, notes 126-28.
131. See Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 658 n.10. Noting that dischargeability was a
matter of federal law, the Court explained that prior to 1970 the bankruptcy courts
and the state courts had concurrent jurisdiction to decide the dischargeability of debts.
However, with the enactment of the 1970 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
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of a preponderance of the evidence standard, on the other hand, avoids
the conflict. In addition, it allows bankruptcy courts to apply the princi-
ples of collateral estoppel in dischargeability proceedings and thereby
avoid wasteful and costly litigation of issues already decided by other
courts.
Andrew Kessler
the bankruptcy courts were granted exclusive jurisdiction over certain dischargeability
exceptions, including the exceptions for fraud.
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Florida v. Bostick: Voluntary Encounter or the Power
of Police Intimidation?
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 27, 1985, two officers from the Broward County Sher-
iff's Department boarded a Greyhound bus in Fort Lauderdale, Flor-
ida. One of the officers, Detective Nutt, carried in his hand a zippered
pouch containing a pistol. The bus driver immediately left the bus,
closing the door behind him. The officers proceeded directly to the back
of the bus to Terrence Bostick. They identified themselves, asked for
his bus ticket and identification, and for consent to search his luggage.1
During the search they found 400 grams of cocaine.2
In a 4-3 decision, the Florida Supreme Court found the search
illegal, because any consent given was tainted by Bostick's belief that
he was not free to leave.3 Since Bostick, a number of Florida courts
have mirrored the state supreme court's reasoning." The Bostick deci-
sion has also been followed in jurisdictions other than Florida, 5 and
applied in other contexts such as border searches,6 tresspass warnings,'
and seizure of firearms."
During the October 1990 term, the United States Supreme Court
1. Brief for Respondent at 1-4, Florida v. Bostick, No. 89-1717 (December 21,
1990) [hereinafter Brief].
2. Lipman, Broward Drug Case Hinges on Permission for Search on Bus, Palm
Beach Post, Feb. 26, 1991, at 3A, col. 5.
3. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989).
4. Nazario v. State, 554 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1990); Mendez v. State, 554 So. 2d
1161 (Fla. 1990); Jones v. State, 559 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1990); Serpa v. State, 555 So.
2d 1210 (Fla. 1990) (decided the same day as Bostick); Avery v. State, 555 So. 2d 351
(Fla. 1989) (decided the same day as Bostick); Smith v. State, 556 So. 2d 761 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Florius, 563 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1990). But see United States v. Fields, 909 F.2d 470 (11 th Cir. 1990) (similar facts,
but appellate court upheld trial court's finding that consent to search baggage was
freely given); Anderson v. State, 566 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
5. E.g., United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784 (D.D.C. 1990), rev'd 921 F.2d
1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
6. United States v. Bareno-Burgos, 739 F. Supp. 772 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
7. State v. Melican, 564 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
8. A.G. v. State, 567 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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granted certiorari to hear Florida v. Bostick.9 The Court will decide
whether the Broward County Sheriff's Office policy on drug searches
breaches bus passengers' fourth amendment rights when the police
board a bus without articulable suspicion, and randomly ask passengers
for "consent" to search their luggage. The decision the Court renders
will impact on the manner in which law enforcement officers through-
out the nation may collect evidence.
The Supreme Court cannot allow police officers to continue to ap-
proach individuals in this intimidating manner. Although the United
States is fighting a war on drugs, there is no need to place the citizen in
the position of the enemy. The Court must clarify the difference be-
tween "voluntary encounter" and "lawful seizure" categories. 10 Cur-
rent standards are too vague, and applying these standards tends to
give greater leeway to the police than is necessary."
The first section of this article gives factual and procedural back-
ground leading to the court's decision as well as the rationale followed
by the majority and the minority on the court. The second section fo-
cuses on the current standards: the governmental and individual inter-
ests to be protected; and the requirements for a lawful seizure. The
third section calls for a narrower definition of the "voluntary
encounter."
II. BACKGROUND ON Bostick
On the morning of August 25, 1985, two Broward County Sher-
iff's Officers boarded a bus bound from Miami to Atlanta during a
stopover in Fort Lauderdale. The bus driver immediately left the bus,
closing the bus door behind him. The officers, Detective Nutt and Of-
ficer Rubino, proceeded directly to the back of the bus where Terrence
Bostick, a passenger, was lying with his head on a red tote bag.12
The officers asked Bostick for his ticket and identification. They
admitted that at this point they did not have any articulable suspicion.
Bostick's ticket matched his identification, and both were immediately
9. 111 S.Ct. 241 (1990).
10. The three categories of police contact with individuals are: "voluntary en-
counters;" "brief, investigatory stops," the lesser level of lawful seizure; and "arrest,"
the ultimate seizure. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
11. Ambrosio, The Drug Courier Profile and Airport Stops: Reasonable Intru-
sions or Suspicionless Seizures?, 12 NOVA L. REV. 273 (1987) (suspect under profile
surveillance should be deemed to be seized when initially approached).
12. Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 1-2.
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returned to him."3
The two police officers explained their presence as narcotic agents
on the lookout for illegal drugs. Detective Nutt then asked Bostick
whether the red tote bag, which he was using as a pillow, could be
searched for drugs. Bostick looked for "approval to another passenger, to
whom the bag belonged, and handed the bag to Nutt, who searched it.
No contraband was found. Detective Nutt then asked for Bostick's'per-
mission to search a blue bag that Officer Rubino had found on the
overhead rack. The evidence was unclear as to whether the defendant
consented to the search of the second bag in which the contraband was
found."
Detective Nutt, testified that they had entered the bus wearing
raid jackets clearly identifying them as sheriff's officers, and ap-
proached Bostick as he sat in the rearmost seat. During questioning,
this officer stood in a position that partially blocked the only exit from
the bus. Bostick also testified that Officer Nutt had his hand in a black
pouch which appeared to contain a gun. Bostick was not able to leave
the bus, as it was ready to depart, and he could only move about the
bus if the officers would allow him to do so. 15
The officers found over 400 grams of cocaine in a blue bag belong-
ing to Bostick. Bostick pled guilty and was sentenced to five years.'"
The Fourth District Court of Appeal issued a per curiam affirmance.
However, the court agreed to certify the following question to the Flor-
ida Supreme Court: May the police without articulable suspicion board
a bus and ask at random, for, and receive, consent to search a passen-
ger's luggage where they advise the passenger that he has the right to
refuse consent to search? 17
The Florida Supreme Court rephrased the issue as follows: Does
an impermissible seizure result when police mount a drug search on
buses during scheduled stops and question boarded passengers without
articulable reasons for doing so, thereby obtaining consent to search the
passengers' luggage?' 8
The court answered the question in the affirmative and quashed
13. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1154.
14. Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 4.
15. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1157.
16. Lipman, Broward Drug Case Hinges on Permission for Search on Bus, Palm
Beach Post, February 26, 1991, at 3A, col. 5.
17. Bostick v. State, 510 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
18. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1154.
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the opinion of the district court. It found Bostick had been seized by
the officers and that any consent he had given to the search of his lug-
gage had been tainted by the illegal detention. 9
The Florida Supreme Court found that under all the circum-
stances, the "reasonable traveler would not have felt that he was 'free
to leave' or that he was 'free to disregard the questions and walk away.'
There was, in fact, . . . no place to which he or she might walk
away."20 The court concluded that although the seizure did not amount
to an arrest, it was the lesser form of seizure requiring constitutional
protection.2'
In arriving at this conclusion, the court looked to the area in which
the "seizure" occurred and the surrounding circumstances. Bostick was
in a bus which he could not leave because it was scheduled to depart
soon.22 Furthermore, the officers partially blocked the only possible exit
from the bus. The fact that one of the officers had his hand on what
appeared to be a gun added to the intimidation.23
Having concluded that there was a detention, the court next
looked to the propriety of the seizure. The court properly followed the
principle of federal and Florida law that the officers must have had, at
a minimum, a reasonable articulable suspicion before detaining Bos-
tick.24 By their own testimony, the officers never had any basis for sus-
pecting illegal activity.25 Thus the court's inquiry was at an end. Bos-
tick had been unlawfully and unjustifiedly detained.26
In his dissent to the majority's opinion in Bostick, Justice Grimes
admitted that he was uncomfortable with the Broward County Sheriff's
practice of routinely boarding stopped buses to inquire of its passengers
19. Id. at 1155.
20. Id. at 1157.
21. Id.
22. Id. The court compared this circumstance with that of Alvarez v. State, 515
So. 2d 288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987). In Alvarez, the defendant had already
boarded his train and begun his journey. To leave in the sense contemplated by Terry
and Mendenhall would have meant to abandon his private berth and possibly miss his
destination. The fourth district concluded that the police activity was tantamount to a
detention. However, the Florida Supreme Court ignored the fact that one would have a
greater expectation of privacy in a private berth than on a bus. Note also that Officer
Nutt, one of the officers who "detained" Bostick, was also an officer involved in the
seizure of Alvarez.
23. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1157.
24. Id. at 1157-58.
25. Id. at 1158.
26. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1158.
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whether they would consent to a search of their luggage.27 However,
law enforcement agents are permitted to board buses, and are free to
communicate with passengers.2 8 Although the location is a factor in
determining whether a seizure has taken place, he found that whether a
reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the encounter was
a question of fact to be determined by the totality of the circum-
stances.29 Justice Grimes noted that in this case, the trial judge had not
considered Bostick to be seized.30
III. CURRENT REQUIREMENTS FOR A LAWFUL SEIZURE
The fourth amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated .. . ."3 The U.S. Su-
preme Court has long recognized the right of every individual to be
"free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law." 2 In other words, the fourth amend-
ment does not protect citizens from all searches and seizures, but only
unreasonable searches and seizures. 33
The basic premise of fourth amendment protection is that every
person has the right to live his life without impediment from others.3 4
However, the citizen loses this right of personal autonomy when he acts
27. Id. at 1159 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 1160.
29. Id.
30. Id. In Florida, findings of fact by a trial court are presumed to be correct.
Marsh v. Marsh, 419 So. 2d 629, 630 (Fla. 1982); Strawgate v. Turner, 339 So. 2d
1112, 1113 (Fla. 1976); see also Medina v. State, 466 So. 2d 1046, 1049 (Fla. 1985)
(presumption of correctness for ruling on motions to suppress). The appellate court
may disturb the trial court's conclusion only when there is a lack of substantial evi-
dence to support the court's conclusion. Strawgate, 339 So. 2d at 1113 (citing
Chakford v. Strum, 87 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1956)). Otherwise, the appellate court would
be improperly substituting its judgment for the trial court's in reaching a contrary
decision. Id.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment is enforceable against the
states pursuant to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961). Florida's constitution also provides against unreasonable searches
and seizures. FLA. CoNsT. art. I §, 12.
32. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
33. Id.; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
34. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1155.
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to harm another.3 5 Therefore, the state has the power to interfere with
the individual's autonomy through search or seizure when it has reason
to believe that an individual has committed a crime.3 6 This power to
interfere does fall within constitutional constraints. 7 For "It]he right
protected by the [f]ourth [a]mendment include[s] the right to be im-
mune from conviction on the basis of unconstitutionally seized
evidence."38
In Bostick, the state had a compelling interest in finding those who
traffic in illegal drugs. The drug problem affects the health and welfare
of our society. 9 Therefore, the Broward County Sheriff's Office had a
legitimate interest in finding the contraband in Bostick's luggage. How-
ever, Bostick did have a "privacy interest in continuing his travels with-
out governmental intrusion."40 He also had a well established privacy
interest in the luggage he carried during his travels. 41
The question is whether, given the government's compelling inter-
est in stemming the drug flow, Bostick's fundamental right to privacy,
and the particular circumstances of the case, the state violated Bos-
tick's personal autonomy with an unreasonable search and seizure.
In determining whether the state's interference with the individual
is lawful, courts must take into account the degree of contact and its
basis. The United States Supreme Court has recognized three main
types of encounters: "voluntary encounters," or "mere communica-
tion," which do not involve the fourth amendment; the "short deten-
tion," or Terry stop, involving some seizure and requiring reasonable
suspicion; and an arrest requiring probable cause.42 Thus, courts must
ask whether the individual has been seized, and on which level.43 But
the "central inquiry under the [f]ourth [a]mendment [is] the reasona-
bleness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. B. WILSON, ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A JURISPRUDENTIAL His-
TORY (1986).
39. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 554, 561 (1980).
40. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1157 (quoting 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §
11.3 at 571 (1978)).
41. Id. (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977)).
42. Terry v. Ohio, 392.U.S. 1 (1968). This article does not deal with the arrest.
43. Schleuter, Survey: Criminal Law and Procedure, 19 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 483,
491 (1988)). See, e.g., United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1986).
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of a citizen's personal security. 44
The first mode of interference, the voluntary encounter, does not
raise any fourth amendment issues. For "[o]bviously, not all personal
intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of per-
sons." 45 Nothing in the Constitution prevents a policeman from ad-
dressing questions to citizens on the street. 46 The police officer enjoys
"the liberty (again, possessed by every citizen) to address questions to
other persons. ' 47 But by the same token, the "person addressed has an
equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away." 48
The voluntary encounter is considered permissible because the
purpose of the fourth amendment is not to eliminate all contacts be-
tween the police and the individuals, but "to prevent arbitrary and op-
pressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and per-
sonal security of individuals. ' 49 Therefore, as long as the individual
encountering the governmental official is free to walk away without an-
swering any questions, the state has not intruded upon the citizen's ex-
pectation of privacy. Under these conditions, the U.S. Constitution does
not require any specific justification.50
Nonetheless, once an officer, uses physical force or a show of au-
thority to restrain the citizen's freedom, the officer has "seized" him
within the meaning of the Constitution."1 The test is whether "in view
of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave." 52
44. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.
45. Id. at 19 n.16.
46. Id. at 34 (White, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 33.
49. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980) (quoting United
States v. Martinez-Fuente, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976)).
50. Id. at 554.
51. Id. at 553. At this point, there is a brief, investigatory (Terry) stop. A brief
detention is justifiable under the fourth amendment if there is a-reasonable, articulable
suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime. Royer, 460 U.S.
at 498. "[S]pecific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts,
[must] reasonably warrant suspicion of a crime." Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1158. There is
no set standard as to what constitutes a reasonable suspicion. Instead the standard
seems to be based on a variety of factors: the seriousness of the offense; the likelihood
that the detainee committed or will commit the offense; consequences of delay; and the
extent of the intrusion. 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.1(d) (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter W. LAFAVE, TREATISE].
52. Id. at 554.
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For a person to come under the protection of the fourth amend-
ment, he must "have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and . . . the expectation [must] be one that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable.' 3 Thus, the area in which a person en-
counters the police will have some impact on whether his expectation of
privacy is reasonable, and whether he has been "seized." 54 In the con-
text of public transportation, there would be a greater expectation of
privacy in a sleeper car where one would not expect to encounter any-
one in one's own cabin, and only a few other passengers in the hall-
way.55 But the individual has a lesser expectation of freedom from gov-
ernmental interference in an airport, which requires extensive hijacking
surveillance and equipment.56
Examples of circumstances indicating a seizure include: the threat-
ening presence of several officers; display of a weapon by an officer;
some physical touching of the individual; and use of language or tone
of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be
compelled. 57 These are circumstances which might reasonably make
the individual think he is not free to leave.
There is some question as to the relevance of a government agent's
intent to detain an individual. Under the Mendenhall test, whether an
officer intends to detain the citizen is irrelevant, except to the extent to
which he conveys his intention. 58 However, a more recent Supreme
Court case, Brower v. Inyo County,59 held that a "[v]iolation of the
[f]ourth [a]mendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical
control . . . .[T]he detention or taking itself must be willful . . . .[It
must be] a governmental termination of freedom of movement through
53. 1 W. LAFAVE, TREATISE § 2.1(b) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). Although the Court generally identifies the pro-
tection of privacy as the fourth amendment's paramount purpose, it has also recognized
that the amendment is intended to protect other interests such as bodily integrity, free-
dom of movement, and possession of property. Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the
Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analy-
sis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1174 n.2 (1988).
54. Alvarez v. State, 515 So. 2d 286, 290 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
55. Id.
56. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 515 (1983) (plurality opinion) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
57. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, n.16; Dunway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207 (1979); 3 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE at 53-55).
58. Id. at 555, n.6.
59. 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
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means intentionally applied."6
Although based on one or more of the above circumstances an in-
dividual might be considered "seized," these situations are not abso-
lutely determinative in and of themselves as to whether there has been
a seizure. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has failed to find a
seizure where the police officer requested production of an airline ticket
and identification."1 The court could not come up with a "litmus-pa-
per" test:
[T]here will be endless variations in the facts and circumstances, so
much variation that it is unlikely that the courts can reduce to a
sentence or a paragraph a rule that will provide unarguable an-
swers to the question whether there has been an unreasonable
search or seizure in violation of the [f]ourth [a]mendment . 2
Hence, each court must balance these factors and determine whether
the individual has been seized.
As evidenced by the Bostick court's split decision,63 in practice,
this balancing of factors is difficult to apply. In two other cases with
similar facts involving the Broward County Sheriff's Office practice of
routinely boarding stopped buses, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found that the district court had sufficient evidence to warrant its
finding that the defendant had not been seized.
In the later case, United States v. Fields,64 two Broward County
Sheriff's officers boarded a north-bound bus that had just arrived from
Miami, Florida. The detectives had no information regarding the de-
fendant suggesting that he was carrying illegal drugs. Both men were
armed, but concealed their weapons under their jackets which bore the
insignia of the Broward County Sheriff's Department. In accordance
with usual procedure, the officers proceeded to the rear of the bus with
the intention of working their way to the front. The detectives identi-
60. Id. at 596-97 (emphasis in original); see also Clancy, The Supreme Court's
Search for a Definition of a Seizure: What Is a "Seizure" of a Person within the
Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 619, 640-45 (1990)
(Brower does away with the reasonable person test, requiring officer's intent and actual
control over the individual).
61. Royer, 460 U.S. at 511 (Brennan, J., concurring in the result, but dissenting
to the portion which finds that Royer was not seized when the police officers requested
his airline ticket and identification).
62. Id. at 506-07.
63. 554 So. 2d 1153.
64. 909 F.2d 470 (1lth Cir. 1990).
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fled themselves to Fields and his seatmate, and explained that they
were seeking the permission of passengers to search their luggage in an
effort to obstruct the flow of illicit drugs. The detectives and Fields
diverge as to whether the defendant was informed of his right to refuse
consent. The officers found cocaine.6 5
The court took an interest in the Bostick opinion, a; well as the
D.C. Circuit's opinion in United States v. Lewis:6
The very nature of the encounter between Detective Hanson and
Mr. Lewis placed the latter in a position in which he could reason-
ably believe that he was not free to walk away. To walk away from
this encounter, Mr. Lewis, who was waiting for the bus to depart
for his Richmond destination, would have had to stand up from his
seat, work his way out of the narrow row in which he was situated,
and then negotiate his way past Detective Hanson, who was posi-
tioned in the narrow exit aisle. In effect, he would have had to
leave the bus, give up his seats, and lose his ability to travel to
Richmond in accordance with his travel plans.17
The Fields court found the Bostick and Lewis opinions disturbing,
and the court was reluctant to effectuate "the gradual erosion of the
[f]ourth [a]mendment." 68 However, the eleventh circuit was bound by
its previous decision in United States v. Hammock.69 In Hammock, the
eleventh circuit had already examined the Broward County Sheriff's
Office policy regarding random searches on buses. The court found that
under the circumstances, the defendant would have felt free to leave
the bus.70
It would appear that given the totality of the circumstances, under
current standards, a court would be justified in both finding there was a
detention, and finding there was not a detention. The standards with
which the courts are working are too vague. With Bostick, the Court
will have an opportunity to redefine what is meant by "whether the
reasonable person would have felt free to walk away."
65. Id. at 471-72.
66. 728 F. Supp. 784 (D.D.C. 1990).
67. Fields, 909 F.2d at 473 (quoting Lewis, 728 F. Supp. at 787)). Lewis has
since been overruled. 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The circuit court distinguished
the Bostick opinion on the basis that in Lewis, the officers did not wear badges or carry
visible weapons. Id. at 1299.
68. 909 F.2d at 473.
69. 860 F. Supp. 390 (11th Cir. 1988).
70. Fields, 909 F.2d at 473.
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IV. NARROWING THE SCOPE OF THE "VOLUNTARY
ENCOUNTER"
The evidence in this cause has evoked images of other days, under
other flags, when no man traveled his nation's roads or railways
without fear of unwarranted interruption, by individuals who held
temporary power in the Government. The spectre of American citi-
zens being asked, by badge-wielding police, for identification, travel
papers - in short a raison d'etre - is foreign to any fair reading of
the Constitution, and its guarantee of human liberties. This is not
Hitler's Berlin, nor Stalin's Moscow, nor is it white supremacist
South Africa. Yet in Broward County, Florida, these police officers
approach every person on board buses and trains ('that time per-
mits') and check identification, tickets, ask to search luggage - all
in the name of 'voluntary cooperation' with law enforcement - to
the shocking extent that just one officer, Damiano, admitted that
during the previous nine months, he, himself, had searched in ex-
cess of three thousand bags! In the Court's opinion, the founders of
the Republic would be thunderstruck. 71
The Bostick court found that the government had "exceeded its
power to interfere with the privacy of an individual citizen who is not
even suspected of any criminal wrongdoing. ' 72 In arriving at this con-
clusion, the court was acting on its fear that these "repressive mea-
sures, even to eliminate a clear evil, usually result only in repression
more mindless and terrifying than the evil that prompted them.""3 The
Florida Supreme Court's decision seems to go beyond the facts of the
Bostick case to fears regarding police conduct in general. However, the
issue raised by Bostick is fact specific:
Whether two police officers violated the [f]ourth [a]mendment
when, as a routine practice unprovoked by any suspicion, they
boarded an interstate bus during a scheduled stop and, while the
door to the bus was closed and one officer carried a pistol in his
hand and partially blocked the aisle, questioned respondent and ob-
tained permission to search his luggage. 714
71. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1158 (quoting State v. Kerwick, 512 So. 2d 347 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
72. Id. at 1158.
73. Id. at 1159.
74. Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at (i) (Question Presented).
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The Supreme Court should go beyond the facts of Bostick, and
address police conduct in general. The Court should not only clarify the
differences between the "voluntary encounter" and the "Terry stop,"
but also decrease the amount of police contact which would come
within the scope of the "voluntary encounter."
The Court needs to redefine What is meant by "whether the rea-
sonable person would have felt free to walk away." This standard, as
applied now, seems to use the reasonable person who is looking at the
set of circumstances, but is not experiencing them. For example, one
can say that Bostick should have known that he did not have to answer
the officers' questions, and that he could have ignored them.7 5 The av-
erage law student or practitioner knows this; however, the average per-
son traveling on a bus does not. Most people are brought up consider-
ing the law enforcement officer as an authority figure, and many see
the officer as the law.
It is generally accepted that citizens rarely feel free to end an en-
counter initiated by a police officer and walk away.76 If taken literally,
the test would make almost all police-citizen encounters seizures, elimi-
nating the voluntary encounter. In the place of the true reasonable per-
son, courts have constructed an artificial reasonable person, one who is
much more assertive than the average citizen when encountering a po-
lice officer. In doing so, courts have described many situations as volun-
tary encounters, when in fact, the individual could not feel free to walk
away. 77
The Court's interpretation of the voluntary encounter does not
take this view of the police officer into account. This is probably be-
cause there is an underlying attitude that the innocent person has noth-
ing to fear. Indeed, courts have asked the question, "what a reasonable
man, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the
defendant's shoes."' 78 Nonetheless, in deciding "whether a reasonable
person would feel free to walk away," courts must necessarily remem-
75. "All he had to do was to literally say 'no' to the officers." Palm Beach Post,
February 26, 1991, at 3A, col. 5 (quoting Joan Fowler, Assistant Florida Attorney
General).
76. Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: the Need for Clarity in Determing when
Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437, 439 (1988).
77. Id.
78. W. LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (of Improbable Cause, Im-
perceptible Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1184, n.77 (1983) (citing United States v. Wilie, 569 F.2d 62, 68
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting Coates v. United States, 413 F.2d 371, 37:3 (1969))).
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ber the average person's awe of authority, whether reasonable or not.
Anything beyond a cordial greeting can be intimidating.
This includes an officer's request for the individual's identification
and bus ticket. Currently, the Court considers such a request as a
"non-seizure. ' 79 It is only when the officer does not promptly return the
documents that he has seized the individual.80 However, the Court
should define this intrusion into the citizen's privacy as a detention, and
demand that the officer have reasonable suspicion. "It is simply wrong
to suggest that a traveler feels free to walk away when he has been
approached by individuals who have identified themselves as police of-
ficers and asked for, and received, his airline ticket and driver's
license."81
Furthermore, courts should give greater weight to the area in
which the contact takes place. A bus is a very small, often crowded,
place. A reasonable person brought up to give deference to the police
would not be comfortable refusing to answer questions while remaining
in the continued presence of an officer'in such tight confines.
In addition, if the passenger does move from his seat, he may be
acting against his own interest. A "reasonable person would fear en-
gaging in such a suspicious act as a sudden exit from a departing bus
when he is being questioned by a police officer."'8 2 Indeed, such abnor-
mal behavior would raise the suspicion of any law enforcement offi-
cial.83 In United States v. Lewis,84 the District of Columbia Circuit
Court rejected such an argument because "it is clear that a mere re-
fusal to cooperate cannot spawn the reasonable suspicion required to
justify more intrusive police methods. '8 5 Justified or not, the police of-
ficer's suspicion is raised, and the person avoiding questioning must pay
the consequences:
If she [the passenger] gets off the bus, she has nowhere to go. If
she nonetheless attempts to leave whe will probably be stopped for
further inquiry and confronted by dogs. If she refuses permission to
search she may be confronted again by police at the next stop pur-
suant to police alert. She is without any practical option except to
79. See supra notes 61 and accompanying text.
80. Royer, 460 U.S. at 503.
81. Id. at 512 (Brennan, J., concurring in the result).
82. United States v. Madison, 744 F. Supp. 490, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
83. Id. at 495.
84. 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
85. Id. at 1300.
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capitulate to police demands. She is, in a word, seized. And she is
illegally seized because all of this occurred without any grounds for
suspicion. 6
It follows that any time an officer requests consent to search a
person's luggage, he is in effect detaining that individual.8 7 In
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,88 the Court recognized that a search pur-
suant to a valid consent is constitutionally permissible. In reaching this
conclusion, it looked to a line of cases dealing with voluntary confes-
sions.89 The Court balanced the need for police questioning as a tool for
the enforcement of criminal laws, with "society's deeply felt belief that
criminal law cannot be used as an instrument of unfairness, and that
the possibility of unfair and even brutal police tactics poses a real and
serious threat to civilized notions of justice." 90 In applying this balance,
it reached the conclusion that the government could present evidence
resulting from a voluntary consent to search.9 However, the state has
the burden of proving that the consent was voluntarily given.92
The Court did not specifically define "voluntary." Instead, it con-
trasted voluntary consent with "the result of duress or coercion, express
or implied."'' 9 The Court held voluntariness to be a question of fact to
be determined from all the circumstances. 4 But the same fears of in-
86. United States v. Colthran, 729 F. Supp. 153, 158 (D.D.C. 1990) (officer tes-
tified that, when passengers refused to permit a search of their luggage, he would
sometimes notify authorities at the next stop to subject the passengers to further scru-
tiny), rev'd United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also United
States v. Felder 732 F. Supp. 204 (D.D.C. 1990).
87. Law enforcement officers rely on searches to introduce evidence of a defend-
ant's guilt and to prevent or curtail criminal activity. The three main types of searches
are: searches incident to an arrest; searches with search warrants, and consent searches.
L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROGENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME: STOPPING AND
QUESTIONING, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENTRAPMENT (The Re-
port of the American Bar Foundation's Survey of the Admininstration of Criminal
Justice in the U.S.), 97-98 (1967).
88. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
89. 412 U.S. at 222 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 358; Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S.
30, 34 (1970)).
90. Id. at 225.
91. Id. at 248.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 249. Among the factors bearing on consent are: an express or implied
claim by the police that they can make the search in any event; show of force by police
at time the consent is sought - confrontation by many police officers, display of weap-
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timidation apply to the voluntary consent as to the Terry stop. The fact
that Officer Damanio was able to search over 3000 bags in nine months
demonstrates the power of police intimidation. Once a person has
been asked for consent to search his luggage, it is not likely he will feel
"free to walk away." At this point, a person should therefore be consid-
ered "seized," and the police officer should at least be required to meet
the "reasonable suspicion" standard required for the Terry stop. 6
V. CONCLUSION
The Court would be correct in deciding that Bostick had been
seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment. The two sheriff's
officers boarded the bus and asked him for his ticket and identifica-
tion.97 They were wearing raid jackets which clearly identified them,
and one of the officers had his hand on what appeared to be a gun.98
Who wouldn't be intimidated? The Court can not possibly expect that
a person with any respect for the law would reasonably "feel free to
walk away." The Court should find that Bostick was seized, and there-
fore require reasonable suspicion of the officers.
Even without a prior seizure, the Court should find that upon be-
ing asked to consent to a search of his luggage, Bostick was seized. The
police were attempting to intrude into a private area, his luggage. Such
an intrusion should not be permissible without reasonable suspicion.
Only after reasonable suspicion has been proven should the Court look
into the validity of the consent. In determining whether the consent was
valid, the Court should look to the same set of circumstances involved
in a seizure. The Court should examine the possibility of intimidation,
even if the officer had no intention of coercing the citizen.
Although Broward County's measures may not be as oppressive as
those of Soviet Russia and South Africa, there is an unsettling resem-
blance. Intimidation is a powerful tool in authoritarian countries, but it
ons, police custody of suspect; threat to seek or obtain a warrant; prior illegal police
action; maturity, sophistication, mental or emotional state of the citizen; prior or subse-
quent refusal to consent; confession or other cooperation; denial of guilt; warning or
awareness of fourth amendment rights; Miranda warnings; "implied" consent by en-
gaging in certain activity; suspect's deception as to identity; and his deception as to
purpose. 3 W. LAFAVE supra note 51, § 8.2.
95. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
97. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1154.
98. Id. at 1157.
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has no place in the United States. It is up to the United States Su-
preme Court to narrow the scope of voluntary encounters, and to pro-
tect the American citizen from these oppressive measures.
Margaret Fanjul Montalvo
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